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Abstract
This study seeks to identify factors conducive to the (in)efficacy of indigenous forces (IF) in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Russia’s republics of Chechnya and Dagestan. Empirically, it is the first study to offer an examination of the deployment of IF in the North Caucasus-based COIN. The findings of this article emphasize that the effectiveness of COIN in Chechnya, unlike Dagestan, is conditioned by a number of factors pertaining to the structural and organizational characteristics of IF. Of these, the IF’s experience as former insurgents, their access to insider information, and their loyalty to incumbents – often maintained by the threat of collective punishment – have proven decisive for a relatively successful COIN in Chechnya.
Notes
1. See Kavkaz Uzel, ‘Severnyi Kavkaz – Statistika Zhertv’.
2. Ibid.
3. Souleimanov, ‘An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency’.
4. Balmforth, ‘Dagestan Becomes Hotbed’; International Crisis Group, ‘Russia’s Dagestan’; Souleimanov, ‘Dagestan’.
5. Campana and Légaré, ‘Russia’s Counterterrorism Operation in Chechnya’; Hahn, ‘The Jihadi Insurgency’; Kim and Blank, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Russia’.
6. Quoted in Kramer, ‘The Perils of Counterinsurgency’, 9.
7. See below for the literature review on the role of IF in COIN.
8. From a somewhat different perspective, recent research has focused on the perils of the deployment of local militia and paramilitary forces largely from among indigenous populations. See Jones, The Strategic Logic of Militia; Goodhand and Hakimi, Counterinsurgency; Ahram, Proxy Warriors.
9. Cassidy, ‘The Long Small War’.
10. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces; Kiszely, ‘Learning about Counter-Insurgency’.
11. US Department of the Army, FM3-24.
12. See Stringer, ‘Historical Lessons’; UK Ministry of Defense, Joint Doctrine Note 6/11.
13. Gonzales, American Counterinsurgency.
14. Hashim, Insurgency, 303.
15. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces, vi.
16. Souleimanov, ‘An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency’.
17. Lyall, ‘How Ethnicity Shapes Insurgent Violence’, 1; Lyall, ‘Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents?’.
18. Paul et al., Victory Has a Thousand Fathers.
19. Boettcher and Cobb, ‘Echoes of Vietnam?’; Bjelajac, Guidelines for Measuring Success; Clancy and Crossett, ‘Measuring Effectiveness’.
20. For more details, see US Department of the Army, FM3-24.
21. Ibid., 50.
22. Gleditsch et al., ‘Armed conflict 1946–2001’; Lacina and Gleditsch, ‘Monitoring Trends’; Kreutz, ‘How and When Armed Conflicts End’; Wimmer et al., ‘Ethnic Politics’; Bohorquez et al., ‘Common Ecology’; Do and Iyer, ‘Geography, Poverty and Conflict’.
23. For an analysis of the ideology and technology of the CE, see Souleimanov, ‘The Caucasus Emirate’.
24. See Kavkaz Uzel. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/241444/ (accessed 08 July 2014).
25. See Kavkaz Uzel, ‘Severnyi Kavkaz – Statistika Zhertv’.
26. Kavkaz Uzel (Caucasus Knot) is an independent Caucasus-based information agency. Its bi-monthly statistics on conflict-related casualties in the North Caucasus are compiled from news reports produced by the Kavkaz Uzel daily. The data from Kavkaz Uzel’s ‘Statistika Zhertv’ (Statistics on casualties) has been widely employed both in scholarly studies and in reports of international organizations.
27. Kuchins et al., ‘The North Caucasus’.
28. Maksakov, ‘Chetyre Putinskikh Goda v Chechne’.
29. Ware, ‘Chechenization’.
30. These two factors are interwoven, but not identical, which is why they are treated jointly While experience as former insurgents often facilitates access to insider information (knowledge of the insurgents’ mountainous hideouts, roads, support networks, etc), as Chechnya’s case illustrates, access to insider information may also be retained through collaboration with incumbents by part of the local population – in Chechnya’s case, the relatives of kadyrovtsy and pro-Moscow Chechen authorities.
31. Souleimanov, An Endless War.
32. Rechkalov, ‘Gory v zakone’.
33. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 May 2001.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 19 September 2001.
36. For an overview of ‘zachistkas’, see, for instance, Fakty i Kommentarii. http://fakty.ua/179947-otkryvajte-suki-zachistka-otperli-konechno-kuda-devatsya-tolko-by-dver-ne-vzorvali or New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/28/world/russia-using-brutality-to-suppress-chechens-rights-group-says.html.
37. Walsh, ‘Chechen Government Admits’.
38. For a detailed analysis of human rights violations during the counterinsurgency, see Gilligan, Terror in Chechnya, 23–97.
39. Interview, Informant #1, A Chechen political scientist, Prague, June 2014.
40. Online interview with Mairbek Vatchagaev, 9 June 2014.
41. Ibid.
42. Souleimanov, ‘An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency’.
43. GFBV, ‘Police tried to silence GfbV – Critical Banner against Putin’s Chechnya Wars’, 10 October 2006.
44. Politkovskaya, ‘Chechnya’.
45. Souleimanov, ‘Chechen Units Deployed’.
46. Public lecture of Prof. Tomas Smid, an expert on the North Caucasus from Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic, delivered at Johns Hopkins University, 23 April 2014.
47. Online interview with Magomed Toriyev, North Caucasian Service, RFE/RL, 5 July 2014.
48. Interview, Informant #2, a former kadyrovets.
49. Venyaminov, ‘Zachistki v Chechne’.
50. Online interview with Mairbek Vatchagaev, 9 June 2014.
51. See Venyaminov, ‘Zachistki v Chechne’.
52. Holland and O’Loughlin, ‘Ethnic Competition’.
53. See Kavkaz Uzel ‘Severnyi Kavkaz – Statistika Zhertv’.
54. See Komsomolskaya Pravda, ‘Protiv boevikov v Dagestane vystupyat 7 tysyach politseiskhikh’, 27 June 2011.
55. See GolosIslama.Ru, ‘V Dagestane budut sozdany vremennye otdely politsii po borbe s terrorizmom’, 23 March 2012.
56. Online interview with Irina Godienko, a liberal Russian journalist with Novaya gazeta covering the North Caucasus, 5 July 2014.
57. Interview with Irina Gordienko, 2015.
58. See Chernovik.ru, ‘Na territorii Dagestana, po dannym MVD, deistvuyut okolo 200 boevikov’, 12 April 2013.
59. Nemtsova, ‘Putin’s Secret War’.
60. TVRain.ru, ‘Dagestanskie politseiskie priekhali za pravdoi v Moskvu’, 05 March 2013.
61. Lenta.ru, ‘Pochem povestka. Prizyvnikov iz Dagestana ne berut v armiyu dazhe za dengi’, 16 January 2012.
62. Souleimanov, ‘Russian Army Ceases Conscription’; Telmanov, ‘V armiyu perestali brat’ Dagestantsev’.
63. Nemtsova ‘Tighter Crackdown’.
64. Interview, Informant #3, a former officer of Dagestani Ministry of Interior.
65. Souleimanov, ‘What Does Amirov’s Arrest Imply’.
66. Online interview with Jean-Francois Ratelle, a George Washington University-based expert on Dagestan, 5 July 2014.
67. Recently, accusations of sexual abuse have been added to the portfolio of Dagestani law enforcement agencies. Interview with Sapiyat Magomedova, a renown Dagestani lawyer dealing with police impunity, Prague, 13 March 2014.
68. Ibid.
69. Barry, ‘Dagestan’s Shadow War’.
70. Kadiyev, ‘MVD Dagestana’.
71. See Kavkaz Uzel. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/220791/
72. Souleimanov, ‘Russia Redeploys army to Dagestan’.
73. Possible explanations for this include the absence of the custom of blood feud in most of Dagestan, which makes the authorities’ imposition of collective guilt toward the insurgents’ relatives, a widespread practice in Chechnya, largely impossible. Due to the resulting lack of trust, Moscow has also sought to minimize the numbers of Dagestani conscripts in the Russian Army, apparently due to its fears of supplying the local insurgency with trained combatants.
74. Newsland.ru, ‘Dagestan: Politseiskii snabzhal boevikov oruzhiem’, 19 May 2012.
75. Interview, Informant #5, an officer of Dagestani Ministry of Interior.
76. Ibid.
77. Bolotnikova, ‘Dagestan postavlyaet’.
78. Djemal, ‘Amirov’.
79. Interview, Informant #5, and Informant #4, Interview with Sapiyat Magomedova in Prague, 13 March 2014.
80. Interview with a member of Dagestani Ministry of Interior.
81. Interview, Informant #6, a Dagestani sociologist.
82. Magomedov, ‘Members of “Execution List”’.
83. Ibid.
84. For instance, the commission for rehabilitation of militants, created in Dagestan in 2010 and disbanded in 2014 had only managed to successfully process around 30 applications and had largely failed to protect those militants who applied to the commission. See http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5926 (accessed 09 July 2014). ‘Peacemaking commission’, designed to replace the ineffective rehabilitation commission, was established in February 2013. Yet, as of 2014, there are no verifiable reports with regard to achievements of this initiative. See, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/220500/ (accessed 09 July 2014).
85. According to the former representative of the commission for rehabilitation of militants, most of the rehabilitated militants are working in the construction industry or occupy other low-paid manual jobs. See http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/215088/ (accessed 12 July 2014).
86. Gortzak, ‘Using Indigenous Forces’.
87. Accordingly, due to the persistence of blood feud, prospects for a sustainable peace in Chechnya appear to be shakier compared to Dagestan, where the local society is considerably less divided on the individual level because of the absence of blood feud.