Helpless or Deliberate Bystander: American Policy towards South Vietnam's Military Coups, 1954–1975

Abstract

The USA's role in fomenting and responding to military coups remains an understudied and politically contentious subject despite it being a recurring foreign policy problem exemplified most recently in both Egypt and Mali. To the extent this topic has been addressed in any depth by scholars, it is mainly limited to an examination of a small number of coups that occurred during the Cold War that the CIA was accused of sponsoring. However, this emphasis on well-known cases to the exclusion of lesser-known cases has resulted in a biased view of omnipotent US power. This limitation is reflected in the case of South Vietnam, in which the focus has been placed on the 1963 coup that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem, whereas the numerous other coups that occurred have received little or no attention. In this article, a more inclusive approach will be taken in which US policy will be examined with respect to all of the main coups and coup attempts that occurred during the period 1954–1975.

Keywords::

• Vietnam
• coup
• Diem

Notes

^1. Two notable exceptions from the 1980s include David, Third World Coups D'Etat; Lacquer et al. ‘The Soviet Union and the Third World Part I’.

^2. See for instance Kinzer, All the Shah's Men; Gustafson, Hostile Intent.

^3.Luttwak, Coup d'Etat, 39.

^4.Statler, Replacing France, 128–9; Ahern, CIA and the House of Ngo, 44–9.

^5.Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 116; ‘Memo from Rostow to Harriman’, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–1963 Vol. I, Vietnam, 1961 (Washington, DC: Department of State), Doc. 335.

^6.Ahern, CIA and the Generals, 140.

^7.Colby, Lost Victory, 76.

^8. Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow, Interview on 3 June 1981, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

^9.Ahern, CIA and the Generals, p. 140.

^10. Ibid., p. 141.

^11. ‘Editorial Note’ FRUS, 1958–1960 Volume I, Vietnam, Doc. 235.

^12.Ahern, CIA and the Generals, p. 142.

^13.Colby, Lost Victory, pp. 77–78. Carver would later become the top CIA analyst on Vietnam.

^14.Ahern, CIA and the Generals, p. 143.

^15. ‘Memorandum from Lansdale to Douglas’, FRUS, 1958–1960 Volume I, Vietnam, Doc. 238. Lansdale had previously assisted Diem with his consolidation of power in the mid 1950s and remained a close confidante. At the time he authored this memo, Lansdale was serving as Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations.

^16. ‘Memorandum from Wood to Anderson’, 2 December 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960 Volume I, Vietnam, Doc. 256.

^17. ‘Memo from French to Erskine’, 6 December 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960 Volume I, Vietnam, Doc. 259.

^18. This point is also highlighted in Ball, ‘Case Study’.

^19. Additional contingency planning with respect to a military coup had been undertaken earlier in the year and was formalized in a memo entitled ‘Suggested Contingency Planning’ that was sent to Durbrow. An updated version of this ‘close hold’ memo was sent to his successor Nolting in October. See ‘Letter from McConaughy to Nolting’, 20 October 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963 Vol. I, Vietnam, 1961, Doc. 181.

^20. ‘Memo from Galbraith to Kennedy, Subject: Policy in Vietnam’, 21 November 1961, Digital National Security Archive, Accessed 25 July 2013.

^21. ‘Paper Prepared by Robert H. Johnson’, 28 November 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam 1961, Doc. 292.

^22. ‘Memorandum from Mendenhall to Rice’, 16 August 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam 1962, Doc. 268.

^23. See for instance ‘Memorandum for Bundy from Battle, Subject: Coup Plotting in South Vietnam’, 29 November 1961, Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS); ‘Draft Paper Prepared by Mendenhall, Subject: How Stable is the Diem Government?’ 22 October 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963 Vol. 1, Vietnam, 1961, Doc. 184.

^24. See for instance ‘Memorandum from Lansdale to Lemnitzer’, 27 December 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam 1961, Doc. 340.

^25.Adamson, ‘Ambassadorial Roles and Foreign Policy’.

^26. Of the many works on this subject, the most extensive treatment can be found in Hammer, A Death in November.

^27.Lodge, The Storm Has Many Eyes, 209.

^28. One of the pivotal figures during this period was Major General Ton That Dinh, commander of all the regular military units in the Saigon region. Upon joining the coup plot, the military balance shifted in favour of the coup, although Nhu tried to enlist him in a counter-coup plot. These internal South Vietnamese plots and counter-plots, which the USA had little insight into, are fundamental to understanding the decision to go ahead with the coup, as well as its specific timing. See Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers, 182–3.

^29. A copy of the original document can be found at http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn02.pdf

^30. Supporters included mostly State Department officials such as Roger Hilsman, Averell Harriman, and George Ball. Opponents included Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, and most other senior administration officials.

^31.Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers, 166–74.

^32. Richardson was recalled to Washington in early October, possibly due to his public exposure by the Times of Vietnam, though it has also been suggested that Lodge sought his removal as he wanted the CIA station's agents reporting to him rather than the station chief. See Blair, Lodge in Vietnam, 87–9. See also Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters, 191.

^33. According to the CIA, the plot leader was General Duong Van Minh, the military adviser to the president. He was supported by Generals Don and Kim, as well as Major General Tran Thien Khiem, executive officer of the Joint General Staff; Major General Nguyen Khahn, Commander of II Corps; and Colonel Nguyen Van Thieu, commander of the Fifth Division near the capital. However, the command of units in Saigon and in the Mekong Delta (just south of Saigon) was in the hands of Diem loyalists. See also: ‘Memorandum of Conference with the President’, 27 August 1963, DDRS.

^34.Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers, 171.

^35. ‘Memorandum of Conference with the President’, 28 August 1963, DDRS; ‘Memorandum of Conference with the President’, 29 August 1963, DDRS.

^36. ‘Memorandum of Conference with the President’, 28 August 1963, DDRS.

^37. ‘Memorandum of Conversation, White House’, 26 August 1963, Department of State, DDRS.

^38.Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, 33. After being forced to leave Vietnam, Carver continued to focus on Vietnam and as of 1963, was working at the Office of National Estimates.

^39. ‘Cablegram from Harkins to Taylor’, 30 October 1963 in Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers, 219–21.

^40. As an alternative to a coup, Edward Lansdale had suggested to Harriman and Galbraith that it could be possible to separate Nhu from Diem by creating an academic position for Nhu at Harvard. Appalled at the suggestion, Galbraith replied ‘We don't do that at Harvard’. See Currey, Edward Lansdale, 254; Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters, 190.

^41. Stanley Karnow interview with Lucien Conein, 1981. Transcript available at http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-3abc7d-interview-with-lucien-conein-1981.

^42. William P. Bundy, Oral History Interview, JFK #3, 25 April 1972.

^43. ‘Cable from Lodge to Rusk’, 5 October 1963 in Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers, 213.

^44. Karnow interview with Conein, 1981.

^45.Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers, 179.

^46. Kennedy's comment can be found in the meeting transcript. See Prados, The White House Tapes, 110–11.

^47.Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers, 180–1.

^48. Ibid., p. 183.

^49. McNamara statement from 25 October cited in Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters, 202.

^50. Chester L. Cooper Oral History Interview-JFK #3, 9 June 1966.

^51. ‘Telegram from Lodge to State Dept.’, 29 October 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963, Doc 225.

^52. The audio transcript of this meeting can be found in Prados, The White House Tapes, 92–140.

^53. On 30 October, the Saigon Station was asked to comment on the judgement that ‘available info here indicates that generals do not have clear preponderance of force in Saigon area, posing possibility of extended fighting’. Saigon Station replied that it had been given neither the coup group's plans nor data on its forces but that ‘the units in the field can be expected to have sufficient ammunition for the coup’. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, 38.

^54.Prados, The White House Tapes, 101–6.

^55. According to this paper: ‘What public posture do we adopt immediately after it becomes known that coup is in progress? Recommendation: ‘We state, both here and in the field, that we are closely following reports and watching developments. If asked about foreknowledge, we reply we had none. If asked whether we continue to recognize the Diem government, we should reply that no action has been taken on this matter. If asked whether we are continuing aid to the Diem government, we should reply we continue to support the Vietnamese people in their efforts to defeat the Communist enemy and to build a better future. In this we wish them all success’. See Issues for Consideration at October 29 Meeting, DDRS.

^56. Lodge cited in Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers, 183.

^57. Cable cited in Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, 38.

^58. President Johnson stated in a conversation with Eugene McCarthy on 1 February 1966, ‘They started with me on Diem… you remember. He was corrupt and he ought to be killed. So we killed him. We all got together and got a goddamn bunch of thugs and assassinated him’. Accessed at http://whitehousetapes.net/clip/lyndon-johnson-eugene-mccarthy-lbj-and-eugene-mccarthy-assassination-dgo-dinh-diem.

^59. Ambassador Joseph A. Mendenhall, Interview on 11 February 1991, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 1998.

^60. ‘Memorandum From Hilsman to Rusk’, 30 August 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963, Doc. 25.

^61. Karnow interview with Conein, 1981.

^62. Cablegram from Lodge to Bundy, 30 October 1963 cited in Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers, 226–9.

^63. Although unable to save Diem and Nhu from execution, Lodge was able to assist other members of the Ngo family to flee into exile. See Lodge, The Storm Has Many Eyes, 210.

^64. Johnson cited by Jack Valenti. Quote can be found in http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/series/pt_03.html.

^65. After the 1 November coup, the ‘military establishment’ underwent various name changes. Initially known as the Military Revolutionary Council, in the years thereafter it was alternatively referred to as the National Leadership Council, the Congress of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Council. Topping, ‘Saigon Politics’; Kaiser, ‘A Paradise for Generals’.

^66. ‘Memo from Harkins to Taylor’, 30 January 1964, DDRS; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 62–3; ‘CIA Cable from Saigon, Subject: Background of Coup Staged by General Nguyen Khanh’, 30 January 1964, DDRS.

^67. ‘Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President’, 4 March 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 Volume I, Vietnam, 1964, Doc. 70.

^68.McNamara, In Retrospect, 111–12.

^69. See for instance ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State’, 28 September 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 Volume I, Vietnam, 1964, Doc. 365. See also Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 256.

^70.McNamara, In Retrospect, 118; Lodge argued it might be necessary to develop the harbour at Cam Ranh Bay as an alternative centre of government run by the US military. See ‘Memorandum of Meeting’, 11 May 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 Volume I, Vietnam, 1964, Doc. 147.

^71.Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 63–4.

^72. Ibid., 73–4.

^73. ‘Message from COMUSMACV’, 13 September 1964, DDRS.

^74. ‘Cable from Westmoreland to Wheeler’, 16 September 1964, DDRS.

^75. ‘Cable from American Embassy in Saigon to Department of State’, 24 December 1964, Subject: Summary of Conversation, 20 December, DDRS.

^76.Nguyen Cao Ky, How We Lost the Vietnam War, 53–5.

^77. ‘Message from Rusk to Taylor’, 24 December 1964, DDRS.

^78. ‘Memorandum from Denney to Rusk’, 27 January 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968 Volume I, Vietnam, 1964, Doc. 365.

^79. Taylor cited in Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 253.

^80. ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State’, 23 February 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968 Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965, Doc.154.

^81.Allen, None So Blind, 178–9. See also ‘Memorandum prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence’, 3 March 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 Volume I, Vietnam 1964, Doc. 68.

^82. Interview with Thomas P.H. Dunlop on 12 July 1996, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 1998.

^83. MACV study cited in Clarke, Advice and Support, 82.

^84.Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 260.

^85. Coup plots were a constant feature of US intelligence reporting from Saigon. See for instance CIA Cable, 12 January 1966, Subject: Reports of Possible Imminent Coup Attempt Led By Retired General Tran Van Don, DDRS; CIA Cable, 20 January 1966, Subject: Continuation of Don-Kim Coup Plotting, DDRS; Text of Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by CIA, 20 May 1966, Subject: The Situation in South Vietnam, DDRS; CIA Cable, 18 March 1968, Subject: President Thieu's Concern Over a Possible Coup, Conditions in the Delta, and Supposed American Use of the National Salvation Front to Effect a Coalition Government with the Viet Cong, DDRS; CIA Cable, 10 October 1968, DDRS; CIA Intelligence Report, 16 September 1968, Subject: The Situation in South Vietnam (Weekly), DDRS; Memo from Colby to Kissinger, 14 September 1973, Subject: Rumors Circulating in Saigon, DDRS.

^86.Allen, None So Blind, 264.

^87. ‘Memorandum from Roche to President Johnson’, FRUS, 1964–1968 Volume V, Vietnam, 1967, Doc. 31.

^88.Goodman, ‘An Institutional Profile’, 75.

^89. Ibid., 79–80; See also Central Intelligence Bulletin, CIA, 20 September 1968.

^90. ‘Report Prepared in the CIA’, 16 September 1968, FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969, Doc. 17.

^91. ‘Backchannel message from Kissinger to Bunker’, 6 October 1972, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972, Doc. 282.

^92. ‘Transcript of a telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger’, 19 August 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972, Doc. 248.

^93.Snepp, Decent Interval, 188.

^94.Lam Quang Thi, The Twenty-Five Year Century, 368–70.

^95. Ibid., 379.

^96. DCI Briefing for 2 April Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) Meeting, 2 April 1975, DDRS.

^97. Colby memo cited in Snepp, Decent Interval, 290–1.

^98. Ibid, 291.

^99. DCI Briefing for 20 April WSAG Meeting, 20 April 1975, DDRS.

^100.Rasen, ‘Final Fiasco’.

^101. Minutes of WSAG Meeting, 26 April 1975, DDRS.

^102.Brigham, ARVN, 47, 52–3. For additional information on the negative impact of ‘coup-proofing’ on military effectiveness, see Quinlivan, ‘Coup-Proofing’.

^103.Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 216.

^104. The policy dilemma of employing the US military to fight rebellious ARVN units also arose from March to May 1966 after Ky and Thieu tried to remove I Corps commander General Nguyen Chanh Thi (who had formerly led the November 1960 coup). This effort was the spark that ignited a revolt in the northern cities, especially in Danang and Hue, among students, Buddhists, and at least one ARVN division. For information about the US reluctance to become involved, see Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 168–74.