![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
In the recent era of state formation in Afghanistan, hundreds of small popular movements rebelled against the Taliban throughout the country. One in particular stands out – the Andar Uprising in the spring of 2012 gave a compelling case of local vigilantism in an area ripe with historic grievances and narratives of community defense dating back to the anti-Soviet jihad. This case is compelling as it shows one faction of the movement engaging in protective paramilitary behavior over the civilian population, while the other faction engages in predatory behavior. Controlling processes, incentives structures, and narratives were all factors correlating to the rise of a popular anti-Taliban resistance in Andar District that battled the Taliban and perceived oppression in their district. When patrons and the community engaged in complementary governance over the paramilitary group, in this case through the Afghan Local Police (ALP), paramilitary behavior was protective of the civilian population. However, when patrons and communities failed to provide complementary governance, as the case of the remaining Uprising force after ALP institutionalization, the paramilitaries engaged in predation on the local population.
Notes
1. The market of protection is a term I borrow from Lane, ‘Economic Consequences of Organized Violence’. It represents the industry in the use of force. In periods of state formation, consumers of protection (citizens) seek an efficient price/service ratio in the market, while producers of the service seek to monopolize and maximize profit. Legitimate governments are in the business of providing efficient (cost-effective) markets of protection, while challengers such as bandits, mafia, and private security contractors seek to provide less efficient markets that maximize profits.
2. This follows along the classical greed versus grievance literature regarding nonstate armed actors. See Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”; and Berdal and Malone, Greed and Grievance.
3. Long, “The Anbar Awakening.”
4. During its climb to prominence, from April to December 2012, UNAMA documented only 45 civilian casualties in Ghazni, the majority of which were directly or indirectly related to the presence of the Andar Uprising. UNAMA noted the Andar Uprising did not target civilians, However, the increased presence of Afghan Army counterinsurgency activities, Taliban attacks, and community militia presence contributed to civilian casualties. See UNAMA, Afghanistan Annual Report, 48.
5. Paramilitary groups are auxiliary forces sponsored either overtly or tacitly by a state to defend against rebel organizations and forward institutional interests. Paramilitaries are both a product and strategy of local rule and state formation, and a product and strategy of state collapse. See Tilly, “War Making and State Making”; Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War; Klare, “The Deadly Connection”, 117; and Bates, When Things Fell Apart, 147–48. Predation is viewed as corruption, rent seeking, and perpetuating violence against society, similar to the behavior of criminal organizations that derive benefits from the nonbureaucratic political economy of violence. See Reno, “Persistent Insurgencies and Warlords,” 54.
6. More commonly referenced as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami, or HIG. There is also a moderate political wing of Hezbi Islami in Afghanistan (HIA) with political representatives throughout ministries, provinces, and parliament. I refer to those associated with the historical tanzim or political/military front, however there are often ambiguities between HIA, HIG, and many associate factions; locals tend to refer to them all as Hezbi Islami or Hezbi, the latter which I refer to.
7. Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 111.
8. Constable, “Afghan militias cling to power.”
9. Naval Postgraduate School 2007.
10. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop.
11. Younus, “Taleban Call the Shots”; and Reuter and Younus, “The Return of the Taliban.”
12. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security, 59; and Bergh et al., Conflict Analysis: Jaghori and Malistan, 8–10.
13. Broadwell and Loeb, All in, 165; and Robinson, One Hundred Victories, 203.
14. People of Ghazni Manifesto; Habib, “Who Fights for Whom”; and Moreau, “How the Taliban Drove Afghan Villagers.”
15. Pajhwok, “Taliban Shut Schools After Government”; Sieff, “Taliban Closes Dozens of Afghan Schools”; Habib, “Who Fights for Whom”; People of Ghazni Manifesto; and Alizada, “Afghan Local Militias.”
16. Interviews with Afghan officials; Habib, “Who Fights for Whom”; and People of Ghazni Manifesto.
17. Engineer Lotfullah Kamrani, to be discussed later, claimed in an interview that he was also part of this cadre. See Quraishi, People & Power.
18. Habib, “Who Fights for Whom.”
19. Moreau, “How the Taliban Drove Afghan Villagers.”
20. Interviews with Afghan officials; People of Ghazni Manifesto; and Foschini, “The Battle for Schools.”
21. Interviews with US and Afghan officials; and Habib, “Who Fights for Whom.”
22. People of Ghazni Manifesto; Habib, “Who Fights for Whom”; Ron Moreau claims the foreign Taliban were held by one of the uprising commanders, Wali Muhammad, and were either swapped with Taliban for Abdul Malik’s release or freed when Muhammad’s house was torched by a Taliban reprisal gang.
23. Interviews with US officials; Foschini, “The Battle for Schools”; and Quraishi, People & Power. See Felbab-Brown, Aspirations and Ambivalence, 150. She contends that Kamrani told his people they would fight the US after taking care of the Pakistani Taliban.
24. Peter, “Locals Turn Against Taliban.” By end of June, Kamrani alleged they had over 500 armed fighters, controlling 31 villages and extended as far as Giro district in the south. See Foschini, “The Battle for Schools.”
25. Interviews with US officials; Habib, “Who Fights for Whom.”
26. Felbab-Brown (149) numbers Uprising fighters at 250, controlling 50 villages and 4000 residents. It is likely the Uprising had strong control in a few select villages, and limited control in others.
27. Interviews with US and Afghan officials; Habib, “AAN Reportage (2).”
28. Engineer Kamrani traveled in an SUV that flew the flag of Afghanistan; see Quraishi, People and Power.
29. Habib, “AAN Reportage (2)”; and Khaama, “Former Governor for Ghazni.” Faizon was an Andar Pashtun commander affiliated with Hezbi. He was a minor commander during the jihad but broke with Hekmatyar after 2001, still maintaining close ties to the Hezbi network. He was director of the Sarda dam project in Andar and became governor of Andar district in 2007, but was forced to resign under charges of corruption.
30. Habib, “Who Fights for Whom”; and Habib, “The Morphing of the Andar Uprising.” Hussaini is an important member of the Andar tribe who served as a senior official in the Taliban government, but joined the Karzai government in 2004 as governor of Zabul.
31. Clark, “What Exactly is the CIA Doing in Afghanistan?”; and Human Rights Watch, Today We Shall All Die.
32. Military Police Complaints Commission, Final Report; Parliament of Canada, Special Committee on the Canadian Mission; Human Rights Watch, Today We Shall All Die; and Smith, “House of Pain.”
33. Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s. While the report redacts the country, media reports confirm COBALT, also known as the Salt Pit, was in Afghanistan. See Windrem and Reynolds, “How the CIA Tried”; Rosenberg and Landay, “Prosecutors Probing Deaths”; and Daily Beast, “Inside the CIA’s Sadistic Dungeon.”
34. Rubin and Rosenberg, “Ragtag Revolts in Parts.”
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Habib, “Who Fights for Whom.”
38. Ibid.
39. See Robison, One Hundred Victories, 206–8.
40. Aikens, “Exclusive: A US-backed Militia.” UN reports listed 11 Taliban killed and ISAF reported three ANSF casualties and one ISAF casualty.
41. Ibid. An ISAF inquiry ‘found no information that substantiates the allegations’ of this event. While, the UN conducted its own investigation of the executions in Andar and ‘verified the allegations of extrajudicial killings of three men by a pro-government militia.’
42. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security, 69.
43. Goldstein, “Afghan Militia Leaders.”
44. Dearing and Braden, “Robber Barons Rising”; and USGS, Summary of the Katawas Gold.
45. USGS, Summary of the Katawas Gold, 650–53.
46. Ghaznavi, “Ghazni’s Mafia State”; Maftoon, “Warlords Grab 75,000 Acres”; Pajhwok, “10,000 Acres of State Land”; Pajhwok, “200 ALP Members Deployed”; and Killid Group, “Powerful Plunder Public Land.”
47. Oppel, “Corruption Undercuts Hopes”; Masoud, “Ghazni in the Grip”; and Ibrahimkhail, “Advisor to Ghazni’s Acting Governor.”
48. Farmer, “Armed Uprising Against Taliban”; UNAMA, Afghanistan Annual Report 2012; Rosenberg and Rubin, “Ragtag Revolts in Parts”; People of Ghazni Manifesto; Habib, ‘Who Fights for Whom”; Felbab-Brown, Aspirations and Ambivalence; and Peter, “Locals Turn Against Taliban.”
49. Habib, “Who Fights for Whom”; Trofimov, “Once Touted Afghan Force”; and Farmer, “Armed Uprising Against Taliban.”
50. Lubold, “Are We Winning in Afghanistan?”; and Aikens, “Exclusive: A US-backed Militia.”
51. Andar, “How Taliban Lost Their Objectives?”; and Quraishi, People & Power.
52. Interviews with US and Afghan officials; Quraishi, People & Power; and Habib, “The Andar Uprising.”
53. Within a few months, the district limit would increase to 300, according to Trofimov, “Once Touted Afghan Force.”
54. Pajhwok, “200 ALP Members Deployed”; CJSOTFA, “Newest Afghan Local Police”; UNAMA, Afghanistan Annual Report 2012, 87; UNAMA, Afghanistan: Midyear Report 2014, 42–7; and UNAMA, Afghanistan Annual Report 2014, 88.
55. Habib, “Who Fights for Whom”; Habib, “The Andar Uprising”; Habib, “AAN Reportage (2)”; Trofimov, “Once Touted Afghan Force”; UNAMA, Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection, 2014; and Pajhwok, “Women among 18 Killed.”
56. Trofimov, “Once Touted Afghan Force”; and Quraishi, People & Power.
57. Sayara Strategies, “Atmospherics Reports.”
58. Nordland, “20 Afghan Police Officers.”
59. Quraishi, People & Power; and Andar, “How Taliban Lost their Objectives.”
60. Quraishi, People & Power.
61. Ibid.
62. Musa Khan quoted in Pajhwok, “Uprising Against Taliban Spreads.”
63. Anonymous, “People and Authorities.”
64. Ibid.
65. Habib, “Who Fights for Whom.”
66. Jamal, “If We Lose Andar’s Battle”; and Khuzai, “Ghazni People’s Uprising.”
67. Jamal, “If We Lose Andar’s Battle.”
68. Habib, “Killing Mullahs and Wedding Guests”; Goldstein, “Afghan Militia Leaders”; and Aikens, “Exclusive: A US-backed Militia.”
69. Sayara Strategies, “Atmospherics Reports.”