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ABSTRACT
Drawing upon ethnographic data gathered over a six year period, this paper illustrates how the contrasting worldviews of US Marines and anthropologists frequently led to misunderstandings, frustrations, and garbled interpretations as the two struggled to work together to help resolve conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. I examine three key military domains where cultural experts and Marines attempted to work together to understand the cultural factors at play in both Iraq and Afghanistan: first as interpreters or experts in pre-deployment language and culture training programs; secondly in theater on the Human Terrain Teams; and third as cultural SMEs (experts) in military planning rooms. As the case studies and interviews illustrate, while both sides thought they were working together to understand the foreign cultures where they were operating, the real cross-cultural misunderstanding was ironically between the cultural experts and Marines.
Acknowledgments
This project was supported by several US Marine Corps educational organizations: CAOCL under the guidance of Col (ret) George Dallas; the Marine Corps University under the Director of the Vice President of the University, Dr. Jerre Wilson; and TECOM (Training and Education Command) under Jeffry Bearor, SES and Deputy Director. Their assistance and support are gratefully acknowledged.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Portions of this paper have been adapted from the author’s book, Holmes-Eber, Culture in Conflict.
2. Bumiller, “We Have Met the Enemy.”
3. Ibid.
4. To protect the individuals in this study, all names are pseudonyms.
5. It is important to note that due to ethical and professional considerations I have never applied for or received a security clearance. Thus all data in this study, including interviews and discussions with military personnel, by definition, contain no sensitive information. With the exception of removing personally identifying information, then, no ‘scrubbing’ of data from my interviews or fieldnotes has been necessary prior to their publication. Furthermore, no personal benefit has been gained by the author as a result of this research.
6. A separate IRB was obtained for this statistical study.
7. A large portion of the survey implementation, design and analysis was conducted by Erika Tarzi and Basma Maki at CAOCL and I am indebted to them for their diligent work. I am also deeply indebted to the hard work and support of MCLL (Marine Corps Lessons Learned) who programmed and sent out the survey online for CAOCL.
8. Almost all Marines of higher ranks are included in the GAL. However entry level Marines (E-1s privates, E-2s lance corporals and O-1s second lieutenants) often do not obtain email addresses until they have completed their MOS (military occupational specialty) training. General Officers were excluded. A few Marine reservists who were currently on active duty did respond to the survey as well as 7 Navy medical, engineering and chaplain MOS who were embedded with Marine units.
9. A complete description of the survey questionnaire, sampling frame and methodology are available from CAOCL upon request.
10. For an in-depth discussion of anthropologists’ experiences and challenges in working on the Human Terrain Teams see McFate, Social Science goes to War.
11. U.S. Human Terrain System, Human Terrain Team Handbook, 2.
12. AAA Commission, “Final Report”; Cohen, “Panel Criticizes Military’s Use”; Fluehr-Lobban, “Anthropology and Ethics”; Gonzalez, “Towards Mercenary Anthropology?”; Gusterson, “The U.S. Military’s Quest”; and Vergano and Weise, ”Should Anthropologists Work?”
13. AAA Commission, “Final Report.”
14. According to correspondence with Dr. Montgomery McFate, who participated in these teams, anthropologists averaged at most 30% of the team memberships.
15. U.S. Human Terrain System, Human Terrain Team Handbook.
16. U.S. Army Headquarters, “Operational Terms and Graphics.”
17. The green cell was added to planning to represent the general population in conflict scenarios. Thus, planning includes blue forces (friendly), red (hostile) and green (neutral/civilians).
18. McFate, Military Anthropology.
19. Price, Anthropological Intelligence.
20. Deitchman, The Best Laid Schemes.
21. Fujimura, “Culture In/Culture of.”
22. Fosher, “Pebbles in the Headwater.”
23. Rush, “Archaeological Ethics.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Paula Holmes-Eber
Paula Holmes-Eber is the author of five books and numerous scholarly publications on culture and conflict, with a focus on women in the Middle East. Her previous publications include: Culture in Conflict: Irregular Warfare, Culture Policy and the Marine Corps and Operational Culture for the Warfighter. She is currently co-editing a sixth book with Kjetil Enstad, titled Warriors or Peacekeepers: International Perspectives on the Cultural Aspects of Conflict in Officer Training (Springer, 2020). From 2006–14, Dr. Holmes-Eber taught thousands of senior level military and government officials on the cultural aspects of conflict as Professor of Operational Culture at Marine Corps University. She is currently an Affiliate Professor at the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington.