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Abstract
After incurring significant losses during France’s 2013 Operation Serval in Mali, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is back. Mokhtar Belmokhtar has rejoined the group, violent attacks are on the increase, and southern Libya offers elements of the group a new safe-haven. This article takes a long view on AQIM, looking at its objectives and ideology, organizational structure, relationship with the local population and revenue model to determine whether they should be labelled as terrorists, insurgents, or ordinary criminals. The article concludes that AQIM generally follows a strategy of terrorism, while some elements and modus operandi could also be indicative of a strategy of insurgency. AQIM’s primary commanders have a long-standing relationship with the global Al Qaeda movement, are unlikely to be seduced by the Islamic State, and enjoy significant autonomy in conducting their operations. There is, however, little evidence that supports the view that AQIM is a criminal organization behind a religious façade, and its Salafi–jihadist ideology remains a leading determinant.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Bart Schuurman, Grégory Chauzal, and Philippe Prevost for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article. The research assistance by Thomas Brzezinski was also much appreciated.
Notes
1. SITE Intelligence Group, ‘AQIM Announces Joining Al Muribatoon’.
2. Weiss, ‘AQIM Takes Couple Hostage’.
3. Boeke and Schuurman, ‘Operation “Serval”’.
4. UN Security Council, Report on Situation Mali.
5. Zenn, ‘Sahel’s Militant “Melting Pot”’.
6. Ibnein, ‘Oumar Ould Hamahada’.
7. Lebovich, ‘Hotel Attacks and Realignment’.
8. Guidère, ‘Timbuktu Letters: New Insights’.
9. Filiu, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
10. Marret, ‘Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb’.
11. Lebovich, ‘Hotel Attacks and Realignment’.
12. Herbst, Talking Terrorism, 164.
13. Schmid, ‘The Definition of Terrorism’, 86–7 (emphasis in original).
14. See Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare.
15. Duyvesteyn and Fumerton, ‘Insurgency and Terrorism’, 27–41.
16. Schuurman, ‘Defeated by Popular Demand’.
17. Khalil, ‘Know Your Enemy’.
18. Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’.
19. Tinti, Trafficking and Instability.
20. Martinez, Algerian Civil War, 209.
21. Kepel, Jihad, 263–73.
22. Amnesty International, Algeria.
23. Baralon, ‘Tibhirine’.
24. Yous, Qui a tué à Benthala?
25. Mokaddem, ‘Les Afghans Algériens’, 75–82.
26. Guidère, Al Qaïda, Conquête du Maghreb, 63.
27. For the translated text, see Tazaghart, ‘AQMI’, 212–13.
28. ‘Al-Qaeda “Issues France Threat”’.
29. Hunt, ‘Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa’.
30. Atiyah, Letter to Zarqawi.
31. ‘Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal’.
32. Pankhurst, ‘Caliphate and Strategy of al-Qaeda’.
33. Gerges, The Far Enemy.
34. Salem, ‘Ben Laden du Sahara’, 68–72.
35. Lebovich, ‘Hotel Attacks and Realignment’.
36. Jauvert, ‘Mali: Histoire Secrète’.
37. Zimmerman, The Al Qaeda Network.
38. Gartenstein-Ross, ‘Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb’.
39. Al-Qaida Papers (Letter from AQIM’s Shura Council to Masked Brigade’s Shura Council).
40. Baud, ‘Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA)’.
41. Hagen, ‘Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb’ (presentation).
42. Al-Qaida Papers (Letter from AQIM’s Shura Council to Masked Brigade’s Shura Council).
43. Perrigueur, ‘Les Montagnes de Kabylie’.
44. Lecocq et al., ‘Hippoppotamus and Eight Blind Analysts’.
45. Siegel, ‘AQIM’s Playbook in Mali’.
46. Mali-al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook, Chapter 3, page 3.
47. Al-Qaida Papers (Letter from AQIM’s Shura Council to Masked Brigade’s Shura Council).
48. Fowler, A Season in Hell.
49. Ibid., 134, 148.
50. Lebovich, ‘Mergers, MUJAO, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’.
51. Bacchi, ‘France’s War in Mali’.
52. Lasserre and Oberlé, Notre Guerre Secrète, 43–44.
53. Boeke and Tisseron, ‘Mali’s Long Road Ahead’.
54. Al-Andulus Media, ‘Call to Youth of Islam’.
55. Schmid, Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates.
56. Zelin, Gartenstein-Ross, and Lebovich, ‘Al-Qa’ida’s Tunisia Strategy’.
57. Chauzal, Fix the Unfixable.
58. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 8.
59. Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, 393.
60. See Scheele, Smugglers and Saints.
61. Fowler, A Season in Hell, 134, 148.
62. Salem, Ben Laden du Sahara, 56–9.
63. Notin, Guerre de la France, 595–8.
64. Rodier, ‘Libye’.
65. Duhem, ‘Nord-Mali Aqmi’.
66. Mali-al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook, Chapter 1, page 2.
67. Ibid., Chapter 1, page 3.
68. Wing, ‘French Intervention in Mali’.
69. Chauzal, ‘Snapshot of Mali’.
70. Presentation Chief JMAC (MINUSMA), Lille 7 December 2015.
71. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in Sahara-Sahel, 68.
72. Detzi and Winkleman, ‘Hitting Where it Hurts’.
73. Scheele, Smugglers and Saints, 122–3.
74. Salem, ‘Ben Laden du Sahara’, 42–5.
75. UNODC, Cocaine Trafficking in Western Africa.
76. Tinti, Trafficking and Instability.
77. Lacher, Organised Crime and Conflict.
78. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in Sahara-Sahel, 149–51.
79. Tinti, Trafficking and Instability.
80. Callimachi, ‘Paying Ransoms’.
81. Guidère, ‘Timbuktu Letters: New Insights’.
82. Fowler, A Season in Hell, 150–1.
83. Ibid., 227–8.
84. Follorou, ‘Otages d’Arlit’.
85. Fowler, A Season in Hell, 310–11.
