Building Stability Overseas: Three case studies in British defence diplomacy – Uganda, Rhodesia–Zimbabwe, and Sierra Leone

Abstract

In 2011, the Department for International Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence launched the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS). This document sought to integrate cross-government activity as it related to conflict and security so as to ‘take fast, appropriate and effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it escalating and spreading’. At the heart of the strategy was the recognition that addressing instability and conflict overseas was morally right and in the UK's national interests. This confluence of foreign policy realism and ethical outlook most clearly found harmony in the acknowledgement that it was cheaper for the international community to avoid conflict than it was to try to manage it. Through an examination of three historical case studies (Uganda 1964–1972, Rhodesia–Zimbabwe 1979–1981, and Sierra Leone 2000–2007), this article seeks to demonstrate just how difficult this seemingly sensible strategic outlook is. In particular, the article shows there are historical parallels in British postcolonial history that very closely resemble contemporary policy choices; that these can be used to define what is different about past and present practice; and, which in turn, can be used to – at least tentatively – mark out the potential strengths and weaknesses in BSOS.

Keywords::

• defence engagement
• state-building
• stabilisation
• defence diplomacy
• intervention

Notes

^1. See Porter, ‘Good Anthropology’.

^2.Stone, ‘Conventional Deterrence’; Kaldor, Human Security.

^3.Ford, ‘Finding the Target’.

^4.Ford, Rose, and Body, ‘COIN Is Dead’.

^5.Building Stability Overseas Strategy, 2.

^6. Ibid., 4–5.

^7. ‘Operational Plan 2012–2015’. See also Chalmers, Spending to Save?

^8.Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa.

^9.Putzel and Di John, Political Settlements.

^10. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa, 250.

^11.Building Stability Overseas Strategy, 5.

^12.Barder, ‘Reforming Development Assistance’, 296.

^13.Building Stability Overseas Strategy, 19.

^14. Ibid., 28.

^15. Estimates of the total number of deaths at the hands of the Amin regime vary from 80,000 to half a million. See ‘Obituary: Idi Amin’, The Guardian, 18 August 2003.

^16.Decalo, Coups & Army Rule in Africa, 158.

^17.Ferudi, Colonial Wars, 264–7.

^18.Davey, ‘Intelligence and British Decolonisation’, 212.

^19.Percox, Britain, Kenya and the Cold War, 187.

^20.Clayton and Killingray, Khaki and Blue, 261–2.

^21.Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies, 71–2.

^22. Ibid., 176. The Commonwealth Relations Office could not find evidence of any communist backing for the mutiny but that did not stop those British officers who were most closely connected to the King's African Rifles from making the case that there had been some outside interference. Naturally this played into Whitehall suspicions that communist subversion was working to stoke up nationalism in the former colonies. See Record of a Discussion at 10 Downing Street at 2.30pm, on Tuesday, July 7, 1964. DO 213/206 TNA (The National Archives).

^23.Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies, 72.

^24. Ibid., 176–7.

^25. Ibid., 178–9.

^26. See reports by Colonel V.J. Senior, Defence Adviser, British High Commission, Kampala, dated January 15 to April 15, 1966, DO 213/158 and D0 213/158/1, TNA.

^27. Also known as the ‘Fortress Colony’, Percox, Britain, Kenya and the Cold War, 209–10.

^28. Background Notes Brief for the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations for Meeting Dr Obote July 3, 1964. DO 213/206, TNA.

^29. Eventually the Israeli Training Team would number between 40 and 60 personnel and train Uganda's Air Force and paratroops, provide instructional assistance to the School of Infantry, train a close-protection unit, and provide 12 Sherman tanks, jeeps, and lorries. See, Uganda/Israel Relations, Letter from British High Commission to FCO, May 25, 1971, FCO 31/1043, TNA. For the quantity of equipment in the Uganda armed forces as of 1972, see Letter from East African Department to Ministry of Defence, January 13, 1972, DEFE 28/171.

^30. By May 1972 Uganda owed a £20.68 million outstanding unpaid loan debt to Israel. See ‘Defence Sales’ Letter from Defence Adviser, May 12, 1972, FCO 31/1364, TNA.

^31. A good description of this coup can be found in Moghul, Idi Amin.

^32. See reports by Colonel V.J. Senior, Defence Adviser, British High Commission, Kampala, dated January 15 to April 15, 1966, DO 213/158, TNA. See also Arms Sales to Uganda: Record of a Meeting in FCO at 3pm on Wednesday 9 February 1972, FCO 31/1364, TNA.

^33.Decalo, Coups & Army Rule in Africa, 158.

^34. Specifically Obote objected to British arms sales to South Africa, see loose minute from East Africa Dept, FCO March 4, 1971; and Letter from High Commissioner in Kampala to Prime Minister, February 15, 1971. Both documents found in FCO 31/1024, TNA. For more on the reasons behind the UK's ambitions to sell arms to South Africa see ‘Sale of Arms to South Africa’, December 31, 1970, CAB 129/154, TNA. Basically, the British were concerned with obstructing Soviet ambitions in the Indian Ocean.

^35. ‘Uganda/Israel Relations’, Letter from British High Commission to FCO, May 25, 1971, FCO 31/1043, TNA. According to Bergman, Mossad and the Israeli MOD were directly involved in supporting the Amin coup (see Bergman, ‘Israel and Africa’, 121–3).

^36. The poor state of relations between Uganda and Tanzania was blamed on Amin. See letter from President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere to Prime Minister, September 4, 1971, PREM 15/1257, TNA.

^37. Israeli views on Uganda, Minute from British Embassy Tel Aviv to East Africa Dept, FCO, July 28, 1971, FCO 31/1043, TNA.

^38. Letter from Export Promotion Department to HM Treasury, May 24, 1971, FCO 31/1057, TNA.

^39. For which President Amin was most grateful, see Letter from General Idi Amin Dada to Prime Minister, January 10, 1972, PREM 115/1257, TNA.

^40. ‘Uganda: British Training and Assistance’, Letter from FCO, August 4, 1971, FCO 31/1063, TNA.

^41. Letter from FCO to British High Commission, Kampala, December 16, 1971, FCO 31/1063, TNA. The Counter Subversion Committee had formed in 1963 as a forum to coordinate all government activity across the aid and military assistance realms so as to have a total strategy to counter the Soviet threat.

^42. ‘Defence Sales’ Letter from Defence Adviser, May 12, 1972, FCO 31/1364, TNA. The decision was subsequently taken by Cabinet on September 7, 1972 to suspend the continuation of the delivery. See letter, ‘Arms for Uganda’, September 14, 1972, FCO 13/1364, TNA. A small training team went with the vehicles to help with training and maintenance.

^43. Memo: ‘Possible Sale of Harrier Aircraft’, May 13, 1971, FCO 31/1057, TNA.

^44. Letter from General Idi Amin Dada to Prime Minister, January 10, 1972, PREM 115/1257, TNA.

^45. Arms Sales to Uganda: Record of a Meeting in FCO at 3pm on Wednesday 9 February 1972, FCO 31/1364, TNA.

^46. ‘Arms Sales to Uganda’, Telex from British High Commission to FCO, February 26,1972, FCO 31/1364, TNA. Israel refused to grant £10 million financial assistance to Uganda during 1971. Consequently following Amin's visit to Libya in February 1972, the Israeli training team and ambassador were expelled from Uganda and all equipment contracts cancelled. Libya subsequently became the Ugandan patron. Because of his anti-Israeli stance, the Saudis and Libyans subsequently jointly gave Amin $18 million while the Saudis then lent a further $15 million. See Africa Research Bulletin (Economic Series), 14 July to 15 August 1972, 2433. Libya went on to open a commercial bank in Kampala where another $16 million was provide for Amin's personal use. See Africa Confidential, 24 December 1972, 4. This heralded Israel's exit from African politics more broadly, see Levey, ‘Israel's Exit from Africa’.

^47. ‘Notes on Visit to Uganda’, February 26–29, 1972, FCO 31/1364, TNA.

^48. Letter from Lord Aldington to the Prime Minister, April 5, 1972, PREM 15/1257, TNA.

^49.Decalo, Coups & Army Rule in Africa, 164–70.

^50. Ibid., 175. ‘Who Runs Uganda?’ FCO Diplomatic Report, October 30, 1972, DEFE 25/298, TNA.

^51. ‘Uganda Cabinet Office Working Group’, September 27, 1972, DEFE 25/297, TNA.

^52. ‘Uganda: Mr Slater's Valedictory Dispatch’, November 13, 1972, DEFE 25/298, TNA.

^53. Amin was overthrown in 1979 following his disastrous decision to invade Tanzania in 1978. Clayton, Frontiersmen, 104. Even with the support of Libyan forces, the Uganda army had been so badly purged and effectiveness so clearly degraded that it was no match for the Tanzanians. The Tanzanians invaded Uganda deposed Amin and eventually Obote was reinstalled as president.

^54. Chiefs of Staff Committee Defence Operations Staff – Rhodesia, The Lesson Learnt from Operation Agila, Note by the Defence Operations Staff, April 17, 1980, DEFE 24/1876, TNA.

^55. BMATT numbers grew from 60 to 150 by 1981. See letter from British High Commissioner, Salisbury to Secretary of State for the FCO, May 14, 1981, FCO 106/461, TNA.

^56. ‘Conclusions’, November 28, 1965, CAB 128/39, TNA. ‘Conclusions’, December 13, 1966, CAB 128/41, TNA.

^57. The deployment of British aircraft to Zambia was in part an effort to forestall Organisation of African Union discussions about putting African troops in Zambia to attack Southern Rhodesia. See telegram No. 2048 December 1, 1965, DEFE 25/194, TNA.

^58.French, Army, Empire & Cold War, 285–6.

^59. See ‘A Note for Minister Without Portfolio’, January 9th, 1969 DEFE 25/263, TNA.

^60. The early phases of the struggle were militarily disastrous. See Beckett, Modern Insurgencies, 139.

^61. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa, 86.

^62.Beckett, Modern Insurgencies, 135.

^63.Preston, Ending Civil War, 57–8.

^64.Beckett, Modern Insurgencies, 139–42.

^65. UDI's greatest supporter and the country most willing to break sanctions was South Africa. South African policies were only subject to change when the government was put under pressure by the United States. See Ford, ‘South African Foreign Policy since 1965’, 42–4.

^66.Preston, Ending Civil War, 58.

^67.Rupiah, ‘The “Expanding Torrent”’; Beckett, Modern Insurgencies, 141.

^68.Rupiah, ‘Demobilisation and Integration’. Beckett observes that there were maybe 60,000 reserves and that UDI forces also contained a number of indigenous battalions. See Beckett, Modern Insurgencies, 140.

^69. Viscount Boyd and a team of five others observed the 1979 elections and concluded that the elections were valid. See ‘Report to the Prime Minister on the Election Held in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia in April 1979’, PREM 19/106, TNA.

^70. For a FCO perspective on all the Lancaster House parties, including those of the Front Line States (Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique), see ‘Rhodesia: Attitudes of the Parties and of the ‘Front Line’ States’, September 6, 1979, PREM 19/111, TNA. For an excellent analysis of the talks in 1979, see Preston, Ending Civil War.

^71. See Preston, Ending Civil War, 70–1.

^72. For a description of the problems facing the Monitoring Force and Observer Group, see Rice, ‘The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe’.

^73. Chiefs of Staff Committee Defence Operations Staff – Rhodesia, The Lesson Learnt from Operation Agila, Note by the Defence Operations Staff, April 17, 1980, DEFE 24/1876, TNA.

^74. Rice, ‘The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe’, 198.

^75. Letter to Major General Acland (commander of Agila) from the Prime Minister, March 10, 1980, DEFE 24/1876, TNA.

^76. ‘MISC 42 (80)3’, letter from FCO to Cabinet Office, June 20, 1980, FCO 46/2471, TNA. The scheme had only been in place since 1968.

^77. ‘UK Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS) Members of the UKMTAS ‘CLUB’ since 1973’, note from the FCO, February 20, 1980, FCO 46/2475, TNA.

^78. This had adverse effects on relations with a number of countries. See, ‘Military Training Charges (Your minute of 23 August)’, August 26, 1977, FCO 37/1826, TNA.

^79. The prime minister wanted to understand the relationship between UKTMAS activity and related arms sales. See note from Prime Minister's office to MOD, February 10, 1980, FCO 46/2475, TNA.

^80. Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence Policy Staff, Cabinet Official Group on Military Training Assistance Funds (MISC 42), Note by the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy), October 21, 1980, TNA.

^81. An example of the fight faced by the FCO with the Treasury can be found in, ‘MISC 42’, July 17, 1980, FCO 46/2472, TNA. See also draft note to Prime Minister from Sir Robert Armstrong, November 3rd, 1980, FCO 46/2470, TNA.

^82. Loose Minute: Rhodesia – The Penalties of Implementing Operation Agila, January 3, 1980, DEFE 13–1415, TNA.

^83. Letter from MOD to Prime Minister, UK Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS), March 11, 1980, PREM 19–163, TNA.

^84. ‘Do Defence Sales Benefit as Much as they Might from UKMTAS etc.?’, Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee – Sub-Committee on Ancillary Measures, June 1, 1973, CAB 148–124, TNA.

^85. Loose minute: Meeting between Prime Minister and Major General Palmer on 2 February 1981, FCO 106/461, TNA.

^86. ‘The Role of BMATT in Zimbabwe’, June 2, 1981, FCO 106/461. TNA.

^87.Clayton and Killingray, Khaki and Blue, 261.

^88. Zimbabwe National Army – Report by the CGS, July 30, 1980, DEFE 13-1415, TNA.

^89. Mugabe told Lord Soames, ‘without them (the BMATT) we could never have achieved what we have’. See letter from British High Commissioner, Salisbury to Secretary of State for the FCO, May 14, 1981, FCO 106/461, TNA.

^90.Clayton, Frontiersmen, 175.

^91.Chitiyo, The Case for Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe, 3

^92. The most comprehensive account of SSR in Sierra Leone can be found in Jackson and Albrecht, Reconstructing Security after Conflict.

^93.Pye, ‘Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism’; Fukuyama, The End of History; Barkawi, ‘Defence Diplomacy’.

^94.Jackson and Albrecht, Reconstructing Security after Conflict, 61–8.

^95.Dorman, ‘The British Experience of Low-Intensity Conflict in Sierra Leone’.

^96. The literatures on Sierra Leone are vast but see, for example, Maconachie and Binns, ‘Beyond the Resource Curse?’; Reno, ‘The Failure of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone’.

^97. See, for example, Richards, ‘War as Smoke and Mirrors’; Maclure and Denov, ‘I Didn't Want to Die So I Joined Them’; Utas and Joergel, ‘The West Side Boys’.

^98. See, for example, Curran and Woodhouse, ‘Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone’; Castaneda, ‘How Liberal Peacebuilding May Be Failing Sierra Leone’; Krogstad, ‘Reconstructing Security after Conflict’.

^99.Kaldor, New and Old Wars.

^100. This 2005 OECD definition of SSR reflects a Western consensus on the issue. Quoted in Civic and Miklaucic, Monopoly of Force, xx–xxi.

^101.Jackson and Albrecht, Reconstructing Security after Conflict; Denney, ‘Liberal Chiefs or Illiberal Development?’.

^102. This included a significant number of light weapons. See Berman, ‘The Provision of Lethal Military Equipment’.

^103.Jackson and Albrecht, Reconstructing Security after Conflict.

^104. Apart from the case studies outlined above this also happened in Anglo–Egyptian relations. See Tal, ‘Weapons without Influence’.

^105. ‘Paratroops Mutiny in Bamako in Blow to Mali Security Efforts’, Reuters, 8 February 2013.

^106. This is not simply limited to a West/al Qaeda struggle either. For example, see the recent deployment and subsequent withdrawal of South African troops in support of President Bozize who was ousted following a coup d'état in March 2013. See ‘Union says most South African troops pulled from Central African Republic’, Washington Post, 2 April 2013.

^107.Domingo and Denney, The Politics of Practice, 8–11.

^108. See Cormac, ‘Organising Intelligence’; Cormac, ‘A Whitehall “Showdown”?’; Davey, ‘Intelligence and British Decolonisation’; Ferudi, Colonial Wars.