Non-Mediated Peacekeeping: The Case of Israeli–Palestinian Security Cooperation

Abstract

The Joint Patrols (JP) and the District Coordination Offices (DCO) succeeded to stabilize, rather than destabilize the Oslo period through their formal and informal structures. Great efforts were made to ensure the success of this unprecedented experiment in ‘non-mediated peacekeeping,’ despite contradictory political forces and primitive organizational management that undermined if not directly opposed their work. Although many problems existed on the ground, particularly on the Joint Patrols, security cooperation was nevertheless a sign of hope, a mechanism for the continuous flow of information, a strategy to reduce tensions in the field, a technique to develop working relations of trust and a means to build shared professional standards for future relations. Two choices can be made vis-à-vis the Joint Patrols for a future peace process and military security cooperation. One, is to disband them. The other, is to make them more sophisticated and capable to support adaptive change.