Strategic threat: narcos and narcotics overview

Abstract

This introductory essay provides a strategic overview of the threat posed by the largest Mexican drug cartels (The Federation, Gulf, Juárez, and Tijuana), and affiliated mercenary groups and street and prison gangs, to the United States. Cartel areas of operation in both Mexico and the United States are highlighted along with linkages to affiliated enforcers and gangs such as Los Zetas, the Mexican Mafia (La Eme), and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). The illegal economies of these threat groups – ranging from narcotics trafficking through commodities smuggling and theft, extortion and kidnapping, weapons trafficking, and street taxation – is discussed. The trans-operational environments involving US engagement with the Mexican cartels, mercenaries, and their Sureños affiliates is then characterized. Lastly, individual contributions to this work are summarized.

Keywords:

• drug cartels
• gangs
• mercenaries
• Mexico
• MS-13
• narco-insurgency
• NARCO-OPFOR
• narcotics trafficking
• Sureños
• US homeland security

Over the last few years, the drug war in Mexico has gained increasing attention in both the mass media and in scholarly and policy publications in the United States. The implications of this ‘narco-insurgency’ for Mexico, the United States, and even for the various Central and South American states where spillover from this conflict continues to wreak havoc should not be understated.1 Much of the dialogue focuses on the health of the Mexican state and its potential for failure. This author and a colleague have in the past commented on that concern:

Full scale Mexican state failure would result in even greater levels of criminalization and lawlessness than are already evident in that state. Simply put, if Mexico dies, we will be trapped in a room with a rotting corpse.2

Currently, two schools of thought exist on Mexican state failure potentials with each drawing upon well researched and analyzed information sources such as interviews, investigative and intelligence sources, and the Mexican press. In retrospect, quite possibly this ‘either/or’ debate as to whether or not Mexico is heading towards collapse is the wrong one to focus upon. This is because the actual threat being faced by the US is so alien to modern perceptions of national security that very few scholars and analysts recognize or even understand it. What is proposed here is that Mexico is not on its way to becoming a ‘rotting corpse’ but potentially something far worse – akin to a body being permanently infected by a malicious virus. Already, wide swaths of Mexico have been lost to the corrupting forces and violence generated by local gangs, cartels, and mercenaries. Such narco-corruption faced few barriers given the fertile ground already existing in Mexico derived from endemic governmental corruption at all levels of society and, in some ways, it even further aided the ‘virus’ spreading through Mexican society from this new ‘infection’. Among its other symptoms, it spreads values at variance with traditional society, including those:

… conceivably derived from norms based on slave holding, illicit drug use, sexual activity with minors and their exploitation in prostitution, torture and beheadings, the farming of humans for body parts, the killing of innocents for political gain and personal gratification (as sport), and the desecration of the dead. Concepts such as due process, right to a jury trial, individual privacy concerns, the right to vote, women's rights to literacy, and self-determination, and the personal freedoms that so many Americans take for granted (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) do not exist.3

To these above ‘symptoms’ of this diseased state can also be added a move in affected sectors toward cult-like religions that worship ‘saints’ and occult figures who validate these values and which promote engaging in blood and ritual sacrifice of one's enemies and their families. While the power and influence of such religions are still relatively weak within this emergent value system, they are beginning to fill a spiritual void for some of the criminal-soldiers of the gangs and para-states that have arisen. For some, dark deities offer protection, wealth, status, women, and a glorious death that others will praise, and, if fortune should have it, immortalize in song (the narcocorrido). For others, professing a twisted form of Christianity allows them to glorify the torture and murder of their enemies as ‘divine justice’.

The end result of all these trends is that Mexico is becoming an entity that is truly the antithesis of the modern nation-state. Parts of Mexico have already been taken over by the virus which courses through its veins and have embraced its narco-criminal value system. Beyond the pull of demand-side economics, NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) and the highly developed national highway system, especially the north–south routes, within the US have further helped those in the drug trade transmit this ‘narco virus’ well into Mexico's neighbors. Territories of the Central and South American states have thereby fallen under its influence along with enclaves – streets, neighborhoods, urban zones, and prisons and jails – within the United States.

It would be both unfair and patently racist, however, to blame Mexico for all of these ills. The interplay between internal and domestic events throughout the Americas with the rise of the early Colombian cartels, the insatiable demand for illegal narcotics in the United States, the civil wars of El Salvador and Guatemala, illegal immigration from the south and the exploitation of cheap labor in the north, and the rise of such gangs as La Eme (The Mexican Mafia), 18th Street, and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) in the Los Angeles region, and the subsequent deportation of ‘LA style gangsters’ back to Mexico and Central America have all, along with numerous other events not mentioned, provided a rich contextual background for where we find ourselves today.

What we now have is a state in which the government is no longer able to govern entire sectors within its sovereign territory and, instead, these areas have been taken by a narco-insurgency and lost to the influence of criminal-based entities. This does not necessarily mean that all of the state will succumb and become that ‘rotting corpse’ as predicted earlier. Colombia, for example, has previously survived such onslaughts though it has never been the same and now, in many ways, resembles a narco-democracy. Nor, however, does the fact that the state government of Mexico has not succumbed necessarily mean that law, order, and state authority will be ultimately reestablished in these former territories, urban zones, villages, or neighborhoods. Indeed, that seems even more unlikely given this same insurgency has already crossed over the US–Mexican border and has probably been festering internally in the United States for decades with the rise and mass proliferation of street and prison gangs throughout the country. Not to overextend the analogy, but the upshot of this dynamic is that what has crossed over the border and what has arisen domestically are similar infections by the same virus – the Mexican strain is simply far more evolved, powerful, and violent.

Narcos over and gangs inside the border

Domestic US homeland security concerns from this threat have recently multiplied given the increasing levels of violence on the border along with a concurrent change in the orientation of the Mexican cartels towards their operations inside the United States. The earlier Mexican cartels' policy of tempering overt violence north of the Rio Grande has been slowly eroding. In the past, those numerous incidents of violence that have taken place within, and at times between, the various narcotics distribution networks themselves have generally been discriminate and of little media interest. Offenses such as failure to make payments on money owed, skimming of profits, or shorting of loads have often resulted in the torture and deaths of cartel operatives and their individual prison and street gang contractors but it has been kept between individuals involved in the drug trade. In fact, on many occasions, these individuals are kidnapped inside the US and taken back to Mexico for elimination thus taking it further out of the US public eye.4

The cartels' policy has since changed due both to a conscious decision on the part of cartel leadership and an inability to maintain control of the various contractors and freelancers that work for the cartel network. This changing orientation can be seen with an increase in firefights pertaining to drug loads coming over the border and ‘firebreak events’ such as the June 2008 Phoenix incident in which cartel operatives, dressed as tactical officers, assassinated a Jamaican drug dealer and, in their subsequent escape and evasion attempt, set up an ambush with the intent of killing responding US law enforcement officers. In May 2009, it was reported that Joaquin ‘El Chapo’ Guzman, head of the Sinaloa Cartel (part of The Federation) had, back in March, given standing orders for cartel operatives to protect drug loads against both rival cartels and US law enforcement with deadly force if required.5 The inability to control parts of the narcotics distribution networks can be seen with the vast number of kidnappings now openly taking place in Phoenix, making it the kidnapping capital of the US. Kidnappings are based on the Sinaloan model which originated as a means to collect on drug debts but later expanded to include kidnappings of legitimate businessmen and merchants. These kidnappings, numbering over 700 in 2007 and 2008 according to police reports (though twice that number are thought to go unreported), appear still to be focused on the collection of drug debts but undoubtedly, in some instances, have shifted to individuals not involved with narcotics distribution or use.6

The extent to which the narco threat has evolved and matured can be viewed in two tables pertaining to (1) the dominant Mexican cartels that have arisen, their areas of operation, and the enforcers (gang contractors) that they use and (2) US street and prison (Sureños) gangs affiliated with these cartels. Table 1 is pieced together from various sources and is divided into sections representing the four dominant Mexican cartels: The Federation (Sinaloa), Gulf, Juárez, and Tijuana. The power and fortunes of these cartels continually rise and fall and, in fact, their actual number is even disputed with the Mexican government in the past identifying seven drug cartels rather than recognizing The Federation, which is a larger cartel alliance.7 For our purposes, we will focus on the four cartels listed because of US governmental and other open source information pertaining specifically to them. The areas of influence within Mexico is listed for each of these four cartels along with a listing of the US states where cartel personnel have been identified as operating.8 It is assumed that these identifications are only of actual cartel personnel and not of US gang contractors as well, but this is unknown since all specific information pertaining to these identifications is restricted. The final column in this table lists the Mexican enforcers of each of these cartels and their gang contractors (in italics). From an OSINT (open source intelligence) perspective, this listing is probably the most comprehensive one so far but undoubtedly errors of omission are present.

Table 1. Federation, Gulf, Juárez, and Tijuana cartels: areas of operations and enforcers.

Name	Mexico^a (areas of influence)	United States^b (personnel reported)	Enforcers (gang contractors) ^c
The Federation (Sinaloa)	Sonora, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, Coahuila, Nayarit; US Border from Western Arizona to Juarez/El Paso	Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia	Los Negros, Los Numeros (faction), Los Pelones (Ex Mexican Mil), La Gente Nueva (Mexican LE), Los Lobos (US Citizens), Fuerzas Especiales de Arturo (FEDA), Barrio Azteca (formerly), Mexicles, Artistas Asesinos, La Eme, Sur-13
Gulf	Michoacan, Veracruz, Tamaulipas, Coahuila; US Border East of Juarez/ El Paso to East of Matamoros	Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas	Los Zetas (Ex Mexican SF), Kaibiles (Ex Guatemalan SF), La Familia, Grupo Tarasco, Los Numeros (faction), Los Halcones, Los Zetitas (Loredo gang members), Texas Syndicate, Mexikanemi, MS-13 (El Salvador), Hermanos Pistoleros Latinos (HPL), Tango Blast
Juárez	Chihuahua, Coahuila; US Border Juarez/EL Paso area	Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wyoming	Los Linces (Ex GAFE), La Linea (State & Local LE), Barrio Azteca (Currently), Sureños, Syndicato de Nuevo Mexico, Mexican Clique Killers
Tijuana	Baja California; US Border from San Diego to East of Mexicali into Western Arizona	Alaska, California, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington	Fuerzas especiales del Muletas (FEM), Sicarios (Tijuana street gangs), La Eme, Logan Calle 30, 18th Street, Varrio Chula Vista, Sur-13, Wonderboys, Border Brothers
^a Guerreo, Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatan, and Quintana Roo disputed between the Federation and Gulf cartels. STRATFOR, Areas of Cartel Influences, 2008; US Drug Enforcement Agency information, adapted by Congressional Research Service (P. McGrath, 2 March 2007).
^b National Drug Intelligence Center, Situation Report: Cities in Which Mexican DTOs Operate Within the United States, ID. 2008-S0787–005, 11 April 2008. See document for the specific cities within these states.
^c Chris Swecker, Ast. Dir. CID, FBI, Congressional Testimony, 17 November 2005; E. Eduardo Castillo, ‘Mexican attorney general: Drug cartels recruiting hit men in U.S’, signonsandiego.com (20 December 2005); Colleen W. Cook, Mexico's Drug Cartels, CRIS Report for Congress, RL34215, 16 October 2007: numerous other OSINT sources including STRATFOR.

The four dominant Mexican drug cartels, their enforcers, and affiliated gang contractors are in violent competition with one another for control over narcotics trafficking routes (plazas) into the United States and the markets within. Narcotics sales within Mexico, and into Central America with the continual opening of new markets in the countries of that region, are also now a source of strife and competition. In addition, conflict over auxiliary forms of illegal revenue generation including street taxation, extortion, and kidnapping along with human and arms smuggling is also taking place between the various gangs, cartels, and mercenary groups on both sides of the US–Mexican border. Until recently, the Mexican state generally turned a blind eye to the growing power, influence, and military-type capabilities of the cartels and their allies. Numerous political, judicial, law enforcement, and military officials and reporters had been corrupted and/or killed allowing the cartels freedom of action via their doctrine of ¿plata o plomo? (silver or lead?). Since late 2006, however, open warfare has broken out between the Mexican drug cartels and the state under the Felipe Calderon administration. With the fighting intensifying, President Calderon recently said, ‘It's either the narcos, or the state.’9 Over 10,000 have died in what has basically become a ‘free for all’, given the wars raging amongst the cartels themselves and between the various cartels and the Mexican state. The violence levels, however, are, in context, still somewhat restrained given the absence of ‘car bombs’ as were employed by the Medellín cartel against the Colombian state in that conflict decades ago. Highlighting additional concerns about this internal war in Mexico, it was reported in March 2009:

The biggest and most violent combatants are the Sinaloa cartel, known by U.S. and Mexican federal law enforcement officials as the ‘Federation’ or ‘Golden Triangle,’ and its main rival, ‘Los Zetas’ or the Gulf Cartel … The two cartels appear to be negotiating a truce or merger to defeat rivals and better withstand government pressure. U.S. officials say the consequences of such a pact would be grave.10

These two cartels alone are estimated to have fielded over 100,000 foot soldiers, rivaling the Mexican army which numbers about 130,000.11 Additionally, the forces of these cartels include former special forces personnel and have access to equipment and weaponry which are in many cases far superior to that fielded by the Mexican state.

Table 2 focuses on US prison and street gangs affiliated with the four major Mexican cartels. Only Sureño (southern) gangs with Mexican and Central American cultural origins have been listed because of their identifiable direct ties to the cartels. Prison and street Norteño (northern) gangs, independent Mexican gangs (e.g. the Fresno bulldogs), black, Puerto Rican, white and other ethnicity prison and street gangs, and all forms of motorcycle gangs have been excluded from this table. The reason for this exclusion is that, while these gangs may benefit from narcotics trafficking inside the United States, they are typically one step removed in the distribution networks and act as retail sub-contractors or second order wholesale suppliers of the narcotics.12 What is apparent from this table is that the Mexican cartels have at their disposal direct linkages to a gang contractor network encompassing tens of thousands of members. This gang wholesale distribution network is controlled by the prison gangs, such as the Mexican Mafia (La Eme) and Barrio Azteca, who have enforced their will and dictates upon numerous Hispanic street gangs in the United States to increase their power and enrich their pockets.

Table 2. US prison and street (Sureños) gangs affiliated with Sinaloa, Gulf, Juárez, or Tijuana cartels.^a

Name	Type	Reach	Size
Barrio Azteca	Prison	National (Texas, SE New Mexico)^b	2000
18th Street	Street	National (44 cities 20 states) & Mexico, Central America^c	30,000–50,000
Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos	Prison	Local (Texas, Mexico)	1000
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)	Street	National (& Mexico, Central America)	8,000–10,000 (30,000–50,000 The Americas)
Mexican Mafia (La Eme)	Prison	Regional (California, Southwest, Pacific areas)	200 350–400^b
Mexikanemi (Emi)	Prison	Regional (Texas)	2000
Florencia 13 (F13 or FX13)	Street	Regional (California, 4 other States)	3000+
Sureños Gangs (Sur-13; includes Avenues, F13)	Street	National (Mostly California)	50,000–75,000
Tango Blast	Street-Prison	Regional	14,000+
Texas Syndicate	Prison	Regional (South-West both sides of the border)^b	1,300^b
^a National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, December 2008 and National Gang Intelligence Center, National Gang Threat Assessment 2009, January 2009.
^b US Department of Justice, Attorney General's Report to Congress on the Growth of Violent Street Gangs in Suburban Areas, April 2008.
^c Via other OSINT.

For instance, all gangs which include the number ‘13’ ‘M’ in their names are subordinate to La Eme. This also includes the local taxation of gang territories to extract revenues from legitimate and illicit businesses operating within the gang's turf. Thereby, each of these gang members can in some way be thought of as a ‘foot soldier’ who, if given a directive by the Mexican Mafia, have the choice of carrying it out or risk having a ‘green light’ placed on them and being killed.13 This would mean that both MS-13 and 18th Street members, increasingly under the control of La Eme, in Central America whose cliques are led by original gangsters or OGs (i.e. originally deported Los Angeles gang members) are to some extent still theoretically (and nominally) under the authority of the Mexican Mafia in California. If they did not follow La Eme dictates, their families and fellow ‘homies’ in the US could suffer severe consequences ranging from intimidation and beatings to rape, torture, and murder. While actual Mexican Mafia influence in Central America is currently in debate, the street and prison gangs are the same in that region. Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street dominate and do openly show respect to La Eme.

The national security importance of these close relationships between Sureño prison and street gangs and the Mexican drug cartels is that dangerous internal narco-terrorism potentials now exist for the US homeland depending on the orders gang ‘foot soldiers’ are given. While this might sound highly implausible, if the Mexican drug cartels and the United States government did in fact engage in open conflict with one another, the Mexican Mafia could possibly side with their cartel allies:

The Mexican Mafia works with allied gangs in the American Southwest to control large swaths of territory along both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border. These gangs are organized to interact directly with traffickers in Mexico and oversee transborder shipments as well as distribution inside the United States.14

With its revenue streams and power threatened, La Eme could draw upon its dominance of the Sureño street gangs to provide support to the Mexican cartels. Failure to provide such ‘military aid’ if requested – even if it is only symbolic and limited in scope – would not only endanger short-term narcotics trafficking operations but also the long-term relationship between these allies.

The Mexican drug cartels thus possess the very real ability to draw either upon their own mercenaries and employed assassins and bring them into the United States to engage in operations against our government or upon allied domestic prison gangs such as the Mexican Mafia. The latter, in turn, can order subordinate ‘13’ street gang ‘foot soldiers’ to engage in specific insurgent operations (such as the killing of police officers or judges) on their behalf. This capability combined with the tried and true ¿plata o plomo? (silver or lead?) doctrine utilized in Mexico, and in Colombia decades before, to intentionally undermine and corrupt the workings of government is a volatile mix. If any real intent to stand up to the US government were ever added to it, Pancho Villa's notorious raid into Columbus, New Mexico in 1916 would look like a Sunday picnic.15

It is assumed such potentials have been considered by Homeland Security Janet Napolitano. However, her vague focus on a ‘trigger point’ concerning spillover of narco-violence from Mexico into the United States fundamentally misses the domestic aspects of the narco-insurgency which could very well emerge.16 As has been outlined earlier, this ‘virus’ which has taken parts of Mexico and is spreading values incompatible with those of a healthy democracy is growing on both sides of the US–Mexican border and has extended its network into Central America along with enclaves and territories in South America as well.17 From a theoretical perspective, it represents the fusion and intersection of third phase cartel and third generation gang concerns that John Sullivan and this author have been researching and writing on now for over a decade.18

The illegal economy of Mexican–US (Sureños) gangs, cartels, and mercenaries

The underworld economy that provides revenues and logistical support to the various gang, cartel, and mercenary groups needs to be touched upon. While narco- and gang-economics are far from an exact science since monetary values are at best estimates and – like much of the other information pertaining to these groups – quickly become restricted in nature, figures are available that provide us a rough overview of what financial resources the narco-cartels and their associates have at their disposal and what the underlying workings of these economies entail. These will provide a reality check as we face the age-old dilemma of balancing a tendency to overestimate our adversaries without consequently and more dangerously underestimating them. We struggled throughout the Cold War in seeking to determine the resources and capabilities of the Soviet Union and our understanding of gangs, cartels, and mercenaries and the various relationships between them is far more primitive.19 The dynamics of this illegal economy can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3. The illegal economy of Mexican–US (Sureños) gangs, cartels, and mercenaries.

Commodity/activity	Monetary value (per year)	Location/direction	Participants
Marijuana	$8.5 billion^a	Mexico to US, US, Mexico	Cartels & gangs
Cocaine	$3.9 billion^a	3rd country to Mexico to US, 3rd country to Mexico	Cartels (+ Colombian) & gangs
Methamphetamine	$1.0 billion^a	Mexico to US, US (limited), Mexico	Cartels & gangs
Heroin	$0.4 billion^a	3rd country to Mexico to US, 3rd country to Mexico, Mexico to US, Mexico	Cartels (+ Colombian) &gangs
Illegal immigrants	$2 billion (Arizona)^d	Mexico to US, 3rd country to Mexico to US	Cartels & gangs
Illegal weapons	$0.356–0.730 billion^e	US to Mexico	Cartels, gangs, & mercenaries
Illegal bulk $ & laundering / black market peso exchange (BMPE) / other	$8.6 billion in bank notes.^c	US to Mexico, US to Mexico to 3rd country	Cartels (+ Colombian)
Plaza & gatekeeper taxes (distribution choke points)	> $1 billion	Mexico to US, US to Mexico	Cartels
Street–prison taxation (extortion)	< $1 billion	Mexico & US	Gangs
Kidnapping (including express)	< $1 billion	Mexico & US	Cartels, gangs, & mercenaries
Commodities, load, & monetary theft	< $1 billion	Mexico & US	Cartels, gangs & mercenaries
ALL	$13.8 billion ^a	ALL	ALL
	$25–$30 billion ^b
	$18–$39 billion (includes Colombians)^c
^a Mark Stevenson, ‘Marijuana big earner for Mexico gangs’. Figures from US drug czar John Walters. Heroin value estimated by subtracting other major narcotics from total estimate.
^b STRATFOR, ‘Organized Crime in Mexico’.
^c National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, December 2008. NDIC estimates.
^d Josh Meyer, ‘Blood money flows by wire to Mexico’, A12. Arizona Attorney General estimate of the value of illegal immigrants being smuggled into Arizona each year.
^e Stohl and Tuttle, The Small Arms Trade in Latin America, 15. Mexican government study that suggests 2000 guns are crossing into Mexico each day. Monetary range based on gun values from $500 to $1000. Other OSINT sources also utilized, including a review of all US HIDTA region reports available via NDIC.

Some of the specific commodities and activities addressed in Table 3 should be discussed. Narcotics are and continue to be the major source of revenue for the Mexican drug cartels and are estimated to be in the $14–17 billion dollar range, based on a compilation of the various sources listed in Table 3, although given the illicit nature of the industry they could actually be somewhat lower or even much higher. Marijuana is by far the dominant source of narcotics revenue for the cartels followed by cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin. Marijuana is highly profitable because it is grown in Mexico as well as inside the US in cartel controlled fields generally concentrated in California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona but with cultivation expanding eastwards. High potency yields, starter plant cloning, and 90-day shortened growth cycles are adding to the marijuana profit margins.20

Cocaine and heroin produced in South America is less profitable than marijuana because the revenues have to be shared with third party cartels and traffickers. It is notable that Colombian heroin production is decreasing while Mexican production and purity has recently increased. These two drugs are worth about half of the marijuana trafficking trade, with most of the value in cocaine sales. Cocaine has seen recent shortages in some US cities because of disruptions in distribution all along the transit chain from Colombia through Central America and Mexico and into the United States due to the Mexican government crackdown, nonetheless, demand for cocaine is still relatively high in the US.21 Heroin use is generally declining in the US and is more prevalent in the eastern states. The Mexican cartels themselves are attempting to better expand their markets in northeastern US cities.22 This may be challenging because of the lack of Sureño gangs in those cities though MS-13 and 18th Street gang members are found in many pockets within the US and new distribution potentials with Norteño, Puerto Rican, and other gangs may exist.

In the case of methamphetamine trafficking, about $1 billion in sales take place annually with the bulk of the drugs originating in Mexico. One of the vulnerabilities of this trade is the need to constantly obtain the precursor ingredients needed to ‘manufacture’ or ‘cook up’ the narcotics. These precursor ingredients, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, are being obtained by the Mexican cartels throughout the Americas in a cat-and-mouse game of bypassing import restrictions and required sales reporting via massive small scale purchases in Mexico and large ‘legal’ purchases by front companies in South America and even Southeast Asia. Mexican cartel and gang affiliated ‘meth labs’ have also existed for years on the US side of the border but some debate rages between local law enforcement and federal government agencies concerning the extent of these operations, especially in California, where the majority of these labs now exist.23 All four of these forms of narcotics are increasingly being marketed, specifically to teenagers and older children, in Mexico itself to boost domestic profits. They are also being sold in Guatemala and other neighboring countries as the Mexican cartels expand into these regions. The value of these markets can be seen in the more than 6000 deaths in Guatemala alone in 2008 likely linked to gang conflict over the lucrative drug trade.24

Mexican drug cartel trafficking of illegal immigrants has multiplied since the 1990s and is now worth at least $2 billion in yearly revenues.25 Initially, the human smuggling or ‘Coyote’ trade was the work of independent operators who were taxed by the gatekeepers and other cartel personnel. Over the last 15 years or so, cartel personnel and their gang associates have increasingly dominated this lucrative business and now sometimes maximize their profits by utilizing those individuals smuggled in to carry drug loads, such as bales of marijuana, on their person into the US as they cross over the border. With the domination of this trade by the cartels, smuggled individuals now face even higher incidents of physical abuse and rape, extortion for additional sums of money, or ending up as indentured household servants or forced into prostitution.26

Other areas of revenue generation are the illegal smuggling of US weapons and bulk sums of money (laundering US narcotics sale proceeds) into Mexico. Middle-men, specialized organizations, and shell laundering businesses in sectors involving large sums of cash, such as casinos, are utilized to make sure that the drug cartel revenues flow back to Mexico and sometimes down to South America. Billions of dollars generated by illegal narcotics sales in, and human trafficking into, the US must flow back to the major Mexican cartels and, in the cases of cocaine and heroin, back to the third party Colombian baby cartels and narcotics funded rebel groups such as FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). Expensive luxury items, real estate, and bulk commodities can also be purchased in order to help launder the narcotics proceeds and are then later resold. Ultimately, the goal is to use financial tricks and ploys, like small bank deposits and wire transfers, to legitimize drug proceeds by getting them into the US and other country's financial systems.27 In the case of illegal weapons smuggling, the US ATF (Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives) Bureau ‘estimates that 90% of the firearms recovered from crime scenes in Mexico originated in the United States’, though this figure is now in dispute.28 The lucrative aspect of the gun trade is due to the fact that Mexico has very strict gun control laws and no private sector gun stores. The estimated value of the illegal weapons trade is in the hundreds of millions of dollars and includes not only handguns but also assault rifles and, in some past incidents, .50 caliber sniper rifles and grenades.29

Sustained community taxation undertaken by street gangs in the US and Mexico is estimated to bring in tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars each year. Failure to pay results in property damage, injury, torture, and ultimately death to an individual or his or her loved ones. The racketeering conviction against La Eme member Francisco ‘Puppet’ Martinez is illustrative of the lucrative potentials of this economy. Martinez ran a taxing crew of the Columbia Lil Cycos, an 18th Street clique in Los Angeles, from his prison cell during the late 1990s:

… 18th Street cliques offer protection from rival gangs in exchange for kickbacks from illegal street sales of narcotics, fake green cards, passports or driver's licenses … the Columbia Lil Cycos also tax illegal vendors. The gang takes a cut from people who sell food, anything counterfeit or anything illegal that goes on in the street.30

He brought in as much as $40,000 in a good month from this operation.31 This was a far cry from the $16,000 earned by his Eme carnal (brother) Alex ‘Pee Wee’ Aguirre each month. He ran a crew of the 57 Chicos clique of the Avenues gang in Los Angeles during this same time period from his prison cell. His camarada (associate) had about 25–30 names on the tax list which included drug dealers, drug houses, body shops, used car dealerships, and barbershops.32 This same process of community taxation is taking place throughout Sureños gang turf on both sides of the border and, in lieu of cash, payments in the form of barter (cars, guns, jewelry, drugs), and potentially even services, are accepted. In Tijuana, failure to pay ‘taxes’ on one's business, which can range from $500 to $23,000 a month, results in arson of the establishment or injury or death to the owner's family.33 A similar process also exists within US and Mexican prisons, which targets unaligned and vulnerable prisoners. In some instances, it may also incorporate revenues generated from male prostitution.

Unlike taxation, which creates a sustained predatory relationship between the gangs and the communities within which they exist, kidnapping and commodity, load, and monetary thefts are normally one-time affairs. Repeated kidnappings of the same individual or the stealing of the same product from the same location, however, may occur if lucrative. Typically, such targets of opportunity are selected although well-planned operations in order to rip off big drug loads and bulk drug profits (large sums of cash) or to kidnap the children of wealthy individuals are not unheard of. These forms of crimes are far more prevalent in Mexico – with thousands of kidnappings per year – than in the US with the exception of Phoenix, Arizona. Kidnappings in Phoenix are well into the hundreds and primarily focused on those involved in the Mexican drug trade as previously mentioned. Most Mexican kidnappings are of the ‘express’ or ‘virtual’ type where one's ATM (automated teller machine) account is emptied out or one's relatives pay a small ransom for a kidnapping that was alleged to have happened or is threatened. High end kidnappings have resulted in ransoms being paid in the low tens of millions (topping out at about $30 million) with settled ransoms more often in the $10,000–30,000 range.34 Failure to pay results in body parts being cut off the victim and sent to family members as an incentive and in some instances, even when payment is made, the kidnapped individual is found murdered or ‘disappears’. Another variant is the Los Zetas practice of using the Internet to lure migrants by means of bogus promises of employment and migration offerings. Those who are then kidnapped and can't come up with money for the ransom demands are sent into prostitution, forced (slave) labor camps, or contribute to the black market organ trade by having a kidney removed.35 Forced participation in the pornography industry, a variant of the prostitution trade, has also been noted.

General commodities theft, other than that of drug loads, was not initially viewed as a revenue generating strategy by the Mexican cartels but in recent years has been gaining increased media attention. The cause for this increase is probably less an intentional diversification of actual cartel income sources, though such claims have been made, but rather the rise of cartel moonlighters and subcontractors acting as entrepreneurs. Off-duty cartel enforcers, drug runners, kidnapper cells, mercenary contractors, and gang contract personnel can make serious money from bulk thefts. These thefts have not only included cars and trucks but also bulk agricultural goods, industrial loads (in one case a 30-ton roll of steel), and millions of gallons of diesel from Pemex pipelines in the state of Veracruz.36 In addition, unaffiliated individuals, pretending to be cartel or mercenary members engaging in commodities theft confound the situation. Gangs of armed and hooded men will claim to be from such groups as FEDA (Fuerzas Especiales de Arturo) or FEM (Fuerzas especiales del Muletas) when in fact they are freelance groups. The same form of deceptive activity also applies to armed groups masquerading as police and military units. This potentially becomes even more ominous when actual police and military groups have gone over to the cartels and engage in commodities thefts while in their duty uniforms.37

Some useful statistics and insights emerge from this overview of the illegal economy of Mexican and US (Sureños) gangs, cartels, and mercenaries. On the surface, the monetary value of the illegal commodities and activities engaged in by these non-state groups appear relatively small vis-à-vis Mexican governmental budget revenues and especially minor when compared to those of the United States. If $20 billion is a fair estimate of those specific narco- and gang-economies, it represents only about 7.8% of Mexican governmental budget revenues of $257 billion and 0.67% of US governmental budget revenues of $2.98 trillion. Compared to Mexican and US gross domestic products (GDPs) of $1.1 trillion and $14.3 trillion (2008 estimates), narco- and gang-economic values appear almost meaningless.38 However, this 7.8% of Mexican governmental budget revenues represented by those narco- and gang-economies, the majority of which flows back as revenues to the Mexican cartels, should not be dismissed lightly.

The cause for concern comes when recognizing that Mexican and US governmental revenues must be allocated to the functioning of numerous state institutions and domestic services and public debt servicing. Further, defense expenditures are dominated by the maintenance of conventional military forces well suited to engagements with other nation-states. These conventional force programs are overwhelmingly based on expensive and complicated warships, aircraft, and tank/artillery/missile systems which are of no value in combating domestic narco- and gang-insurgencies.

Additionally, gang, cartel, and mercenary groups do not have huge bureaucracies, domestic programs, or debt-servicing commitments to contend with and field ‘foot soldiers’ relatively cheaply – outfitting an enforcer with an assault rifle, armor piercing ammo, grenades, and body-armor can be done for less than $2000. If basic training costs are factored in, an effective criminal-soldier can be produced in three to four months time for about $5000. Further, the majority of the personnel belonging to those groups come from disenfranchised and lower socio-economic groups in inner cities, slums, and poor rural villages with minimal basic costs of living. Also, at least in the US, more than a few of the gang families are on public assistance programs.

The Mexican cartels have a large enough free cash flow to allow them to engage in the ongoing corruption of governmental officials and law enforcement and military personnel by means of bribes or enticements of joining the cartels as employees at better rates of pay. This suggests that gang, cartel, and mercenary groups can translate a higher percentage of their economies (group revenues) into ‘criminal-insurgent activities’ based on diplomacy-corruption (plata) and military-like (plomo) capabilities than the nation-state ‘law enforcement-military’ capabilities needed to counter them. The actual efficiency or force multiplier is unknown (whether 1.25 × to 3 × or even higher) but it helps to explain why these threat groups can operate effectively on smaller budgets when compared to overall governmental revenues.

US engagement in trans-operational environments

A component of the strategic threat that the Mexican cartels and their associated mercenary and gang affiliates pose to the US is the numerous operational environments in the Western Hemisphere in which they are now being engaged. These six trans-operational environments can be viewed in Table 4. These operational environments can be characterized by the environment itself, the location of the physical threat, the narco-opposing force (NARCO-OPFOR), a typology of the criminal-combatants engaged, and the US responding forces. The most basic environment is that of crime taking place within the US. Local and state law enforcement respond to the threats that exist in this environment – threats which are basically low level street and prison gangs and individual members of the Mexican cartels. The next environment type is that of high intensity crime taking place in the US. This threat is derived from more organized entities such as the Mexican cartels themselves and actual drug trafficking gangs who have access to better weapons and employ more sophisticated tactics. The responding forces are specialized law enforcement units and task forces and federal law enforcement agencies such as the DEA, FBI, and ATF.

Table 4. Trans-operational environments involving US engagement with Mexican cartels, mercenaries and Sureños gangs

Operational environment	Crime	High intensity crime	Homeland security (terrorism and insurgency)	Homeland defense (terrorism and insurgency)	Foreign military support (terrorism and insurgency)	Foreign law enforcement support (high intensity crime)
Physical threat location	United States	United States	United States	United States	Mexico Latin America	Mexico Latin America
NARCO-OPFOR	Street and prison gangs, individual cartel members	Mexican cartels, street and prison gangs	Mexican cartels, Mexican/US street and prison gangs	Mexican cartels, Mexican/US street and prison gangs	Mexican and Colombian cartels, Latin American street and prison gangs	Mexican and Colombian cartels, street and prison gangs
Criminal-combatant Typology	1^st GEN. gangs, individual members of more advanced gangs or cartels and mercenary groups	1^st–2^nd phase cartels, 2^nd GEN. gangs	2^nd–3^rd phase (emergent) cartels, 3^rd GEN. gangs, narco-terrorists, narco-insurgents, narco-mercenaries, criminal-soldiers	2^nd–3^rd phase (emergent) cartels, 3^rd GEN. gangs, narco-terrorists, narco-insurgents, narco-mercenaries, criminal-soldiers	1^st–3^rd phase (emergent) cartels, 3^rd GEN. gangs, narco-terrorists, narco-insurgents, narco- mercenaries, criminal-soldiers	1^st–3^rd phase (emergent) cartels, 2^nd GEN. gangs
US responding Forces	Local and state law enforcement	Special LE units and task forces and federal law enforcement (DEA, FBI, ATF)	Federal law enforcement (DEA, FBI, ATF), Department Of Homeland Security (DHS)	US Northern Command, US Army North	US Northern Command, US Army North, US Southern Command, US Special Forces	Special LE units and task forces and federal law enforcement (DEA, FBI, ATF)
Source: ©Counter-OPFOR Corporation, September 2009.

The third operational environment is characterized by threats to US homeland security. This is a new environment that has been created in response to the September 11 attacks and is focused on protecting the US from threats of terrorism and insurgency taking place within its borders. The primary responding forces are drawn from federal law enforcement agencies and components of the still relatively new Department of Homeland Security. Some specialized units created by the larger cities, especially New York and Los Angeles, will also be operating in this environment though, from a support and consequence management perspective, all levels of law enforcement and other responder groups will also be involved. The next operational environment is homeland defense support against terrorism and insurgency taking place on US soil. The military corollary to homeland security with the operating environment and response requirements also articulated since the September 11 attacks. The creation of US Northern Command and US Army North are integral components of the federal military response, with these entities presently providing a stability and support and consequence management support role due to Posse Comitatus.

The fifth operational environment is found in Mexico and Latin America and pertains to foreign military support. Specifically the US military is providing allied military forces, predominately the Colombian and Mexican militaries, with the training, resources, and hardware necessary to respond to the drug cartels who are waging campaigns of narco-terrorism and narco-insurgency throughout large swaths of Latin America. This response from the US side falls predominantly upon US Northern Command and US Army North in regards to Mexico and US Southern Command and US Special Forces in regards to Latin America. The final operational environment is also primarily found in Mexico and Latin America. It pertains to foreign law enforcement support to allied nations facing what is generally considered to be an operational environment challenged by cartel, mercenary, and gang generated high-intensity crime. Federal law enforcement agencies and specialized law enforcement units, such as Los Angeles based gang task forces, are principally involved in providing this foreign support.

Of concern with regard to the trans-operational environments the US is engaging in is the lack of any form of comprehensive hemispheric strategy coordinating these multiple efforts. Because the threats are principally non-state, criminal, and more networked than hierarchical in nature, they continue to defy US national security perceptions. This should be somewhat of an amazing occurrence given the recent passing of the eighth anniversary of September 11 but ultimately it is not. The US response to the threats posed by the Mexican (and Colombian) cartels and their mercenary and gang associates is being responded to in a federally mandated ‘stove pipe’ manner. This is the process the US followed for decades during the Cold War – though an overarching strategy existed – and ultimately yielded victory over the Soviet Union. This same process is now being taken into the twenty-first century and applied to very different types of threats. In this new conflict in the Americas, we are still very much in the opening rounds so caution concerning the future is warranted. At the very minimum, the US critically needs an organizing hemispheric strategy to be developed which coordinates the current ‘stove pipe’ response.39 More than likely, however, given the fundamentally different nature of the new non-state threats and opposing networks (the NARCO-OPFOR) developing in the Americas, a hemispheric strategy combined with a new process, drawing upon network response capabilities, will be required to meet this new challenge – a war this author views will be fought over humanity's new forms of social and political organization.

Overview of the work

The work which follows is divided into three major thematic parts. Part 1 focuses on organization and technology use by Sureños gangs, Mexican cartels, and their hired enforcers. The first essay revisits and revises a 1998 article on drug cartel evolutionary processes. The update links a discussion of cartel phases to the better known third gang generation typology and then turns its eye to a discussion of third phase cartel potentials in Mexico. Lastly, it assesses four alternative futures that could take place in Mexico, as well as their cross-border implications for the United States. Of concern are the potentials for broader ‘societal warfare’ taking place between state and non-state forces over the value system, ideology, and organizational form of the Mexican state. The second contribution provides a detailed military grade operational assessment of the Los Zetas mercenary organization. This private narco army, or freebooter corporation, is the enforcer component of the Gulf Cartel and has made earlier forms of cartel gunmen totally obsolete. An in-depth analysis is undertaken of Los Zetas capabilities and organizational structures with the intent of providing a reference for friendly forces (the ‘good guys’) to better know thy enemy. From an open source information perspective, this assessment sets the new standard of our understanding of that narco opposing force (NARCO-OPFOR). The third essay provides a review of Sureños-affiliated gang and Mexican cartel member use of social networking sites. Because of the sensitive nature of these topics, little to no publicly available research has been conducted. Patterns of gang and cartel use identified were then compared to more sophisticated Internet use by terrorist groups with similarities and contrasts noted. The essay concludes with a few general observations concerning likely narco Internet use patterns that will emerge.

Part 2 of the work addresses corruptive (silver; plata) and coercive (lead; plomo) techniques and methods utilized by the Mexican cartels and their allies. The initial essay is a ‘no-holds-barred’ look at corruption in Mexico. The primary argument developed by the contributor revolves around the contention that ‘… corruption IS the institution of government in Mexico and that a long line, generations long, of politicians and officials have merely passed beneath the “yoke” of corruption on their way to acquiring personal wealth and accomplishments. Corruption is a mistress to which nearly all of the political elite of Mexico are seduced.’ It is little wonder that the rise of powerful drug cartels, with ample revenues and the ability to offer huge bribes with impunity, have overtaxed a Mexican political system already overly ripe with graft and moral bankruptcy. The second contribution provides a detailed and clinical analysis of cartel violence revolving around firefights, raids, and assassinations. Signature tactical events are discussed along with evidence of a shift from cartel gangsterism into ‘paramilitary terrorism with guerrilla tactics’. The sections on the militarization of cartel gunmen and the conflict crossing over the US border are especially relevant to the theme of this special issue. The third essay focuses on the heinous acts, specifically torture and beheadings, and their potential links to the narcocultos (narco cults) arising in Mexico. An overview of torture and beheadings conducted by the Mexican cartels, their enforcers, and Sureños gangs on both sides of the Rio Grande is provided. It is followed by a detailed overview of the narcocultos that have arisen and their potentials for ritual torture and sacrifice. Such religious practices would bring a new and unwanted dynamic into the drug wars in Mexico. The current conflict could then be expanded from a criminal insurgency into a conflict between traditional value systems and emergent narco-value systems with quasi-religious and cult-like underpinnings.

The third part of the work discusses response strategies directed at the flow of narcotics coming over the US and Mexico border and their subsequent use. The first essay highlights approaches pertaining to counter-supply policies and operations. They target the actual flow of drugs into the US and the narco-trafficking organizations themselves. Further, counter-violence approaches to gangs and related groups will be discussed in that essay. While innovative options may be provided, such as the use of intelligence networks, they will fall under the counter-supply and counter-violence theme. The second essay focuses on counter-demand targeting and concerns itself with traditional, right of center, and left of center perspectives on illegal narcotics use. From these discussions, a blended counter-demand strategy is explored. It is derived from extinguishing user demand, coercing the users, and to some extent fulfilling user demand by the provision of prescription narcotics to ‘special status’ addicts and by means of limited decriminalization of personal marijuana use. Such a suggested strategy would have its own negative elements and should be considered less of a bad choice than the other, even worse, US counter-demand policy options that exist.

Following the thematic parts of the work, an afterword is then provided which to some extent plays ‘devil's advocate’ to many of the criminal insurgency focused contributions and counterbalances them with a differing viewpoint. It compares and contrasts the present situation in Mexico to that of Colombia encountered decades ago when it was locked in a fierce and violent struggle with the Medellín and later Cali cartels and leftist guerillas. That essay advocates the position that Mexico is nowhere near as threatened as Colombia once was and that using the terms ‘Colombianization’ and ‘insurgency’ would be improper in describing the drug-related violence presently taking place in Mexico. The essay ends by offering core principles that should be used to respond to the ‘high intensity crime’ taking place in Mexico.

Notes

 1. While my usage is in the singular, multiple narco-insurgencies are in actuality being waged by the competing cartels and their networks. Taken together they can be broadly viewed as a larger narco-insurgency being directed against the nation-state form in the Western hemisphere. Recent works on this topic include: Brands, Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy; Sullivan and Elkus, ‘State of Siege’; Fleming, Drug Wars; and Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty. For a view of this of threat to the Mexican state written in Spanish, see Menéndez and Ronquillo, De Los Maras A Los Zetas.

 2. Bunker and Begert, ‘Overview: Defending Against Enemies of the State’, xli.

 3. Bunker and Begert, ‘Overview: Defending Against Enemies of the State’, xxvii. While some of these criminal values may sound questionable, Mexico is now thought to be the second largest producer of child pornography in the world according to some estimates. See Guillermoprieto and Lowrey, ‘Popping the Balloon Theory’.

 4. As far back as the 1970s, the Colombian cartels had sent operatives into the United States to establish cocaine processing labs and create distribution routes. The disappearance and subsequent killing of cartel personnel, contractors, and any other individuals that crossed the cartels on US soil has thus been discretely going on for almost 40 years. According to Chepesiuk, one early group of these assassins was the Palestinos: ‘Santacruz employed a group of hit men who were known as the Palestinos, street-tough Colombians who came from Medellin under the leadership of Julio Palestino. The Cali cartel brought the Palestinos to the United States, and they were suspected of being involved in the killing of numerous people in New York, Chicago and Miami.’ See Chepesiuk. Drug Lords, 55.

 5. Meyer, ‘Drug Violence May Bleed into the U.S.’, A1, A18–19.

 6. Quinones, ‘America's Kidnapping Capital’, A1, A22–23.

 7. Cook, Mexico's Drug Cartels, 1.

 8. For the actual maps which show the locations where the cartel personnel have been identified as operating, go to National Drug Intelligence Center website (http://ndic.gov) and look for the Situation Report: Cities in Which Mexican DTOs Operate Within the United States. Note this means that the La Familia cartel will not be highlighted even though it has now become a major player in the Mexican drug wars.

 9. Luhnow and Millman, ‘Mexican Leader Prepares for Bloodier Drug Wars’, 6.

10. Carter, ‘EXCLUSIVE: 100,000 Foot Soldiers in Mexican Cartels’, 1–5.

11. Carter, ‘EXCLUSIVE: 100,000 foot soldiers in Mexican cartels’, 1–5Ibid.

12. This may be an inaccurate assumption on the part of this author but I would rather err on the side of conservatism in defining the gang contractor groups directly linked to the Mexican cartels. Nothing in the open source literature suggests that this assumption is inaccurate but ties to the Latin Kings have been mentioned in other works.

13. My understanding of La Eme influence, organization, and operations is derived from Rafael, The Mexican Mafia and Blatchford, The Black Hand and some discussions with law enforcement personnel. Historical context was provided by reading Dunn, The Gangs of Los Angeles. Specific attention should be paid to the La Eme mandated gang peace meetings that took place in El Salvador Park in Santa Ana in the Summer of 1992 and at Elysian Park, next to Dodger Stadium, in September 1993. Such meetings mark their ascendancy over the Sureño street gangs in their areas of operation.

14. Burton and West, ‘When the Mexican Drug Trade Hits the Border’, 4.

15. For information on this raid and some thoughts on the current border war, see Jenkins, ‘Savage Struggle on the Border: Part II’, 27–8, 29–31.

16. Strohm, ‘Homeland Security Chief Defines “Trigger Point” for Border Response’, 1.

17. It is interesting that, as the Mexican drug cartels move into Central America, they will presumably link up with the MS-13 and 18th Street prison and street gangs – who function as some of their street gang contractors in the US – which have overrun many of those countries already. These gangs are even more vicious than their Los Angeles brethren. One example is an infamous bus massacre in December 2004 in Honduras that killed 27 people (including children). It was masterminded by Rivera Paz, known as ‘El Culiche’ (The Tapeworm), leader of the MS-13 gang in Honduras and a deported LA gangster. See Vasquez, ‘Mexican Drug Cartels Infiltrating Guatemala’, 1; Barrett, ‘DEA: Mexican Cartels Migrate’, 1; and Ellingwood, ‘Mexico's Drug War is Pushing Gangs into Guatemala’, A1, A18.

18. See Bunker and Sullivan, ‘Cartel Evolution’, 55–74; Sullivan and Bunker, ‘Third Generation Gang Studies’, 1–10.

19. Special thanks to Graham Turbiville for reviewing this analysis and providing insights into the many uncertainties that exist when undertaking it. His lessons learned concerning this process when applied to Soviet military capability were invaluable.

20. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Domestic Cannabis Cultivation Assessment 2007.

21. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), ‘Cocaine’ section of the National Drug Threat Assessment 2009.

22. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), ‘Heroin’ section of the National Drug Threat Assessment 2009.

23. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), ‘Methamphetamine’ section of the National Drug Threat Assessment 2009 and National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Methamphetamine Threat Assessment 2009.

24. Ellingwood, ‘Mexico's Drug War is Pushing Gangs into Guatemala’, A1, A18.

25. While there is valid concern that members of entities hostile to the US, reportedly including Hezbollah personnel, have been smuggled in by these groups, it is safe to say that these are rare occurrences.

26. Meyer, ‘Cartels Snatch Coyote Trade’, A1, A12.

27. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), ‘Illicit Finance’ section of the National Drug Threat Assessment 2009; and Meyer, ‘Blood Money Flows by Wire to Mexico’, A12.

28. Embassy of the United States: Mexico, ‘U.S. – Mexico at a Glance: Law Enforcement at a glance’. A figure disputed by David Kuhn, a military standoff weapons and counter-terrorism expert. The author has reviewed Kuhn's findings based on an analysis of international weapons transfers to the Mexican cartels. Personal communications with David Kuhn, October 2009.

29. Embassy of the United States: Mexico, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives. ‘U.S. – Mexico At a Glance: Combating Illicit Firearms’; and Stratfor.com., ‘Mexico: Dynamics of the Gun Trade’.

30. del Barco, ‘Feds Aim to Dismantle L.A’.s 18th Street Gang'.

31. Winton, ‘L.A. Sues 18th Street Gang Members, Seeking Cash Damages for Pico-Union and Westlake neighborhoods’.

32. Blatchford, The Black Hand, 2, 135–41.

33. El Universal . ‘M3 Report: Gulf Cartel Stealing from Pemex Pipelines!’

34. For some dated, yet good baseline data, see Peters, ‘Kidnapping Thrives in Mexico’.

35. NarcoGuerra Times , ‘Zetas Now Harvesting and Marketing Kidneys’.

36. El Universal, ‘Mexican Trains, Trucks Hijacked in New Crime Wave’, Reuters and ‘M3 Report: Gulf Cartel stealing from Pemex Pipelines!’ The diesel estimate is based on the seventy companies involved that bought the stolen fuel and the average of 3500 gallons per week delivered.

37. A far more common occurrence, however, is the theft of seized narcotics by uniformed Mexican law enforcement and military personnel operating freelance or under cartel authority.

38. US Central Intelligence Agency , The WORLD FACTBOOK. Accessed repeatedly in June 2009 for information pertaining to Mexico and the United States.

39. This fits well with the suggestion that the State Department becomes a ‘Department of State and Non-State’ as part of its reorganization to address the new threats emerging. See Armstrong, ‘Hitting Bottom in Foggy Bottom’.