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ABSTRACT
This article explores how military ‘frontline workers’ use their discretion to interpret and then comply, breach or bypass policies that reach into the tactical level, and why. Based on extensive primary sources including in-depth interviews, end-of-tour reports and data from records, the case study explores the implementation of policies on civil-military relations by military commanders in the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan in 2005–2012. This article finds that the commanders used their considerable discretion to implement policies that parted from national directives. In doing so, the Norwegian military strove to align their approach with close allies and NATO and became actual policy-makers. This article contributes to the debate on how western militaries behave at the tactical level by employing the concept of ‘discretion’.
Acknowledgments
For helpful comments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper, the author would like to thank her PhD-project supervisors Professor Torunn Laugen Haaland and Associate Professor Kristoffer Kolltveit. The author would also like to thank Professor Sven G. Holtsmark and colleagues at IFS for valuable comments, an anonymous reviewer at Small Wars & Insurgencies, and the informants who generously shared their time and insights. The author gratefully acknowledges funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and Eckbos Legat.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, xii.
2. Ibid., xiii (italics in original).
3. For an overview of the status of ‘street-level bureaucracy’ literature, see Hupe, Hill and Buffat (eds.), Understanding Street-Level Bureaucracy.
4. Notable contributions include Ruffa, Military Cultures in Peace and Stability Operations, Friesendorf, How western soldiers fight, Johnsson, “Strategic Colonels”.
5. Ruffa, Military Cultures in Peace and Stability Operations.
6. Friesendorf, How western soldiers fight.
7. Scholars have applied various terms to denote aspects of this phenomenon, such as civil-military interaction, civil-military coordination and cooperation, and more recently, civil-military entanglements. In this study, I use the term civil-military relations, because first, the term captures both the ‘separation’ and ‘coordination’ elements of Norway’s policy. Second, this choice is in line with existing literature. For an excellent discussion of civil–military relations literature and complex operations, see Ruffa, Dandeker and Vennesson, “Soldiers drawn into politics?”.
8. The Ministry of Justice and the Police contributed in areas such as police training and prison reform. In this article, I will omit contributions from the justice sector, since police-military relations deserve special attention. Also, as pointed out by Gjørv, Understanding Civil-Military Interaction, 85, footnote 6, it is not clear to what extent the police are included among those referred to as ‘civilians’ in Norwegian policy documents.
9. Notable publications include Gjørv, Understanding Civil-Military Interaction and NOU 2016: 8, “A Good Ally,”.
10. E.g. Baumann, “Clash of Organisational Cultures?”; van der Lijn, “Comprehensive Approaches, Diverse Coherences” and Dafinova, “Keeping the Inter-Agency Peace?”.
11. E.g. Williams, “Empire Lite Revisited”; Lindell and Wiklund, “Jakten på synergin [Chasing Synergies]”. For analyses of interactions between military and a wide variety of civilian actors, see e.g. Gjørv, Understanding Civil-Military Interaction; Rietjens, Soeters and van Fenema, “Learning from Afghanistan”.
12. E.g. Keane and Wood, “Bureaucratic Politics, Role Conflict, and the Internal Dynamics”; Keane and Diesen, “Divided We Stand”; Greentree, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing”.
13. Dafinova, “Keeping the Inter-Agency Peace?”.
14. Baumann, “Clash of Organisational Cultures?”.
15. Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 3.
16. Ibid., 27.
17. Ibid., 13.
18. Kalkman and Groenewegen, “On Frontline Workers,” 1165.
19. Johnsson, “Strategic Colonels,” 4.
20. Based on Durose, “Revisiting Lipsky,” 980; see Johnsson, “Strategic Colonels,” 40–44 and 50–65 for a discussion of the concept of discretion and ‘military discretion’.
21. Hupe et al., “Introduction,” 17.
22. Hill, The Public Policy Process, 237, cited in Hupe, Hill and Buffat, “Introduction,” 17.
23. PRT and military relations with non-governmental humanitarian and development organizations and host nation representatives are not treated in this article.
24. See e.g. Flatemo, “Norsk konseptutvikling [Norwegian concept development],” 42–43.
25. Nor should the Norwegian civilian PRT component directly dispose any funds.
26. NATO defines CIMIC as ‘the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies’ AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation Doctrine, 1–1, 2003.
27. NOU 2016: 8, “A Good Ally,” 130. The Norwegian version of the report remains the authoritative version, but this article refers to the English version for the sake of simplicity. This point is corroborated in Gjørv, Understanding Civil-Military Interaction, 87.
28. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) records, [852.1, sak 06/09781-2], “Afghanistan – Midler til utviklingstiltak i Faryab-provinsen ‘Småpottfondet’,” attachement: “Konsept for sivilt-militært samvirke i det norskledede PRTet i Meymaneh, Afghanistan” [undated], 30 May 2006. This concept paper was not mentioned in any of the interviews and it is unclear if the commanders were made specifically aware of it.
29. Ibid.
30. Gofen, “Mind the Gap,” 474.
31. Since PRT commanders’ end-of-tour reports could be retrieved from the Norwegian Armed Forces electronic lessons-learned database (FERDABALL), the author did not request access to the records of the Ministry of Defence.
32. The first four PRT contingents were British-led.
33. The author did not find a complete overview of envoys from that ministry.
34. The author translated all quotations from Norwegian to English. The interviewees read and approved the direct quotations.
35. The article has been declassified by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norwegian Joint Headquarters. No changes were made in the original manuscript.
36. NATO, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook, edition 4, 3.
37. Ekhaugen and Oma, “Norwegians in Maymanah,” 221.
38. Gompelman, Winning Hearts and Minds?, 21.
39. The Swedish Afghanistan evaluation concluded that ‘The field level was in some ways left in the lurch’ SOU 2017:16, “Sverige i Afghanistan,” 165. In the Dutch case, Rietjens argues that the concept appeared ‘vague and ambiguous at the field level’. Rietjens, “Between Expectations and Reality,” 84.
40. Strøm-Erichsen, “Norges innsats i Afghanistan [Norway’s Efforts in Afghanistan],” author’s translation.
41. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice and the Police, “A Strategy,” 4.
42. The Norwegian government removed CIMIC from the PRT until 2011 due to political reasons. For more on the Norwegian model and CIMIC, see Gjørv, Understanding Civil-Military Interaction.
43. Transition Support Group Faryab (deployed in June 2012), handed over security responsibility and the camp to Afghan security forces in October 2012.
44. This article will define civilian projects broadly, leaving aside a discussion of potential security-related aspects of such projects.
45. NOU 2016: 8, “A Good Ally,” 134, citing e-mail exchange with former PRT commanders. See also Gompelman, Winning Hearts and Minds?, 22; Harpviken, “A Peace Nation Takes up Arms,” 161.
46. NOU 2016: 8, “A Good Ally,” 134.
47. See Gompelman, Winning Hearts and Minds?, 35. The hospital project and the mosque project have been cited as infamous examples of ‘misinformed aid’ in Harpviken, “A Peace Nation Takes up Arms,” 161.
48. Author’s interview with brig. Arne Opperud, commander PRT 8, 9 December 2019 and col. Jørn-Erik Berntsen, commander PRT 9, 20 February 2020.
49. At the time, most likely donors were Norway or Finland, and proposals were submitted through the embassies. The Finns withdrew from the Norwegian-led PRT later in 2007. Brig. Opperud, December 2019.
50. Brig. Opperud, December 2019.
51. Col. Berntsen, February 2020.
52. Ibid.
53. Ghormach district was located in Badghis Province, across Faryab’s western provincial border. The district was seen as an insurgent stronghold. The PRT was involved in several large operations into Ghormach, and in late 2008, the Afghan government incorporated Ghormach into Faryab.
54. Col. Berntsen, February 2020.
55. As suggested in author’s interview with Hans Dieset, development adviser October 2007–October 2009, 22 January 2020.
56. Dieset, January 2020.
57. Author’s interview with brig. Ivar Knotten, commander PRT 12, 9 December 2019.
58. Ibid. For more on ARSIC-North, see Gompelman, Winning Hearts and Minds?, 37–38.
59. Brig. Knotten, December 2019.
60. Author’s interview with col. Ivar Omsted, commander PRT 13, 21 November 2019.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. The planned Norwegian-financed civilian aid did not materialise, however, since the operation came to a halt.
64. Author’s interview with col. Rune Solberg, commander PRT 15, 19 February 2020.
65. Key checkpoint in an area prioritised by the Russians with units and resources during the Soviet-Afghan War.
66. Col. Solberg, February 2020.
67. Record of the Norwegian Armed Forces (ANAF)/FERDABALL, ‘D + 180 – Erfaringsrapport for PRT 15’, (undated), 22.
68. Author’s interview with col. Fred Arne Jacobsen, commander PRT 16, 17 December 2019.
69. Ibid.
70. Author’s interview with brig. Lars Magnus Huse, commander PRT 17, 17 December 2019.
71. Ibid.
72. Author’s interview with col. Torger Gillebo, commander PRT 18, 19 November 2019.
73. Ibid.
74. Based on Dieset, January 2020.
75. Col. Gillebo, November 2019.
76. Col. Berntsen, February 2020.
77. Author’s interview with Annika Evensen, development/political adviser September 2005-April 2006, 4 December 2019 and Dieset, January 2020.
78. Col. Solberg, February 2020.
79. Author’s interview with Alexander Leirfall, political adviser August 2010–August 2011, 20 November 2019 and Andreas Danevad, development adviser August 2011–August 2012, 21 November 2019.
80. Leirfall, November 2019.
81. A Norwegian political adviser and police adviser, and a Finnish political adviser, police adviser and development adviser. Piiparinen, “A Clash of Mindsets?” 149.
82. Ibid.
83. Brig. Opperud, December 2019.
84. Leader Group, PRT Meymaneh, “Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymaneh, Guidelines,” 4 and 5.
85. Col. Berntsen, February 2020.
86. Brig. Knotten, December 2019.
87. Ibid.
88. Col. Omsted, November 2019.
89. NOU 2016: 8, “A Good Ally,” 126.
90. Col. Solberg, February 2020; col. Jacobsen, December 2019; brig. Huse, December 2019 and col. Gillebo, November 2019.
91. Col. Omsted, November 2019; col. Jacobsen, December 2019; brig. Huse, December 2019 and col. Gillebo, November 2019.
92. Ibid.
93. Col. Omsted, November 2019.
94. Col. Gillebo, November 2019.
95. Col. Jacobsen, December 2019 and col. Gillebo, November 2019.
96. Col. Berntsen, February 2020.
97. Col. Jacobsen, December 2019.
98. Danevad, November 2019.
99. As emphasised by brig. Knotten, December 2019 and col. Gillebo, November 2019.
100. Danevad, November 2019.
101. As pointed out in author’s interview with Mathias Rongved, second secretary (political adviser) August 2011–February 2012, 13 November 2019; Danevad, November 2019; Leirfall, November 2019; Evensen, December 2019 and Dieset, January 2020.
102. Dieset, January 2020.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. NOU 2016: 8, “A Good Ally,” 94.
107. Evensen, December 2019.
108. Brig. Opperud, December 2019.
109. Rongved, November 2019.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. See Dafinova, “Keeping the Inter-Agency Peace?” 321 for similar findings related to other PRTs.
113. Col. Berntsen, February 2020.
114. Brig. Knotten, December 2019.
115. Col. Jacobsen, December 2019.
116. Col. Gillebo, November 2019.
117. Ibid.
118. Col. Omsted, November 2019.
119. Col. Jacobsen, December 2019.
120. Col. Gillebo, November 2019.
121. ANAF/FERDABALL, “ISAF 2008, PRT 11 (D + 180),” (undated), author’s translation.
122. ANAF/FERDABALL, ‘D + 180 – Erfaringsrapport for PRT 15’, (undated), author’s translation.
123. Col. Gillebo, November 2019.
124. Col. Omsted, November 2019.
125. Kalkman and Groenewegen, ‘On Frontline Workers,’ 1152.
126. Col. Gillebo, November 2019.
127. Parliamentary Ombudsman for the Armed Forces, “Rapport fra befaring i Afghanistan [Inspection report from Afghanistan],” [undated].
128. Hellum, “Menn i dumme kjoler [Men in Silly Dresses],” 43.
129. MFA records, [801.2, sak 08/02847-1], “Afghanistan – Sivilt militært samarbeid – tiltaksforslag,” 25 March 2008, 9.
130. Ekhaugen, “Whole-of-government coordination”.
131. Ibid., 17.
132. Bolle, “Forsvaret i parløp med USAID [the Norwegian Armed Forces Paired with USAID]”.
133. As suggested by Brig. Huse, December 2019.
134. Tore Gjerstad, “Frykter fiasko [Fear of failure],” Dagbladet, 19 September 2008.
135. Diesen, Dagsnytt 18, NRK P2, 25 September 2009.
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Lene Ekhaugen
Lene Ekhaugen is Research Fellow at the Centre for Civil-Military Relations at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), Norwegian Defence University College. She is a PhD Candidate at the University of Oslo.