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Abstract
The Sahel has gained attention in international politics as one of the central theatres in the war on terrorism. International actors in this war seek alliances with states in the region, reinforcing the latter’s military strength and their legitimacy from outside. At the same time, increasingly-connected young populations question the legitimacy of their states, and contest that legitimacy from within and below. In the absence of states delivering any reasonable form of social contract, young people become torn between different governing orders and find themselves in a liminal space. In this article we present the cases of youth in Mali and Chad, who find themselves in a period of re-definition of their position in society and hence search for legitimate structures representation. In this search they may frame their belonging in terms of ethnicity, religion or political opposition – and increasingly also in adherence to global citizenship. New information flows and connectivity among young people in these regions, and between them and the diaspora, has given a new turn to their search for citizenship/belonging and rightful representation. However, whether their search will be successful in this geopolitical context is questionable.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Isabelle Duyvesteyn for repeated feedback on the draft article and José Carlos Gomez Aguiar for comments made during the conference preceding this publication. We would further like to thank Han van Dijk and Meike de Goede for their feedback and Ruadhan Hayes for editing.
Notes
1. See, for example, Fredericks, 2013, 214.
2. The jihadist movements are also likely to have networks within the Chadian capital, and the Fulani youth in Mali in our case study below are equally confronted with international military and ‘developmental’ actors.
3. Augusteijn, Review, Mobilizing the faithful.
4. Duyvesteyn, Introduction to this issue; Schoon, “The Paradox Of Legitimacy.”
5. De Boeck and Honwana, Makers & Breakers.
6. Sommers, “Governance, Security and Culture”; Abbink, Vanguard or Vandals, 3–4.
7. Sommers, “Governance, Security and Culture,” 2011.
8. Branch and Mampilly, Africa Uprising, 3.
9. Herrera, “Youth and Citizenship”; Iwilade, “Crisis as Opportunity”.
10. Branch and Mampilly; Herrera and Sakr, Wired Citizenship.
11. While the war on terror in the Sahel goes back further in time (see, for example, Ellis: Briefing: The Pan-Sahel Initiative), here we are particularly interested in developments that took place since the crisis in Mali broke out in 2012, which also affected Chad and amplified the war on terror in that country. Chad became deeply involved militarily in fighting in Mali and later on its own boarders and in neighbouring countries against Boko Haram.
12. See for example Vromen et al., “Young People, Social Media”; Herrera, “Youth and Citizenship.”
13. Herrera and Sakr, Wired Citizenship; Englund and Nyamnjoh, Rights and the politics of.
14. Iwilade, “Crisis as Opportunity,” 1057.
15. Branch and Mampilly, Africa Uprising, 126.
16. Finnström, “Meaningful Rebels?,” 224.
17. For the distinction between internal and external legitimacy, we build on Jackson and Rosberg, Popular legitimacy.
19. A perspective on female youth’s roles in the processes we describe here remains open to investigation.
20. Lecocq, Disputed Desert.
21. Lecoq et al., “One Hippopotamus.”
22. For an overview of what has happened, see Lecocq et al., “One Hippopotamus.” See also reports of the International Crisis Group (ICG), e.g. Briefing 115 (December 2015) (https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/mali-peace-below) and ICG (July 2016) (https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/central-mali-uprising-making).
23. It is interesting to note here that the past few years have seen a flow of literature and films that criticize the regime of former Chadian president Habré. The critiques on the Déby regime are still not very open except for the ‘testimony literature’ of several opponents of the regime (see, for example, Yorongar, Tchad: démocratie, crimes, torture). To read more on the history of the period of ‘democratization’ after 1990, see Buijtenhuis, Transitions et élections au Tchad.
24. See de Bruijn, 2016a, 2016b.
25. A case study composed from the research of Boukary Sangaré and Mirjam de Bruijn We cannot relate the whole rather complex situation here See also De Bruijn et al., “Communicating War”; De Bruijn, 2015; Sangaré, 2016 (GRIP) See also the report of ICG 2016 (https://wwwcrisisgrouporg/africa/west-africa/mali/central-mali-uprising-making).
26. Research conducted by Mirjam de Bruijn and Han van Dijk; see De Bruijn and van Dijk, Arid Ways; De Bruijn and van Dijk, “Moving People.”
27. De Bruijn and van Dijk, “Moving People.”
28. Lecocq et al.; Keita et al. Téléphonie et Mobilité Au Mali.
29. See the short video made by Boukary Sangaré on http://www.connecting-in-times-of-duress.nl/ganda-izo-the-fulbe-self-defense-group-in-northern-mali/ [accessed 15 March 2017].
30. Here, we refer to interviews which Boukary Sangaré, a member of our research team, conducted with the leaders of the Fulani in 2012, 2013 (with the presence of Mirjam de Burijn), 2014 and 2015, and to various information provided to both Boukary Sangaré and Mirjam de Bruijn by telephone.
31. Cissé, (fc), “Biographie de Hamadoun Koufa.”
32. See Wing, “French Intervention in Mali,” for a similar stance with regards to the French framing of the need for intervention in the region.
33. Based on the research of Mirjam de Bruijn in 2014–2016 into youth protest and the development of the music protest scene in N’Djaména.
34. In the 2015 Human Development Index published by the UNDP, Chad held position 185 out of 188; only Eritrea, The Central African Republic and Niger scored worse than Chad. In 2016 it sank one place to position 186 (see http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf, 211, Accessed January 5, 2017, and http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf, 201, accessed on March 15, 2017).
35. For this paper we limit ourselves to 2016 because of the limitation of space; however, it is good to note that initial protests were held in 2014 as a reaction to severe inflation, and then a serious renewal of youth protest and state violence occurred in March 2015, when a measure against the wearing of helmets led to youth protests that were cruelly repressed by the state, resulting in the death of one of the protesters (see De Bruijn, blog post). See also De Bruijn, Citizen journalism at crossroads; and De Bruijn, 2017).
36. Re-established only in January 2017, but then without the extra primes for state employees, which in fact means a reduction in their salaries by 50%. The unions have announced that if this does not change, they will renew their actions. Strikes by students and teachers in Chad are not a new phenomenon; however, it seems they have reached a new dynamic and size in recent years, accelerated by increased communication possibilities.
37. Hansen, “A Democratic Dictator’s Success, “ 584.
38. See for example Collet, “The Challenges of,” 6–7.
39. This information was obtained through Facebook, based on research by the first author. See also Séverin, “Fighting Terrorism in Chad.”
40. Similar sentiments, though less strong, resonate in Uganda with regards to donor support for the Museveni regime. See for example Branch and Mampilly, ch. 6.
41. De Bruijn 2017, blog post, https://mirjamdebruijn.wordpress.com/2017/03/03/ugly-contrasts-in-chad/.
42. See for example Collet.
43. Ellis, “Briefing: The Pan-Sahel Initiative,” 462–3.
44. See Wing, 2016 for critical comments on the international war on terrorism as waged in northern Mail.
45. Griffin, “Operation Barkhane and Boko Haram.”
46. Behrends et al., Travelling Models.
47. Hansen, “A Democratic Dictator’s Success.”
48. See also Iwilade, “Crisis as Opportunity.”
49. After the failed coup attempt of February 2008, Déby invested even more heavily in his army than before, breaking the agreement signed with the World Bank to use oil revenue money for investing in development and the future generations. See Behrends et al., Travelling Models; Hansen, “A Democratic Dictator’s Success.”
50. See also Iwilade, “Crisis as Opportunity”; Vromen et al., “Young People, Social Media.”
51. The extent to which the state and international military endeavours control information channels and content is not obvious for both countries. For example, while the Internet was cut off in Chad in 2016 and there had been earlier reference to close contacts between mobile phone providers and the state (for example, during the 2008 rebel advance), the population to a certain extent found ways to circumvent the restrictions on communications this caused. Nevertheless, more research is required into the control and surveillance by states such as Chad and Mali in the digital age (see also Herrera and Sakr, Wired Citizenship and Herrera, Citizensgip under surveillance for discussion of such practices in the Middle East).
52. Lund, “Twilight Institutions.”
53. Collet, “The Challenges.”
54. Ellis, “Briefing: The Pan-Sahel Initiative.”
55. See for example Human Rights Watch, 2016.
56. For the questionability of their effect, see also for example Carayannis and Lombard, Making sense of the Central African Republic on external interventions over time in the Central African Republic.
57. Lottholz and Lemay-Hébert, “Re-reading Weber, Re-conceptualizing State-building.”
58. Lottholz and Lemay-Hébert, “Re-reading Weber, Re-conceptualizing State-building,” 9.
59. Jackson and Rosberg, “Popular Legitimacy in African Multi-ethnic States.”
60. Finnström, “Meaningful Rebels,” 205.
61. Iwilade, “Crisis as Opportunity.”
62. Herrera, “Youth and Citizenship”; Iwilade, “Crisis as Opportunity.”
63. Herrera, “Youth and Citizenship.”
64. As noted above, this is not a new phenomenon. Think, for example, of ‘Cold war imperatives, […] there can be little question that they helped to legitimize some of the most repressive regimes anywhere in the continent’ (Lemarchand, Uncivil states and civil societies: 184). See also HRW, 2016. Or, as Mampilly and Branch show for Uganda, military spending was condoned and made possible by extensive and continuing donor support in the field of development (118–119). And despite popular protest in the aftermath of the 2011 election: ‘Today the state’s donor-supported militarization continues unhindered’ (ibid., 145).