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ABSTRACT
Increasing attention paid to US casualties in far-flung places such as Tongo Tongo, Niger, and headlines claiming ‘secret wars’ have fueled discussion about American military’s involvement in Africa. Though the continent has been a part of the American way of war since the beginnings of the US – consider the early combat actions of US Marines in Tripoli –, current African conflicts are challenging our understanding of war and approaches to winning it. This article examines the ways America seeks to achieve its ends in Africa with a particular focus upon the last 10 years of US counter-terrorism and stability operations in Niger and the Sahel Region. The author proposes unifying American, Allied, and partner efforts through a strategy of Active Containment.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Atkinson, An Army at Dawn.
2. Bowden, Black Hawk Down. ‘Black Hawk Down’ also refers to the movie of the same name co-produced and directed by Ridley Scott, from a screenplay by Ken Nolan and released in December, 2001. It dealt with the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident, referred to at the time as the Battle of Mogadishu and code-named Operation Gothic Serpent.
3. Echevarria, An American Way of War or Way of Battle? 2. Accessed November 1, 2017. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/ssi_op_ed_jan04.pdf
4. Hanson, The Western Way of War, 13.
5. Art, “Geopolitics Updated,”’, 79–113.
6. Morris, “The Fog of War.”
7. McNamara and VanDeMark, In Retrospect.
8. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (reprint, 2010).
9. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War’,” 380–2.
10. Spruyt, “The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State’,” 127–149.
11. Kissinger, World Order.
12. Wagner, War and the State (reprint, 2010), x.
13. Ibid.
14. Bennett and Stam, The Behavioral Origins of War, 203.
15. Buhaug et al., Global Trends in Armed Conflict. Accessed November 15, 2017. https://www.hbuhaug.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Global-Trends_final.pdf
16. Muggah and Krause, “Closing the Gap between Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Insecurity.”’,
17. Buhaug et al., Global Trends in Armed Conflict.
18. Seybolt, Aronson, and Fischhoff, Counting Civilian Casualties.
19. Spruyt, “The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State.”
20. Key Strategic Issues List 2017–2018 (Carlisle Barrack, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 7 August 2017). Accessed May 1, 2018. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1363
21. Turse, ”Even AFRICOM’s Own Commander Admits its Strategy is Not Working.’,” Accessed October 15, 2017. https://www.thenation.com/article/even-africoms-own-commander-admits-their-strategy-is-not-working/
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23. The White House, U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa.
24. Which foreign aid, it must be noted, was but only one component of the overarching and far-reaching concept. See Kennan, An American Life, 276–336.
25. ‘By, through, with’ is a term of art used by the U.S. military that connotes working closely with partners to achieve military objectives instead of American-led or unilateral military operations. Linda Robinson, ‘SOF’s Evolving Role: Warfare “By, With, and Through” Local Forces’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 9 May 2017), Accessed November 15, 2017. https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/sofs-evolving-role-warfare-by-with-and-through-local.html
26. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, Theater Campaign Planning Planner’s Handbook Version 1.0, 1–2.
27. United States Africa Command, Theater Campaign Plan 2000–16’, 18.
28. United States Africa Command, United States Africa Command 2017 Posture Statement. Accessed November 17, 2017. https://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiSr4yJrcrXAhWRDuwKHZGZCl4QFggmMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.africom.mil%2Fmedia-room%2Fdocument%2F28720%2Fafricom-2017-posture-satement&usg=AOvVaw3wIZ0BmMJEY6A4u2O04H58
29. For discussion, Guido, Terrorist Sanctuary in the Sahara. Accessed November 1, 2017. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=2066
30. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 13.
31. Department of Defense, QDR Execution Roadmap.
32. Ibid., 5–6.
33. ‘Increase partner capacity’ is now referred to as ‘Building Partner Capacity’ or BPC. McInnis and Lucas What is “Building Partner Capacity?”; and Livingston, Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance.
34. Department of Defense, Military Contribution to Cooperative Security Joint Operating Concept Version 1.0, 5–20.
35. The White House, National Security Strategy.
36. Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011.
37. The White House, National Security Strategy, 27.
38. Ibid., 21.
39. McNerney etal., Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventative Tool. This study examines the Preventative Hypothesis, concluding (p.2), ‘Although the preventative hypothesis is now an important assumption for U.S. defense policy, data in support of the hypothesis have not been examined thoroughly, and the logic underlying it remains unspecified. For instance, various DoD sources offer different interpretations, many of which are not fully described in terms of casual linkages, essential assumptions, and necessary conditions’.
40. Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011, 7.
41. Paul et al., What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?; and Paul et al., What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity in Challenging Contexts?
42. Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance, 1.
43. ‘Institutional Development’ from FID is now being referred to by BPC and SFA as ‘DIB’, Defense Institution Building. McNerney et al., Defense Institution Building in Africa.
44. United States Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3–22, ix.
45. For example, the Department of Defense published DoD Instruction Number 5000.68 on 27 October 2010 ‘Security Force Assistance’, to establish policy and assign ‘responsibilities regarding the preparation of DoD personnel and operational planning for, as well as the conduct of, SFA’. However, this instruction includes no references or mention of SC other than the Joint Doctrine Note definition of SFA ‘as a subset of DoD overall SC initiatives’, 2.
46. Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan.
47. Livingston, Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance, 1.
48. Government Accountability Office, “Security Force Assistance,” 29.
49. United States Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine Note 1–13, I-2.
50. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3–22, 1–1. Unfortunately, FM 3–22 does not provide much help in understanding SC and SFA, defining SC as ‘all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships… a common Service function that supports combatant commands…. [and] a key element of global and theater shaping operations’, 1–1.
51. Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Security Force Assistance Planner’s Guide; also, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, SFA Assessment Handbook; and Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Operational Force Development.
52. Wuestner, Building Partner Capacity / Security Force Assistance, 30.
53. Ibid., 31–32.
54. United States Government, International Crime Assessment. Accessed December 2, 2013. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000497956.pdf
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56. Schmitt, “Drones in Niger Reflect New U.S. Tack on Terrorism.’,” Accessed March 5, 2017. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/world/africa/drones-in-niger-reflect-new-us-approach-in-terror-fight.html
57. Armin Rosen, “One Uranium Mine in Niger Says a Lot About China’s Huge Nuclear-power Ambitions.’,” Accessed October 21, 2017. http://www.businessinsider.com/niger-uranium-mine-and-nuclear-china-2015-10?IR=T
58. UPI, “Cease-Fire Truce Reached with Niger Rebels’,” Accessed November 14, 2013. http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/05/15/Cease-fire-truce-reached-with-Niger-rebels/UPI-99581242403588/
59. Saint Girons, Les Rébellions Touarègues [The Tuareg Rebellions].
60. Boilley, Les Touaregs Kel Adagh, Dépendances Et Révoltes: Du Soudan Français Au Mali Contemporain [The Kel Adagh Tuaregs, dependencies and revolts: From French West Africa to contemporary Mali].
61. Klare, Resource Wars, 217.
62. Abdalla, “Understanding of the Natural Resource Conflict Dynamics.” Accessed October 21, 2013. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper194.pdf
63. Jian, “Fuelling the Dragon,”’, 588. Accessed April 4, 2018. http://gpepsm.paginas.ufsc.br/files/2014/11/JIANG-2009.-China%E2%80%99s-Rise-and-Its-Energy-and-Resources-Extraction-in-Africa.pdf
64. Ibid., 587.
65. Daojiong, “China’s Energy Security,”’, 186.
66. Zweig and Jianhai, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy’,” 36.
67. World Nuclear Association, “Uranium Markets’.” Accessed December 12, 2013. http://world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Uranium-Resources/Uranium-Markets/
68. Daojiong, “China’s Energy Security,”’, 185.
69. Zweig and Jianhai, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy’,” 32.
70. French, China’s Second Continent.
71. Shaffer and Ziyadov, Beyond the Resource Curse.
72. United States Congress, “Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs.”
73. Thorp et al., The Developmental Challenges of Mining and Oil, 132.
74. UPI, “Cease-Fire Truce Reached with Niger Rebels.”
75. It is significant to note that the comments about the peace accords are circumstantial as the actual document is not publicly available for review.
76. See note 74 above.
77. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) was stablished in 2005 with partners including Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. TSCTP is a multifaceted, multi-year strategy implemented jointly by the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense to assist partners in West and North Africa increase their immediate and long-term capabilities to address terrorist threats and prevent the spread of violent extremism. Key areas the U.S. provides support under TSCTP include: enabling and enhancing the capacity of North and West African militaries and law enforcement to conduct counterterrorism operations; integrating the ability of North and West African militaries and law enforcement, as well as other supporting partners, to operate regionally and collaboratively on counterterrorism efforts; enhancing border security capacity to monitor, restrain, and interdict terrorist movements; strengthening the rule of law, including access to justice and law enforcement’s ability to detect, disrupt, respond to, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity; monitoring and countering the financing of terrorism (such as that related to kidnapping for ransom); and reducing the limited sympathy and support among communities for violent extremism. See United States Department of State, ‘Programs and Initiatives.’, Accessed November 2, 2017 https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/
78. Lewis and Bavier, citing Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie in “U.S. Deaths in Niger Highlight Africa Military Mission Creep.’,” Accessed October 10, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-africa-security/u-s-deaths-in-niger-highlight-africa-military-mission-creep-idUSKBN1CB2J1
79. Arieff, Attack on U.S. Soldiers in Niger. Accessed October 22, 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IN10797.pdf
80. Ibid.
81. Associated Press, “Top U.S. General.”’, Accessed November 11, 2017. http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-top-us-general-families-americans-deserve-answers-on-niger-2017-10?IR=T
82. Mokeddem, Al Qaida Au Maghreb Islamique: Contrebande Au Nom de L’islam [Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb: Smuggling in the name of Islam].
83. Lacher, “Organized Crime and Terrorism in the Sahel.’,” Accessed December 2, 2013. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126014/2011C01_lac_ks.pdf
84. IRIN, “Can Niger Offer Mali Lessons on the Tuareg?” Accessed November 14, 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/97823/can-niger-offer-mali-lessons-tuareg
85. Thurston, “With Eye on Mali, Niger Adopts New Strategy for Tuareg North’,” Accessed November 15, 2013. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12400/with-eye-on-mali-niger-adopts-new-strategy-for-tuareg-north
86. Collier and Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy, and Growth in Post-Conflict Countries”; and Collier, “Post-Conflict Economic Recovery.”‘, http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/international_law/users/vessier9/public/Collier%20-%20Post-conflict%20Recovery.pdf
87. Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding.”’,
88. Chand and Coffman, “How Soon Can Donors Exit from Post-Conflict States?”
89. Mazimba, Challenges of the African Military in Peacekeeping Missions in Africa. Accessed December 2, 2013. https://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwj5tfS9x8bXAhWNYlAKHWTkDmQQFggmMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fget-tr-doc%2Fpdf%3FAD%3DADA561378&usg=AOvVaw3LQqQHcwc4eH6ulV2QpdBC
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91. Varhola, “Foreigners in a Foreign Land.”’, Accessed November 3, 2015. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/foreigners-in-a-foreign-land-complexity-and-reductionist-staff-approaches-in-stability-oper; also, Moyo, Dead Aid.
92. Widely available; see e.g. Accessed June 5, 2018. https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/152853-you-may-not-be-interested-in-war-but-war-is