‘Destructors’ in action, support for insurgents: case study of the Third Silesian Uprising

ABSTRACT

After regaining independence in 1918, Poland faced many fundamental and strategic challenges. One of them was the issue of border crossings on the German-Polish border in Silesia. It was a region dominated by modern heavy industry, to which both the modern states laid claim. The course of the border was to be decided by a plebiscite, but the parties to the conflict resorted to violence and military means. In a complicated international situation and without the possibility of open military intervention, Poland effectively used the strategic tool of special operations – known more widely today as unconventional warfare. Thanks to their skillful application, the German military advantage was effectively eliminated and strategic goals were achieved. Poles effectively cut lines of communication, making it impossible to support pro-German organizations in Silesia, and successfully organized insurgent forces that achieved the goals important for Poland’s development policy. This paper tells the story of a special mission unit called the Destruction Group ‘Wawelberg’ and its use as a tool for implementing the state policy of unconventional warfare during the Third Silesian Uprising.

KEYWORDS:

• Special operations forces
• unconventional warfare
• insurgency
• Third Silesian Uprising
• Konrad Wawelberg
• Tadeusz Puszczyński

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Joint Publication 3–05 Special Operations, XI.

2. ADP 3–05 Army Special Operations, 2–10, 2–11.

3. Jakubczak, Królikowski, Marczak, Gąsiorek, Działania nieregularne, 27.

4. The following books and articles can be identified: Zarzycka, Polskie działania specjalne na Górnym Śląsku 1919–1921 (Polish special operations in Upper Silesia 1919–1921), 1989; Starczewski, Płk dypl. Tadeusz Puszczyński współtwórca działań specjalnych (dywersji pozafrontowej) w Polsce w okresie międzywojennym (Colonel qualified Tadeusz Puszczyński co-creator of special operations (diversion behind the front) in Poland in the interwar period), 2013; Kaczmarek, Powstania śląskie 1919–1920-1921, nieznana wojna polsko-niemiecka (Silesian Uprisings 1919–1920-1921, unknown Polish-German war), 2019; Kania, Góra Św. Anny – Kędzierzyn 1921 (Mount St. Anna-Kędzierzyn 1921), 2022. This issue was also touched upon in two of my books: Historia działań specjalnych od wojny trojańskiej do II wojny światowej (History of special operations from Trojan War to the Second World War), 2004, and Geneza i rozwój polskich operacji oraz sił specjalnych (The origin and development of Polish operations and special forces), 2013.

5. Czapliński, Kaszuba, Wąs, Żerelik, Historia Śląska, 41–103.

6. Ibid., 111–116.

7. Ibid., 122–207.

8. Duffy, 27–68.

9. Czapliński, et al., 208–331.

10. Ibid., 368–385.

11. German Königshütte, today the center of Chorzów.

12. Józef Piłsudski was a Polish statesman who served as the Chief of State (1918–22) and First Marshal of Poland (from 1920). He was considered the de facto leader (1926–35) of the Second Polish Republic as the Minister of Military Affairs. After World War I, Józef Piłsudski held great power in Polish politics and was a distinguished figure on the international scene. He is viewed as a father of the Second Polish Republic re-established in 1918, 123 years after the final Partition of Poland by Austria, Prussia, and Russia in 1795. Piłsudski was also an experienced revolutionary and underground fighter (if you prefer, a terrorist). He was the creator of the Wydział Spiskowo-Bojowy (Conspiracy-Combat Department) of the Polish Socialist Party. In 1910, Józef Piłsudski described philosophy of operations organized by his organization thus:

1. Exploiting of surprise element. If there is a lack of this element, combat actions are impossible in the face of the enemy’s domination. The main base of action remains unexceptional, only one chance assuring victory. Everything that leads to surprise (secret, mystery, conspiracy) must be implemented. Hence, there are difficulties of concentration and preliminary preparations.

2. Speed control and implementation of terror tactics because you have to deal with stronger forces, enemies or an inert environment. For this purpose, explosives are the most effective, their noise produces fear and inertia of hostile elements.

3. No reserve due to the necessity of the element of conspiracy and the difficulty of withdrawal. No reserve requires the elaboration of the plan, predicting all sorts of details, which may lead to the failure of the action, a strict division of roles of all participants. This vulnerability of combat actions is compensated little by the efficiency of the people who were able to adapt themselves to changed circumstances.

4. No long battles. The actions are shortlived leading to either mastering the enemy, or failure and a quick withdrawal. Any resistance by the enemy destroys the most successful action.

5. The efficiency of people is a guarantee of success. Action on Wspólna Street (1907) [the direct action or post office robbery on 22 February 1907, carried out under the command of Tomasz Arciszewski] is the peak of combat efficiency: in a few minutes the battle was fought with the soldiers and officers of the post and the confiscation of the money was made next to the district office near the troops. After that the participants (including the three wounded) withdrew and disappeared without a trace. Bezdany is also an example of extraordinary efficiency. [Bezdany raid was a train robbery (or direct action) carried out on the night of 26–27 September 1908 in the vicinity of Bezdany near Vilnius on a Russian Empire passenger and mail train by a group of Polish revolutionaries, led by Piłsudski.]

6. The role of managers in the absence of the reserve decreases. It is mainly visible during concentration and withdrawal. If the same action is reduced to zero, it has a moral, not material meaning.

7. Retreat is a very important part of the action that requires a separate sort of artistry. The trick is to spread as quickly as possible in the environment. Many actions could not be made only because of the lack of conducive conditions for retreat. A quote from: Piłsudski, „Historia Organizacji Bojowej P.P.S.”, 35–36.

13. Kaczmarek, Powstania śląskie 1919–1920-1921, 19–142.

14. Ibid., 143–194; Dowell, ‘Erupting one hundred years ago today, TFN looks back at the story of The First Silesian Uprising’, 16 August 2019, https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/erupting-one-hundred-years-ago-today-tfn-looks-back-at-the-story-of-the-first-silesian-uprising-7168 (accessed 26 October 2022).

15. Kaczmarek, op. cit., 195–289.

16. Ibid., 290–317.

17. Ibid., 318–375 and Mielżyński, Wspomnienia i przyczynki do historji III-go powstania górnośląskiego, 11–58.

18. Kaczmarek, 378–523 and Mielżyński, 77–164.

19. Tadeusz Puszczyński (noms de guerre „Konrad Wawelberg”, „Zapała”), was born in Józinki near Piotrków in 1895. He was an activist of the Polish Socialist Party, a certified colonel of the Polish Army, a leading independence activist. In 1910, he was a co-organizer with Stefan Rowecki (during World War II he was the commander of the Home Army) and Zygmunt Zaremba of the ‘Filarecja’ Independence and Progressive Youth Union in Piotrków. Part of the Polish Socialist Party from 1913, he was arrested and imprisoned. He moved to Warsaw after being released. At risk of being arrested again, he left for Krakow. From August 1914, he was part of the 1st Brigade of the Polish Legions. From 1915, he was part of the Polish Military Organization in District of Kielce, then the commander of District VII in Radom. He collaborated with the radical peasant movement. He was active in the Polish Socialist Party – Opposition. In May 1918, he became the commander of the Mobile Branches of the Polish Military Organization in the area of the Austrian occupation (he adopted the pseudonym ‘Konrad’), then Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the 4th Polish Military Organization. From November 1918, he was in the Polish Army. From January 1919, he was in the People’s Militia of the Polish Socialist Party, then the commander of the company of the 8th Rifle Battalion (later the 79th Infantry Regiment). From December 1919 in the Plebiscite Section of Department II of the Ministry of Military Affairs. From April 1920, head of the Plebiscite Division B for Upper Silesia. He was the co-initiator of the Second Silesian Uprising, member of command. From November 1920, he was the organizer and head of the Department of Destruction. In the Third Silesian Uprising, he was the commander of the Destructive Group, and rearguard group commander of the Supreme Command of the Insurgent Army (‘Wawelberg’ Group). Between the years 1922–1927, he was in the Department II of the General Staff and held the function of Head of Division A-III (intelligence technique). In the period from 1927 to 1929, he studied at the Higher Military School, then he was the commander of the battalion in the 65th Infantry Regiment, then the chief of staff in the 12th Infantry Regiment. From October 1936 to October 1937 in the Border Protection Corps (Korpus Ochrony Pogranicz), he was the commander of the regiment and finally held the position of Chief of Staff of the Border Protection Corps. He subsequently fell ill with a brain tumor and the operation performed in Stockholm did not produce any results. He died in 1939 in Warsaw. He was posthumously promoted to the rank of Colonel. (Based on: Starczewski, „Płk dypl. Tadeusz Puszczyński współtwórca działań specjalnych (dywersji pozafrontowej) w Polsce w okresie międzywojennym”, 915–940.)

20. Zarzycka, Polskie działania specjalne na Górnym Śląsku 1919–1921, 35–60 and Królikowski, Historia działań specjalnych od wojny trojańskiej do II wojny światowej, 167–168.

21. Zarzycka, 61–108.

22. Starczewski, 919.

23. Królikowski, Geneza i rozwój polskich operacji oraz sił specjalnych, 128–129.

24. The Department of Destruction included nine officers, four cadets, four sergeants, five plutonowy (military rank between senior corporal and sergeant), two corporals, and 22 privates. With commander, Capt. Tadeusz Puszczyński ‘Wawelberg’; deputy commander, Lt. Stanisław Baczyński ‘Büttner’; deputy commander for technics and liaison with the Plebiscite Command, Lt. Teofil Morelowski ‘Johann Schmidt’; economic officer, Lt. Edmund Charaszkiewicz ‘Eugeniusz’; and Lt. Jerzy Paszkowski ‘Thiele’.

25. Starczewski, 922.

26. Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive), sygn. (Document Reference) 130.45.18, M. Mielżyński. Dla kpt. Wawelberga. Instrukcja Operacyjna nr 1 z 22 IV 1921 r (Mielżyński. for Capt. Wawelberg. Operational Manual No. 1 22 April 1921).

27. Zarzycka, 117–120.

28. Starczewski, 923–924.

29. See above 21.137.

30. Mielżyński, 59–64, 303–308 and Zarzycka, 137–179 and Królikowski, Historia działań specjalnych, 168–174 and Starczewski, 918–927.

31. Janusz Meissner (pen name: ‘porucznik Herbert’) was born in 1901. He is famous in Poland as a writer, journalist, and a pilot of the Polish Air Force. In 1919, Meissner completed pilot training at Kraków’s Lower Pilot School, and in 1920, at Poznań’s Higher Pilot School. From July 1920, he served in the Polish-Soviet War, in the Toruń Reconnaissance Squadron in the rank of pilot sergeant. For his combat flight of 16 July 1920, he was decorated with the – newly introduced – Cross of Valor, and promoted to lieutenant. After the Polish-Soviet War, he participated in the preparations for the Third Silesian Uprising. For his contribution to the success of the Uprising, he was decorated with the Virtuti Militari (highest military decoration in Poland), 5th class, and with the Cross of Independence with Swords. After the Silesian uprisings, he returned to civilian life. After an unsuccessful attempt to become a businessman, he returned to the military in 1922 and remained part of it until 1946. In 1946, he returned to Poland from Great Britain. Meissner died in 1956.

32. Meissner, Wspomnienia pilota. Jak dziś pamiętam, 356–359. The long citation reflects the atmosphere of the operation and the emotions of the combatants.

33. Starczewski, 925–927.

34. Zarzycka, 137–179 and Starczewski, 927–928.

35. On the state of knowledge about Polish paramilitary organizations in Upper Silesia, incl. in: The National Archives, 1921. Polish Semi-military formations in Upper Silesia. Retrieved from https://history-commons.net/artifacts/2566911/polish-semi-military-formations-in-upper-silesia/3589372/ on 19 December 2022. CID: 20.500.12592/fg7dkq.

36. The National Archives, 1921. Polish insurrection in Upper Silesia. Retrieved from https://history-commons.net/artifacts/2567740/polish-insurrection-in-upper-silesia/3589750/ on 19 December 2022. CID: 20.500.12592/m44nct.

37. Bernhard Franz Karl Adolf von Hülsen formed the Freikorps (von) Hülsen, a paramilitary unit that participated in the suppression of the Spartacist League in Berlin. In 1921, Generalleutnant von Hülsen commanded units in the battle of Mount St. Anna.

38. Hülsen, Der Kampf um Oberschlesien. Selbstschutz im dritten Polenaufstande, 50–54.

39. Sypniewski, part 2 of ‘Noty biograficzne oficerów i podoficerów Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego pełniących służbę w Posterunku Oficerskim nr 1 w Mławie’, 293–294.

40. Pełpoński, Wywiad polski na ZSRR 1921–1939, 29–30. On the evolution of the structure of the Polish General Staff in the: Kmiecik, Sztab Generalny Wojska Polskiego 1918–1939, 2013.

41. Starczewski, 932.

42. More on this subject in: Królikowski, Historia działań specjalnych, 174–186, and Królikowski, Geneza i rozwój, 77–83. There are also references to other sources and studies.

43. More on this subject in: Starczewski, „Polski wywiad wojskowy w przygotowaniu sieci dywersji pozafrontowej na Podhalu i jej udział w akcjach dywersyjnych w początkowym okresie okupacji”, 69–94.

44. „III Powstanie Śląskie: Zryw narodowy czy wojna domowa?”, 2 May 2009, https://polskatimes.pl/iii-powstanie-slaskie-zryw-narodowy-czy-wojna-domowa/ar/112050 (accessed 16 August 2022).

45. Januszewska-Jurkiewicz, Luksa, 97–116.

46. Starczewski, 915–916.

47. ‘III Powstanie Śląskie: Zryw narodowy czy wojna domowa?’.

48. „Agat z tradycjami powstańców śląskich”, 24 July 2019, http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/28850?t=Agat-z-tradycjami-powstancow-slaskich (accessed 16 August 2022).

49. „Decyzja Nr 23/MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej z dnia 22 lutego 2019 r. w sprawie nadania imienia patrona 13. Śląskiej Brygady Obrony Terytorialnej”, and „13 Śląska Brygada Obrony Terytorialnej im. ppłk. dypl. Tadeusza Puszczyńskiego ps. „Konrad Wawelberg”” https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/13bot/ (accessed 25 September 2022).

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Hubert Królikowski

Hubert Królikowski is Professor at the Middle and Far East Studies Institute, Political and International Studies Faculty of Jagiellonian University in Krakow. He holds Ph.D. in Military History from the Military Historical Institute awarded in 1996, was habilitated in National Security at National Defense Academy in Warsaw in 2006, and has been full professor since 2015. From 1994 to 1997, he worked at the National Security Bureau. Between the years 1997-2005, he was a Senior Defense Analyst with responsibilities to service national defense accounts at CEC Government Relations. He was the Director’s Plenipotentiary for Offset at the Institute of the Aviation (2006-2007) and later was the Director of the Offset Programs Department in the Ministry of the Economy during the period 2007-2016. Afterwards, he was a Deputy Director at the Military Foreign Affairs Department, Advisor of the Minister of National Defence Plenipotentiary for the Strategic Defence Review, and Director of the Department of Defense Analyses in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister.