Inter- and intra-agency intelligence liaison during ‘the troubles’

ABSTRACT

Intelligence is crucial to success in counter-terrorism, and successful intelligence work involves effective liaison between and within all the organisations involved. Scholars rarely address intelligence in counter-terrorism other than through case studies, while studies of intelligence in counter-insurgency and studies of international intelligence liaison emphasise the value of intelligence liaison with little attention to how it works in practice. This article substantially expands existing knowledge and understanding by focusing on intelligence coordination within Northern Ireland in the 1990s. It draws on heretofore unexploited, yet voluminous, original material. It analyses the contribution that computerisation made to inter-agency liaison, the contribution the Northern Ireland Prison Service made to intelligence work, the role played by intra- and inter-agency structures and the valuable work that the right individuals in the right posts can do. This article thereby provides a broader and deeper understanding of the challenges faced by state agencies and how some of these were overcome to facilitate inter- and intra-agency intelligence liaison in Northern Ireland in the 1990s. It therefore contributes to emerging theory that seeks to explain intelligence.

KEYWORDS:

• Intelligence
• counter-terrorism
• liaison
• coordination
• ‘the troubles’

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 382.

2. Kirk-Smith and Dingley, “Countering Terrorism in Northern Ireland,” 551.

3. Coakley and Todd, “Breaking Patterns of Conflict in Northern Ireland,” 2.

4. Craig, “Laneside, Then Left a bit?”.

5. Dickson, “Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights in Northern Ireland,” 488.

6. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 76.

7. Witness P160 (RUC CID), transcript, Day 39, 23 June 2008, Rosemary Nelson Inquiry (RNI), 4; Samuel Kincaid (CID), transcript, Day 144, 24 March 2009, Billy Wright Inquiry (BWI), 99.

8. Ian Monteith (RUC CID), transcript, Day 89, 10 December 2008, RNI, 16.

9. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 105.

10. Lomas and Murphy, Intelligence and Espionage, 3–7.

11. Hillebrand and Hughes, “The Quest for a Theory of Intelligence,” 1.

12. Kahn, “An Historical Theory of Intelligence,” 4.

13. Gill, “Theories of Intelligence,” 212.

14. Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory,” 727. See also Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 33–52.

15. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror, 41–2.

16. Jeffery, “Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency Operations,” 119.

17. Ibid.

18. US Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3–24, 132.

19. Intelligence and Security Committee, Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? 8.

20. Ibid., 9.

21. Ibid., 53.

22. HM Government, CONTEST, 21.

23. Anderson, Attacks in London and Manchester March-June 2017, 42.

24. Ibid., 37.

25. Ibid., 24.

26. Ibid., 42.

27. Intelligence and Security Committee, The 2017 Attacks, 2–3.

28. HM Government, CONTEST, 27–8.

29. See Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison”; Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation”; and Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation.”

30. Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation,” 493.

31. Whelan, “Security Networks and Occupational Culture”; Whelan and Dupont, “Taking Stock of Networks Across the Security Field.”

32. Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation.”

33. Hastedt and Skelley, “Intelligence in a Turbulent World,” 115.

34. Bamford, “The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland.”

35. Bar-Joseph and Levy, “Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure,” 468.

36. Newbery, Interrogation, Intelligence and Security, 62–131.

37. For example, Carlin, Thatcher’s Spy.

38. Leahy, The Intelligence War Against the IRA.

39. Craig, “You will be Responsible to the GOC.”

40. Moran, “Evaluating Special Branch and the Use of Informant Intelligence in Northern Ireland,” 5.

41. Charters, “Counterinsurgency Intelligence.”

42. Charters, “Have a Go.”

43. Finegan, “Shadowboxing in the Dark.” Others include Bamford, “The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland” and Jeffery, “Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency Operations.”

44. Jackson, “Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a ‘Long War’,” 76.

45. Edwards, “Misapplying Lessons Learned?” 307.

46. See note 44 above.

47. Finegan, “Shadowboxing in the Dark,” 505.

48. Jeffery, “Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency Operations,” 141–3; and Dimitrakis, “British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency,” 390.

49. Jeffery, “Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency Operations,” 141–3.

50. Opening submission by Mr Philips (Counsel to the Inquiry), transcript, Day 1, 15 April 2008, RNI, 77–9; The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 14.

51. Newbery, “Official Inquiries and their Sources of Evidence.”

52. Byman, “US Counterterrorism Intelligence Cooperation,” 145.

53. Hitz and Weiss, “Helping the CIA and FBI Connect the Dots,” 27.

54. D.J. Trevelyan (Home Office), 4 September 1972, CJ 4/827, The National Archives (TNA); C.J. Henn (MoD) to J. Halliday (Home Office), 25 January 1972, CJ 4/827, TNA.

55. C.J. Henn to J. Halliday, 25 January 1972, CJ 4/827, TNA.

56. Officer Y, Witness Statement KY1, no date, The Bloody Sunday Inquiry (BSI), 5–6.

57. Witness A643 (Army intelligence), transcript, Day 96, 7 January 2009, RNI, 115; The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 186.

58. Geraghty, The Irish War, 159–60.

59. The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 143.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Witness FA (SB Prison Liaison Officer), transcript, Day 98, 8 October 2008, BWI, 6–8.

63. Witness DB (RUC SB), transcript, Day 28, 4 February 2008, BWI, 63.

64. Opening submissions by Mr Phillips, transcript, Day 40, 24 June 2008, RNI, 24.

65. The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 142–5.

66. Witness FG (E3A, TCG), transcript, Day 42, 4 March 2008, BWI, 20.

67. The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 143.

68. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 77.

69. The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 142.

70. Ibid., 140.

71. Ibid., 144.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., 143.

74. B629 (RUC SB), transcript, Day 114, 25 February 2009, RNI, 99.

75. B629, transcript, Day 114, 25 February 2009, RNI, 126, 131.

76. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 78.

77. Warner Review, 1997, as referred to in The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 144. The Police Service of Northern Ireland will not release their copy of the Warner Review under the Freedom of Information Act, letter to author, 8 January 2018.

78. Warner Review, 1997, 144.

79. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 79; Warner Review, 1997, as referred to in The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 144.

80. Dr Bill Duff (former RUC officer), interview, 8 September 2020.

81. Foreword by Sajid Javid (Home Secretary), CONTEST, 5.

82. Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Chapter 1, 26.1, and Schedule 6.

83. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 74.

84. Witness ZD (Head of Prison Intelligence Unit), transcript, Day 29, 5 February 2008, BWI, 35.

85. Witness FA, transcript, Day 98, 8 October 2008, BWI, 12.

86. Ibid., 110–12.

87. See note 80 above.

88. Witness FA, transcript, Day 98, 8 October 2008, BWI, 43–4.

89. Witness ZD, transcript, Day 29, 5 February 2008, BWI.

90. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 256.

91. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 71–2.

92. Ibid., 246.

93. Ibid.

94. Witness FA, transcript, Day 98, 8 October 2008, BWI, 15, 17, 47.

95. Ibid, 20.

96. Witness ZD, transcript, Day 30, 6 February 2008, BWI, 65.

97. Seamus McNeill (civil service, attached to NIPS), transcript, Day 33, 18 February 2008, BWI, 147–8.

98. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 72.

99. Witness D (NIPS Operations and Management Division), transcript, Day 21, 26 June 2007, BWI, 53; and Witness D, transcript, Day 20, 25 June 2007, BWI, 134; Witness ZD, transcript, Day 30, 6 February 2008, BWI, 53.

100. Witness D, transcript, Day 20, 25 June 2007, BWI, 123.

101. Annex B, Terms of reference for the Prisons Liaison Group, attached to ‘The handling of intelligence bearing on prisons’ issues: Joint Report: Under Secretary [redacted (a member of the Security Service)] Staff/Under Secretary Prisons’, unsigned, undated, cover letter by Sir James Hennesy, 15 November 1983, evidence submitted to The Billy Wright Inquiry.

102. Witness D, transcript, Day 21, 26 June 2007, BWI, 8; and The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 74.

103. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 71.

104. Ibid., 74.

105. Witness D, transcript, Day 21, 26 June 2007, BWI, 53; and Witness D, transcript, Day 20, 25 June 2007, BWI, 134.

106. Witness ZD, transcript, Day 30, 6 February 2008, BWI, 64.

107. Ibid., 63.

108. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 74.

109. The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 163.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.; The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 106–7.

112. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 107.

113. See Cormac, Confronting the Colonies and Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

114. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 107.

115. Witness HAG (Head of Assessments Group, Security Service), transcript, Day 26, 30 January 2008, BWI, 4; Witness DCI (Director and Coordinator of Intelligence), transcript, Day 47, 12 March 2008, BWI, 81; Witness DO3 (Security Service), transcript, Day 99, 9 October 2008, BWI, 45.

116. Witness DCI, transcript, Day 47, 12 March 2008, BWI, 81; and Witness DO1 (Assessments Group), transcript, Day 24, 28 January 2008, BWI, 5.

117. Witness HAG, transcript, Day 26, 30 January 2008, BWI, 4.

118. Witness AH (Security Service), transcript, Day 41, 3 March 2008, BWI, 7.

119. Witness DO3, transcript, Day 99, 9 October 2008, BWI, 30–1.

120. The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 162.

121. Ibid., 165.

122. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 105.

123. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 106.

124. David, Witness Statement KD2, 17 February 2000, BSI, 1.

125. Omand, Securing the State, 304.

126. Witness HAG, transcript, Day 26, 30 January 2008, BWI, 2.

127. Witness A566 (Army intelligence officer), Witness Statement, RNI, 2.

128. The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 165.

129. Ibid., 170, 164.

130. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 104.

131. Carlin, Thatcher’s Spy, 88.

132. Rudner, “Hunters and Gatherers,” 195–6.

133. Witness DCI2 (Security Service), transcript, Day 104, 21 October 2008, BWI, 38.

134. Quoted in The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 164.

135. Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 137; Witness EA (Intelligence Corps), transcript, Day 111, 10 November 2008, BWI, 13–14.

136. Witness FG, transcript, Day 42, 4 March 2008, BWI, 8.

137. Witness AH, transcript, Day 41, 3 March 2008, BWI, 51–2.

138. Chris Albiston (Head of IMG), transcript, Day 76, 13 November 2008, RNI, 18.

139. Witness HAG, transcript, Day 26, 30 January 2008, BWI, 6.

140. Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed,” 247.

141. Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision,” 61; Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 143, original emphasis.

142. Witness HAG, transcript, Day 26, 30 January 2008, BWI, 14; Taylor, Provos, 352.

143. Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation,” 492.

144. Witness HAG, transcript, Day 26, 30 January 2008, BWI, 84; B597 (Head of IMG), transcript, Day 79, 25 November 2008, RNI, 9.

145. Witness HAG, transcript, Day 26, 30 January 2008, BWI, 84.

146. Ibid., 85.

147. Ibid., 84.

148. Ibid., 8.

149. The Billy Wright Inquiry Report, 79.

150. B567 (SB), transcript, Day 112, 23 February 2009, RNI, 3.

151. The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report, 277.

152. Organograms, ID10-0001 and ID10-0002, evidence to The Billy Wright Inquiry.

153. B597 (Head of IMG), transcript, Day 79, 25 November 2008, RNI, 9–10.

154. Chris Albiston, transcript, Day 140, 18 March 2009, BWI, 145.

155. Witness FG, transcript, Day 42, 4 March 2008, BWI, 91.

156. Ibid.

157. Witness DB, transcript, Day 28, 4 February 2008, BWI, 20–1.

158. Chris Albiston, transcript, Day 140, 18 March 2009, BWI, 144.

159. B597, transcript, Day 79, 25 November 2008, RNI, 3; Witness DG, transcript, Day 136, 10 March 2009, BWI, 10–11.

160. Chris Albiston, transcript, Day 76, 13 November 2008, RNI, 67; Chris Albiston, transcript, Day 140, 18 March 2009, BWI, 157.

161. Review of Special Branch: Report of the Working Group on Progress in Implementation, annex, quoted in Chris Albiston, transcript, Day 141, 19 March 2009, BWI, 60–2.

162. Ibid.

163. Rudner, “Hunters and Gatherers,” 194.

164. Hitz and Weiss, “Helping the CIA and FBI Connect the Dots,” 5.

165. Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Patrick Finucane, 15.

166. Simpson, Duplicity and Deception, 23, 35.

167. Simpson, Duplicity and Deception; Brown, Into the Dark.

168. Brown, Into the Dark, 154.

169. Monteith, transcript, Day 89, 10 December 2008, RNI, 16, 26; Witness B511 (RUC CID then SB), transcript, Day 80, 26 November 2008, RNI, 6.

170. Brown, Into the Dark, 292–6.

171. Simpson, Duplicity and Deception, 8, 24. For further consideration of coordination within the police see Sheptycki, “The Police Intelligence Division-of-Labour.”

172. See note 15 above.

173. Leahy, The Intelligence War Against the IRA, 2.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Samantha Newbery

Dr Samantha Newbery is Reader in International Security at the University of Salford. Her next monograph, Terrorist Informers, examines the recruitment, handling and use of informers during ‘the troubles’, focusing on such questions as what lengths the authorities went to in order to stop their informers from being prosecuted for criminal activity and the extent to which inquiries retrospectively investigating the use of terrorist informers gained the authorities’ full cooperation. Dr Newbery’s previous works include Interrogation, Intelligence and Security: Controversial British Techniques published by Manchester University Press in 2015, and Why Spy? The Art of Intelligence co-authored with Brian T.W. Stewart CMG, a former Deputy Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or ‘MI6ʹ), published by Hurst in 2015.