The Illusion of Afghanistan’s Electoral Representative Democracy: The Cases of Afghan Presidential and National Legislative Elections

Abstract

This article is the latest in a series of published articles systematically examining Afghan Presidential and legislative elections. Structural problems including fraud, ethno-linguistic block voting, and the Single Non-Transferable Vote have had significant impacts on the development of Afghan democratic elections. The challenge now facing the current Afghan government and future elections is the daunting task of uniting the Afghan people while not repeating the electoral mistakes of the past. The tricky balancing act of fostering an overarching national identity without being perceived as privileging particular identities requires strong leadership and a willingness to challenge traditional ethnic, linguistic, and religious norms when need be. Karzai and Ghani Administrations have seriously failed relative to this dynamic.

Keywords:

• Afghanistan
• Afghan Presidential and Wolesi Jirga elections
• Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)
• election fraud
• ethno-linguistic block-voting

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank two former students – Suzzette Lopez and LT Joseph Bubulka – for their assistance in the formulation of this article and its analyses. The author would also like to thank Matthew DuPee, Larry Goodson, Harold Ingram, M. Chris Mason, and Ahmad Waheed for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Notes

1. United Nations Security Council, Agreement on the Provincial Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 5 December 2001, S/2001/1154.

2. 27 candidates official registered to run during the registration period that lasted from 16 September 2013 through 6 October 2013. Afghanistan’s Independent Election Committee disqualified 16 of these candidates to run for a variety of reasons and three other candidates exited the race before the April election.

3. In 2014, Ghani stopped to using his tribal name – Ahmadzai.

4. For example see: “Afghan Election Complaints Commission Warns of Fraud.” Radio Free Europe/Radio, Liberty, 9 April 2014. https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-election-complaints-commission-warns-of-fraud/25326898.html.

5. Nordland, “Asraf Ghani named President of Afghanistan by Election Panel.”

6. Gall, “In the Afghan Election.”

7. Mason, “Fraud and Folly In Afghanistan.”

8. For example, ‘Fifteen thousand Abdullah supporters marched on the Arg to protest the election. Ghani’s circle was equally adamant. His campaign coördinator at the time, Hamdullah Mohib, recalls a meeting in which Ghani advisers discussed bringing a hundred thousand people into the streets. Ghani told them, in his didactic way, “A civil war lasts on average ten or fifteen years, and even then they’re very hard to end – ours is still going on. I can guarantee that tomorrow, if you March on Kabul, the first bullet will be fired. If anyone can guarantee when the last bullet will be fired, then I’ll allow the March.”’ Packer, “Afghanistan’s Theorist-in-Chief.’

9. Forugh, “Afghanistan’s Uprising for Change.”

10. Pacheco, “The Role of External Development Actors in the Post-conflict Scenarios. Also see: Noel, From Power Sharing to Democracy.

11. International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate,” 1.

12. For a series of excellent analyses of Afghan elections by the Afghan Analysis Network, see: van Bijlert, ‘Afghan Elections Dilemma”; van Bijlert, “Polling Day Fraud in the Afghan Elections”; Qaane and van Bijlert, “Elections in Hibernation”; Ruttig, “Elections (31)”; Ruttig, “Pluralistic within Limits, but Not Democratic.”

13. For the seminal works on Afghanistan societal fragmentation, see: Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan; and Barfield. Afghanistan.

14. Peleg, “Transforming Ethnic Orders to Pluralist Regimes,” 10.

15. Horowitz, “Democracy in Divided Societies,” 35.

16. For an excellent discussion of these phenomena based on extensive Afghan field research see: Murtazashvili, Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan.

17. CIA World Fact Book, 2016.

18. Generally see: Barfield. Afghanistan, op. cit.

19. Starr, “Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Afghan Nation-building,” 108, 109.

20. International Center for Transitional Justice, Stabilizing Afghanistan.

21. Carter and Clark, No Shortcut to Stability, 12.

22. Tavernise and Wafa, “U.N. Officail Acknowledges.” Also see: Abdul-Ahad, “New Evidence of Widespread Fraud.”

23. In addition to the presidential race this election also saw 3197 candidates vie for 420 provincial council positions. For an excellent analysis of the presidential election see: Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°96, Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance, 25 November 2009; and Crisis Group Asia Report N°171, Afghanistan’s Election Challenges, 24 June 2009.

24. The selection of a particular vice presidential candidate was often aimed at ethnically balancing a candidate’s ‘ticket.’ For example, Karzai retained Vice President Karim Khalilli, an ethnic Hazara. Karzai replaced his first Vice President Ahmad Zia Massoud (a Tajik) with Mohammad Qasim Fahim, the powerful Tajik warlord, leader of the Northern Alliance and former Minister of Defense. Ironically during the 2004 Presidential election, Karzai dismissed Fahim from his ticket on the last official date for filing of presidential election candidacy forms and replaced him with another Tajik, Ahmad Zia Masood.

25. Bays, “The Words of the Professor.”

26. “Violence to Prevent Observers from Widely Monitoring Polls.”

27. “Low Turnout Seen in Afghan Election.”

28. Interviews of Afghans concerning the Presidential election in Kandahar City and surrounding districts by Thomas H. Johnson, June–July, 2009.

29. United Nations General Assembly Security Council, “The Situation in Afghanistan.”

30. European Union Election Observation Mission, “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Final Report.”

31. Gall, “Observers of Afghanistan’s Election.”

32. Ibid.

33. The IEC is a constitutional body appointed by the president to oversee polls. It is tasked with registering voters, running polling stations, and issuing election results. The IEC is accountable to the Afghan parliament and population. Members of the IEC are selected by the president, which has cast doubt on the commission’s independence. On the other hand, the ECC is an independent panel that reports any findings of fraud to the Independent Election Committee (IEC), which under law must accept ECC findings. It was established under Article 52 of the Afghan Electoral Law to investigate and oversee all challenges and complaints associated to the electoral process. If an offense is found to have taken place, it has the right, under Article 54, to impose sanctions. The ECC can also review disputes regarding the eligibility of nominated candidates. It is made up of two national commissioners and three international commissioners. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Supreme Court of Afghanistan each select one commissioner; the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations appoints the final three commissioners. The provincial embodiment of the ECC is the Provincial ECC, set up in each of the provinces and composed of three Commissioners and one support officer. During the 2005 and 2009 elections, the ECC required that at least one Afghan commissioner had voluntarily agreed with any finding in order to prevent the three international commissioners from abusing their majority to override the two Afghan commissioners.

34. “Karzai ‘Stripped of Outright Win’.”

35. United Nations General Assembly Security Council, “The Situation in Afghanistan.”

36. In Kandahar, the Taliban released a series of ‘night letters,’ instructing voters to stay home on Election Day. In one letter, the Taliban warned, "Dear citizens, we are warning you not to participate in the election. If you do, you will fall prey to our operations." (Matthew Fisher and Mike Blanchfield, “Afghanistan Clamps Down on News Media; Reporting on Violence Halted. Government Doesn’t Want Key Election Disturbed by Images of Destruction,” The Gazette, 19 August 2009). Baghlan and Kunduz were also greatly affected by violence, where of the incidents that took place in 2009, 42 and 31%, respectively, took place in August alone (Figures based on data collected from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, http://www.nctc.gov/site/other/wits.htm)

37. The Economist, “Afghanistan’s Presidential Elections.”

38. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition,” 13.

39. Analyses such as those presented in this paper are often criticized as possibly violating the ‘ecological’ or inference fallacy that warns against making inferences about the nature of specific individuals based on aggregate or group data. Sociologist William Robinson coined the term ‘ecological fallacy’ in his famous article – Robinson, W.S. “Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals.” American Sociological Review 15, no. 3 (1950): 351–357. Here he argued that it is incorrect to assume that variables observed at the aggregated or ecological level are the same at the individual level. This does not mean, however, that associations such as those presented here are necessarily defective. Rather, it suggests that the process of aggregating or disaggregating variables or data may conceal variations and that researchers need to be aware of this. Grunfeld and Griliches (Grunfeld, Yehuda and Zvi Griliches. “Is Aggregation Necessarily Bad?” Review of Economics and Statistics 42: 1–13.) argue that ‘[I]n practice we do not know enough about micro behavior to be able to specify micro equations perfectly. Hence empirically estimated micro relations … should not be assumed to be perfectly specified … Aggregation of economic variables can, and in fact frequently does, reduce these specification errors. Hence, aggregation does not only produce aggregation error, but may also produce an aggregation gain.’ It should be realized that the analyses presented here are not interested in individual behavior; rather the study is interested in ethno-linguistic group voting behavior. And the results recognized by the analyses presented here are similar to those found in earlier Afghan elections that were assessed. Moreover, the Appendices present a series of pairwise correlations that also reflect the findings presented concerning the relationships between ethno-linguistic groups and presidential voting preferences. The findings presented are also supported by numerous qualitative discussions of Afghan politics that suggest the prominent role of ethnic affiliations in Afghan political life. For example see: Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, op. cit.

40. We are well aware that the Pashtuns, as well as the other Afghan ethno-linguistic entities do not necessarily represent homogenous groups. In the case of the Pashtuns numerous sub tribes and khels (clans) are relevant and these sub groupings often have inconsistent political views and desires. Pashtuns consist of five large confederations – Durrani, Ghilzai, Ghurgusht, Karlanri, and Sarbani – each of which traces its roots to a single ancestor.

41. Tajiks did not have a strong negative vote against Ahmadzai (r = −0.29); most of the Tajik voters disdain was clearly aimed at Karzai.

42. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition,” 14.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., 14, 15.

45. The Economist, “Afghanistan’s Presidential Elections.” Irregularites have been witnessed in every Post-Bonn Afghan election. For example, it is cited that blatant irregularities were witnessed during the registration process for the 2004 Presidential election, including 140 per cent voter-registration rates in three provinces. (See: Baldauf, “Afghans Vote, Ready or Not.”).

46. For example, see: Gopal, “Afghan Voter Registration Marred”; Coghlan, “President Karzai’s Supporters ‘buy’ Votes for Afghanistan Election.”

47. BBC, “Karzai Stripped of Outright Win.”

48. Pannel, “Afghan Election Fraud is Unearthed.” In May and June of 2009 the author of this article interviewed a number of Afghan citizens who had detailed information concerning the selling and purchase of voter registration cards in Kandahar City.

49. “Violence to Prevent Observers from Widely Monitoring Polls.”

50. Worden, “Delays Will Not Improve Afghan Elections.”

51. Saddique, “Afghanistan’s Karzai Faces Pressure to Confront Corruption Menace.”

52. Filkins, “Afghanistan Postpones Parliamentary Election by 4 Months.”

53. Hamid Karzai, speech to first session of Afghanistan’s Parliament, 20 February 2010.

54. See Appendix 2 for how the seats are distributed for both the 2005 and 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections. The number of seats allocated is based on the total population. This is shown in Appendix 3 in a simple linear regression analysis of number of seats to total population. The number of seats each province can have is important if true representational government is to be established. In the case of Afghanistan the guidelines for this process have been established in Article 20 in Chapter 5 of the Electoral Law. The law regulates the number of seats to each province is to be in proportion to the population size. Additionally the minimum number of seats for each province has been set at two seats. If this occurs the remaining provinces in which extra seats were not allocated to shall divide the remaining seats proportionally based on population size. (Legal Frame Work: Laws and Decrees:Electoral Law, 2010).

55. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition,” 20.

56. Astri Surhke suggests: ‘The Parliament was … weakened by an election law that introduced a curious and rarely used system designed to inhibit political party representation (the Single, Non-transferable Vote system, or SNTV)’. Surhke, “Electing to Fight in Afghanistan.”

57. The Electoral Law also mandates the minimum number of seats to be filled by women. The minimum number of seats allocated to women shall be at least twice the number of provinces. Appendix 2 presents the number of seats allocated to each province. In Afghanistan’s case the minimum number of seats required to be filled by women is 68 (Seat Allocation, 2008–2010). Article 83 of the Constitution established this number (Legal Frame Work: Laws and Decrees:Electoral Law, 2010). Special provisions are required to be taken if there are an insufficient number of women candidates to meet this requirement.

58. Mohaqiq received 13.2% of the vote in 2005 when he was the leading vote getter for the Kabul Wolesi Jirga positions.

59. Worden, Afghanistan’s Ongoing Election Drama.

60. International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate,” op. cit., 1.

61. “Played for Fools: Hamid Karzai’s Shenanigans Make the Going Even Harder for NATO.”

62. Peter Galbraith in interview with David Frost, in Frost Over the World, Al Jazeera English, 26 February 2010.

63. Saddique, “Afghanistan’s Karzai Faces Pressure to Confront Corruption Menace.”

64. International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate,” op. cit., 3.

65. Rubin and Wafa, “Afghan President Tries to Please Both Warlords and West.”

66. Ibid.

67. Rubin, “Afghan Cabinet Nominations Show Little Change.”

68. Ibid.

69. International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate,” op. cit., 1.

70. Afghan Wolesi Jirga elections were scheduled to be held on 15 October 2016; they were postponed, in part, because the lack of resolution concerning the reform of Afghanistan's electoral laws. See: Mashal, “Afghan Panel Sets Election Date.”

71. Ibid., 5.

72. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition,” 12–15.

73. See Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, op.cit.

74. For example, see: Roy and Volk, The Failure of Political Islam.

75. Ibid., 168.

76. For example, see: Johnson, Taliban Narratives.