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ABSTRACT
In a situation where the Russian national self-image and economic realities fail to add up, this article discusses whether Russian private military companies have become low-cost tools to restore Russian great power status. Our findings suggest that whenever these companies are used in a ‘power as outcome’ way, they appear less successful at adding great power status on the cheap and less useful at elite enrichment. In contrast, PMCs seem well suited to make power contributions, and for a low cost, in a ‘power as prestige’ way. In these settings they are also more suitable instruments for informal elite earnings.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Gunitsky and Tsygankov, “The Wilsonian Bias,” 385.
2. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” 203; and Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 40.
3. Gilpin, War and change, 31.
4. Renshon, Fighting for Status, 2.
5. Østensen and Bukkvoll, “Russian Use”. The historical roots of various forms of privatized proxy forces is dealt with in the articles in the first section of this special issue, including in the introductory article.
6. Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State,” 19.
7. Mukhametshina, “Rossianie lubiat verit v staroe.”
8. Bukkvoll and Østensen, “The Emergence.”
9. Albats, The State Within, Belton, Putin’s People; and Soldatov and Borogan, The Compatriots, 129–71.
10. Suslov and Karaganov, “A New World Order.”
11. International Monetary Fund.
12. Global Firepower.
13. Beckley, “The Power of Nations.”
14. All three claims based of statistics from (1) own calculations based on ILO figures at https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/labour-productivity/, (2) data from the OECD at https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/social-spending.htm, and (3) the ‘neighboring countries relations’ indicator in the Global Peace Index at http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/.
15. A variety of concepts are used in the scholarly literature to denote these companies. For further clarification on the choice of concept in this article as well as in the other articles in this special issue, see ‘Advancing Private Security Studies: an introduction to the Special Issue’ by Eugenio Cusumano and Christopher Kinsey.
16. Stephanov, “Igry Patriota.”
17. Korotkov, “Bez Shchita.”
18. However, Rosneft and Gazprom, have explicit permission to keep large protective forces to protect their facilities and staff, which includes permissions to use force, to detain or even kill individuals that threaten their business. See Hurst, “The Militarization of Gazprom.”
19. Bennetts, “Putin Signed Decree.”
20. Marten, “The GRU, Yevgeny Prigozhin,” 5.
21. . In Venezuela, a PMC appears to have worked to protect existing economic assets and political influence, while in Belarus they may have acted more as ‘shaping tools’ or instruments that may help influence the turn of events in away favourable to Russian interests.
22. Cusumano and Corbe, “Introduction,” 5.
23. Stanovaia, “Rossiya v siriiskom konflikte»”; and Frolov, “«V shage ot mirovoi voiny.”
24. See e.g. several such reasons discussed in Hamilton ‘Russia’s War in Syria’, 128–31.
25. Rondeaux, Decoding the Wagner Group, 59.
26. Rozhdestvenskii, Rusiaeva and Baev, “Operatsia v Sirii.”
27. Sukhankin, Continuing War, 7–8; and Grau and Bartles, “The Russian Gound-Based Contingent,” 80.
28. Maetnaia and Chizhova, “Siriiskaia kompania v rubliakh.”
29. See note 26 above.
30. Korotkov, “Spisok Wagnera.”
31. Korotkov, “Nemnogo biznesa.”
32. Sobol, “Povar Putina.”
33. Gibbons-Neff, “How a 4-hour Battle.”
34. Rozhdestvenskii and Badanin, “Master and Chef.”
35. Pawlyk, “Fewer Russian Mercenaries.”
36. Stephanov, “Igry Patriota”; and Korotkov, “Bez Shchita.”
37. Larin, “Biznes na krovi.”
38. Butusov, “Razgrom rossiiskoi ChVK Wagner”; and Scholl, “Ob Syrien oder Ukraine.”
39. Butusov, “Razkryta taina lichnosti Wagnera.”
40. Ivashkina and Skibitskaia, “Chastnyi Diversant.”
41. Sukhankin, Continuing War, 8.
42. See note 40 above.
43. Sukhankin, Continuing War, 8.
44. There are reports that Russian PMCs have been operating in some capacity in Madagascar (possibly Wagner), Nigeria (Moran), Kenya (Moran claims to have worked there), Somalia and South Sudan. See Assymmetric Warfare Group, ‘Russian Private Military Companies’ and Sukhankin, “War, Business and Ideology.”
45. Konovalov, “Voina, biznes i reforma.”
46. Ross, “How Russia Moved and UNSC, “Final Report, 39.
47. See Searcey, “Gems, Warlords and Mercenaries’) and Ross, How Russia Moved.”
48. UNSC, “Final Report,” 39.
49. Lister, Shukla, and Ward, “CNN Special Report.”
50. UNSC 2018, “Final Report,” 39.
51. See note 49 above.
52. Romanovsky et al. “The Night Has No Eyes.”
53. Searcey, “Gems, Warlords and Mercenaries.”
54. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Increases Pressure.”
55. Dukhan, “Central African Republic,” 7.
56. Marten, “The GRU, Yevgeny Prigozhin,” 8.
57. See note 49 above.
58. Kalika, “Russia’s ‘Great Return,” 20.
59. Sukhankin, “Russian Private Military Contractors,” 18.
60. Ibid., 21.
61. The Russian Government, “Dimitry Medvedev’s Meeting.”
62. Stratfor, “Russia Revisits.”
63. Reuters, “Russian Contractors Are Training.”
64. Flanagan, “Russian Mercenaries Help.”
65. Sputnik News, “Russia Denies Reports.”
66. Narayanan, “The Mercenaries Behind.”
67. McGregor, “Will Khartoum’s Appeal.”
68. Felgenhauer, “Russia to Build Naval Base.”
69. Alamin, “Warlord-Linked Sudanese Firm.”
70. Elsamani, “Mineral Potentials and Resources,” 6.
71. Reynolds, “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries,” 4.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Åse Gilje Østensen
Dr Åse Gilje Østensen is assistant professor at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy at the Norwegian Defence University College. She holds a PhD in comparative politics, University of Bergen (2013). Østensen’s research centres on civil-military topics and security commercialization. She has published on private security and military companies, most recently focusing on the Russian segment of this industry and also on matters related to total defence programs. Østensen has a particular interest in how civilian actors may present both challenges and solutions to military organizations of various types.
Tor Bukkvoll
Dr. Tor Bukkvoll is a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. He has studied political developments in Russia and Ukraine since the mid-1990s, especially in the areas of defence and security. He speaks Russian and Ukrainian, and obtained his PhD from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Bukkvoll was a visiting research fellow at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey autumn 2019 to autumn 2020 and at the Changing Character of War program at the University of Oxford in 2008. Dr Bukkvoll has published widely on a number of topics, among them Russian military capacities, military innovations, special operations forces, and ‘non-state’ military actors in Russia and Ukraine.