International quest for local legitimacy in Afghanistan: A tower of Babel?

Abstract

With continuing challenges facing the international presence in Afghanistan, the need to secure local legitimacy, or ‘winning heart and minds’ of the local population is gaining increasing foothold in contemporary policy-making and academic debate on international intervention. However, knowledge of how international actors in the field understand local legitimacy remains limited. The purpose of this article is to take a first cut at examining how the two leading actors of international intervention – the UN and NATO – frame the issue of local legitimacy in Afghanistan, and to evaluate the potential impact of these findings on the prospects of inter-organizational coordination in the field. Based on a qualitative comparative analysis of statements issued in UN SC Resolutions, SC Debates, and S-G Reports (2001–2011) and NATO Declarations and Opinions (2003–2011), the study finds that the UN and NATO frame the issue of local legitimacy in surprisingly similar ways. However, the framing appears problematic in terms of how it depicts the relationship between the international presence and the Afghan state and its people. To illustrate, both the UN and NATO tend to externalize the issue of local legitimacy by linking it to the strength of the Afghan state rather than to the quality and effectiveness of international assistance and furthermore do not explicitly recognize Afghan civilians to have any autonomous influence on the level of local legitimacy. Instead, civilians are only portrayed to affect the level of legitimacy indirectly as the victims of insurgent or coalition attacks. The results of the study thus indicate a lack of awareness and self-criticism within the international intervention apparatus towards the potential pitfalls of international assistance, and it signals a lack of attention paid to the agency of local Afghans, which stands the risk of jeopardizing prospects for international civil–military coordination with Afghan stakeholders.

Keywords:

• local legitimacy
• international assistance
• Afghanistan
• UN
• NATO
• inter-organizational coordination

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the participating authors of the special issue on Coordinating Actors in Complex Operations, in particular the editor, Chiara Ruffa and Damon Coletta, for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this article.

Notes

 1. For the purpose of this article, international assistance refers to all international civilian and military assistance invited by the host state and authorized by a UN Security Council Resolution.

 2. Assistance is mainly provided through the conduct of operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces. Furthermore, ISAF has mentored, trained, and equipped the Afghan National Security Forces, S/2011/55, §13.

 3. The UN Security Council authorizes the deployment of ISAF in December 2001 (S/RES/1386), and thereafter mandates the launch of UNAMA in March 2002 (S/RES/1401). In August 2003 NATO takes on the responsibility of command, coordination, and planning of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan.

 4. Another avenue of research addresses the observable implications of legitimacy on other social phenomenon. Such scholarly work struggles with the issue of endogeneity, namely whether variations in legitimacy are causes to, or the result of, other social processes and developments.

 5. Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 17. Here, the definition of perception proposed by Talentino is fitting, namely ‘consciousness or observation in the sense of understanding’, Talentino, ‘Perceptions of Peacebuilding’, 155.

 6. Galtung and Eide, ‘Some Factors’, 240.

 7. Albarracín et al., Handbook of Attitudes, 4.

 8. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence, 92.

 9. Moulakis, Legitimacy, 4.

10. Karlborg, ‘Local Legitimacy’.

11. Galtung and Eide, ‘Some Factors’.

12. Futamura and Notaras, ‘Local Perspectives’.

13. Olsson and Jarstad, ‘Local Ownership of Peace’, 103.

14. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War; Galtung and Eide, ‘Some Factors’; Pouligny, Peace Operations.

15. Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo; Galtung and Eide, ‘Some Factors’; Pouligny, Peace Operations.

16. Galtung and Eide, ‘Some Factors’, 249f; Gelot and Söderbaum, ‘Interveners and Intervened upon’, 84; Olsson and Jarstad, ‘Local Ownership of Peace’, 102.

17. See e.g. Galtung and Eide, ‘Some Factors’; Kalyvas, Logic of Violence; Pouligny, Peace Operations; Talentino, ‘Perceptions of Peace-building’.

18. Security Council Report. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/index.php.

19. NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-7CC5171B-0D7F0A8B/natolive/search_380.htm.

20. There are no official texts issued by NATO prior to 2006.

21. These less formal statements are more likely to be colored by the viewpoint of the speaker in question. However, they are nonetheless stated in the official capacity of the speaker, which makes them relevant to include when examining the framing of local legitimacy in UN and NATO policy discourse.

22. The quantitative selection process included texts that contained any of the following keywords for UN documents: civil*, consent, force, legit*, local, mission, resistance, and support* (the asterisks indicate wildcard searches targeting all words beginning with these letters). Due to search engine restrictions in regard to NATO documents, the keywords ISAF and civilian/local were used to make a first selection in regard to Opinions.

23. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/56/681-S/2001/1157, §20.

24. UN Security Council, S/RES/1383. A slightly revised version of this statement first appeared in Agreement on the Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan, S/ 2001 /1154 2001, 2.

25. UN Security Council, S/RES/1453. In Security Council debates, the term ‘Transitional Administration’ is not used consistently in relation to ‘legitimate authority’ of Afghanistan, instead terms such as Afghan state, national government, central government, Interim administration, authority and government and Loya Jirga are also mentioned in this respect.

26. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/56/875–S/2002/278, §42.

27. UN Security Council, S/PV.5025, 13, 20.

28. UN Security Council, S/PV.6154, 12.

29. UN Security Council, S/PV.4979, 5–6.

30. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/63/751–S/2009/135, §47.

31. UN Security Council, S/PV.5760, 36.

32. David Petraeus quoted in ‘ISAF Commander General David Petraeus Interviewed on Afghanistan’, NATO, 31 August 2010. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_65854.htm?selectedLocale = en.

33. Götz Gliemeroth quoted in ‘General Götz Gliemeroth: ISAF Commander’, NATO, 1 October 2003. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_20534.htm?selectedLocale = en.

34. Petraeus, ‘ISAF Commander’.

35. Eric Tremblay quoted in ‘Press briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai and ISAF Spokesman Brigadier General Eric Tremblay’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 9 December 2009. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_60060.htm?selectedLocale = en.

36. Jean-Louis Py quoted in ‘General Jean-Louis Py: ISAF Commander’, 1 July 2004. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_21170.htm?selectedLocale = en.

37. Tremblay, ‘Press briefing by NATO Spokesman’.

38. Tremblay, ‘Press briefing by NATO Spokesman’.

39. James Appathurai quoted in ‘Press briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai and ISAF Spokesman Brigadier General Eric Tremblay’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 9 December 2009. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_60060.htm?selectedLocale = en.

40. The term ‘under the ownership of the Afghan people’ frequently appears in UN Security Council Resolutions on Afghanistan dating back to 2006, principally in reference to the internationally supported implementation of the Afghanistan Compact, which was issued at the London Conference on Afghanistan, UN Security Council, S/RES/1662.

41. See UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/64/364–S/2009/475, §34, UN Security Council, S/PV.5025; and UN Security Council, S/PV.5215.

42. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer quoted in ‘Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer after the Informal Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, with Invitees, with non-NATO ISAF Contributing Nations’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 19 February 2009. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_51362.htm?selectedLocale = en.

43. Phil Jones quoted in ‘Press briefing by Major General Phil Jones, Director, Force Reintegration Cell at ISAF’, NATO, 16 September 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_78208.htm?selectedLocale = en.

44. John R. Allen quoted in ‘Interview with General John R. Allen, Commander ISAF’, NATO, 2 September 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_77543.htm?selectedLocale = en.

45. Petraeus, ‘ISAF Commander’.

46. Jones, ‘Press briefing by Major General’.

47. Mohammad Zahir Azimi quoted in ‘Press briefing on Operation Moshtarak with Brigadier General Tremblay, ISAF Spokesperson, General Azimi, Spokesperson for the Afghan Ministry of Defence and Zemerai Bashary, Spokesperson for the Afghan Ministry of Interior’, NATO, 17 February 2010. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_61529.htm?selectedLocale = en.

48. UN Security Council, S/2008/434, §77.

49. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/61/326–S/2006/727, §10.

50. UN Security Council, S/2008/434, §71.

51. Jones, ‘Press briefing by Major General’.

52. Eric Tremblay quoted in ‘Press briefing on Operation Moshtarak with Brigadier General Tremblay, ISAF Spokesperson, General Azimi, Spokesperson for the Afghan Ministry of Defence and Zemerai Bashary, Spokesperson for the Afghan Ministry of Interior’, NATO, 17 February 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_61529.htm?selectedLocale = en.

53. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/61/326–S/2006/727, §10.

54. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/62/722–S/2008/159, §59.

55. Allen, ‘Interview with General John’.

56. NATO. Summit Declaration on Afghanistan.

57. UN Security Council, S/PV.5760, 3. In contrast, the term ‘citizen’, used much less frequently, connotes independent agency of local Afghans: ‘For many Afghans, some relief in the daily struggle to survive, rather than politics, will be the key test of the peace process. In that respect, the success of the reconstruction effort will be vital since, without it, the patience of the average citizen will run thin and the legitimacy of the Government will become strained’, UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/57/762–S/2003/333, §75.

58. Allen, ‘Interview with General John’; de Hoop Scheffer, ‘Press conference by NATO Secretary General’.

59. de Hoop Scheffer, ‘Press conference by NATO Secretary General’.

60. Tremblay, ‘Press briefing by NATO Spokesman’; Dan McNeill quoted in ‘Joint press briefing with General Dan McNeill, Commander of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and Ambassador Daan Everts, NATO Senior Civilian Representative’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 12 September 2007. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_8491.htm?selectedLocale = en.

61. Gliemeroth, ‘General Götz Gliemeroth: ISAF Commander’.

62. UN Security Council, S/PV.6255, 33.

63. De Hoop Scheffer, ‘Press conference by NATO Secretary General’.

64. Py, ‘General Jean-Louis Py’.

65. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/63/892–S/2009/323, §11.

66. UN Security Council, S/PV.6287, 12.

67. UN Security Council, S/PV.5025, 23.

68. UN Security Council, S/PV.4541, 10.

69. An illustrative example is the reoccurring notion of the UN as an impartial actor with the expertise necessary to strengthen ‘Afghan legitimacy and ownership of the country's own development process… on the national, province and district levels alike’, UN Security Council, S/PV.5760, 3.

70. See S/2008/434 2008, §24 and UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/64/364–S/2009/475, §73. UN discourse also identifies a regional dimension to the legitimacy of activities in Afghanistan, stating that international assistance ‘will have greater legitimacy and efficacy if underpinned by the concerns, perspectives and support of the countries in the region’, UN Security Council, S/PV.6625, 17.

71. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/58/742–S/2004/230, §58.

72. To illustrate, concurrent with the finalization of ISAF expansion throughout Afghanistan in the fall of 2006, NATO issued Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which stipulated a framework for the establishment of a cooperation program between NATO and Afghan authorities ‘on defence reform, defence institution building and the military aspects of security sector reform’ (§1, 11) with the ‘desired end state’ of ‘a credible, professional military force able to support Afghan authorities to maintain security and stability in the country’ (§10).

73. NATO. Declaration by the Heads of State and Government, 2008, 6.

74. Tremblay, ‘Press briefing on Operation Moshtarak’.

75. Tremblay, ‘Press briefing by NATO Spokesman’.

76. NATO, Declaration by the Heads of State and Government, 2008, §9.

77. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/57/850–S/2003/754, §7.

78. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/61/326–S/2006/727, §10.

79. See UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/59/744–S/2005/183, §69; UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/65/783–S/2011/120*, §75; and UN Security Council, S/PV.5994, 26.

80. UN Security Council, S/PV.5760, 20, 33.

81. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/63/372–S/2008/617, §68.

82. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/64/364–S/2009/475, §34.

83. See UN Security Council, S/PV.6255, 20 and UN Security Council, S/PV.6094, 8, 29.

84. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/61/799–S/2007/152, §5.

85. Appathurai, ‘Press briefing by NATO Spokesman’.

86. The potentially negative impact of civilian assistance on local legitimacy is not explicitly addressed in UN or NATO discourse other than the lack of civilian assistance, or lack of coordination between international civilian and military efforts.

87. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/63/892–S/2009/323, §57.

88. Tremblay, ‘Press briefing by NATO Spokesman’.

89. Tremblay, ‘Press briefing by NATO Spokesman’

90. Allen, ‘Interview with General John’.

91. Daan Everts quoted in ‘Joint press briefing with General Dan McNeill, Commander of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and Ambassador Daan Everts, NATO Senior Civilian Representative’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 12 September 2007. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_8491.htm?selectedLocale = en.

92. Appathurai, ‘Press briefing by NATO Spokesman’.

93. NATO, Statement on Afghanistan by Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

94. NATO, Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2010; NATO, Declaration by the Heads of State and Government, 2010.

95. Anders Fogh Rasmussen quoted in ‘Press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen following the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers with non-NATO ISAF Contributing Nations, Brussels’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 11 March 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_71514.htm?selectedLocale = en; Anders Fogh Rasmussen quoted in ‘Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with non-NATO ISAF contributing nations, Berlin’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 14 April 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_72419.htm?selectedLocale = en; and Allen quoted in ‘Interview with General John’.

96. Anders Fogh Rasmussen quoted in ‘Press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen following the meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with non NATO-ISAF contributing nations’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 8 December 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_81976.htm?selectedLocale = en

97. Phrase inspired by Pouligny, Peace Operations.