Russia's war in Georgia: lessons and consequences

Abstract

The Russian military operation during the Five-Day war in Georgia points to a number of lessons with strategic implications for Russia. The deficiencies in its military performance – not least concerning C4ISR and precision strike capability – have underscored the need for a modernization of the Armed Forces and a diversification of Russia's military capability. Russia needs to arrive at a strategic decision on the priorities for the future development of its military and defence industry: should it prepare for large-scale wars or post-modern warfare and counter-insurgence? In the meantime, the scope of Russian military strategy will be clearly limited and military force will remain a powerful but blunt security policy instrument.

Keywords:

• interoperability
• military force
• command and control
• communications
• weapon systems
• intelligence
• electronic warfare
• reconnaissance
• capacity
• Russia
• Georgia
• strategy

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to Vasily Zatsepin, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for the Economy in Transition, for providing perceptive comments and advice on a draft of this article. Needless to say, any errors or transgressions that remain are solely the responsibility of the authors.

Notes

 1. Svechin, Strategy, 269.

 2. Vitaly Shlykov has defined it as ‘an armed low-intensity conflict with conventional weapons and completely traditional tactical methods’. Shlykov, ‘Voina c neizvestnoi tseliu’.

 3. Allison, ‘Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to “coerce Georgia to peace”’, 1149.

 4. Schneider, ‘The Nuclear Forces and Doctrines of the Russian Federation’, 411.

 5. Cimbala and Rainow, Russia and Postmodern Deterrence, x–xiii. See also Kiselev, ‘Distantsionnoe protivoborstvo’, 83.

 6. CAST, ‘Preliminary Results of Russia's Arms Trade in 2007’; Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie , ‘Dengi reshaiot ne vse’.

 7. Cimbala and Rainow, Russia and Postmodern Deterrence, 43.

 8. Klein, ‘Military implications of the Georgia War’, 17–18.

 9. Trenin, ‘Moscow the Muscular’.

10. Even a military superpower such as the US has had obvious difficulties in this respect. See for instance Fishel, ‘Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night’.

11. Simonian, ‘Chernomorskii flot dreifuet v Ochamchiru’.

12. Simonian, ‘Moskva prikroet Abkhaziiu s vozdukha’.

13. Tsyganok, ‘Uroki piatidnevnoi voiny v Zakavkaze’, 3.

14. Tsyganok, ‘Uroki piatidnevnoi voiny v Zakavkaze’; Shcherbakov, ‘Spetspropaganda otsidelas v kustakh’ [The Special Propaganda hopes it will soon blow over].

15. For an analysis of the ‘peacekeeping’ aspects of the Russian military intervention, see Allison, ‘Russia resurgent?’, 1155–61.

16. This was also part of the Soviet strategy for the 1967 Six-Day War. Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, 116.

17. Shanker, ‘Russians Melded Old-School Blitz With Modern Military Tactics’.

18. Allison, ‘Russia resurgent?’, 1151.

19. Cf. IISS, ‘Russia's rapid reaction’.

20. The 33rd and 34th Motorized Mountain Troop Brigades based in Botlikh, Dagestan and Zelenchukskaia, Karachai-Cherkessiia respectively were reportedly established in 2007. The units are exclusively manned with contract soldiers. Litovkin, ‘General Shamanov tratit milliardy’.

21. On the debate about the GRU's ability or failure to warn Moscow, see Shlykov, ‘Voina s neizvestnoi tseliu’.

22. Felgenhauer, ‘Russian Rail Road Troops Complete Mission in Abkhazia’.

23. Shanker, ‘Russians Melded Old-School Blitz With Modern Military Tactics’.

24. Menkiszak, ‘Russian Invasion of Georgia, Developments, Objectives and Consequences’.

25. Tichonov, ‘“Kavkaz-2008”: zaslon terroru’.

26. Felgenhauer, ‘Russian Rail Road Troops Complete Mission in Abkhazia’; Muchin, ‘V armii: Voenno-ekonomicheskie manevry’; Shanker, ‘Russians Melded Old-School Blitz With Modern Military Tactics’.

27. Cited in Klein, ‘Military Implications of the Georgia War’, 13. See also Kedrov, ‘Voina na Kavkazskogo khrebta’.

28. See, for instance, Socor, ‘Moscow Orchestrates War Scare in South Ossetia’.

29. Baev, ‘Russian “Tandemocracy” Stumbles into a War’.

30. Baranov, ‘The August War between Russia and Georgia’.

31. Khramchikhin, ‘Uroki ratnykh uspekhov i neudach’.

32. Marine infantry units did indeed take part in the first Chechen War, however not in their capacity as naval forces but merely for want of available infantry units.

33. Baev, ‘Russian “Tandemocracy” Stumbles into a War’.

34. Bozheva, ‘Ravniais! SMI… Otstavit!’

35. Bozheva, ‘Ravniais! SMI... Otstavit!’

36. Khramchikhin, ‘Uroki ratnykh uspekhov i neudach’.

37. Baranets, ‘Armiia shla na voinu v starykh latakh’.

38. Borisov, ‘Boi vtemnuiu’.

39. Aminov, ‘Georgia's Air Defense in the War with South Ossetia’.

40. IISS, ‘Russia's rapid reaction’.

41. Aminov, ‘Georgia's Air Defense in the War with South Ossetia’.

42. IISS, ‘Russia's rapid reaction’.

43. Shanker, ‘Russians Melded Old-School Blitz With Modern Military Tactics’; Khramchikhin, ‘Uroki ratnykh uspekhov i neudach’.

44. Khramchikhin, ‘Uroki ratnykh uspekhov i neudach’.

45. Petrov, ‘Russian Army's weaknesses exposed during war in Georgia’.

46. Baranov, ‘The August War between Russia and Georgia’.

47. Tsyganok, ‘Uroki piatidnevnoi voiny v Zakavkaze’.

48. Shanker, ‘Russians Melded Old-School Blitz With Modern Military Tactics’.

49. Rastopshin, ‘K beskontaktnym operatsiiam XXI veka ne gotovy’.

50. Rastopshin, ‘K beskontaktnym operatsiiam XXI veka ne gotovy’

51. As cruise missiles are expensive compared to conventional bombs, economic considerations may have motivated the use of other munitions.

52. IISS, ‘Russia's rapid reaction’.

53. Khramchikhin, ‘Uroki ratnykh uspekhov i neudach’; Tsyganok, ‘Uroki piatidnevnoi voiny v Zakavkaze’.

54. Borisov, ‘Boi vtemnuiu’.

55. Rastopshin, ‘K beskontaktnym operatsiiam XXI veka ne gotovy’; Tsyganok, ‘Uroki piatidnevnoi voiny v Zakavkaze’.

56. Petrov, ‘Russian Army's weaknesses exposed during war in Georgia’.

57. Frolov, ‘Ispolnenie gosudarstvennogo oboronnogo zakaza Rossii v 2007 godu’.

58. Babchenko, ‘Gruziia-200’ (the title of the article refers to the Russian military term gruz-200, which is a cover word for transporting deceased personnel); Felgenhauer, ‘It Was No Spontaneous, But Planned War’.

59. Borisov, ‘Boi vtemnuiu’.

60. Tsyganok, ‘Uroki piatidnevnoi voiny v Zakavkaze’.

61. Tsyganok, ‘Uroki piatidnevnoi voiny v Zakavkaze’; Nikolskiy, ‘Voina meniaet biudzhet armii’.

62. Rastopshin, ‘K beskontaktnym operatsiiam XXI veka ne gotovy’.

63. Nikolskiy, ‘Voina meniaet biudzhet armii’.

64. Solovev, ‘“Ot rossiiskogo informbiuro…” – ne polychilos’.

65. Kedrov, ‘Voina na Kavkazskogo khrebta’.

66. Lukanin, ‘Tsena pobedy’.

67. Tsyganok, ‘Uroki piatidnevnoi voiny v Zakavkaze’.

68. Nikolskiy, ‘Voina menyayet biudzhet armii’.

69. Tikhonov, ‘Protivoborstvo v diapazonakh chastot’.

70. Rastopshin, ‘K beskontaktnym operatsiiam XXI veka ne gotovy’; Solovev, ‘“Ot rossiiskogo informbioro…” – ne polychilos’.

71. Nikolskiy, ‘Voina meniaet biudzhet armii’.

72. IISS, ‘Russia's rapid reaction’.

73. Felgenhauer, ‘It Was No Spontaneous, But Planned War’; Baranov, ‘The August War between Russia and Georgia’.

74. Klein, ‘Military Implications of the Georgia War’, 13.

75. Kedrov, ‘Voina na Kavkazskogo khrebta’.

76. Shlykov, ‘Voina s neizvestnoi tseliu’.

77. van Bladel, The All-Volunteer Force in the Russian Mirror: Transformation without Change, 217.

78. Fishel, ‘Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night’, 386–8.

79. Vendil Pallin, ‘Russia and its military: Between reform and modernization’.

80. Litovkin, ‘Genshtab informiruet zagranitsu’.

81. It will most probably prove difficult for Russia to maintain armed forces of one million. A more realistic figure is somewhere between 500,000 and 700,000 if the goal is for the troops to have modern equipment and soldiers and officers in high readiness units. See, for example, Arbatov, ‘Military reform’, 113.

82. For description of Serdyukov's reform, see Solovev, ‘Voennaia reforma 2009–2012 godov’, Konovalov, ‘Perestroiku armii provedut bez glasnosti’ and Herspring, ‘Russia's military in the throes of change’.

83. Vendil Pallin, ‘The role of the military in Russian foreign policy’, 111–18. On the relative size of the defence budget, see Cooper, ‘Military expenditure in the three-year federal budget of the Russian Federation, 2008–10’.

84. RFE/RL. ‘Russian Soldiers in South Ossetia Living In “Horrendous” Conditions’.

85. Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, ‘Novosti’, 29 January 2009. See also RFE/RL, ‘Russia Demands Return of Soldier from Georgia’.

86. RIA Novosti, ‘Sledstvie ubedilos, chto serzhant Glukhov sam sbezhal iz chasti’.

87. See Allison, ‘Russia resurgent?’, 1155–9.