Conceptual failure, the Taliban's parallel hierarchies, and America's strategic defeat in Afghanistan

Abstract

ISAF exists to protect the Afghan constitutional model. This strategic objective will be defeated because the GIRoA model has a conceptual flaw that renders it incapable of delivering governance at the local level (Tier IV). This fatal flaw has enabled the Taliban, by developing parallel hierarchies, to displace GIRoA and establish itself in southern locales as the political authority. The Taliban are fighting a revolutionary war, a Maoist displacement strategy that uses guerrilla tactics to advance a political program. Petraeus and McChrystal failed to recognize the character of war, and believed the Taliban are pursuing an exhaustion strategy. They failed to devise a counter-RW strategy. The ‘Surge’ was doomed ab initio.

Keywords::

• COIN
• Maoist
• parallel hierarchies
• revolutionary war
• displacement strategy
• exhaustion strategy
• manteqa

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the American Institute of Afghanistan Studies for hosting me in Kabul in summer 2013; to Dr Masood Karokhail and Mr Rahim Khurram of the Tribal Liaison Office for giving of their time and expertise; and to the convenors and participants of the ‘Warfare and Organized Violence’ workshop, Faculty of History, University of Cambridge, where an early version of this article was presented in 2011.

Notes

^1. Mao, Guerrilla Warfare, 33.

^2.Nagl, ‘Not losing’.

^3.Rasmussen, ‘NATO's plan’.

^4.ISAF Commander's Initial Assessment, 30 August 2009. (Hereafter referred to as IA.)

^5.Chandrasekeran, Little America, 59, 62.

^6. Martel, William C. Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Strategy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

^7. Ibid., 392.

^8. von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Eds. and trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

^9. Ibid., 69 (emphasis added).

^10. See, e.g., Gray, ‘Irregular Warfare’; Strachan and Scheipers, Changing Character of War; Kalyvas, ‘Changing Character of Civil Wars, (1800–2009)’.

^11. See IA.

^12.Gentile, ‘A Few Questions’.

^13.Yingling, ‘Failure in Generalship’.

^14.Dombey and Luce, ‘Petraeus warns’.

^15.Wendle, ‘Limits of the Surge’.

^16.Petraeus, ‘Lessons of Vietnam’, 293–4.

^17.Greenberg, Lawrence. A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946–1955. Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987.

^18.Fall, Street Without Joy, 374.

^19. Ibid., 375.

^20.Giap, Military Art, 169.

^21.Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, 234–5 (emphasis added).

^22. See Isby ‘Pushtun Politics’.

^23.Glatzer, ‘War and Boundaries’, 399.

^24. Daniel Helmer, US Army, email to author, 10 November 2007.

^25.Smith, ‘Talking to the Taliban’.

^26.Zahab, ‘North-West Frontier Province’, 6–7 (emphasis added).

^27.White, Pakistan's Islamist Frontier, 96. We thank Mariam Abou Zahab for this reference.

^28. Glatzer, ‘War and Boundaries’, 399.

^29.Gray, Irregular Enemies, 22.

^30.Gentile, ‘Strategy of Tactics’, 7.

^31. IA 1–3, 2–2.

^32. IA 1–1.

^33. IA 1–2, 2–4.

^34. IA 2–4.

^35. IA 2–9.

^36.Maley et al., ‘Nightmare Scenario’.

^37. IA 2–5 to 2–8.

^38. IA 2–6.

^39. IA 2–8.

^40.Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, 52.

^41.Ricks, ‘Airstrikes Rise’.

^42. Rahim Wardak (then) GIRoA Defense Minister in IA 2–4.

^43. See bibliography.

^44.Thier, ‘Great Debates’.

^45.Maley, Rescuing Afghanistan, 46.

^46.Rashid, Descent, 75–6.

^47. Conversations with Thomas Barfield, Boston University.

^48.Qassem, ‘Afghanistan’, 189.

^49.International Crisis Group, Afghanistan.

^50.Zaidi, ‘General's Bloody Nose’.

^51. See Isby ‘Pushtun Politics’.

^52.Barfield, ‘Afghanistan’; Glatzer, ‘War and Boundaries’, ‘Pashtun Tribal System’, and ‘Ethnic and Tribal Disintegration’; Canfield, ‘Ethnic, Regional, and Sectarian’.

^53.Schetter, Ethnicity.

^54.Khalilzad, ‘Politics of Ethnicity’.

^55. Isby, ‘Pushtun Politics’.

^56. Rashid, Descent, 212.

^57. Qandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, and Zabul are ‘Greater Qandahar’; Paktia, Paktika, and Khost are ‘Greater Paktia’. The new provinces are the product of gerrymandering.

^58. Qassem, ‘Afghanistan’, 181ff.

^59.Maley, Executive, ¶¶ 14–15.

^60.Maley, Discussion of Forms, 5 (emphasis added).

^61.Viet Minh operative quoted in Race, War Comes to Long An, 42–3.

^62.Rashid, Taliban, 25.

^63.Dorronsoro, Revolution, 245; Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 218–50; Davis, ‘How the Taliban Became a Military Force’, 43–50.

^64. Davis, ‘How the Taliban’, 55.

^65. Rashid, Descent, 87.

^66.Bleuer, ‘Persistent Myth’. We are indebted to Dr Bleuer for his trailblazing research.

^67. Dorronsoro, Revolution, 240–1; Shahrani, ‘War, Factionalism’, 719; Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 208–9; Saikal, Afghanistan, 219.

^68.Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 209.

^69.Rasanayagam, Afghanistan, 154.

^70. Shahrani, ‘War, Factionalism’, 719; Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 208–09.

^71. Rasanayagam, Afghanistan,154.

^72.Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 208–9.

^73. Shahrani, ‘War, Factionalism’, 720; Dorronsoro, Revolution, 241–42; Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 207.

^74. Shahrani, ‘War, Factionalism’, 720.

^75.Karokhail, ‘Informal Structures’.

^76.Glatzer, ‘Afghanistan’, 177.

^77. Meetings with Rahim Khurram, Tribal Liasion Office, Kabul, 2008, 2013.

^78. Personal communications with Dr Sharifi.

^79. Personal communications with Mohammad Eshaq.

^80. Saikal, Modern Afghanistan, 217–18.

^81. Ibid., 218.

^82.Favre, Interface, 7.

^83. Glatzer, ‘War and Boundaries’, 381.

^84.Favre, Local Shura.

^85.Mehrabad Nawa.

^86. Favre, Local Shura, Annex 1; Informal and Customary Justice, Appendix 11.

^87. UN Security Council, S/2001/1154 (5 Dec. 2001).

^88. Formulation is by Col. Gabriel Bonnet.

^89. Race, War Comes to Long An, 105–20.

^90. Ibid., 108.

^91.Fall, Counterinsurgency, 112.

^92. Ibid., 126.

^93. Johnston, Tim. “Les Talibans rêvent d'un Etat islamique à l'état pur.” Reuters, March 30, 1997.

^94.Kitson, Low Intensity, 31.

^95.Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency.

^96. Fall, Counterinsurgency, 122.

^97. Race, War Comes to Long An, 105–6.

^98. Rashid, Descent, 251.

^99. Meeting with Brig. Gen. Milley, Bagram, 2008.

^100. Mullah Omar, Qavanin-i mullah omar.

^101.Cook, Commanding Right.

^102. The Taliban's RW, al-amr bi'l ma‘ruf, and puritanical reform are explicated in a paper in progress.

^103.Perlez, ‘Frontier Years’.

^104.Race, War Comes to Long An, 98.

^105.Petraeus, ‘Learning Counterinsurgency’, 3–5.

^106. Chandrasekeran, Little America, 190–204.

^107. Meeting with Masood Karokhail, Tribal Liaison Office, Kabul, 2013.

^108. IA 1–1.

^109. Kitson, Low Intensity, 33ff.

^110.Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, 2.

^111.Maloney, ‘A Violent Impediment’.

^112. Fall, Counterinsurgency.

^113. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, 70.

^114. Fall, Counterinsurgency, 111–12.

^115. Race, War Comes to Long An, 112.

^116.Chayes, ‘Government by Crime Syndicate’.

^117. On qawm, see Shahrani, ‘War, Factionalism’, 717; Favre, Interface, 5–6.

^118.Owen and Brady, ‘The Last Post’ (emphasis added).

^119.Clark, ‘Emperor's New Clothes’.

^120.West, Wrong War, passim.

^121. IA 1–4.

^122.Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, 52.

^123.Mao, Guerrilla Warfare, 81.

^124. A version appeared in 2011, but is virtually identical. The 2010 version is in translation in many online resources.

^125.Shah ‘Islamic Emirate;’ Clark, The Layha.

^126.Johnson and DuPee, ‘Analysing the New Taliban Code of Conduct’.

^127. See, e.g., Mehrabad Nawa, 25–6.

^128.Nagl et al., A Pathway to Success.

^129. Favre, Local Shura, 4.

^130. Fall, Counterinsurgency, 11.

^131.Burke, ‘Taliban Win Over Locals’.

^132.Zadran, ‘Socio-Economic’, 207–14.

^133.Tapper, Bartered Brides, 280.

^134.Barth, ‘Segmentary Opposition’, 8.

^135.Lindholm, Generosity & Jealousy, 63.

^136. West, Wrong War, 193–5.

^137. Chandrasekeran, Little America, 138.

^138. See AREU Report N^os 302E, 303E, 437E, 620E, 918E, and 921E.

^139.MacAuslan, Land Acquisition, 12–22, 21 (quote).

^140. AREU N^o 302E, Appendix K.

^141.Ottaway and Lieven, ‘Rebuilding Afghanistan’, 4.