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ABSTRACT
This article investigates how political ambitions are translated into military practice in the small Norwegian contribution to the International Coalition against ISIL in Iraq from 2017 to 2019. The most important Norwegian political aims do not correspond clearly to a military objective, and thus military practice must take on a symbolic function. Understanding the processes of translation that this requires and the social complexity of operating with such aims with partners and Coalition forces is not straight-forward. The analysis of my interviews with commanders and seconds-in-command concludes by suggesting that such missions may require small-state militaries like the Norwegian to reconceive what constitutes core military practices, and that practice theory or the wider disciplines of sociology and anthropology may inform such a reconception.
Acknowledgments
The author acknowledges funding from the Research Council of Norway under the Peace Research Institute Oslo project SFAssist (project number 274645).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Clausewitz, On War, 99.
2. Simpson, War from the Ground, 5.
3. Clausewitz, On War, 90.
4. Ibid., 91.
5. United States Department of State, “Joint Statement Counter-ISIL Coalition.”
6. Quoted in Græger, “Norway between NATO,” 91.
7. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Minstry of Defence, A Good Ally.
8. Ibid., 11.
9. Ibid.
10. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Veivalg norsk sikkerhet- og utenrikspolitikk.
11. Ibid., 6.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 7.
14. Ibid., 36.
15. The Ministry of Defence, “Militære bidrag i kampen.”
16. Beadle and Diesen, Globale trender mot 2040, 157.
17. Beadle and Diesen are not entirely clear on this point. On the one hand, they state that the ability of the Norwegian Defence “to affect the outcome of the conflicts in question, can be counted as close to zero” (157). On the other hand, they acknowledge that Norway made a substantial contribution in Libya and with the special forces in Afghanistan, and that Norway thereby gains military recognition and credibility among our allies (ibid.).
18. Lange, “How Norway is helping the U.S.”
19. The Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “USAs forsvarsminister besøkte Norge.” My translation.
20. Ibid.
21. There is a plethora of terminology related to activities aimed at stabilizing a host nation (HN) and enabling it to deal adequately with internal and/or external threats to its security. In the USA the umbrella term Security Sector Assistance covers a range of programs, including building partner capacity (BPC), security cooperation (SC) and security sector reform (SSF). Such programs, in turn, comprise efforts along different lines, civilian as well as military, that are broadly aimed at improving safety, security and justice in the HN. The term Security Force Assistance (SFA) refers, in the NATO context, to “all NATO activities that develop and improve, or directly support, the development of local forces and their associated institutions in crisis zones”. NATO, Allied Joint Publication 3.16, 1. SFA concerns activities by special operations forces (SOF) or regular forces at the military strategic, operational, and tactical levels aimed at improving the HN’s capability to deal with threats against its stability and security. SFA falls under the broader general term military aid, but in NATO terminology does not include military assistance, which concerns SOF operations that “support and influence critical friendly assets”. Ibid., VIII.
22. Lopez, “Security Force Assistance Brigades.”
23. Biddle, Macdonald and Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Pay-off,” 89.
24. Ibid., 92.
25. Ibid., 94.
26. Ibid.
27. Biddle, Macdonald and Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Pay-off,” 94.
28. See note 16 above.
29. Ibid.
30. NATO, Allied Command Operations, 2-2.
31. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice.
32. Schatzki, Social Practices, 12.
33. Ibid., 91.
34. See for example Luft, Beer, Bacon and Bullets; Ruffa, Military Cultures; and Soeters and Manigart, Military Cooperation.
35. Schatzki, Social Practices, 98.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 98–9.
38. By necessity, the main element of pre-deployment training consists in practicing such things as “action on IED”, i.e. what to do if one encounters an improvised explosive device, and preparing for potential biological or chemical attacks.
39. Beadle and Diesen, Globale trender mot 2040.
40. Clausewitz, On War, 91.
41. Nicolini, Practice theory, 2.
42. Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason, 105.
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Kjetil Enstad
After graduating from the University of Oslo in 1998, Kjetil Enstad worked as a journalist and editor until he received a Ph.D. scholarship at the University of Oslo in 2005. He finished his Ph.D. on the novels of South-African author J.M. Coetzee in 2008. Since then he has been associate professor at the Norwegian Military Academy, which merged with the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) in 2018. From 2010–2012 he was head of department in the Department for Military Theory, International Relations and Communication, and in Spring 2018 he was briefly assistant dean at the NDUC. His research interests lie in theoretical and philosophical foundations for the professions and the role of language and culture as determining factors for professional practices (see e.g. Enstad, K. (2017). ‘Teaching professional ethos’. Journal of Military Ethics. Vol. 16 (3/4), pp.192–204). He is coeditor of Warriors or peacekeepers? International perspectives on the cultural aspects of conflict in officer training, forthcoming (2020) from Springer.