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Abstract
While broad scholarly attention has been devoted to the securitization of migration in the ′EU’s relations with neighboring countries, less attention has been given to the ways in which the EU is partnering with third countries to fight other central ′‘unconventional security threats′’, such as terrorism and drug trafficking. This article traces the evolution of EU cooperation on these two issues with countries along the cocaine trafficking routes to Europe, i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean and West Africa. A mapping of EU initiatives and cooperation reveals that not only can a securitization of EU cooperation be observed in both regions, but various ′‘unconventional security threats′’, perceived in geopolitical terms, seem increasingly to serve as drivers for EU external action. The modalities of EU support – through international and regional organizations as well as third countries’ own counter-crime and counter-terrorism capabilities – suggest that the Union is fighting drug trafficking and terrorism ′‘by proxy′’. The article discusses whether the ′‘indirect′’ EU approach is a strategy of efficient engagement, or rather a way of avoiding commitment while portraying itself as a ′‘global crime fighter′’. Lastly, more analytical attention to third country interests, agency, and opposition is suggested in order for analyses to transcend the one-directional understanding of power seemingly underpinning the proxy concept.
Acknowledgments
The article is based on a presentation at the Proxy Actors Workshop at the University of Glasgow, 22 June 2015. Great thanks to Alex Marshall for organizing the workshop, for editing this special issue, and for establishing a research network on the topic of proxy actors. Thanks also to the other workshop participants for very interesting discussions, as well as to Francesco Strazzari and Hans van der Veen for invaluable support.
Notes
1. Ferreira Nunes, ‘Security Culture’.
3. Trauner, The Internal–External Security Nexus.
4. I.e., Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe; Council of the European Union, Internal Security Strategy; European Commission, The European Agenda on Security.
5. Strazzari and Russo, ‘A US Mainland and a EU Archipelago?’.
6. See e.g. European Commission, The European Agenda on Security.
7. Ibid., 4.
8. Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe.
9. Stambøl, ‘Governing Cocaine Supply’; Cully et al., Assessment of the Implementation.
10. Chatwin, ‘The Effects of EU Enlargement’.
11. Strazzari and Coticchia, ‘High Stakes, Low Strategies’.
12. Czerniecka and Heathershaw, ‘Security Assistance and Border Management’.
13. Gibert, ‘Securitisation of the EU’s Development Agenda’.
14. Stambøl, ‘Governing Cocaine Supply’.
15. Cully et al., Assessment of the Implementation.
16. Argomaniz, ‘Post-9/11 Institutionalisation’.
17. Argomaniz, ‘A Rhetorical Spillover?’
18. Council of the European Union, A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA.
19. Argomaniz, ‘A Rhetorical Spillover?’
20. Olsen, ‘Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy’.
21. UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime.
22. EMCDDA, The European Drug Report 2013.
23. EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report.
24. HTPSE, Mid-Term Review.
25. Jelsma, ‘Diverging Trends in Global Drug Policy’.
26. Fukumi, Cocaine Trafficking.
27. Ibid.
28. The EU has spent more than €90 million on peace and security projects in Colombia between 2008 and 2014 (HTPSE, Mid-Term Review, 168ff.). European Commission, ‘EU-Colombia’.
29. Fukumi, Cocaine Trafficking.
31. HTPSE, Mid-Term Review, 39.
32. For a detailed account of the shift in EU policy and action on drugs in LAC, see Stambøl, ‘Governing Cocaine Supply’.
33. Council of the European Union, European Pact.
34. UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime.
35. UNODC, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat.
36. UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime.
37. Ibid., 11.
38. See e.g. Europol, OCTA 2011.
39. UNODC, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat.
40. Shaw and Mangan, Illicit Trafficking.
41. Strazzari, Asawad.
42. Bøås, ‘Guns, Money and Prayer’; Strazzari, Asawad.
43. Bøås, ‘Guns, Money and Prayer’.
44. Yess, ‘Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb backs ISIS’.
45. Gibert, ‘Securitisation of the EU’s Development Agenda’.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Dover, ‘Towards a Common EU Immigration Policy’.
49. In fact, EU assistance to Nigeria related to drug trafficking, totaling €36 million for 2014–2017, exceeds the entire budget of the CRP, €35 million for the period 2009–2013. See https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/March/nigeria-european-union-commits-98-million-to-fight-corruption-drugs-and-injustice.html (accessed 1 November 2015).
50. European Parliament, A Coherent EU Strategy for the Sahel.
51. Gibert, ‘Securitisation of the EU’s Development Agenda’, 623.
52. Cully et al., Assessment of the Implementation.
53. Léonard, ‘Border Controls’.
54. See https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=13858 and https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/eu-projects/west-sahel-%E2%80%94-mauritania-mali-niger-senegal_en (last accessed 02 August 2015).
55. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-libya/pdf/factsheet_eubam_libya_en.pdf.
56. In Africa, AIRCOP includes Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo, and SEACOP includes Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
57. http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/jun/interpol-wapis-presentation-may-2014.pdf (accessed 20 February 2015).
58. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10–505_en.htm (accessed 20 February 2015).
59. http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=32187 (accessed 01March 2015).
60. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ghana/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20141211_1_en.htm (accessed 20 February 2015).
61. Dover, ‘Towards a Common EU Immigration Policy’; Gibert, ‘Securitisation of the EU’s Development Agenda’.
62. Strazzari and Coticchia, ‘High Stakes, Low Strategies’.
63. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-ssr-guinea-bissau/pdf/01102010_factsheet_eu-ssr-guinea-bissau_en.pdf (accessed 04 August 2015).
64. Argomaniz, ‘A Rhetorical Spillover?’; Martins and Ferreira Perreira, ‘Stepping Inside?’
65. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/pdf/factsheet_eucap_sahel_niger_en.pdf (accessed 1 November 2015).
66. Conversation with Morten Bøås, to whom I owe my thanks both for sharing his knowledge on (EU policy in) the Sahel and West Africa, and for discussions about the proxy concept.
67. Wichmann, Interdiction.
68. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/18-council-establishes-naval-operations-disrupt-human-smugglers-mediterannean/ (accessed 03 August 2015).
69. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2015/01/19/ (accessed 01 August 2015). See also Strazzari and Stambøl, We Saw It Coming.
70. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15–4866_en.htm (accessed 01 August 2015).
71. Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe.
72. Strazzari and Russo, ‘A US Mainland and a EU Archipelago?’; Aldrich and Rees, ‘Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism’.
73. Strazzari and Russo, ‘A US Mainland and a EU Archipelago?’
74. Aldrich and Rees, ‘Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism’.
75. Argomaniz, ‘A Rhetorical Spillover?’; Aldrich and Rees, ‘Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism’.
76. Strazzari and Russo, ‘A US Mainland and a EU Archipelago?’
77. Ibid.
78. Olsen, ‘Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy’.
79. Czerniecka and Heathershaw, ‘Security Assistance and Border Management’.
80. Léonard, ‘Border Controls’.
81. €35 million for 2009–2013 (HTPSE, Mid-Term Review).
82. EUCAP Sahel Niger had a budget of €9 million in 2014–2015 (EUCAP Sahel Niger Factsheet), http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/pdf/factsheet_eucap_sahel_niger_en.pdf, EUCAP Sahel Mali had a budget of €11.4 million (EUCAP Sahel Mali Factsheet 2015), http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-mali/docs/factsheet_eucap_sahel_mali_en.pdf and EUTM Mali had a budget of €27.7 million for the entire mandate of 24 months (EUTM Mali Factsheet), http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/pdf/2015-december-factsheet_eutm_mali_en.pdf.
83. EUNAVFOR Med common costs are estimated at €11.82 million for a two-month startup phase and the initial mandate of 12 months (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/22-fac-naval-operation/).
84. MINUSMA approved resources for only one year, 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015, totaled $830 million (Peacekeeping Factsheet http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml).
85. UNOCI budget for approved resources, 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015, totaled $493 million.
86. Kaukeleire and Raube, ‘The Security–Development Nexus’.
87. Olsen, ‘Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy’, 291.
88. Ibid.
89. Roy, Europe and the Mediterranean.
90. Felbab-Brown, ‘The Dubious Joys’
91. Olsen, ‘Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy’.
92. Gibert, ‘Securitisation of the EU’s Development Agenda’, 624.
93. Gibert, ‘Securitisation of the EU’s Development Agenda’; Olsen, ‘Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy’.
94. Olsen, ‘Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy’.
95. Strazzari, ‘Captured or Capturing?’
96. Ibid.
97. Thanks to Patrick Cullen for directing my attention to these points and for conversations about the proxy concept.