The Union Defence Force and the suppression of the Bondelswarts Rebellion, 1922

ABSTRACT

From the proclamation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had been deployed to suppress several internal disturbances. These unrests varied in terms of their scale, intensity, and geographic location, and represented dissatisfied and disenfranchised parts of the population, both in the Union and South West Africa (now Namibia). The uprisings in turn tested the organisation, force structure and strategies of the defence force. The Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922, although brave and tragic, provides a lens through which to investigate the first large scale rural counterinsurgency operation conducted by South African forces after the end of the First World War. These operations occurred only months after the quelling of the 1922 Rand Revolt on the Witwatersrand. The reputation of the Bondelswarts as guerrilla fighters, and the fear of further unrest breaking out across the territory, prompted the South African authorities to seek a rapid resolution to the simmering unrest in the desolate terrain of southern South West Africa. The result of this brief and violent conflict also held far reaching political consequences. This article investigates the uprising and rural counterinsurgency operations undertaken by the South African authorities in suppressing the Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922.

KEYWORDS:

• South Africa
• Namibia
• Bondelswarts Rebellion
• insurgency
• counterinsurgency

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Van der Waag, The Union Defence Force, 183–190.

2. Van der Waag, A Military History, 141. For a contemporary discussion on South Africa’s evolving threat perception see Esterhuyse, The South African Security Predicament, 1–22.

3. Van der Waag, The Union Defence Force, 189–190.

4. This was similar to localised operations conducted by commandos in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in southern Africa – they were essentially punitive expeditions.

5. Van der Waag, South African Defence, 146–147.

6. See Geyer, The Union Defence Force, 136–151; Geyer, Die Eerste Operasionele Optrede.

7. See Garcia and Kleynhans, ‘Counterinsurgency in South Africa’ 53–79.

8. See Fokkens, The Ovamboland Expedition.

9. See Makobe, The Bulhoek Massacre, 22–41; Makobe, The Price of Fanaticism, 38–41; Makobe, Understanding the Bulhoek Massacre, 98–105.

10. See Fokkens, The Role and Application, 23–45; Krikler, The Rand Revolt.

11. Van der Waag, A Military History, 144–145.

12. See Fokkens and Visser, Die rol van die Unieverdedigingsmag, 124–153.

13. DOD Archives, DC GP2 Box 3520, Air Operations, 23 March 1922.

14. Van der Waag, The Union Defence Force, 197–198.

15. See for instance: Dale, Armed Forces, 57–71; Dale, Pretoria’s Banana Warriors, 74–108; Hayes, Vision and Violence, 133–157; Innes, Imperialism and the National Struggle, 44–59; Kössler, From Reserve to Homeland, 447–462.

16. See for instance: Ambrose Brown, The Return.

17. See for instance: Werner, A Brief History, 135–146.

18. See for instance: Prein, Guns and Top Hats, 99–121.

19. See for instance: Lewis, The Bondelswarts Rebellion, 1–248; UG 30–22, UG 30–22, Report of the Administrator, 1–21; UG 16–23, Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts, 1–33.

20. See, Brian, The rise of African nationalism, 1–10.

21. McCleland, The Bondelswarts Anti-Colonial War.

22. See, Union of South Africa, Report of the Administrator of German South West Africa, 1924.

23. See for instance: Fokkens, The Role and Application, 56–72; Fokkens, The Suppression of Internal, 109–146; Van der Waag, Smuts’s Generals, 33–61.

24. See for instance: Killingray, A Swift Agent, 429–444; Dedering, Air Power, 451–465; Garcia, Airpower in the Union, 1–26; Pirie, British Air Shows, 48–70.

25. See, Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force.

26. See for instance: Dedering, Petitioning Geneva, 785–801; Dedering, War and Mobility, 275–294; Dubow, Smuts, 45–74; Legassick, The Racial Division, 152–186; Davey, The Bondelzwarts Affair; M.W., South-West Africa, 459–469.

27. Van der Waag, A Military History, 106.

28. See Grundlingh and Swart, Radelose Rebellie; Fedorowich, ‘Sleeping with the lion?’ 71–95; Garcia and Kleynhans, ‘Counterinsurgency in South Africa’ 53–79.

29. For the concept of ‘small wars’, see Calwell, Small Wars.

30. For more on the Union’s willingness to engage in ‘small wars’ within South West Africa, see Fokkens, The Suppression of Internal, 109–146; Fokkens, The Ovamboland Expedition.

31. Lewis, The Bondelswarts Rebellion, 1–9.

32. UG 16–23, Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts, 2–3.

33. For more on the German-Herero War see for instance Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa; Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest.

34. For more on the historical impact of climate and terrain on warfare in Namibia, see Kleynhans, A Critical Analysis, 29–53; Lehmann, Between Waterberg and Sandveld, 533–558.

35. Lewis, The Bondelswarts Rebellion, 14–17.

36. UG 16–23, Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts, 3.

37. Lewis, The Bondelswarts Rebellion, 18–22.

38. Lewis, The Bondelswarts Rebellion, 23. People of colour provided service to the UDF in a variety of roles, which included guides, scouts, and labour. See for instance Garcia, The First Campaign Victory.

39. UG 16–23, Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts, 3–12.

40. UG 30–22, Report of the Administrator, 2.

41. UG 16–23, Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts, 13–14.

42. Lewis, The Bondelswarts Rebellion, 69–72.

43. UG 16–23, Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts, 15–17.

44. National Archives and Record Service of South Africa (NARSA), Prime Minister (PM) 141/1922, Vol 167/22, Report by Van Coller on events leading to outbreak of fighting with Bondelswarts, 19 June 1922.

45. UG 16–23, Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts, 17–20.

46. NARSA, PM 141/1922, Vol 167/22, Report by Van Coller on events leading to outbreak of fighting with Bondelswarts, 19 June 1922.

47. Lewis, The Bondelswarts Rebellion, 82–84.

48. NARSA, PM 141/1922, Vol 167/22, Report by Hofmeyr on the Bondelzwarts Rising, 22 June 1922.

49. UG 16–23, Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts, 16.

50. NARSA, PM 141/1922, Vol 167/22, Report by Hofmeyr on the Bondelzwarts Rising, 22 June 1922.

51. See Kilcullen etc.

52. See note above 40.

53. NARSA, PM 141/1922, Vol 167/22, Report by Hofmeyr on the Bondelzwarts Rising, 22 June 1922.

54. The Minister of Defence sanctioned the payment of volunteers to bolster Union forces, see DOD Archives, Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Group 2, Box 12, Defence HQ to General Brink, 28 May 1922.

55. NARSA, PM 141/1922, Vol 167/22, Report of Military Operations against the Bondelswarts Hottentots, 26 May to 8 June 1922; UG 30–22, Report of the Administrator, 6.

56. Garcia and Kleynhans, ‘Counterinsurgency in South Africa’ 57–58.

57. Kiras, ‘Irregular Warfare,’ 193–194; NATO, Counterinsurgency: Reference Curriculum, 37; US Army, FM, 3–24: Insurgencies, 3–1; and British Army, FM: Countering Insurgency, 3–5. For a detailed discussion on intelligence in counterinsurgency operations see: Rid and Heaney, Understanding Counterinsurgency.

58. UG 30–22, UG 30–22, Report of the Administrator, 1–21; UG 16–23, Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts, 1–33.

59. NARSA, PM 141/1922, Vol 167/22, Report by Hofmeyr on the Bondelzwarts Rising, 22 June 1922; NARSA, PM 141/1922, Vol 167/22, Report by Van Coller on events leading to outbreak of fighting with Bondelswarts, 19 June 1922.

60. NARSA, PM 141/1922, Vol 167/22, Report of Military Operations against the Bondelswarts Hottentots, 26 May to 8 June 1922.

61. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 54; and Kiras, ‘Irregular Warfare,’ 194; Also see: NATO, Counterinsurgency: Reference Curriculum, 13–14; Springer, ‘Stabilizing the Debate’; NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine, 4–3; US Army, FM 3–24: Insurgencies, 1–12; British Army, FM: Countering Insurgency, 3–11.

62. UG 30–22, UG 30–22, Report of the Administrator, 4; NARSA, PM 141/1922, Vol 167/22, Report by Hofmeyr on the Bondelzwarts Rising, 22 June 1922.

63. NARSA, PM 141/1922, Vol 167/22, Report by Hofmeyr on the Bondelzwarts Rising, 22 June 1922.

64. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Major Prins to General Brink, 5 June 1922. The Union Government for some time suspected that the Bondelswarts cause was supported from the Union by the Griqua leader Andries Stockenstroom Le Fleur. The Union authorities regarded Le Fleur with some contempt and were weary of the disturbing role that he played in the Northern Cape region of South Africa. For more on this matter, see UG 16–23, Rebellion of the Bondelzwarts, 26–27.

65. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Defence HQ to General Brink, 28 May 1922.

66. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, General Brink to Defence HQ, 28 May 1922.

67. Fokkens, The Role and Application, 66; DOD Archives, CGS, Group 1, Box 12, File 23, Report by Nussey on Bondelswarts Rebellion – South West Protectorate, 26 June 1922.

68. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Reports from DOD HQ Cape Town to HQ Pretoria, 31 May 1922. June 1922; DOD Archives, DC GP2 Box 3520, Air Operations, 1922.

69. DOD Archives, DC GP2 Box 3520, Air Operations, 1922. It should be clearly stated that this aerial attack also included an attack on women, unarmed people, livestock, and other animals. Whether this constitutes a war crime needs full consideration, and although at the time it may have formed part of the norms of war, by modern standards it certainly appears to be a violation of modern international humanitarian law.

70. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Lieutenant Colonel Nussey to Pretoria HQ, 4 June 1922.

71. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Major Prins to General Brink, 5 June 1922.

72. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Major Prins to General Brink, 29 May 1922.

73. Ibid. 1922.

74. See note above 65.

75. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, General Brink to Major Prins, 29 May 1922.

76. See note above 65.

77. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Colonel Van Ryneveld to General Brink, 28 May 1922.

78. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Major Prins to General Brink, 30 May 1922.

79. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Reports from DOD HQ Cape Town to HQ Pretoria, 31 May 1922.

80. See note above 65.

81. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Major Prins to General Brink, 5 June 1922.

82. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Reports from DOD HQ Cape Town to HQ Pretoria, 31 May 1922; DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Colonel Lieutenant Nussey to Pretoria HQ, 5 June 1922.

83. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Major Prins to General Brink, 31 May, 1 June 1922.

84. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Major Prins to General Brink, 31 May, 2 June 1922.

85. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Air Operations Report, June 1922. Similar to endnote 69 – whether this constitutes a war crime needs full consideration, and although at the time it may have formed part of the norms of war, by modern standards it certainly appears to be a violation of modern international humanitarian law.

86. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Major Prins to General Brink, 5 June 1922.

87. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Major Prins to General Brink, 6 June 1922; See, Fokkens, The Suppression of Internal.

88. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Major Prins to General Brink, 5 June 1922. Some reports state that the engagement happened on 5 June: DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Secretary of Defence Report, 14 June 1922.

89. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Major Prins to General Brink, 5 June 1922; See, Fokkens, The Suppression of Internal.

90. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Major Prins to General Brink, 6 June 1922.

91. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, SA Police Report, 12 June 1922.

92. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Secretary of Defence’s report, 14 June 1922.

93. See, Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics.

94. See, for example, Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force; Union of South Africa, Report of the Administrator of German South West Africa, 1923 and 1924.

95. DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 12, Colonel Van Ryneveld to Pretoria HQ, 20 May 1922.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Evert Kleynhans

Evert Kleynhans [MMil, PhD (Mil) (Stell)], is a senior lecturer in the Department of Military History at the Faculty of Military Science of Stellenbosch University. He is the editor of Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies. His primary research interests include the South African participation in both world wars, as well as low-intensity conflict in Southern Africa. His most recent works include Hitler’s Spies: Secret Agents and the Intelligence War in South Africa (Jonathan Ball, 2021) and The Naval War in South African Waters, 1939-1945 (African Sun Media, 2022).

Antonio Garcia

Antonio Garcia is a research fellow affiliated with the Department of Military History of the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University. He has worked in international peace and security, education, and public diplomacy; served as a senior officer in the South African National Defence Force, and has published the book, The First Campaign Victory of the Great War (Helion, 2019).