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Abstract
The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces.
Notes
1. See Hughes, ‘Introduction’.
2. For a discussion of this issue, see Aughey, The Politics of Northern Ireland, 63–80.
3. Thornton, ‘The British Army and the Origins of Its Philosophy of Minimum Force’; Mockaitis, ‘The Minimum Force Debate’.
4. House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘Iraq’.
5. In this context, see French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency; Ucko and Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis.
6. Bennett, ‘The Reluctant Counter-insurgents’, 292; Smith and Jones, The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency, 29–54.
7. UK Chief of the General Staff, Operation Banner.
8. Jones and Smith, ‘Myth and the Small War Tradition’, 438.
9. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency.
10. Paget, Counter-insurgency Campaigning; Kitson, Low Intensity Operations.
11. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.
12. Strachan, ‘British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq’, 8.
13. Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars, 3–16.
14. Cassidy, ‘The British Army and Counterinsurgency’, 53.
15. Quoted in Ucko and Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis, 9.
16. Mockaitis, ‘The Minimum Force Debate’.
17. Thornton, ‘The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy’, 86.
18. Ibid., 91, 93.
19. Betz and Cormack, ‘Iraq, Afghanistan, and British Strategy’.
20. See Reis, ‘The Myth of Minimum Force’.
21. French, ‘Nasty Not Nice’, 749.
22. Hack, ‘Iron Claws on Malaya’, 101.
23. Ibid., 124.
24. Mockaitis, ‘The Minimum force Debate’, 764.
25. Bennett, ‘The Other Side of the COIN’, 647.
26. Mockaitis, ‘The Minimum Force Debate’, 764.
27. See Jackson, The British Empire, 108–31.
28. Bennett, ‘The Other Side of the COIN’, 651.
29. Clausewitz, On War, 60–1.
30. Dixon, ‘Hearts and Minds?’, 368.
31. Salt and Smith, ‘Reassessing Aid to the Civil Powers’.
32. Bew, ‘Mass, Methods, and Means’, 156.
33. House of Commons, Motion on Northern Ireland (Rules of Engagement), cc 991–1014.
34. For a study of the educational influences, see Bennett, ‘Escaping the Empire’s Shadow’.
35. Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 3.68.
36. Bew, ‘Mass, Methods and Means’, 163.
37. Ibid., 168.
38. Clausewitz, On War, 7.
39. Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 91–105.
40. Punch, State Violence, Collusion and the Troubles, 71.
41. Mumford, ‘Minimum Force Meets Brutality’.
42. Donohue, ‘Regulating Northern Ireland’.
43. French, ‘Nasty Not Nice’, 752.
44. Melaugh, ‘Internment – Summary of Main Events’.
45. Report of the enquiry into allegations against the Security Forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on the 9th August, 1971.
46. Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism.
47. Cobain, ‘Inside Castlereagh’.
48. Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-terrorism Policy and Human Rights, 110.
49. European Court of Human Rights, The Republic of Ireland vs. The United Kingdom.
50. Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism, 1.4. See also Report of the enquiry into allegations against the Security Forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on the 9th August, 1971, 1.9.
51. See Whyte, ‘Britain Taught the World How to Torture’.
52. Ibid.
53. Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-terrorism, 29.
54. Cowan, ‘Derry Shootings Were Not My Idea, Says General’.
55. For the classic account of the tough minded approach of the Parachute Regiment to its engagement in the early years of the Northern Ireland crisis, see Clarke, Contact.
56. Quoted in Thornton, ‘Getting it Wrong’, 99.
57. Quoted in Punch, State Violence, Collusion and the Troubles, 4.
58. Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 3.69.
59. Ibid., 2.13.
60. Ibid., 3.6.
61. Ibid., 3.21.
62. Ibid., 3.25.
63. Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 3.26.
64. Siddique and French, ‘Bloody Sunday Inquiry’.
65. Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 3.79.
66. Ibid., 3.80.
67. Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 3.107–3.112.
68. ‘Northern Ireland (Rules of Engagement)’, cc991–1014.
69. Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 3.41, 3.42.
70. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era, 8.
71. Urban, Big Boys Rules, 17.
72. Smith, ‘Escalation in Irregular War’, 631.
73. Bew, ‘Mass, Methods and Means’, 160–1.
74. Smith and Neumann, ‘Motorman’s Long Journey’, 413–15.
75. Newsinger, ‘From Counter-insurgency to Internal Security’, 100.
76. Ibid., 99.
77. Bennett, ‘Smoke without Fire?’, 278.
78. See for example, McDonald, Gunsmoke and Mirrors; Clark, Border Crossings.
79. Dillon, The Dirty War, 93.
80. Cursey, MRF Shadow Troop, 174–201.
81. Jones and Smith, ‘Myth and the Small War Tradition’, 442.
82. Urban, Big Boys Rules, 24.
83. Ibid., 21, 22.
84. Ibid., 159.
85. Ibid., 73.
86. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 11.
87. Dillon, The Dirty War, xxxiii.
88. Ingram and Harkin, Stakenife, 61.
89. Punch, State Violence, Collusion and the Troubles, 118.
90. Ibid., 123.
91. Ibid., 128.
92. Urban, Big Boys Rules, 21.
93. De Silva QC, ‘The Report of the Pat Finucane Review’, vol. 1, 74.
94. Ibid., 87.
95. Bew, ‘Mass, Methods and Means’, 163.
96. Dillon, The Dirty War, 84.
97. Mumford, ‘Minimum Force Meets Brutality’, 12.
98. Smith, ‘Escalation in Irregular War’, 629.
99. Bew, ‘Mass, Methods and Means’, 169.
100. Clausewitz, On War, 5.
101. Ibid., 67.
102. See for example Murray, The SAS in Ireland.
103. Smith and Roberts, ‘War in the Gray’, 377–98.
104. Smith and Neumann, ‘Motorman’s Long Journey’, 430.