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ABSTRACT
Insurgencies are routinely conceptualised using a binary opposition between states and rebels. However, this neglects the complexity of their interaction, especially their collaboration. Although rebel-state collaboration is found throughout the history of insurgency, we lack a full explanation of why it occurs. This article endeavours to take the first step in developing a comprehensive theory by analysing rebel-state collaboration in two heuristic case studies: Afghanistan and Syria. Through process tracing, we find four mechanisms that can explain collaboration: 1) to prevent a costly military stalemate, 2) to gain or maintain legitimacy, 3) because external threats incentivise a mutually beneficial alliance, and 4) because both have to operate under the constraints of the pre-existing political economy. The relative weight of each varies, reflecting the fluid and contextual nature of wartime political orders. Contrasting with more popular explanations, we argue rebels and states are willing to collaborate even when the other benefits too, providing they believe their relative gains would be higher than their opponents, or the costs of competing would be too large. In providing a fuller explanation of rebel-state collaboration, we advocate a rethink about how to capture and analyse the complex and dynamic interactions between rebels and states.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. The dominant Hobbesian conceptualisations of civil war implied that states, powerful and sovereign, maintained stability and created prosperity, whilst rebels brought chaos and destruction. For an excellent critique of these studies, see Péclard and Mechoulan, “Rebel governance.”
2. Staniland, “States, insurgents.”
3. Ibid.
4. Arjona, “Wartime institutions”; Staniland, “States, insurgents”; and Worrall, “(Re-) emergent orders.”
5. Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, Rebel Governance; Péclard and Mechoulan, “Rebel governance”; Arjona, Rebelocracy.
6. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence; Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongman Governors; Staniland, “States, insurgents”; and Stewart, “Civil War.”
7. See for instance Martínez and Eng, “Struggling to Perform”; and Stewart, “Civil War.”
8. Christia, Alliance Formation; Kasfir, Nelson and Terpstra, “Introduction: Armed Groups.”
9. See note 2 above.
10. Ibid.
11. Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongman Governors.
12. South, “Hybrid Governance.”
13. Staniland, “States, insurgents”; Stel, “Mediated Stateness”; and Worrall, “(Re-) emergent orders,” p. 712.
14. See Brenner, “Ashes of Co-Optation.”
15. Clausewitz, On War; and Simpson, War from the Ground Up
16. Stel, “Mediated Stateness.”
17. Terpstra and Frerks, “Governance Practices.”
18. Stokke, “Building the Tamil.”
19. Mampilly Rebel rulers; and Terpstra and Frerks, “Rebel Governance.”
20. For the distinction between ‘covering law’ and ‘mechanism’ approaches to causation, see Tilly, “Mechanisms in Political Processes.”
21. Ibid.
22. George and Bennett, Case Studies, p. 75.
23. Levy, “Case studies.”
24. Eckstein, “Case Study,” p. 137
25. Beach, “Process-tracing.”
26. See note 23 above.
27. Giustozzi and Franco, The Battle; Jackson, Life under.
28. Sigsgaard, Education and Fragility.
29. Glad, Knowledge on Fire.
30. Glad, Knowledge on Fire; Johnson, “The Taliban.”
31. Human Rights Watch, Lessons in Terror.
32. The New Humanitarian, “Taliban forces students.”
33. Muzhary, “One Land.”
34. Reuter and Younus, “The Return.”
35. Ibid.
36. Giustozzi, Negotiating.
37. Rubin and Rudeforth, Enhancing Access.
38. Giustozzi, “Hearts, Minds”; and Giustozzi and Franco, The Ongoing Battle.
39. Giustozzi and Franco, The Battle.
40. Ruttig, “Schools on the Frontline.”
41. AREU, The Political Economy; and Giustozzi and Franco The Battle.
42. AREU, The Political Economy.
43. Ibid.
44. See note 37 above.
45. Trofimov, “Emboldened Taliban.”
46. See note 39 above.
47. See note 40 above.
48. See note 46 above.
49. Ruttig, “Schools on the Frontline,” p. 127
50. See note 36 above.
51. Giustozzi, “Hearts, Minds.”
52. Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare; and Royall, “Winning Minds.”
53. Jackson, Life under.
54. Danishju, “Taleban Try Soft Power.”
55. Giustozzi, Afghanistan: Taliban’s.
56. Although the region is mainly inhabited by Kurds, there are also significant Syriac, Turkmen and Arab minorities.
57. International Crisis Group (ICG), “Popular protest.”
58. ICG, “Syria’s Kurds,” p. 15.
59. Caves, “Syrian Kurds.”
60. For more details, see Allsopp, “Kurdish Political Parties”; and Allsopp and van Wilgenburg, The Kurds.
61. Allsopp and van Wilgenburg, The Kurds.
62. ICG, Flight of Icarus?.
63. Khaddour, How Regional Security, p. 8; and ICG, “Flight of Icarus?” p. 2.
64. ICG, “Syria’s Kurds.”
65. Ibid.
66. Jenkins, The Dynamics.
67. Allsopp, “Kurdish Political Parties,” p. 296.
68. Sary, Kurdish Self-governance.
69. Ibid.
70. Allsopp and Van Wilgenburg, The Kurds; ICG, “Flight of Icarus”; and Khalaf, “Governing Rojava.”
71. Barfi, Ascent of the PYD, pp. 5–6; and Plakoudis, “The Syrian Kurds,” p. 106.
72. ICG, “Popular protest.”
73. Khaddour, How Regional Security.
74. Sary Kurdish Self-governance, p. 8–9
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Al-Jazeera, “Damascus Documents.”
78. See note 58 above, 2.
79. Ibid, p. 8.
80. Sary, Kurdish Self-governance, p. 16.
81. See note 62 above.
82. Ibid.
83. Allsopp, “Kurdish Political Parties.”
84. Plakoudis, “The Syrian Kurds,” p. 106.
85. Balanche, “Kurdish Forces.”
86. See note 80 above.
87. ICG, “Flight of Icarus?” p. 8; and Allsopp and Van Wilgenburg, The Kurds, p. 68
88. ICG, “Flight of Icarus?” p, 8.
89. Allsopp and Van Wilgenburg, The Kurds, p. 69; Al-Jazeera, “Syrian Kurds”; and Kurdwatch, “Tall Hamis.”
90. Andresen, “Friends or Foes?.”
91. House of Commons, Debate, column 135.
92. See note 64 above.
93. See note 83 above.
94. Gary, Kurdish Self-governance.
95. Plakoudas, “The Syrian Kurds.”
96. Allsopp and Van Wilgenburg, The Kurds, p. 67.
97. Al-Jazeera, “Syrian Kurds.”
98. ICG, “Flight of Icarus?” p. 8.
99. Khalaf, “Governing Rojava.”
100. ICG, “Flight of Icarus?” p. 7.
101. Khalaf, “Governing Rojava,” p. 12.
102. Ibid., p. 16
103. See note 80 above.
104. Ibid., p. 17.
105. See note 101 above, 19.
106. Ibid.
107. See note 62 above.
108. See note 99 above.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Khaddour, The Assad Regime’s.
113. ICG, “Flight of Icarus?” p. 15.
114. See note 101 above, 18.
115. Balanche, Sectarianism in Syria’s, p. 58.
116. See above 108.
117. Balanche, Rojava Seeks.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. See note 101 above, 17.
121. Narbone, Favier and Collombier, Inside Wars, p. 18.
122. See note 101 above, 17.
123. Khaddour, How Regional Security, pp. 16–17.
124. Ibid.
125. Van Wilgenburg, “Syrian Kurdish.”
126. Eaton, et al., Conflict Economies, p. 43.
127. KurdWatch, “Rumailan.”
128. Jackson, Life under, p. 25.
129. See Schlichte and Schneckener, Armed Groups for an excellent discussion on the importance of legitimacy for armed groups, and how they cope with addressing different audiences.
130. See Mampilly, Rebel Rulers; and Terpstra and Frerks, “Rebel Governance” for a similar explanation for collaboration in Sri Lanka.
131. Community demands were also important in Sri Lanka, see Terpstra and Frerks, “Rebel Governance.”
132. Mampilly, “A Marriage of Inconvenience.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Jelte Johannes Schievels
Explaining rebel-state collaboration in insurgency: Keep your friends close but your enemies closer
Jelte Schievels is a researcher and consultant whose academic interests include the political economy of insurgency, the foundations of political order, drug economies and rebel governance. At the War Studies Department of King’s College London, his academic interests research focused on the studying local dynamics in civil war, specifically examining the role of illicit drug economies in civil war and how rebel organisations construct local governance.
Thomas Colley
Dr Thomas Colley is a Senior Lecturer in Defence and International Affairs at Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and a Visiting Research Fellow in War Studies at King’s College London. His research examines propaganda, strategic communication and their use in war and international politics.