Iraq, 2003–2011: succeeding to fail

ABSTRACT

This study examines the US experience during the Iraq war, from the planning phase that began in 2001 to the withdrawal of US forces in 2011. It reveals a dearth of planning and intelligence leading up to the invasion; reluctance by conventional coalition military forces to conduct reconstruction, political and security capacity-building; and, later, full spectrum counterinsurgency operations. These forces took on some missions traditionally reserved for special operations forces, and they increasingly assumed diplomatic roles as they interfaced with the Iraqi leadership and local kingpins. Although these efforts yielded some impressive organizational learning and limited operational successes, they were hampered by lack of adequate preparation, a poor understanding of the human terrain, shortsighted strategies, and ultimately a dearth of political will to stay the course. The outcome was far from the model Middle East democracy envisioned by the invasion’s architects, and the American experience in Iraq instead became a cautionary tale for military intervention.

KEYWORDS:

• Iraq
• insurgency
• counterinsurgency

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. This article has been heavily influenced by the thoughts, writings, and sources of the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group, (hereafter referred to as the OIF SG), of which LTC Jeanne Godfroy had the privilege of being an active part of from 2013–2015. As such, it is critical that the authors reference the unpublished (at this time) manuscript produced by that effort, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Volumes I and II, and its other authors, COL Joel Rayburn, COL James Powell, COL Frank Sobchak, and COL Matthew Morton. This article reflects their thoughts, writings, and conclusions, and some of the primary sources cited here are actually taken from the manuscript as it stood in December 2016. Those sources include primary source interviews and documents, now declassified, that will be released once the manuscripts are published.

2. Woodward and Balz, “10 Days in September,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/politics/news/postseries/tendaysinseptember/.

3. Primary and secondary sources used by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapters 2–3.

4. Woods, Saddam and Terrorism, 13–25; other primary source documents held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapters 2–3, 7.

5. Primary source interviews held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapter 2; for additional influences on these planning assumptions, see Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 37–42.

6. Primary source interviews held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapter 3; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 110–117.

7. Primary source documents and interviews held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapters 2–3. Fontenot, Degen and Tohn, On Point, 73–74.

8. Primary source interviews held by the OIF SG, Volume 1, Chapter 2; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 162–3.

9. Primary source interviews and documents held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapter 3; Fontenot, Degen and Tohn, On Point, 69.

10. Benshael, “Mission Not Accomplished,” 68–77, 79–81; Primary source interviews and sources held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapter 3.

11. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 165–6.

12. Primary source interviews held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapter 3.

13. Godfroy, “The Other Side of the ‘COIN’,” 1–4. This paper was produced with the support and resources of the OIF SG.

14. Ibid., 1.

15. Briscoe et al., All Roads Lead to Baghdad448–69, 482–7, 497; and Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 161, 312–20, 332, 336, 343–5; primary source interviews and secondary sources from the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapter 4.

16. Primary source interview held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapter 4.

17. Cline, “The Other Symbol of George W. Bush’s Legacy,” https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/press-past/2013/05/01/the-other-symbol-of-george-w-bushs-legacy. It is worthwhile to note – as this article does – that President Bush did not actually declare victory or sanction the ‘Mission Accomplished’ sign that was displayed. He declared the end to major combat operations in Iraq, a de-facto declaration of victory.

18. Godfroy, “The Other Side of the COIN,” 4.

19. Woods, Saddam and Terrorism, 4, 8, 13–25.

20. Godfroy, “The Other Side of the COIN,” 12; Secondary source document used by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapter 7. This particular secondary source contained analysis from numerous interviews with and intelligence on the Sunni tribes maintained by units in Anbar through 2007.

21. Godfroy, “The Other Side of the COIN,” 13–14; Ware, “Inside Iran’s Secret War for Iraq,” 26–31; and Felter and Fishman, Iranian Strategy in Iraq, https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Iranian-Strategy-in-Iraq.pdf.

22. Godfroy, “The Other Side of the COIN,” 11–14.

23. International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge,” https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/iraq-s-civil-war-sadrists-and-surge, accessed 15 September 2013; and Felter and Fishman, Iranian Strategy in Iraq.

24. Rayburn, Iraq After America, 178–9.

25. Primary source interviews and documents held by the OIF SG, Volume I.

26. Godfroy, “The Other Side of the COIN,” 4–11; Primary source interviews and documents held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapters 7, 9.

27. Ibid.

28. Primary source material provided to the OIF SG from personnel at U.S. Central Command.

29. Primary source interviews held by the OIF SG, Volume I.

30. Ibid.

31. Hull, “Civil Warriors,” http://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/handle/88435/dsp01z603qx56m.

32. Godfroy, “The Other Side of the COIN,” 5–6; Materials held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapter 7.

33. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 208.

34. Report, James Schlesinger to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, 24 August 2004, 11–12, http://www.antiwar.com/rep2/abughraibrpt.pdf; Transcript, “Brian Whitman, W. Hayes Parks, and Ambassador Richard Prosper,” http://www.defense.gov/Transcript/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2281; Bybee, “Standards of Conduct,”, 2340-2340A; and Sanchez, Wiser in Battle, 151–4; primary source materials held by the OIF SG, Volume I.

35. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle, 151–4; Coalition Provisional Authority Ministry of Justice, Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq; and Philip Gourevitch and Errol Morris, Standard Operating Procedure, 174–5. “Court Martial in Iraq,” 60 min II, 24.

36. McChrystal, My Share of the Task,172; and Ricks, Fiasco, 290.

37. Group Primary source interviews and sources held by the OIF SG for The U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Volume I; Bernard et al., The Battle Behind the Wire, 52–3.

38. Bernard et al., The Battle Behind the Wire, 57; Primary source materials held by the OIF SG for Volume I.

39. Interview, William Knarr, Lieutenant Colonel David Graves, and Mary Hawkins, Institute for Defense Analyses with Mullah Nadhim al Jabouri, 12 and 14 February 2011; Chulov, “ISIS: The Inside Story.”

40. President George Bush, 26 February 2003, in the “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/international/20051130military-text.pdf, accessed 31 August 2017.

41. General Franks, American Soldier, 268, 329; primary source documents and interviews held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapter 2.

42. Primary sources and primary source interviews held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapters 7, 9.

43. Declassified documents held by the Institute for Defense Analysis and the OIF SG; Iraq Survey Group, Final Report and Key Findings, online, accessed 10 September 2017, https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/ .

44. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Strategic Plan, 1 August 2003, Department of Defense FOIA library at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foia/Reading_Room/CPA_ORHA/; Bremer, My Year In Iraq, 114–16.

45. Primary source documents held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapter 5.

46. Discussion, COL Joel Rayburn with a senior United States diplomat, April 2015, Washington DC; International Crisis Group, “Governing Iraq,” 5; Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, 191.

47. Primary source interviews and sources held by the OIF SG, Volume I, Chapters 6, 8.

48. Executive Summaries and meeting notes from the Commander of Multi-Security Transition-Command-Iraq, June-July 2004.

49. Ibid.

50. Garamone, “Predictability, Stability at Heart of Rotation Policy,” http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=27835; U.S. Department of Defense Update on Force Rotation Plan, 26 November 2003, accessed 21 October 2015, http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/29439/us-sends-extra-troops-tp-iraq-(nov.-27).html; and Primary source materials from the OIF SG, Volume I; Papers of General Casey, “Papers.”.

51. Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 69–73.

52. Ibid.

53. Jaffe and Cloud, The Fourth Star, 128; and Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 67–73; Primary source interviews and sources held by the OIF SG, Volume I.

54. United Nations, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546,” http://unscr/com/en/resolutions/doc/1546, accessed 8 August 2017; and Chadrasekaran, “U.S. Hands Authority to Iraq Two Days Early,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/22/AR2007062200847.html.

55. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 157–177.

56. Primary source documents from MNF-I held by OIF SG, Volume I, Chapter 15.

57. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 177–180, 344–358.

58. MNSTC-I Executive Summaries and meeting notes for LTG David Petraeus, June-July 2004; Trip reports for LTG David Petraeus, August-October 2004.

59. MNSTC-I Executive Summaries and meeting notes for LTG David Petraeus, August 2004- January 2005.

60. MNSTC-I trip reports and meetings with Iraqi officials, January – March 2005.

61. Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 149–50.

62. Bailey, Iron, and Strachan, eds., British Generals in Blair’s Wars, 80; Fisher, “Italy to Withdraw Its Troops from Iraq,” http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/20/world/europe/italy-to-withdraw-its-troops-from-iraq-by-end-of-the-year.html?mcubz=0; Full Text: British Broadcasting Company, “Al Qaeda Madrid Claim,”http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3509556.stm; and United Kingdom, “Testimony of Sir Richard Sannatt to UK Government’s Inquiry,” http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/55290/20100728am-dannatt.pdf.

63. Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 144–146; MNSTC-I Executive summaries and trip reports, October 2004- May 2005.

64. Jaffe and Cloud, The Fourth Star, 200–210; and Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 138, 180–190.

65. Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 183–200; Cloud and Jaffe, The Fourth Star, 221; and Rayburn, Iraq After America, 23, 25–6.

66. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 301–302.

67. Baker and Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report, 3.

68. Ibid., 7–10, 38, 59, 61, 71.

69. Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 285–6, 302–8.

70. Kagan, “Enforcing the Law,” http://www.understandingwar.org/iraq-project/publications/reports, 1–5, 7–8.

71. Sky, The Unraveling, location 2830.

72. Collins, “Military Innovation in War,” 170, http://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/handle/88435/dsp01br86b3727; and Mansoor, “Army,” 75–86.

73. Kagan, “Enforcing the Law,” 1–5, 7–8.

74. Cloud and Jaffe, The Fourth Star, 255–58; and Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 348–66.

75. MNSTC-I notes; Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 335–41.

76. International Crisis Group, “Iraq After the Surge I,” 11–13. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/iraq-after-surge-i-new-sunni-landscape.

77. Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 248–53.

78. Ibid., 406.

79. CPT Hull, “Iraq,” 2–3.

80. Sky, The Unraveling, locations 3141–3147, 3199–3211, 3365–3385, 3471–3493.

81. International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists, and the Surge,” 3–4, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/iraq-s-civil-war-sadrists-and-surge.

82. Rayburn, Iraq After America, 30–36.

83. Partlow and Abramowitz, “Iraq Passes Bill on Ba’athists,’ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/12/AR2008011201122.html; Rubin, “Ending Impasse, Iraq Parliament Backs Measures,” http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/world/middleeast/14iraq.html?mcubz=0; and Goode, “Iraq Passes Election Law, Setting Aside Kirkuk Status,” http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/world/middleeast/25iraq.html?mcubz=0.

84. Rayburn, Iraq After America, 44; and Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro, “Testing the Surge,” 18–22.

85. Author was present for that meeting.

86. Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro, “Testing the Surge,” 18–22.

87. Sky, The Unraveling, kindle edition, locations 4466–4472, 5722–5748, 5864–5870.

88. Obama, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/02/27/responsibly-ending-war-iraq.

89. Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 529.

90. Hull, “Civil Warriors,” 99.

91. Sky, The Unraveling, kindle edition, locations 5068–5094, 5126–5132, 5246–5303; Sullivan, “Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime,” 6–7, 28–37, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis-Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf; and Rayburn, Iraq After America, 42–58. 60–64.

92. Adams, “2009 Command Report,” 27–28. Dagher, “2 Blasts Expose Security Flaws in Heart of Iraq,” ; Myers and Santora, “Election Date Set in Iraq as Bombs Kill Scores,” ; and Williams, “Bombings in Iraq, Deadliest Since 2007.”

93. Rayburn, Iraq After America, 4–6.

94. Collins, “Military Innovation in War,” 140–151.

95. Ibid.,154–176.

96. Barry, “Iraq’s Real WMD.”

97. Smith, “Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003–2009,” 14.

98. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, 23; and Phillips, “The Birth of the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell.”

99. Collins, “Military Innovation in War,” 262–264.

100. Atkinson, “Left of Boom”; Zorpette, “Countering IEDs,” http://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/military/countering-ieds; and Higginbotham, “U.S. Military Learns to Fight Deadliest Weapons,” http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/07/ff_roadside_bombs/all/.

101. McGriff, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, 15–16; and Guardia, US Army and Marine Corps MRAPS, 40.

102. Vanden Brook, “Armored Vehicles Cut IED Deaths”; and Carter and Gilmore, “Running the Numbers on MRAPs.”

103. Collins, “Military Innovation in War,” 65.

104. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 186.

105. McChrystal, “It Takes a Network.”

106. Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America, 253–255; and Colonel Liam Collins, interviews with former JIATF directors and deputy directors.

107. Collins, “Military Innovation in War,” 345–347.

108. Flynn, Juergens, and Cantrell, “Employing SOF ISR Best Practices,” 57.

109. Faint and Harris, “F3EAD.”

110. COL Liam Collins, interview with Michael Flynn; McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 145.

111. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 224–234.

112. Collins, “Military Innovation in War,” 406–407.

113. Datablog, “War in Iraq,” https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/dec/15/war-iraq-costs-us-lives, accessed 15 July 2017; and Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq,” http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl1331110.pdf.