Insurgent–populace relations in Nepal: an analysis of attitudinal and behavioural support

Abstract

The first objective of this article is to provide conceptual clarity regarding the term ‘support’ in the context of insurgent campaigns. While it is commonly claimed that insurgent and counterinsurgent forces compete for the support of the populace, there is often ambiguity as to whether this refers to a voluntary preference for a group of armed actors (attitudinal support), or a set of actions that provide direct benefits to one of these groups (behavioural support or collaboration). Furthermore, while a number of academics and practitioners focus upon the former on the assumption that it translates into the latter with sufficient consistency (Lawrence ‘of Arabia’, Mao, etc.), others maintain a contradictory stance (Kilcullen, Kalyvas, etc.). The findings from research undertaken into the 1996–2006 conflict in Nepal suggest a more complex reality in that certain forms of collaboration (e.g. provisions of information) seemingly necessitate supportive attitudes to a greater extent than others (e.g. supplies of food). The second objective is to evaluate the various approaches used by the Maoist insurgents to generate these distinct forms of support. While their ideology largely failed to resonate with the populace, attitudinal support was obtained through various ‘popular appeals’, including land reform, an opposition to an increasingly repressive monarchy, and campaigns to empower certain marginalised sectors of society. In contrast, the development initiatives of the Maoists, and their nationalist rhetoric in opposition to US and Indian influence were substantially less effective. Each of these initiatives were undertaken to obtain collaboration via attitudinal support, but the former was also generated directly through the use of coercion against specific non-combatants.

Keywords:

• Nepal
• Mao
• Maoist
• Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
• insurgent
• insurgency
• support
• coercion

Notes

 1. See, for instance, del Pino, ‘Family, Culture, and Revolution’, 158–9; Grenier, Emergence of Insurgency in El Salvador, 83; Kataoka, Resistance and Revolution in China, 300–1; Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, 48–50; Maranto and Tuchman, ‘Knowing the Rational Peasant’, 260; Pike, Viet Cong, 381–2; Taylor, Shining Path, 162; and Scott, ‘Revolution in the Revolution’, 97–134. Similar comments from the case of Nepal were provided by Graham, ‘People's War’, 241; and Shneiderman, ‘The Formation of Political Consciousness in Rural Nepal’, 304. During the field research conducted for this article the local Nepali residents often reported that the ideological appeals of the Maoists were only understood by a minority, and that acts of collaboration were largely contingent upon rhetoric and actions of a less esoteric nature. It also emerged that the narrower concept of class was poorly understood, with locals tending to associate to a greater extent with their ‘traditional’ ethnic and caste identities.

 2. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 364.

 3. While each of these themes is discussed to varying degrees in the case study literature, few accounts assess their comparative importance. Focusing upon the Chinese case, the following provide two prominent exceptions: Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power; and Selden, Yenan Way. There are no widely acknowledged studies that offer empirical evidence from the field.

 4. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 92.

 5. See, for instance, Sharma, ‘The Maoist Movement’, 42.

 6. A focus upon the issues faced while undertaking research in post-conflict environments is beyond the scope of this article, but see, for instance, Fujii, ‘Interpreting Truth and Lies’; Pettigrew et al., ‘Relationships, Complicity and Representation’; and Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War, 31–50.

 7. On the advice of Kathmandu-based researchers the quantitative data was collected through distributing questionnaires to students aged 16 and upwards in schools for completion by their parents. This approach is common in rural Nepal as it enables researchers to overcome issues associated with a dispersed populace located in regions with a limited transport infrastructure. Using this method, the resultant sample was representative of the populace in terms of caste and ethnicity, but the respondents were disproportionately middle-aged males as the students tended to obtain responses from the ‘head of household’. As this bias was consistent between locations it does not undermine the comparative analysis between the districts.

 8. Sendero Luminoso of Peru provided direct inspiration for the Nepali Moaists is arguably the most comprehensively studied insurgent organisation in history.

 9. As interpreted, in particular, by McAdam et al., ‘Towards an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution’.

10. The distinction between attitudinal and behavioural support is also made in Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 87–110. The extent to which ambiguities in the English-language usage of the term support undermine the comprehension of insurgent–populace relations is also observed in Marks, ‘Making Revolution’, 43.

11. Focusing upon a range of case studies, the issue of insurgent recruitment is more narrowly considered, for instance, in Eck, ‘Recruiting Rebels’; Florez-Morris, ‘Joining Guerrilla Groups in Colombia’; Henricksen and Vinci ‘Combat Motivation in Non-State Armed Groups’; and Ribetti, ‘The Unveiled Motivations of Violence in Intra-State Conflicts’.

12. Regarding the statistical information provided in the text: * = at a confidence level of 90%; ** = at a confidence level of 95%; and *** = at a confidence level of 99%. Throughout this article the error bars presented for the questionnaire data represent the margin of error at a confidence level of 95%.

13. The information provided in the literature with regard to behavioural support is generally anecdotal and focused primarily upon financial matters. Regarding the Nepali case, for instance, see Gersony, Sowing the Wind, 68; Ogura, ‘Maoist People's Government’, 185, 192; and Pettigrew, ‘Living between the Maoists and the Army in Rural Nepal’, 267. For greater detail on behavioural support in practice outside of the context of Nepal, see Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 54–5; and Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War, 121–8.

14. While largely absent from the field of conflict studies, the relationship between attitudes and behaviours has long been a central theme of study in psychology. See, for instance, McGuire, ‘The Vicissitudes of Attitudes and Similar Representational Constructs in Twentieth Century Psychology’; and Terry et al., ‘Prejudices Attitudes, Group Norms, and Discriminatory Behaviour’.

15. Aside from being observed by interviewees during the field research, regarding other case studies this is also discussed in Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 93; and Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War, 17.

16. Numerous respondents claimed that the Maoists often did not demand ‘contributions’ from the most impoverished families.

17. Regarding other case studies this is also observed in Hartford, ‘Repression and Communist Success’, 122; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, 115; Leites and Wolf Jr, Rebellion and Authority, 11; and Maranto and Tuchman, ‘Knowing the Rational Peasant’, 257–8.

18. Johnson, ‘Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict’, 649.

19. Connor, National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, 71.

20. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries, 164.

21. Lawrence cited in Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare, 2.

22. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 44.

23. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 53. Also see Petersen, Resistances and Rebellion, 9. An alternative justification for adopting a behaviour-centric approach relates to the practical issue of measuring the attitudes of individuals during internal conflict, as discussed in Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 92–5.

24. Leites and Wolf Jr, Rebellion and Authority, 45.

25. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 67–8.

26. Kalyvas and Kocher, ‘The Dynamics of Violence in Vietnam’, 339.

27. For instance in the VDC of Dharmapani, where there was little attitudinal support, the Maoists reportedly gained limited information but considerable food. By contrast, in the VDC of Darbhung the levels of attitudinal support were elevated and the insurgents reportedly gained considerable supplies of both assets. While not demonstrated here, the findings for the provisions of money and shelter largely mirrored that for food supply, and the findings for materiel transportation reflected those for provision of information. These findings are indicative as they do not specifically demonstrate that the actual supply of food and information varied. Rather, they indicate a perception among local respondents that these provisions varied.

28. Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War, 156.

29. This is also observed in DeNardo, Power in Numbers, 8–15; Goldstone, ‘Theories of Revolution’, 425–53; Grenier, The Emergence of Insurgency in El Salvador, 2; McCormick, Sharply Dressed Men; Marks, Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam, 1–15; and Selbin, Modern Latin American Revolutions.

30. Romano, Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 10–11.

31. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 17. Wendell Phillips was a US abolitionist.

32. McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, 16.

33. McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, 46.

34. A similar argument is made in DeNardo, Power in Numbers, 27–32.

35. McCormick, Sharply Dressed Men, 1.

36. Leve, ‘Women's Empowerment and Rural Revolution’, 346–7.

37. Graham, ‘People's War’, 233.

38. Shah, ‘A Himalayan Red Herring’, 193.

39. DeNardo, Power in Numbers, 52.

40. A thorough consideration of the many solutions to the free-rider problem is beyond the scope of this thesis. Comprehensive accounts are available in Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma; and Moore, ‘Rational Rebels’.

41. Race, War Comes to Long An, 174.

42. Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War, 12.

43. See, for instance, Gersony, Sowing the Wind, 65; Onesto, Dispatches from the People's War, 90; Ramirez, ‘Maoism in Nepal’, 237–8; Seddon and Hussein, Consequences of Conflict, 31; and Kamal Dahal, ‘Inside the Revolution in Nepal’, 101.

44. While the land reform initiative was the most obvious candidate, neither was it possible to identify selective material incentives to promote these broader forms of behavioural support in other Maoist campaigns. For instance, the benefits of their development initiatives (including the construction of roads, school buildings, irrigation systems, etc.) were not distributed in a manner that benefited collaboration.

45. This theme is also briefly discussed in Gersony, Sowing the Wind, 69.

46. This evidence is not sufficient to suggest that the Maoists conform to the ‘criminal insurgency’ portrayed in numerous contemporary accounts, and Maoist respondents often reported that they sought to limit such practices through internal monitoring systems and severe sanctions against the culprits.

47. This issue is also discussed in Graham, ‘People's War’, 235.

48. See, for instance, This issue is also discussed in Graham, ‘People's War’, 243.

49. Karki and Seddon, ‘The People's War in Historical Perspective’, 23.

50. The first of these two explanations also overlooks the option of fleeing to secure locations.

51. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 37. Also see, for instance, Goodwin, No Other Way Out, 48; and Mason and Krane, ‘The Political Economy of Death Squads’, 181.

52. While not applicable in the case of Nepal, in certain instances insurgents also provide protection against the violent excesses of competing non-state organisations, often including those with linkages to the security forces. The ongoing conflicts in Colombia and Sudan (Darfur) provide two recent examples.

53. As observed by Kasfir, ‘Guerrillas and Civilian Participation’, 273.

54. Levine, ‘Rural Revolution in Manchuria’, 173.

55. Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War, 13.

56. Degregori, ‘Harvesting Storms’, 141. Also see Isbell, ‘Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho’, 90.

57. As observed, for instance, in Lecomte-Tilouine ‘Terror in a Maoist Model Village’.

58. Kalyvas, ‘“New” and “Old” Civil Wars’, 101. Also see Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 141–5; and Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 18.

59. While such acts generated behavioural support directly from the elite subsets of the populace, there was little evidence to suggest that this violence gained attitudinal support from ‘ordinary residents’ as a form of vengeance. As is often the case the greatest level of micro-level detail regarding this theme comes from the Peruvian case. See, for instance, Berg, ‘Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas’, 114–15; Degregori, ‘Harvesting Storms’, 136–41; Starn, ‘Missing the Revolution’, 76; Taylor, Shining Path, 129, 164; and Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 249.

60. Various causal mechanisms may underlie this inferred relationship. Most notably, a lack of attitudinal support may be a consequence of the coercive practices of the insurgents. Or, conversely, the insurgents may utilise elevated levels of violence against the populace in certain locations as a result of a local lack of attitudinal support.

61. It is worth briefly observing that a number of interviewees maintained that each of these themes provoked attitudinal opposition from certain individuals from the ‘traditional’ sectors of society, including the ‘dominant’ castes, elders, etc.

62. Karki and Seddon, ‘The People's War in Historical Perspective’, 28; Shah, ‘A Himalayan Red Herring’, 219; and Sharma, ‘The Maoist Movement’, 41–2.

63. Sharma, ‘The Maoist Movement’, 45; and Shneiderman and Turin, ‘The Path to Jan Sarkar in Dolakha District’, 80.

64. Karki and Seddon, ‘The People's War in Historical Perspective’, 28–9; and Ogura, ‘Maoist People's Government’, 177, 216–17.

65. While beyond the scope of this article, it is necessary to observe that not all of the ethnic communities provided support to the insurgents in equal measure, as indicated in Gersony, Sowing the Wind; and Shneiderman and Turin, ‘The Path to Jan Sarkar in Dolakha District’, 87.

66. With regard to other leftist insurgent movements this issue is discussed, for instance, in Cordero, ‘Women in War’, 352; Lobao, ‘Women in Revolutionary Movements’; Reif, ‘Women in Latin American Guerrilla Movements’; and Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 21–3, 215–19.

67. Onesto, Dispatches from the People's War, 174; Parvati, ‘Women's Participation in the People's War’, 169; and Pettigrew and Shneiderman, ‘Women and the Maobaadi’.

68. Gautam et al., ‘Where there are no Men’, 229; Gersony, Sowing the Wind, 58–60; Manchanda, ‘Maoist Insurgency in Nepal’, 249; Onesto, Dispatches from the People's War, 175–7; Pettigrew and Shneiderman, ‘Women and the Maobaadi’; Sharma and Prasain, ‘Gender Dimensions of the People's War’, 156–7.

69. Compare, for instance, Manchanda, ‘Maoist Insurgency in Nepal’, 253; Onesto, Dispatches from the People's War, 168; and Pettigrew and Shneiderman, ‘Women and the Maobaadi’. Li Onesto is or was a correspondent for the Revolutionary Worker and provides an account that is highly sympathetic towards the Maoists.

70. Shah, ‘A Himalayan Red Herring’, 208.

71. See, for instance, Bhattarai, Monarchy versus Democracy, 57; Shah, ‘A Himalayan Red Herring’, 208; and Thapa, ‘Erosion of the Nepali World’, 237.

72. This issue is discussed, for instance, in Connor, National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, 84–6; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 112; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, 4; Maranto and Tuchman, ‘Knowing the Rational Peasant’, 253; Popkin, Rational Peasant, 218; Selden, Yenan Way, 116; Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam, 22; and Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, 245–50.

73. The former theme is considered in detail in Mishra, ‘India's Role in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency’.

74. See, for instance, Gersony, Sowing the Wind, 64; Onesto, Dispatches from the People's War, 131; Seddon and Hussein, Consequences of Conflict, 32; and Thapa, Kingdom under Siege, 109.

75. As observed, for instance, by Levi, ‘A Model, a Method, and a Map’, 24–5; Lichbach, ‘Social Theory and Comparative Politics’, 249–50; Moore, ‘Rational Rebels’, 427; and Romano, Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 68.

76. Olson, Logic of Collective Action, 61.

77. Outside of the case of Nepal, a list of the studies that focus upon this issue is available in Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 95. Also see, for instance, Kerkvliet, Huk Rebellion, 33; Selden, Yenan Way, 53; Taylor, Shining Path, 180; and Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 257.

78. See, for instance, Lecomte-Tilouine, ‘Terror in a Maoist Model Village’; Pettigrew, ‘Guns, Kinship and Fear’; Pettigrew, ‘Living between the Maoists and the Army’; de Sales, ‘The Kham Magar Country’; de Sales, ‘From Ancestral Conflicts to Local Empowerment’; Shneiderman and Turin, ‘The Path to Jan Sarkar in Dolakha District’; and Shneiderman, ‘The Formation of Political Consciousness in Rural Nepal’.

79. A very limited psychological treatment of the Nepali case is provided in Graham, ‘People's War’, 243.

80. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 95–6.

81. As observed by Levi, ‘A Model, a Method, and a Map’, 24–5.

82. This is also the approach adopted by Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War.