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ABSTRACT
There has been speculation for some time that unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are poised to revolutionize military land operations. These expectations have amplified with recent developments, not least the reported deployment and testing of Russian weaponized UGVs in Syria. Yet when it comes to the operational use of mobile ground-based robots – armed or otherwise – the recent history of the technology can be described as one of promise so far unfulfilled. By tracing past and present efforts to develop and field UGVs – and the enduring challenges that lie therein – this article attempts to gauge the likely impact of such systems in future conflict, as well as their effect on international security more broadly. The article concludes that although UGVs will almost certainly become a major – if not indispensable – feature of future military land operations, they will, similar to other promising militarily relevant technologies before them, continue to produce unrealistic expectations about their impending revolutionary effect.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. Scharre, Army of None; Fielding, “Robotics in Future Land Warfare”; and Sloan, “Robotics at War.”
2. Congressional Research Service, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics.
3. See in particular Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, “Separating Fact from Fiction.”
4. The academic community usually refers to UGVs (especially UGVs possessing significant autonomous capabilities) simply as mobile robots. This article uses both terms interchangeably. In this study, UGVs do not include bipedal humanoid types of robots or powered exoskeletons.
5. Shaker and Wise, War without Men.
6. Bode and Huelss, “Autonomous Weapons Systems.”
7. Much recent commentary about UGVs focuses on the future role of ground variants of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), especially in matters related to the legality and ethics of their use. Refer to Klare, “Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War.”
8. Cited in: https://vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf. For a translation look to Coalson, “Top Russian General Lays Bare.”
9. Krieg and Rickli, Surrogate Warfare; and Rossiter, “Participation in Warfare.” On the opposing side, insurgents have also looked to drones to increase the distance between attackers and attacked. See Rossiter, “Drone Usage by Militant Groups.”
10. Hall, “Drones: Public Interest, Public Choice.”
11. Rossiter, “Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and Warfare.”
12. For an accessible primer on this topic, see Murphy, Introduction to AI Robotics. For teleoperated UGVs, externally situated humans transmit navigational guidance to the vehicle. Autonomous vehicles determine their own course using onboard sensors and processing capabilities. The term supervisory control is often given to control schemes that combine inputs from external human operators and onboard sensors to determine the navigation.
13. Underpinning all of this is system integration, which provides synergy within a robotic system.
14. Gray, Strategy for Chaos; Boot, War Made New; Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer”; Van Creveld, The Transformation of War; and Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War.
15. RMAs or MMIs can also of course be driven by major organizational changes to militaries. See Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, 22.
16. Fastabend and Simpson, “Adapt or Die.”
17. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power. Whilst other analysts consider the effectiveness of force employment and relative skill levels of military personnel important determiners of military potency, few would disagree that technological superiority is typically an advantage. On the importance of force employment and skill levels in producing military effectiveness, see in particular Biddle, Military Power.
18. An imprecise concept, technology can refer to products, to technology and skills or the activities in developing technologies. This analysis employs the more limited sense of the term of technology as a product, i.e. as a weapon, in a military context. Although the phrase ‘military technology’ is used throughout, the study recognizes that the origins may be either civilian or defense. Smit, “Science, Technology and the Military.”
19. For the effects of the Sputnik launch on U.S. policy, refer to Peoples, “Sputnik and ‘Skill Thinking’ Revisited.”
20. Kissinger, “Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack.”
21. A number of studies have found that sudden shifts in the military balance between dyads – especially those with a history of animosity – raises the likelihood for war. For synoptic coverage of work on this theory, refer to Geller and Singer, Nations at War, 147. See also Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 59–62; and Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
22. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, 2. Indeed, there are some historic examples of states learning from and improving upon the efforts of first mover that produce better long term results. Japan and the U.S. accrued greater benefits from carrier warfare even though Britain was the first mover. See Hone, Friedman, and Mandeles, American and British Aircraft Carrier Development.
23. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 232.
24. Freedberg Jr., “Evolutionary Revolution.”
25. This term was coined by York in The Advisers, ix.
26. Van Lente, Spitters, and Peine, “Comparing Technological Hype Cycles.”
27. Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War; Fino, “Breaking the Trance”; Howard, “How much can Technology Change Warfare”; Freedman, The Future of War; and Rossiter, “High-energy Laser Weapons.”
28. Letter from Major General A. Schomburg to Lieutenant General J. H. Hinrichs, 16 January 1962, history office, US Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL, quoted in Seidel, “From Glow to Flow,” 114.
29. See Rossiter, “High-energy Laser Weapons.”
30. This at least seems to be the case with the ABL project. The program was cancelled in 2012 after encountering insurmountable technical obstacles and rising costs.
31. Dedehayir and Steinert, “The Hype Cycle Model,” 28. On this point see again Lente, Promising Technology; and Guice, “Designing the Future.”
32. Von Hippel, “‘Sticky Information’ and the Locus of Problem Solving.”
33. Two battalions of the Teletanks were deployed in the Winter War against Finland in 1940.
34. Michel and Gettinger, “Out of the Shadows.”
35. Tsitsimpelis Taylor, Lennox, Joyce, “A Review of Ground-based Robotic Systems.”
36. In 1976, robots were put onboard the Viking 1 and 2 space probes.
37. Gage, “A Brief History of Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV).”
38. A U.S. Marine Corps’ UGV RSTA program in the early 1980 s called the Ground Surveillance Robot (GSR), for example, successfully tested, using a fully actuated 7-ton M-114 armored personnel carrier as the testbed host vehicle, the ability to follow a lead vehicle autonomously. See: Harmon, “The Ground Surveillance Robot (GSR).”
39. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps each pursued a number of battlefield (RSTA and weapons-launching) UGV developments in the 1980s.
40. Prototype systems were even procured in 1987/1988 from Grumman and Martin Marietta. Both systems were joystick-controlled via fiber optic link, the operator navigating via the returned TV image. The Grumman system was a hybrid diesel-electric drive with its four wheels in an articulated diamond pattern, while the Martin vehicle was a diesel-powered hydrostatic four-wheel drive with skid steering.
41. Consequentially, the TMAP was retargeted to the RSTA mission. It was renamed the Teleoperated Mobile All-Purpose Platform. Refer to Young, “Military Explores Robotic Technology.”
42. Arguably, progress in mobile ground robots is inextricably linked to AI. Because much of modern UGV research has been related to mobility, developments in artificial intelligence (AI) and automation was behind much of the rapid capability gains. The development of autonomous mobile robots with nontrivial navigational capabilities began as an interesting application domain for Artificial Intelligence researchers in the late 1960s. See DARPA, Strategic Computing Program Second Annual Report.
43. Singer, Wired for War, 54.
44. Brooks, Flesh and Machines, 6 and 10–11.
45. On technological exuberance and robotics at the turn of the century, see Singer, Wired for War, 8.
46. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, US Public Law 106–398, Section 220, 106th US Congress, 2nd session, 2000, accessed at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-106publ398/pdf/PLAW-106publ398.pdf.
47. Scharre, Army of None, 61.
48. See the US Congressional Budget Office report: The Army’s Future Combat Systems Program and Alternatives (August 2006), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7461/08-02-army.pdf.
49. The Armed Robotic Vehicle, a five-ton mini-tank that could be equipped with missiles or a.30 mm chain gun; and the Soldier Unmanned Ground Vehicle, a 30-pound, man-portable scout equipped with weapons and sensors. Refer to Fish, “UGVs in Future Combat Systems.”
50. Scharre, Army of None, 14. Britain was perhaps the first to field a modern military UGV: the Morfax Wheelbarrow, a remote controlled Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) unit deployed to Northern Ireland in the early 1970s.
51. As did the Talon, a two-foot-six-inch robot which looks like a miniature tank made by Foster-Miller. By 2008 there were close to 2,000 Talons in the field and the firm had won a $400 million contract to supply another 2,000. Singer, Wired for War, 23 and 26–27.
52. Boot, ‘The Paradox of Military Technology,’ 24.
53. These can be equipped with M240 or M249 machine guns, Barrett.50 caliber rifles, 40 mm grenade launchers, or antitank rocket launchers, SWORDS were controlled remotely by a soldier using a video screen and joystick. Refer to M. E. Purdy, Presentation slide “Ground robotics technology,” Joint Ground Robotics Enterprise, Department of Defense, June 2007.
54. Morris, “Military Projects 4,000 Robots,” 4; and Bachman, “The U.S. Army is Turning to Robot Soldiers.”
55. Sharkey, “Cassandra or False Prophet of Doom.”
56. A good example is BigDog, a dynamically stable quadruped military robot created in 2005 by Boston Dynamics with Foster-Miller that received considerable publicity but was ultimately disappointment. Hern, “US Marines Reject BigDog.”
57. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: 239–40.
58. Congressional Research Service, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS), 5.
59. Mike Ryan, Human-Machine Teaming, 13.
60. Global spending on robotics and UAVs reached USD116 billion last year, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of up to 20 percent, pushing spending to a predicted USD210 billion by 2022. As a result, there is a widening capability gap between commercial and military systems.
61. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, 7. Accessed at: https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
62. Scharre, Army of None, 61.
63. Judson, “Army Poised to Transform Ground Robotics Industry.”
65. Atherton, “Robots May Replace One-Fourth”; and Farmer, “US Army considers replacing thousands.”
66. See the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy, March 2017, 5. Accessed at http://www.arcic.army.mil/App_Documents/RAS_Strategy.pdf.
67. According to statements published in Russia’s state-owned RIA Novosti, the Russian defense ministry announced that, as well as the Uran-6 designed for mine clearance, the Uran-9 multifunctional reconnaissance and fire support system was deployed in Syria, though this has not been verified. See Atherton, “Russia Confirms its Armed Robot Tank was in Syria.” There is no hard evidence that the Russians have tested unmanned ground vehicles in actual combat other than relatively basic explosive ordnance disposal/mine-clearing robots. A video of the robot can be viewed at: www.youtube.com/watch?vKOZbXwjwoOg.
68. See: “Russia tests robotic strike vehicle in conditions close to real combat,” Tass News Agency, 19 January 2018, https://tass.com/defense/985821.
69. Novichkov, “New Russian Combat UGV Breaks Cover,” 30.
70. Bendett, “Russian Ground Battlefield Robots.”
71. Refer to “Combat robots for Russian troops to go into serial production this year – defense minister,” Tass News Agency, 15 March 2018, https://tass.com/defense/994310.
73. Wong, “China’s Norinco rolls out new combat.”
74. Dominguez, “China Seeking to Surpass U.S.,” 6.
75. Husseini, “In Pictures: The UK MoD’s Future Robot Army.”
76. See: https://www.rheinmetalldefence.com/en/rheinmetall_defence/systems_and_products/unbemannte_fahrzeuge/index.php.
77. A larger version has recently been unveiled by Iran. See Atherton, “Did Iran just show off a new ground robot?”
78. Scharre, Army of None, 102.
79. See for example, Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power.
80. Gilli, and Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare?”
81. Ryan, Human-Machine Teaming, 38.
82. One impediment for the use of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) is the resistance of pilots whose professional standing is linked to piloted planes.
83. The minimum ratio for operator-UGV control is 1:1 as seen in many of the RSTA-specific UGVs used in Iraq and Afghanistan. For larger, more complex systems that incorporate complicated EO/IR suites or lethal payloads, the ratio jumps to 2:1 and 3:1. Evans III and Jentsch, “The Future of HRI,” 435.
84. Coker, Future War, 17. Original italics.
85. Gilli and Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare?”; Fuhrmann and Horowitz, “Droning On”; Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, “Separating Fact from Fiction”; and Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies.”
86. Cohen, “Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,” 399. For similar points, see Farrell, Osinga, and Russell, (eds.), Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, 10; Murray, Military Adaptation in War, 8–13 and 15.
87. The idea has been to put prototype hardware into the hands of prospective users to conduct operational appraisals while using the systems, creating a sense of ownership among the user community, as well as provide constructive feedback to the developers.
88. Scharre, Army of None, 8.
89. Congressional Research Service, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS).
90. This is partly due to the fact that traditional tracked and wheeled robots must reorient to perform some maneuvers, such as lateral displacement. See Iagnemma, Shimoda, and Shiller, “Near-optimal Navigation.”
91. Elliot Redden, “Robotic Control Systems for Dismounted Soldier,” 346.
92. It is fitted with a mast-mounted radar and infrared (IR) and optical sensors, and some sources report that it can locate enemy vehicles at a range of 6 km and troops at 3 km. A video clip showing the unit is available at: www.youtube.com/watch?vuFC4yMMtHG0.
93. Much of the following information is derived from Andrei P. Anisimov, Senior Research Officer at the 3rd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense. His reported on the Uran-9’s critical combat deficiencies during the 10th All-Russian Scientific Conference entitled “Actual Problems of Defense and Security,” held in April 2018.
94. See a translation of key parts of the presentation delivered by a senior Russian Ministry of Defense scientific researcher at a 2018 security conference at the Naval Academy in St Petersburg at: https://defence-blog.com/army/combat-tests-syria-brought-light-deficiencies-russian-unmanned-mini-tank.html.
95. Instead of its intended range of several kilometers, the Uran-9 could only be operated at distance of 300–500 meters among low-rise buildings, wiping out up to nine-tenths of its total operational range.
96. Brown, “Russia’s Uran-9 Robot Tank”; and Mizokami, “Russia’s Tank Drone.”
97. One of the reasons UAS technologies have been more aggressive in their development than the UGV is the fact that UAS communication’s architecture, including command and control nodes, pre-existed and the maneuver space aircraft use contains less obstructions to the command and control links from Ground Control Station to the UAS.
98. Minkov and Oron-Gilad, “Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs),” 211.
99. Zhang et al., “Unmanned Ground Vehicle Navigation.”
100. Lee, “Future Unmanned System Design,” 177.
101. Carlson and Murphy, “How UGVs Physically Fail,” 424.
102. Reliability studies demonstrated that the Mean Time between Failure (MTBF) for the types of UGVs deployed to Iraq was far too low. Ibid.; and Smuda et al, “Deploying of Omni-directional Inspection System.”
103. Tiron, “Ground Robotics Experience Bumpy Ride.”
104. Nguyen-Huu et al., “Reliability and Failure in Unmanned”; Kenyon, “U.S. Robots Surge onto the Battlefield.”
105. This is not new. AI has always been at the center of mobile ground robot research. See Klafter, “Mobile Robots, Research and Development.”
106. Lamb, “Battle of the Bot.”
107. At present, humans remain better drivers on snow-covered roads, driving into the sun, and driving in rain or dust storms than robots.
108. Collins, “A Genome Story.”
109. See transcript of PBS interview with Paul Saffo at: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/cyberspace/saffo.html.
110. Dosi, “Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories”; and Jun, “A Comparative Study of Hype Cycles, 1414.
111. Coker, Future War, 17.
112. Dombrowski and Gholz, “Identifying Disruptive Innovation,” 104.
113. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, xv.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Ash Rossiter
Ash Rossiter is Assistant Professor of International Security at Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi where his research focuses on technology and national security, the changing character of war and conflict and the shifting geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region. Prior to academia, he pursued a career in the Middle East, spanning both the public and private sectors.