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Abstract
This article analyses Russia’s role in the Ukrainian crisis in the context of Moscow’s foreign policy historical development, underlining patterns of continuity and change in its policies towards the CIS. It argues that Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine results from a combination of two trends, reinforcing a Russian interventionist agenda: perceived threats to Russia’s interests in the near abroad and a radicalised and conservative national spectrum shaping foreign policy decisions. The combination of domestic and external factors driving Russia’s agenda in the near abroad raises important challenges for Russian society and its leaders as it does for its neighbours and partners.
Notes
1. Lo, Vladimir Putin.
2. Levada Centre, ‘Approval of Putin’. Between January 2000 and December 2011, President Putin’s domestic approval ratings have consistently scored above 70% and, following March 2014 (the month when Crimea was recognised as a part of the Russian Federation), his ratings recovered from an average of 65% to over 80%.
3. ‘Q: Is Vladimir Putin Running a Proxy War in Ukraine?’; von Eggert, ‘All Politics are Local’.
4. Russian Ministry of Defence, Russian Military Doctrine.
5. Russian Federation, Foreign Policy Concept.
6. See Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS.
7. Mitrofanova, ‘The Russian World’.
8. Lo, Russian Foreign Policy, 13.
9. Sakwa, Putin, 161.
10. Freire, A Rússia de Putin, 44. ‘[. . .] a construção identitária pós-Soviética acompanha a redefinição das políticas russas com Vladimir Putin, sugerindo uma “nova” Rússia construída sobre as fundações do “velho” império.’ Translation by the author.
11. Allison, ‘Russian Security Engagement’, 86.
12. Rudensky, ‘Russian Minorities’, 58.
13. Putin, First Person, 133–4.
14. For an early analysis of Russia’s take on Chechnya and Kosovo secessionism, see Baev, ‘Russia’s Stance’.
15. Trenin, ‘Russia’s Breakout’.
16. Freire and Simão, ‘The Modernisation Agenda’.
17. Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia.
18. See Nygren, ‘Putin’s Use of Natural Gas’; Freire, ‘Russia’s Energy Policies’.
19. Dunn and Bobick, ‘The Empire Strikes Back’; Bobick, ‘Separatism Redux’.
20. Karagiannis, ‘The Russian Interventions’.
21. Kramer, ‘Why Russia Intervenes’.
22. Saivetz, ‘The Ties That Bind?’.
23. Putin, ‘A New Integration Project’.
24. Karagiannis, ‘The Russian Interventions’.
25. Torbakov, ‘Russian Policymakers’.
26. From an international law perspective, Russia’s military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is considered to be in Georgian territory. There is a sharp difference between the peacekeeping forces stationed in these regions following the ceasefire agreements of the 1990s and the military build-up developed since 2008, based on bilateral agreements between Moscow and the separatist authorities.
27. Global Security, Russian Military Budget.
28. Baev, Russian Energy Policy, 93.
29. Dunn and Bobick, ‘The Empire Strikes Back’.
30. See for instance Bukkvoll, ‘Off the Cuff Politics’.
31. Ibid.
32. Nilsson, ‘Russian Policy’. Felgenhauer, ‘Ukraine, Russia’.
33. Nilsson, ‘Russian Policy’.
34. Haran and Burkovsky, ‘War in Georgia’.
35. Felgenhauer, ‘Moscow Ready’.
36. Russian Federation, ‘The Basic Provisions’; Russian Federation, ‘Conception of the Foreign Policy’.
37. Natoli, ‘Weaponizing Nationality’.
38. Artman, ‘Annexation by Passport’.
39. Krushelnycky, ‘Fears That Crimea Could Be Next’.
40. Bukkvoll, ‘Off the Cuff Politics’; Nilsson, ‘Russian Policy’.
41. Saari, ‘Russia’s post-Orange Revolution Strategies’.
42. Bukkvoll, ‘Off the Cuff Politics’; Saari, ‘Russia’s post-Orange Revolution Strategies’.
43. Samukhvalov, ‘Relations in the Russia-Ukraine-EU triangle’.
44. Krasnov and Brada, ‘Implicit Subsidies’.
45. ‘Russia Gives Ukraine Cheap Gas’.
46. Laruelle, Russian Nationalism.
47. Marszal, ‘Ukraine Protests’; ‘West has “lost sense of reality”’.
48. US Department of State. ‘President Putin’s Fiction’.
49. See the video of President Putin’s press conference on 4 March 2014, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hg_4D_qR18s.
50. Laruelle, ‘The Ukrainian Crisis’.
51. Hillis, Children of Rus’.
52. Laruelle, ‘The Three Colors of Novorossiya’. See also Jarzyńska, ‘Russian Nationalists’.
53. See Pribylovsky, ‘Power Struggles Inside the Kremlin’.
54. Laruelle, ‘The Three Colors of Novorossiya’.
55. See for instance the account by Alexander Sytnik, on the role of the Russian Institute for Strategic Research in advising the Kremlin, namely of the SVR Lieutenant General Leonid Reshetnikov and his criticism of the Kremlin’s weak stance towards the former Soviet countries. Dzutsev, ‘Analyst Provides Insider View’.
56. Laruelle, ‘The Three Colors of Novorossiya’.
57. Ibid.
58. Freedman, ‘Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management’.