Giving Peacekeeping a Chance The Modern Military's Struggle over Peace Operations

Abstract

In this paper I have provided a first look at the changes in military doctrine with respect to peacekeeping operations since the first Gulf War. This overview demonstrates that significant work has in fact been accomplished with respect to doctrine and in response to lessons learned in contemporary peace operations throughout the past decade. The study suggests that conventional wisdom about wide-spread resistance by military leadership to peace operations may not be an accurate assessment. Moreover, theoretical studies that infer doctrinal change – or lack thereof – from observations of military success or failure at the operational level may also be missing much of what is important with respect to true military change. Currently, there is significant evidence to suggest that the doctrinal changes outlined here have not been fully absorbed or otherwise directed to tactical level commanders. Still, the military is heavily engaged in stability operations and peacekeeping around the globe. If unit level commanders are to have well trained, properly educated personnel with which to carry out these missions, real change – at the operational level – must begin to take place in accordance with already revised military doctrine. Toward that goal, more research is needed to uncover the hidden obstacles, as well as the most powerful agents, for promoting change. In order to reach this goal – to truly understand the mechanisms responsible for military change – we must examine the processes within both the military and civilian organizations responsible for directing military forces.