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Abstract
The article presents the application of a concept of political territoriality in the case of Al-Shabaab. It first presents territoriality as a human strategy based on control of territory. Hereinafter, the set of criteria for the examination of political territoriality is presented. It concludes that given the development of Al-Shabaab, we can identify three distinct periods connected to the ′organization’s relation to territory: 2006–2008 – defiance; 2009–2011 – supremacy; and 2012–present – withdrawal. The issue of the deterritorialization of Al-Shabaab since 2012 is also connected to the need to enhance the strategies used against the group as it is becoming more connected to population and functional identification than territory.
Notes
1. Riegl, ‘Terminologie kvazistátů’.
2. Sack, ‘Human Territoriality’, 55.
3. Ibid., 56.
4. Sack, Human Territoriality, 2–3.
5. Ibid., 20.
6. Sack, ‘Human Territoriality’, 57.
7. Vollaard, ‘The Logic of Political Territoriality’, 691.
8. Ibid., 690.
9. Ibid., 693.
10. Agnew, Globalization and Sovereignty, 6.
11. Goemans, ‘Bounded Communities’, 29.
12. Kahler, ‘Territoriality and Conflict’, 3.
13. Johnson and Toft, ‘Grounds for War’.
14. Johnston, ‘Out of the “Moribund Backwater”’, 684–5.
15. Kahler, ‘Territoriality and Conflict’, 4, 9, 13.
16. Newman, ‘The Resilience of Territorial Conflict’, 96.
17. See Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence.
18. Gartzke, ‘Globalization, Economic Development, and Territorial Conflict’, 179.
19. Johnston, ‘Out of the “Moribund Backwater”’, 687, 690.
20. Korbin, ‘Back to the Future’.
21. Kahler, ‘Territoriality and Conflict’, 2.
22. Newman, ‘The Resilience of Territorial Conflict’, 88.
23. Gurr, ‘Peoples Against States’.
24. Staniland, Networks of Rebellion, 21–2.
25. As P. Williams points out, in some places the population perceives even the harsh rule of violent non-state actors as desirable in comparison to the lawlessness connected to state failure. See Williams, Violent Non-State Actors.
26. Berg and Kuusk, ‘What Makes Sovereignty a Relative Concept?’; Zaidi, ‘Toward a Measure of the Functional Effectiveness of a State’.
27. Bruton, Somalia.
28. Murphy, Somalia: The New Barbary?.
29. Menkhaus and Shapiro, ‘Non-State Actors and Failed States’.
30. Murphy, Somalia: The New Barbary?; Menkhaus, ‘The Crisis in Somalia’.
31. Menkhaus, ‘Governance without Government in Somalia’.
32. Shortland and Percy, ‘Governance, Naval Intervention and Piracy in Somalia’.
33. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 4.
34. Ibid., 15–48; Shinn, ‘Al-Shabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia’.
35. Ibid.
36. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 73.
37. Mwangi, ‘State Collapse’, 518.
38. Solomon, ‘Somalia’s Al-Shabaab’, 352–3.
39. Marchal, ‘A Tentative Assessment’, 390, 394; Thomas, ‘Exposing and Exploiting’, 414.
40. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia; Thomas, ‘Exposing and Exploiting’, 413.
41. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia.
42. Menkhaus, ‘Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate’, 5; Solomon, ‘Somalia’s Al-Shabaab’, 357; Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia.
44. Williams, ‘After Westgate’; Mwangi, ‘State Collapse’, 521; Anderson and McKnight, ‘Kenya at War’; Menkhaus, ‘Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate’.
45. Al-Shabaab even declared war on Israel. See http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/al_shabaab.html.
46. Al-Shabaab merged with Al Qaeda ‘to confront the international crusaders and their aggression against the Muslim people’. See http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/al_shabaab.html. Also in 2012, Ayman al-Zawahiri – leader of Al Qaeda – announced the merger with Al-Shabaab in the following words: ‘Today, I have pleasing glad tidings for the Muslim Ummah that will please the believers and disturb the disbelievers, which is the joining of the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia to Qaedat al-Jihad, to support the jihadi unity against the Zio-Crusader campaign and their assistants amongst the treacherous agent rulers.’ See https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/zawahiri-announces-joining-of-shabaab-to-al-qaeda.html.
47. On the impact of the merger on the self-presentation of Al-Shabaab, see http://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf, p.7.
48. Thomas, ‘Exposing and Exploiting’, 416. For the discussion over the changing nature of the Al-Shabaab rhetoric between 2007 and 2010, see Curran, ‘Global Ambitions’.
49. Mwangi, ‘State Collapse’, 522–3.
50. This shift is evident when looking at the predominance of the Kenyan issue in Al-Shabaab press statements since 2012. For a clear picture visit SITE intelligence coverage of Al-Shabaab’s statements at https://news.siteintelgroup.com/index.php?option=com_customproperties&lang=en&tagId=21&task=tag&view=search&limitstart=0&limit=100.
51. Another sign of this process appears in the statement presented by Al-Shabaab after the Garissa University massacre. The statement presents passages such as: ‘It is a well known fact that the Kenyan government has perpetrated unspeakable atrocities against the Muslims of East Africa. [. . .] Throughout East Africa, the Muslims were stripped of all their dignity and subjected to the most inhuman treatment for failing to succumb to the subjugation of the disbelievers. [. . .] The Muslim blood is inviolable whereas the blood of a Kafir [disbeliever] has no protection except by Eeman [belief] or Aman [covenant of security]. [. . .] For as long as your government persists in its path of oppression, implements repressive policies and continues with the systematic persecution against innocent Muslims, our attacks will also continue.’ Full text is available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/al-shabab-statement-on-deadly-campus-assault-in-kenya/2015/04/04/4577ce52-dad9–11e4–8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html.
52. Mwangi, ‘State Collapse’, 514.
53. Garnstein-Ross, ‘The Strategic Challenge’, 34–5.
54. Nelson and Sanderson, ‘Al Shabaab’, 3–6.
55. See Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia.
56. See Anderson and McKnight, ‘Kenya at War’.
57. See http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/txu-pclmaps-oclc-795784383-somalia_2012_population_density.jpg.
58. Anderson and McKnight, ‘Kenya at War’, 10–11; United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 10 October 2014’, 43–7.
59. United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 10 December 2008’, 46.
60. Kambere, ‘Financing Al-Shabaab’.
61. According to the World Bank. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST.
62. See http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/txu-pclmaps-oclc-795784383-somalia_2012_population_density.jpg.
63. Map of Al-Shabaab activities in 2014 available at United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 10 October 2014’, 60.
64. Mwangi, ‘State Collapse’, 522–3.
65. See: Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 73–102.
66. McFate, The Modern Mercenary, 131.
67. For detailed analysis of the state of infrastructure inside Somalia, see World Bank report at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/08/13/000445729_20130813141504/Rendered/PDF/802330WP0Somal0Box0379802B00PUBLIC0.pdf.
68. Menkhaus, ‘Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate’, 6.
69. Bryden, ‘The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab’, 2.
70. Ibid., 11.
