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Research Articles

Friend or frenemy? The role of trust in human-machine teaming and lethal autonomous weapons systems

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Pages 822-850 | Received 13 Jul 2019, Accepted 26 Nov 2018, Published online: 05 Jun 2020
 

ABSTRACT

This article explores the imprecise boundary between Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and Human-Machine Teaming – as a subset of Human-Machine Interaction – and the extent both are emerging as a point of concern (and option) in military and security policy debates. As the development of Human-Machine Teaming relates to artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities there also exists an area of concern pertaining to reliability and confidence, particularly in the heat of battle. Also known as Manned-Unmanned Teaming, Human-Machine Teaming attempts to engender trust and collaborative partnerships with robots and algorithms. Clearly the prospect of LAWS in recent times, or so-called ‘killer robots,’ has raised questions relating to the degree such devices can be trusted to select and engage targets without further human intervention. Aside from examining the ‘trust factor,’ the article also considers security threats posed by both state and non-state actors and the complicit yet inadvertent role multinational corporations play in such developments where civilian technology is modified for dual-purposes. The effectiveness of government regulation over AI, including whether AI can be ‘nationalised’ for national security reasons, will also be examined as part of AI non-proliferation.

Disclosure Statement

No conflicts of interest were declared for the publication of this article.

Notes

1. Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, “Intervention by the Campaign,” 1.

2. Ashley & Stanton cited in Stanton, “An Introduction to Trust,” 1–2.

3. Bernstein (ed.), The Military Commander, 199.

4. Schaefer, “The Perception and Measurement,” 33–38.

5. UK MoD, Joint Concept Note 1/18, 48.

6. UK, “Human Machine Touchpoints,” 2.

7. UK MoD, Joint Concept Note 1/18, 49.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Work, “The Third Offset Strategy.” See also: Scharre, “The Opportunity and Challenge,” 17.

11. Work, “The Third Offset Strategy.”

12. EU, Statement.

13. Netherlands, Statement, 3.

14. USAF Office of the Chief Scientist, Autonomous Horizons, 8.

15. Ibid 9.

16. Ibid 19–20.

17. Zacharias, Autonomous Horizons: The Way Forward, 84.

18. Germany, Statement, 2.

19. Ibid.

20. Chung, “OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics,” 5.

21. Tangney, “Human Systems Roadmap Review,” 26–27.

22. Krishnan, “Automating War,” 188–189. See also: Krishnan, Killer Robots, 162; Lin, Bekey & Abney, Autonomous Military Robots, 77; Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour, 171–176.

23. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour, 155, 169, 171, 173.

24. Morris, “A Four-Phase Approach,” 4.

25. Ibid 8.

26. U.S. DoD, Joint Publication 3–09, A-9. (Bold in original.)

27. U.S, Human-Machine Interaction, 5.

28. Turek, “Explainable Artificial Intelligence.”

29. Ibid.

30. Gunning, “XAI,” 7:04–8:44.

31. Ibid 12:35–15:11.

32. ICRC, “Ethics and autonomous weapon systems,” 15–16.

33. ICRC, “Statement,” 4.

34. Schuster, “When Something Has To Give,” 52.

35. Gjorgjinski, “Chair’s non-paper,” 6.

36. Poland, Statement.

37. Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, “Country Views,” 1–2.

38. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Countries.” Note: Palestine and the Holy See were not in the survey.

39. Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook, 229–230.

40. According to analysis based on an online representative sample of 2,148 U.S. citizens, conducted in November 2015 and published in September 2016. Kriner & Shen, “Battlefield Casualties and Ballot Box Defeat,” 2.

41. Trump, “Remarks.”

42. Fiott, “America First,” 47.

43. Trump, “America First,” 1–2.

44. Office of Management and Budget, America First, 15–16.

45. Schneider & Macdonald, U.S. Public Support, 15.

46. Work, “Remarks.”

47. Work cited by Sadowski, “Enabling MUM-T,” 2. See also, Work, “The Third Offset Strategy.”

48. Schroeder, “Policies,” 38, 52–53.

49. Fiott, “America First,” 46–47.

50. Ibid 48.

51. Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook, 230.

52. Ibid 11–12, 198–199, 213, 219, 222, 232.

53. Brockmann & Kelley, The Challenge of Emerging Technologies, 36.

54. RT, “Whoever leads in AI.”

55. U.S. Extremist Crime Database cited in U.S. Government Accountability Office, Countering Violent Extremism, 34.

56. Cook, A Message.

57. Obama, “Remarks.”

58. UNIDIR, The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies, 4.

59. UNODA, Securing Our Common Future, 51.

60. Silver et al, “Mastering Chess and Shogi,” 4.

61. Sato, Young & Patterson, “AI & Machine Learning.” For a technical explanation, see Jouppi et al, “In-Datacenter Performance Analysis.”

62. BOINC, “Volunteer computing.”

63. Google Cloud, “Platform Terms of Service.”

64. Google Cloud, “TPU pricing.” Note: ‘In order to connect to a TPU, you must provision a virtual machine (VM), which is billed separately. For details on pricing for VM instances, see Compute Engine pricing.’

65. Pohler et al, “A Technological Perspective,” 13.

66. Chertoff, Perils of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Proliferation, 9.

67. CCW, Tweet: 10 Possible Guiding Principles.

68. Ibid.

69. Gjorgjinski, “Chair’s non-paper,” 5.

70. Guterres, Address.

71. CCW, Tweet: Message by @UN Secretary-General.

72. UN, 2017 Group of Governmental Experts. See also: UN, Status of contributions, 3; Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, Diplomatic Efforts Falter.

73. FOLI, “An Open Letter.”

74. FOLI, “About the LAWS Pledge. See also, FOLI, Lethal Autonomous Weapons Pledge.”

75. FOLI, “Autonomous Weapons.”

76. Gaber, “Transcript of UN Remarks.”

77. Arms Control Association, “Group of 4,000 Anonymous Google Employees.”

78. ‘Googlers’, “Letter to Google.”

79. Gaber, “Transcript of UN Remarks,” 2.

80. Pichai, “AI at Google.”

81. U.S. DoD, “Project Maven.”

82. Peniston, “Google’s Withdrawal from Pentagon.”

83. Menegus, “Here’s the Letter.”

84. Amnesty International, “Open letter.”

85. U.S. DoD, Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications, 24. See also: U.S. DoD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 15.

86. U.S. DoD, Annual Report to Congress, 101–102.

87. Ibid 21.

88. Pence, “Remarks.”

89. C-Span, “Google Data Collection,” 2:08:25–2:12:30.

90. Hawley, “Following Google CEO Meeting with President Trump.”

91. Trump, “Tweet: Google is helping China.”

92. Trump, “Tweet: Just met with @SundarPichai.”

93. UK National Archives, European Union Referendum Act 2015. See also: BBC News, EU Referendum Results.

94. Vote Leave, Campaign Resources.

95. Hughes, “Trump calls to “drain the swamp”.”

96. Trump, “The Inaugural Address.”

97. Yueh, The Great Economists, 283–286.

98. Klare, “Autonomous Weapons Systems.”

Additional information

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the publication of this article.

Notes on contributors

Aiden Warren

Aiden Warren is an Associate Professor in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, Melbourne. His teaching and research are in the areas of International Security, US national security and foreign policy, US Politics (ideas, institutions, contemporary and historical), International Relations (especially great power politics), and issues associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). He was the 2018 Fulbright Scholar in Australia-United States Alliance Studies, based at the Arms Control Association (ACA) in Washington, D.C.

Alek Hillas

Alek Hillas is a researcher in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, where he graduated with a first-class honours degree in International Studies. His research interests are in global security and international humanitarian law, including artificial intelligence and lethal robotics, and Australian foreign policy.

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