Evaluating the effect of military intervention on rebel governance in terms of disaggregated human security

ABSTRACT

This article examines the effect of foreign military intervention on rebel governance in terms of disaggregated human security. Case studies reveal that, on the one hand, a ‘thirst for legitimacy’ influenced by military intervention has led rebel groups to engage in internal and external diplomatic activities. Moreover, their efforts to develop fundamental rebel governance structures have had clearly positive effects on human security. On the other hand, when repelled from a territory by military interventions, rebel groups have attempted to control their remaining territories through the imposition of fear, which can devastate human security in rebel-held areas.

KEYWORDS:

• Rebel governance
• military intervention
• human security
• rebel legitimacy
• insurgency

Acknowledgments

We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Daisuke Madokoro, Nagafumi Nakamura, Hiroki Kusano, Hiromu Miyashita, Hiroshi Nishikai, Hiroto Sawada, Hotaka Maki, Masataka Nakauchi, and Shu Uchida. We greatly thank anonymous reviewers and the editor of the Small Wars & Insurgencies for comments on this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Kisangani and Pickering, “The human consequences of foreign military,” 230–249.

2. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, “Killing Time,” 615–642; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, “Third-Party Intervention,” 345–363; Cunningham, “Blocking resolution,” 115–127; Regan, “Third-Party Interventions,” 55–73.

3. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, “Intervention and Democracy,” 627–649; Pickering and Peceny, “Forging democracy at gunpoint,” 539–560; Hermann and Kegley, “The U.S. Use of Military Intervention,” 91–114; Meernik, “United States Military Intervention,” 391–402.

4. Pickering and Kisangani, “Political, Economic, and Social Consequences,” 363–376.

5. For the definition of rebel governance, we follow Kasfir; rebel governance must meet the following three conditions: the rebels control territory where civilians reside; the rebel groups act violently; and the rebels continue their hostility or threaten to do so in the territory they govern. See Kasfir, Rebel Governance, 25.

6. Terpstra, “Rebel Governance, Rebel Legitimacy,” 1145.

7. Owen, “Measuring Human Security,” 37; Owen, “Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus,” 373–387.

8. Owen, “Measuring Human Security,” 53.

9. UN Human Security Unit, “Human Security Theory and Practice,” 23.

10. Aydin, “Where Do States Go?,” 47–66.

11. Humphreys and Weinstein, “Who Fights?,” 4–8.

12. Duyvesteyn, “Rebels & Legitimacy,” 669–685; Terpstra, “Rebel Governance, Rebel Legitimacy,” 1143–1173; Gawthorpe, “All Counterinsurgency is Local,” 839–852; Podder, “Understanding the Legitimacy of Armed Groups,” 686–708; Malejacq, “From Rebel to Quasi-State,” 867–886; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 53–58; Kitzen, “Legitimacy is the Main Objective,” 853–866.

13. A/RES/60/1, 15 September 2005, paras. 138–139; A/59/565, 2 December 2004; Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, 35.

14. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, “Draining the Sea,” 375–407.

15. Hultman, “Attacks on Civilians in Civil War,” 167.

16. Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett, “The post-war public health effects,” 869-884.

17. Jenkins, Scanlan, and Peterson, “Military Famine, Human Rights,” 823–847.

18. See note 1 above, 230–249.

19. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, “Killing Time,” 615–642; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process,” 345–363; Cunningham, “Blocking resolution,” 115–127; Regan, “Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts,” 55–73.

20. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, “Intervention and Democracy,” 627–649; Hermann and Kegley, “The U.S. Use of Military Intervention To Promote Democracy,” 91–114; Meernik, “United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy,” 391–402.

21. See note 4 above, 363-376.

22. Wood, Kathman, and Gent, “Armed intervention and civilian victimization,” 647–660.

23. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, “Draining the Sea,” 375–407; Hultman, “Attacks on Civilians in Civil War,” 141–181.

24. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, “Killing Time,” 615–642; Cunningham, “Blocking resolution,” 115–127; Regan, “Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts,” 55–73.

25. Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process,” 345.

26. See note 22 above, 652–653.

27. See note 4 above, 365.

28. Bueno de Mesquita, Downs, and Smith “Thinking Inside the Box,” 439-457; Davenport “Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression,” 683-713; Poe and Tate “Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s,” 853-872; Poe, Tate, and Keith “Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited,” 291-313.

29. See above 20.

30. Stewart, “Civil War as State-Making,” 205–226.

31. Gopal, “The Taliban in Kandahar,” 8.

32. Hockey and Jones, “The Limits of ‘Shabaab-CARE’,” 34; Marchal, “Rivals in Governance,” 349–348; Hansen, Horn, Sahel and Rift, 28.

33. Skjelderup, “Jihadi governance and traditional authority structures,” 1185; Harper, Everything You Have Told Me is True, 103.

34. Mampilly, Rebel Rules, 93–128.

35. Terpstra and Frerks, “Governance Practices and Symbolism,” 1021.

36. See note 6 above, 1145.

37. Huang and Sullivan, “Arms for Education?” 1.

38. Legitimacy and rebel governance have been discussed in previous studies. For instance, Kasfir has identified three specific elements for legitimacy: territorial control, a resident population, and violence or a threat of violence. See Kasfir, Rebel Governance, 25.

39. Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, Rebel Governance in Civil War, 190; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 17; Huang and Sullivan, “Arms for Education?” 2–3.

40. Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War,” 89–126.

41. See note 9 above, 23.

42. See note 35 above, 17, 63.

43. Florea, “Rebel governance in de facto states,” 1010–1014; Huang and Sullivan, “Arms for Education?,” 2–3; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 16–17.

44. Grindle, “Good Enough Governance,” 535.

45. Barry, Clay and Flynn, “Avoiding the Spotlight,” 533.

46. Adams, “Can Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),” 180.

47. Regime type information was taken from Polity IV Dataset. Information on GDP per capita was taken from World Bank Dataset. Information on incompatibility of conflict was taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. See Pettersson et al., “Organized violence 1989-2020,” 809–825, and Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946-2001,” 615–637. Information on relative rebel strength was taken from the Non State Actor Dataset by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan “It takes two,” 570–597.

48. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 175–181.

49. Kasfir, “Guerrillas and Civilian Participation,” 281.

50. Makara, Rakner and Svåsand, “Turnaround,” 6.

51. Jeppsson, “Financial Priorities Under Decentralization in Uganda,” 187.

52. SPLM/A, “The Manifesto of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement,” 10.

53. See note 35 above, 145.

54. Ibid., 147–48.

55. Ibid., 158.

56. Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government, 160.

57. Blunt, “Governance Profile for the SPLM-Held Areas of Southern Sudan,” 17.

58. Podder, “Mainstreaming the Non-State in Bottom-Up State-Building,” 229–30.

59. Akol, “Operation Lifeline Sudan,” 54.

60. Ibid, 54.

61. Riehl, Who is Ruling in South Sudan?, 7.

62. See note 30 above, 206, 210.

63. Menkhaus, “State collapse in Somalia.”

64. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 31.

65. Ingiriis, “From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab,” 2044.

66. Ryu, “Suicide Bombings Increase in Somalia.”

67. See note 64 above, 83.

68. Ibid., 84.

69. UN Human Security Unit, “Framework for Cooperation for the System-Wide Application of Human Security,” 7, 34. See also Table 1.

70. International Crisis Group, “Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency,” 2.

71. See note 64 above, 85.

72. Lake, The Satebuilder’s Dilemma, 37.

73. Pham, State Collapse, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency, 45.

74. Cooper, “U.S. Strikes in Somalia Kill 150 Shabab Fighters.”

75. Anzalone, “Black Banner in Somalia,” 12.

76. Human Rights Watch, “Somalia: Al-Shabaab Demanding Children.”

77. Hockey and Jones, “The Limits of ‘Shabaab-CARE’,” 35.

78. Hiraal Institute, “The Fighters Factory,” 2.

79. Ibid., 3.

80. Skjelderup, “Jihadi governance and traditional authority structures,” 1179-80.

81. According to Ingiriis, the capacity of the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) is far behind the Amniyat’s. See Ingiriis, “Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia,” 125–151.

82. Gelot and Hansen, “They are from within Us,” 572.

83. See note 35 above, 53.

84. See for example UN Document, S/2020/398 paras. 15–17; UN Document, SC/14194.

85. On using ‘fear’ to maintain the governance, see also Gelot and Hansen,“They Are From Within Us,” 572.

86. For example, al-Shabaab stated that it had conducted food distributions in Bay, Bakol, Mudug, Hiraan and Galguduung in 2007. See West, “Al-Shabaab Plays on Aid Distribution Role to Win Over Desperate Somalis,” 5.

87. Ibid., 5.

88. Meldrum, “Somalia famine.”

89. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 114; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 53.

90. International Crisis Group, “Instruments of Pain (III)”, 4.

91. Ibid., 5.

92. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency”, 19.

93. Rashid, Taliban; Crews and Tarzi, The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan.

94. Liuhto, “The Schools of the Taliban.”

95. Human Rights Watch, “You Have No Right to Complain.”

96. New York Times, “Taliban’s Ban On Poppy A Success, U.S. Aides Say.”

97. McInnes, “A Different Kind of War?”, 175.

98. Although there are effects on the human security provided by a government, since our focus is on the effect on human security by rebel governance, we do not refer to the former type of change. For instance, such change involves the strengthening of permanent government institutions. By securing Kabul from the Taliban and supporting the elected government, the ISAF engendered a sense of legitimacy towards the Afghanistan government.

99. See for example Mitchell, “NGO Presence and Activity in Afghanistan, 2000–2014,” 5–6.

100. Olson, “Fighting for Humanitarian Space,” 7.

101. Jackson, “Life under the Taliban shadow government,” 8.

102. Jackson, “Taliban policy and perceptions towards aid agencies in Afghanistan,” 13.

103. Ibid., 15.

104. Giustozzi, “Hearts, Minds and the Barrel of a Gun”, 71.

105. See note 102 above, 5.

106. World Bank, “Afghanistan: Promoting Education During Times of Increased Fragility,” 33.

107. See note 105 above, 75.

108. See note 102 above, 16.

109. Associate Press, “A timeline of the US military presence in Afghanistan.”

110. Terpstra, “Opportunity Structures, Rebel Governance, and Disputed Leadership,” 8.

111. See note 6 above, 8-9.

112. Lieven, “An Afghan Tragedy,” 25–26; Ibrahim, “Explainer”; Skjelderup, “Jihadi governance and traditional authority structures,” 1180–1181; Lydon, “Inventions and Reinventions of Sharia in African History,” 87–90.

113. Curtis and Sindre, “Transforming State Visions,” 392.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Koki Shigenoi

Koki Shigenoi is a PhD Candidate at Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University. Previously, he was a visiting researcher at the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, and Al Jazeera Centre for Studies.

Wakako Maekawa

Wakako Maekawa is an Assistant Professor at Nagoya University of Commerce and Business in Faculty of Economics. She received her Ph.D. in Government.