The prospects of combined action: Lessons from Vietnam

Abstract

Military commanders, policymakers, and analysts have recently embraced the concept of combined action as a powerful tool to improve the effectiveness of Afghan security forces in the fight against the Taliban. In doing so, they explicitly draw inspiration from the Combined Action Program employed by US Marines during the Vietnam War. This program is widely considered to have greatly improved the effectiveness of South Vietnamese government forces and contributed to increased population security in its area of operations and is considered a model worthy of emulation. This study finds that the success of the Vietnam-era Combined Action Program was more qualified than contemporary proponents argue. It argues that successes were tempered, and conditioned, by the choice of junior commanders, the level of operational control enjoyed by the US Marines, and the way the local forces were recruited and deployed. These conditions offer valuable lessons for those seeking to employ combined action not only in present-day Afghanistan, but also in future counterinsurgency campaigns.

Keywords::

• Combined Action Program
• Corps Tactical Zone
• Joint Action Companies
• Popular Forces Militia
• US Marine Corps
• Vietnam War

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Robert Farley for his insightful comments on previous versions of this article.

Notes

^1.Zais, Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 15.

^2.United States Army, ‘Field Manual 3–24’, 5–25.

^3.Corbin, ‘Combined Action Platoons Needed in Iraq’; Moyar, ‘Can the U.S. Lead Afghans?’; Moyar, ‘How to Whip the Afghan Army Into Shape’; West, The Wrong War; Lange, A Forgotten Lesson.

^4. According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the ability to partner with local forces, and help the latter defend themselves, will be central to US defense policy in the future. Gates, ‘Helping Others Defend Themselves’.

^5.Weltsch, ‘The Future Role of the Combined Action Program’, 57–8; Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, 22.

^6. Hunt, Pacification, 27, 39, passim.

^7.Jordan, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, 8.

^8. As Max Boot points out, the Marines had a long history of working with local forces. Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace.

^9. III MAF, ‘Fact Sheet’, 1.

^10.Cassidy, ‘Back to the Street’, 76.

^11. Arminio, ‘Foreign Internal Defense’, 8.

^12. Combined Action did not spread beyond I CTZ, however. While General Westmoreland (COMUSMACV) frequently expressed his approval for the program, he did not consider it a feasible approach for a variety of reasons. Combined action, therefore, remained a relatively small program conducted independently by the Marines in ICTZ, and was never embraced by the rest of the US military in Vietnam.

^13. See Walt, Strange War, 105. Many proponents of the program also highlight the contributions of the PFs to the program. In doing so, they emphasize the added value of the local knowledge that the PFs brought to the program.

^14. US Marine Corps, Operations of III MAF, December 1968, 68; US Marine Corps, Operations of III MAF, March 1970, 14.

^15. In 1967, for instance, villages that were protected by a combined action platoon scored on average 2.95 points on the five-point scale of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), while other villages scored an average of 1.6. See Brush, ‘Civic Action’. CAPs outperformed their counterparts also in other measures, such as kill-ratios, weapons-losses, and desertions. In 1966, for instance, CAPs performed better than all other ARVN infantry units in these categories, including the ARVN Airborne and Rangers. Thayer, Systems Analysis View, Volume 6, 7. During the first six months of 1969, the CAP kill-ratio was 8:1, compared to 2.7:1 for independent PF platoons in I CTZ. See Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, 38.

^16. Standard operating procedure for CAPs was that operations had to be combined. That is, on every patrol/ambush there had to be both a Marine and a PF presence. We can assume therefore that the higher operational tempo of the CAPs versus regular PF platoons also meant that PFs were involved and that this was not just due to higher levels of activity on the part of the Marines.

^17. PFs assigned to the CAP constituted a mere 17.5% of the total PF force deployed in I CTZ (a number that includes the US Marines that were part of the program), yet the Combined Action Platoons ‘conducted 45% of total operations of PFs in ICTZ. US Marine Corps, Operations of III MAF, December 1968, 69.

^18. According to MACV's Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES), more than half of the PF units ‘seldom’ sought ‘engagement with the enemy’. Thayer, Systems Analysis View, Volume 7, 145.

^19. Ibid., 43. Desertion rates for PFs in the last half of 1968 were 10.3 per month per 1000 troops. This dropped in the first quarter of 1969 to 5.5 per month per 1000. In contrast, the numbers for ARVN combat forces and RFs for this period were closer to 27 and 11.2 per 1000. According to West, the desertion rate for CAP PF platoons was 4% per annum. See West, Area Security System. Significantly, the command chronologies of the Combined Action Groups do not show any evidence of concern about PF desertion rates, while desertion rates for other units featured prominently in other MACV assessments.

^20. While these numbers may have overall been highly inflated, there is no real reason to believe that the CAP numbers were more inflated than those of the line units. In fact, given the fact that many of the CAP were conducted with small arms, rather than with the use of indirect artillery support, there is a good chance that the CAP numbers were more accurate than those reported by the line units.

^21. US Marine Corps, Operations of III MAF, December 1968, 69.

^22. According to West, CAPs achieved a 7.2 to 1 kill-ratio between 1966 and 1968. This was only slightly lower than the kill-ratios achieved by large-unit operations (which relied a great deal upon Close Air Support and artillery. It was a lot more favorable than the kill-ratios achieved by other PF platoons in I CTZ, and across the country. West, Area Security System.

^23.Krulak, First to Fight, 199. As the HES suggests, moreover, the program did not just increase the effectiveness of the PFs. It also appears to have been successful in increasing population security.

^24.Ridderhof, ‘Combined Action’. In general, the costs to the US (and the government of South Vietnam) of sustaining one PF soldier were about a quarter of maintaining an ARVN conscript. Heymont, Resource Allocations, 6.

^25. Hunt, 27. For more on the PFs, see Ngo Quang Truong, Territorial Forces, 27–30.

^26.USMACV, Command History, 108; Thayer, Systems Analysis View, Volume 6, 15.

^27. Thayer, Systems Analysis View, Volume 7, 143. Thayer cites a RAND study conducted at the time, which found even more dismal numbers.

^28. Part of the problem was also that the VC/NVA tended to place ambushes at likely avenues of approach when they attacked PF outposts. Having been caught on multiple occasions in such ambushes early on in the conflict, the ARVN units became much more cautious.

^29. Jordan, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, 8.

^30. The insurgents often made this decision easier for the PFs by giving them the choice to not get involved in the actual fight. See Race, War comes to Long An, 180.

^31.West, Small Unit Action in Vietnam; Williamson, The U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Program, 16; Cross, Born a Foreigner, 171.

^32. The Marines were certainly better equipped than the VC local forces, who were their primary opponents at the village level. See Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, 39–40.

^33. This was certainly not always the case, and the proficiency of CAP Marines also varied considerably as the selection criteria for the program varied over the years. Since, however, all Marines are trained as riflemen first, one can assume that the overwhelming majority of CAP Marines were actually proficient in the use of their own personal weapon.

^34.West, The Village, 105.

^35.Sorley, Vietnam Chronicles, 291.

^36. Clarke, Advice and Support, 161.

^37.Truong, Territorial Forces, 59.

^38. Starting at the end of 1967, MACV began to pay more attention to the territorial forces. In an effort to upgrade the effectiveness of these forces they were not only supplied with more powerful weaponry but they also became the focus of a sustained training program by means of Mobile Advisory Teams. For a description of the development of the MAT system, see ibid., 111–13. While Truong suggests that changes took place after 1967, this view was not supported by the officer in charge of territorial security at MACV headquarters. See Jordan, Senior Officer Debriefing Program.

^39. Weltsch, ‘The Future Role of the Combined Action Program’, 98. For instance, Hop Brown, a member of the 1st Combined Action Company (CAC) in 1965 observed that the PFs he worked with initially failed to maintain and clean their personal weapons properly, but that their efforts improved after they witnessed the Marines clean their weapons every single day. Hemingway, Our War Was Different, 23.

^40. The importance of capable junior leadership in the ‘village war’ is almost universally acknowledged. See Myers, ‘The Pacification of Cam Lo’, 51. This is not to say that the senior leadership was any better, but the tactical effectiveness of the PF platoons was dependent more upon the talents of the junior commanders than it was dependent upon the administrative skills of the village and district chiefs that were in charge of the PFs.

^41. Truong, Territorial Forces, 51, 53, passim.

^42. Jordan, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, 19.

^43. Weltsch, ‘The Future Role of the Combined Action Program’, 98.

^44. Many observers point out that the Marines did not have formal control over the PFs, but suggest that the Marines had de facto control over the Combined Action Platoons. One former CAF commander has argued that ‘in most cases Marines asserted themselves with the compliance of the Vietnamese (but if necessary they simply took command). Cosmas et al., US Marines in Vietnam, 145.

^45.Corson, The Betrayal, 183.

^46. According to Colonel Metzger, one of the commanders of the program, leadership selection was rigorous, and many potential CAP Marines were rejected. ‘I would say that the majority … we rejected. We rejected them usually because simply did not … have the leadership … capabilities.’ Cosmas et al., US Marines in Vietnam, 143.

^47. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, 35.

^48.Henderson, Cohesion, 108, 123; Bartone and Kirkland, ‘Optimal Leadership’, 398.

^49. Weltsch, ‘The Future Role of the Combined Action Program’, 98. Not only do good NCOs make sure that their men are taken care of, they also set an example in battle for their troops to follow. As Daniel Bolger points out, soldiers are ‘hero worshippers’ looking for someone to follow in combat. Bolger, ‘So You Want to Be an Adviser’.

^50. The RVNAF tendency to follow set patterns in their operations has been frequently noted by American observers. See Weltsch, ‘The Future Role of the Combined Action Program’, 57–8.

^51. As one CAP NCO argued, ‘If the PFs were not trained properly it was the CAP leader's fault. As with my Marines, they learned by example and some were good and trainable; others were totally useless.’ For more examples of how the Marines led and taught by example, see Goodson, CAP Mot, 181, passim.

^52. For examples see Flynn, Personal War in Vietnam. Flynn's book is an account of his visit with a company that was part of the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP), a CAP off-shoot.

^53. In general, not all Vietnam observers share the favorable view of the CAP. Some believe the program was a failure, while others consider it to have been somewhere in the middle between effective and ineffective. Yet others have argued that the PF contingent was a significant weak link in the program. See, for example, Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency, 400. Former CIA director William Colby argued that the program was only effective as long as the Marines were involved, and that it did not have lasting effects on the PF or population security in the absence of their presence. Colby, Lost Victory, 189.

^54. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, F-25; Flynn, Personal War in Vietnam, 41.

^55. According to Allnutt's study, about 65% of terminating CAP Marines believed that the Vietnamese armed forces were only ‘doing as much as they had to’ (or less) to combat the VC/NVA. Hemingway's book, which offers vignettes written by various CAP veterans, shows the divergent views that CAP Marines held of their local counterparts. Hemingway, Our War Was Different.

^56. See Tony Vieira in ibid., 41.

^57. For the general view on the quality of Marines assigned to CAPs, see Melvin Zais, Commanding General XXIV Corps 1969–1970, who argued that ‘All personnel are closely screened to eliminate misfits and those lacking the motivation and maturity required.’ Zais, Senior Officer Debriefing Report.

^58. Lieutenant Eck, who is widely credited with setting up the first combined action units in 1965, argued that he received the best available Marines to man his units. Others involved in setting up the initial program have refuted this argument. Major Cullen Zimmerman, executive officer of the 3/4 Marine Battalion has argued that he told ‘Company Commanders that he wanted a regulation squad of volunteers who were good, but not the best Marines in the company’. Zimmerman ‘did not require the companies to sacrifice their capabilities to fill the ranks of CAP, but he insisted on quality marines’. Weltsch, ‘The Future Role of the Combined Action Program’, 61. It is important to point out that both Zimmerman and Eck agree that the CAP Marines, at least initially, were of above average quality and led by experienced and mature Marines.

^59. For one example, see Harvey Baker's testimony. Hemingway, Our War Was Different, 61. See also Arminio, ‘Foreign Internal Defense’, 8. This was certainly what CAP commanders seemed to have assumed about those who volunteered.

^60. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, C-4.

^61. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, 49. According to Peterson, the CAP School had to shift attention to small-unit warfare because many of the CAP Marines that arrived at the school were not from the combat arms and were in dire need of remedial training.

^62. See Major H. G. Duncan in Hemingway, Our War Was Different, 155.

^63.US Marine Corps, 2nd CAG Command Chronology, 4–108. All this does not necessary mean that the squad leaders in 2nd CAG were unqualified. It does suggest, however, that there were general concerns about the leadership capabilities and potential of the CAP NCOs.

^64.Kopets, ‘The Combined Action Program’.

^65.Ridderhof, ‘Combined Action’.

^66. Cosmas et al., US Marines in Vietnam, 143.

^67.Estes, A Field of Innocence.

^68. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities.

^69. The issue of command over Vietnamese troops was decided early on in the conflict. General Westmoreland believed that putting Vietnamese troops under the command of Americans was a bad idea for political reasons. He believed that the US would be ‘seen as a colonial power’ if it would take command over the ARVN. See Truong, RVNAF, 19.

^70. One of the original commanders of the Combined Action Program, Corson, argued that, ‘in the combat environment and immediate preparation thereto the Marine sergeant assumes complete command of the CAP’. Corson, The Betrayal, 183.

^71. As a result, CAP Marines were often like other US advisers in Vietnam, whom Corson described as eunuchs whose ability to affect ‘ARVN's performance is based upon an ability to wheedle, plead, and cajole’. Ibid., 103.

^72. Another result of this lack of control was not related to combat effectiveness per se, but to pacification in general. As Flynn points out in his account of his ‘embed’ with a CUPP, the Marines had no control over their local partners. For example, Flynn witnessed a number of PFs rob an old lady to procure food. As Flynn points out ‘Clearly such behavior did nothing to create goodwill among the population.’ Flynn notes that the Marines reacted with ‘apathy’ to the episode, explaining their failure to intervene as a function of their lack of authority over the PFs. Flynn, Personal War in Vietnam, 41.

^73.US Marine Corps, ‘4th CAG Chronological Summary’, 2.

^74. See Major H. G. Duncan in Hemingway, Our War Was Different, 153.

^75.Palm, ‘Tiger Papa Three’, 40.

^76. Cosmas et al., US Marines in Vietnam, 147.

^77. Edward Palm points out that the PFs in his CAP also had a habit of not showing up for patrolling duty whenever they felt like it.

^78. Goodson, CAP Mo, 85.

^79. Kopets, ‘The Combined Action Program’.

^80. See Hop Brown in Hemingway, Our War Was Different, 22.

^81. In general, province and district chiefs frequently deployed territorial forces for different purposes than they were intended for. See Corson, The Betrayal, 85.

^82. Hemingway, Our War Was Different, 112.

^83. The historical record suggests that the most effective PF troops were those who had a personal grudge against the VC. See for example, Estes, A Field of Innocence, 267–8; Hemingway, Our War Was Different, 102.

^84. West, Area Security System, 69.

^85. In doing so, they did not necessarily keep the original purpose of the Popular Forces in mind, and assigned PF platoons on ‘hardship’ tours to ‘hard’ VC areas. Ibid., 46.

^86. On the effects of out-of-area deployment of PFs, see Ridderhof, ‘Combined Action’.

^87. Palm, ‘Tiger Papa Three’, 40.

^88. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, 52. This does not mean that language skills are unimportant. The authors argue that they are less important during combat operations, but much more important in pacification operations where the ability to understand and converse with the local population is of great importance. Allnutt and his co-authors therefore suggested that there should at least be one Vietnamese-speaking Marine in each CAP.

^89. General Matthew Ridgway, commander of UN forces in Korea, pointed out that one of the keys to his success in improving the effectiveness of the ROK was the fact that he had complete control over the Korean forces at his disposal. While he was hesitant in criticizing Westmoreland, he was puzzled by the command-and-control structure in Vietnam. ‘I never could understand why they have a dual command in South Vietnam. Why in hell didn't they put the ARVN under Westmoreland? I understand he didn't want it, but I don't know why and never talked to him about it.’ Thayer, Systems Analysis View, Volume 7, 241.

^90. This issue was recognized by at least some of the chief policymakers involved. In 1965, President Johnson floated an idea for the ‘experimental encadrement by U.S. forces of South Vietnamese ground troops’. This idea appears to have never been seriously considered by Westmoreland. See Clarke, Advice and Support, 90.

^91. According to West, the social cleavages in the village he describes were clear. Part of the village supported the insurgents while the other part did not. Both sides had a direct stake in the outcome of the conflict, as the impact on their day-to-day lives was immediate. West, for instance, describes how government supporters made the VC families perform communal menial jobs in the village after the CAP had driven the VC away. They fully expected the roles to be reversed if the VC ever came back.

^92. Even long-standing experience with a society may not shield foreign powers from making mistakes in identifying suitable local allies. The French authorities in Algeria discovered this the hard way in Algeria, where they frequently armed local groups whom they believed were opposed to the FLN, only to discover that they were affiliated with the FLN. More than a century of French rule over Algeria, in other words, did not necessarily mean that the French had developed a fine-grained and accurate knowledge of the local ‘human’ terrain.

^93. It is, moreover, difficult to imagine that the skillful exploitation of local cleavages is a recipe for future social stability in the host society.

^94. During the Vietnam War, Westmoreland repeatedly asked Army Chief of Staff to assign his best officers to American tactical units in Vietnam, not to advisory positions. See Clarke, Advice and Support, 237.

^95. West, The Wrong War.