![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Russia’s airpower failure in the Ukraine war was due to incompetent air campaigning and execution, coupled with the success of a highly effective Ukrainian ground-based air defense. The Russian Air Forces (VKS) attempted to execute what they term a ‘Strategic Air Operation’ based on a ‘non-contact’ doctrine, articulated widely in recent years. But they could not achieve this in practice. As a result, like the famous Potemkin Village of Catherine the Great’s time, Russia’s Air Force today is only a façade of a modern twenty-first-century Air Force. Throughout the first eight months of the invasion, Russia failed to achieve air superiority, failed at suppression of enemy air defense, and failed to deny the use of airpower to its adversary. The absence of Russian airpower was prominently on display during the September 2022 counterattack in the Kharkiv area, where Ukraine took back 3,000 plus square miles of its territory and again with the counteroffensives in the south, where Ukraine retook Kherson. This paper explores both the ‘how’ of Russia’s airpower failure along with ‘why’ it could not execute its own stated doctrine.
Acknowledgments
My sincere appreciation to my primary Air War College advisor, Professor Dr. Douglas Peifer for guiding me through many revisions with sound advice and counsel from his decades of experience and publishing. Thank you as well to co-advisors Dr. Anna Batta and to Dr. Andrew Akin. I would also like to thank Professors Chris Marcell and Dr. Jay Varuolo with Joint Warfighting Studies in the Global College of Professional Military Education at Air University, both former aviators, for helping explain the intricacies of SEAD and GBAD concepts to a non-aviator. Thank you to Dr. Heather Venable and Dr. John Terino of the Air Command and Staff College for their generous reviews and insights. Finally, my appreciation to Dr. Liz Woodworth, Director of Air War College Research, whose passion for writing helped inspire me to write this paper. All these professors are truly a credit to Air Force University, Maxwell Air Force Base.
My appreciation as well to Dr. John Nagl, Associate Professor of Warfighting Studies at the U.S. Army War College, who graciously welcomed my paper and efforts into his Ukraine Task Force Project, a truly collaborative effort. A final thank you to my AWC classmate and State Department colleague Mark Turner for serving as a proofreader, and to Mr. David Abruzzino for his help this past summer introducing me to open-sources.
Disclosure statement
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect theofficial policy or position of the US government, the Department of Defense, or Air University. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States Government.
Notes
1. Note: Russian Aerospace Forces, “vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sili”, or VKS in Russian, were renamed such after the merger in 2015 of Russia’s Air Force, previously VVS, Army Aviation, and some long-range Air Defense and Space forces. For sake of simplicity in this article we will refer to the VKS by the more generalized ‘Russian Air Force’.
2. Katherine Walla, ‘Six Months, Twenty-Three Lessons: What the World Has Learned from Russia’s War in Ukraine’, Atlantic Council (blog), August 23, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/six-months-twenty-three-lessons-what-the-world-has-learned-from-russias-war-in-ukraine/.
3. Putin’s Siloviki, translated as ‘Strongmen’, is a term derived from the institutions of ‘strength’, also known as the ‘organi’ or organs of power in Russia, the security services, which he himself was a veteran of, the KGB. In modern times, it is often used to refer to his inner circle of advisors, most of whom are KGB, FSB, or other security veterans.
4. Angela Stent, “The Putin Doctrine”, June 15, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-01-27/putin-doctrine.
5. There were, of course, eight years of war with Ukraine that pre-dated the February 2022 invasion. The war in the east and Donbass never relented over that multi-year period.
6. Senior Russian officials commented openly about regime change being part of the Russian plan for a New Ukraine. There was also alleged reporting on potential Russian assassination/detention teams sent into Ukrainian territory to detain or kill Ukrainian leaders. This reporting has not been substantiated but if true would support the narrative that Russia planned for a quick defeat of Ukraine and occupation of its territory, with the resulting change to seize and use its military hardware and bases in what they planned would be a quick victory and takeover.
7. Team of the Official Website of the President of Russia, Article by Vladimir Putin”On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, President of Russia, accessed 10 August 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181.
8. Sharon Braithwaite, “Zelensky Defiant: Ukrainian President Refuses US Offer to Evacuate, Saying ‘I Need Ammunition, Not a Ride”, CNN, accessed 9 November 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/26/europe/ukraine-zelensky-evacuation-intl/index.html.
9. Maskirovka, literally ‘disguise’ in Russian is a concept as old as the Tsarist military, carried through to Soviet and now Russian Federation services, military, and intelligence. It can also be called ‘denial and deception’ in the West and refers to the ability to confuse, disorient, and mislead the adversary by deception.
10. G. S. Isserson and Bruce Menning, The Evolution of Operational Art, Revised and expanded second edition (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2013).
11. Ellen Ioanes, “Here’s What We Know about the State of Russia’s Military”, Vox, 18 September, 2022, https://www.vox.com/2022/9/18/23359326/russia-military-failures-ukraine.
12. Anton Lavrov, “Russian Military Reforms from Georgia to Syria’, accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-military-reforms-georgia-syria. p.20.
13. Lars Peder Haga. Air Forces: The Next Generation, Chapter 3: Russia, Modernizing Air and Space, 1st ed. (Howgate Publishing Limited, 2020).60.
14. Michael Kofman, Anya Fink, Dmitry Gorenburg, Mary Chesnut, and Jeffrey Edmonds, and Julian Waller. ‘Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts’. ” CNA Research Memorandum. Russian Strategic Initiative, October 2021). https://www.cna.org/reports/2021/10/russian-military-strategy-core-tenets-and-conceptsal Concepts | CNA.
15. In Russian: стратегическая воздушно-космическая операция, abbreviated SVKO in Russian but we will use the translation of Strategic Air Operation, or SAO, for simplicity in our analysis. This is cited in the CNA report from: ‘Strategic aerospace operation’, Стратегическая воздушно-космическая операция, Ministry of RF Encyclopedia, undated,https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=10372@morfDictionary.; Tyutyunnikov, ‘Military thought in terms and definitions’, p. 265.
16. Michael Kofman et al, ‘Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts’. p.55.
17. TheCNA report and SAO definition also notes the goals to ‘thwart a strategic operation and operational deployment of forces, Interdict maneuver between theaters of operation, and Decrease military and economic potential’ but for sake of this paper we will focus on the first five, which also are the most salient to air operations in the Ukraine War.
18. Airpower and the Range of Military Operations. Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3–0 Operations and Planning. Last Updated: 04 November 2016, 3–0-D07-OPS-Airpower-ROMO.pdf (af.mil).
19. See JP 1–02 of Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command,45.
20. Mike Pietrucha, ‘Amateur Hour Part II: Failing the Air Campaign’, War on the Rocks, August 11, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/amateur-hour-part-ii-failing-the-air-campaign/.
21. See again Haga’s analysis of Russia’s Air Forces. Actual flight hours are hard to come by given Russian secrecy on all military issues, but 100 flight hours seems to the upper end of most estimates found by this author. This dearth of flight training is highlighted also by Justin Bronk with RUSI who noted a lack of night-trained Russian pilots in Ukraine.
22. For further perspective on Joint Operations and the lack of demonstration of them in Ukraine, there are products from NATO’s JAPCC. See, for instance, Rafael Ichaso. ‘Russian Air Force’s Performance in Ukraine – Joint Air Power Competence Centre’. Journal of the JAPCC 35 (February 15, 2023). https://www.japcc.org/articles/russian-air-forces-performance-in-ukraine-air-operations-the-fall-of-a-myth/.).
23. Sam Cranny-Evans and Dr. Sidharth Kaushal, ‘The Intellectual Failures Behind Russia’s Bungled Invasion’, April 1, 2022, https://www.rusi.orghttps://www.rusi.org.
24. In Russian: ‘bezkontaktnaya voina’, which could also be translated as ‘without contact’ war or warfare. See for example the article (in Russian language) characterizing the invasion of Ukraine as what one Russian expert, Leonid Dmitriev, called ‘A Classic Non-contact War Taking Place’ in February 2022 on the on-line Russian blog ‘The Insider’..
25. V. V. Gerasimov, ‘Organizatsiya oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii v usloviyakh primeneniya protivnikom “traditsionnykh” i “gibridnykh” metodov vedeniya voiny’, Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk, Vol. 2, No. 55, 2016. As cited in Samuel Charap et. al. Russian Grand Strategy: Rhetoric and Reality. Santa Monica, CA. RAND Corporation.Chapter 3, p.27.
26. Roger McDermott. ‘Russia’s Entry to Sixth-Generation Warfare: The “Non-Contact” Experiment in Syria’. Jamestown. Accessed January 7, 2023. https://jamestown.org/program/russias-entry-to-sixth-generation-warfare-the-non-contact-experiment-in-syria/.
27. For an excellent analysis of what Russia anticipates in terms of NATO attack, and Russian efforts to counter it, see again Michael Kofman, Anya Fink, Dmitry Gorenburg, Mary Chesnut, and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts”.
28. Justin Bronk, Dr. Jack Watling, and Nick Reynolds, ‘The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence’ (Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies), accessed November 7, 2022, https://www.rusi.orghttps://www.rusi.org.
29. Justin Bronk, Dr. Jack Watling, and Nick Reynolds, “The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence”.9–12.
30. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine”, Oryx (blog), accessed September 27, 2022, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html.
31. Note again that Russian Aerospace Forces include rotary wing, Airborne Forces, and other elements not traditionally included in U.S. or Western air forces.
32. Zhanna Bezpiatchuk, “Ukraine War: Chornobaivka Airbase, Symbol of Russian Defeat”, BBC News, November 29, 2022, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63754797.
33. Lawrence Freedman, “Why War Fails: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Limits of Military Power”, Foreign Affairs 101, no. 4 (August 2022).
34. Mikhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February – July 2022” (Royal United Services Institute), accessed December 6, 2022, https://www.rusi.orghttps://www.rusi.org.
35. Anil Chopra, “Ukraine War. The War in the Air. An Analysis. Air Marshal Anil Chopra”, Air Power Asia (blog), March 9, 2022, https://airpowerasia.com/2022/03/09/ukraine-war-the-war-in-the-air-an-analysis-air-marshal-anil-chopra-aadi-def-talks/.
36. Lars Peder Haga, Air Forces: The Next Generation, 1st ed. (Howgate Publishing Limited; 1st edition, 2020).
37. Zamone Perez, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Offers Lessons on Land, at Sea and by Air”, Defense News, August 1, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/2022/08/01/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-offers-lessons-on-land-at-sea-and-by-air/.
38. Bronk first noted this disconnect in a spring 2022 RUSI article, ‘The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force’, and later returned to the issue of failing Russian airpower in the comprehensive November 2022 RUSI study noted above.
39. Justin Bronk as featured in John Slick’s podcast, The Aerospace Advantage, “Episode 110 - Russian Airpower in Ukraine: Lessons for the West. The Aerospace Advantage, accessed January 9, 2023, https://mitchellinstituteaerospaceadvantage.podbean.com/e/episode-110-russian-airpower-in-ukraine-lessons-for-the-west/.
40. David Axe, “Ukraine’s Ex-German Air-Defense Guns Are In Action, Supporting The Counteroffensive”, accessed September 27, 2022, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraine-s-ex-german-air-defense-guns-are-in-action-supporting-the-counteroffensive/ar-AA12hdQz?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=a5820e8d94ec4ce5b370c49237e5644a.
41. Oryx, ‘Attack On Europe’. Note: This author has found the Oryx website to be one of the best Ukrainian war websites in documenting actual Russian losses vice accidents or friendly fire, etc. They document carefully, often with reference to press reporting, photos or other evidence, each instance of alleged shoot-downs by either side.
42. Haga, Air Forces: The Next Generation.40.
43. Justin Bronk, Jack Watling, and Reynolds, “The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence’.6.
44. ‘100,000 Russian troops killed or injured in Ukraine, US says’. Associated Press. 10 November 2022. Retrieved 10 November 2022.
45. Michael Kofman, Anya Fink, Dmitry Gorenburg, Mary Chesnut and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts”.p.70.
46. Maximillian K. Bremer and Kelly A. Grieco, “Success Denied: Finding Ground Truth in the Air War over Ukraine”, Defense News, September 21, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/09/21/success-denied-finding-ground-truth-in-the-air-war-over-ukraine/.
47. Maximillian K. Bremer and Kelly A. Grieco, “Success Denied: Finding Ground Truth in the Air War over Ukraine”, Defense News, September 21, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/09/21/success-denied-finding-ground-truth-in-the-air-war-over-ukraine/.
48. ”SEAD Operations of the Future The Necessity of Jointness” By Colonel Joseph Speed and Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Panagiotis Stathopoulos. Published by Joint Air Power Competence Centre (2017–2020), June 2018 in Journal Edition 26.
49. Axe, “Ukraine’s Ex-German Air-Defense Guns Are In Action, Supporting The Counteroffensive”.
50. Axe, David, “Ukrainian Air-Defenses Mauled A Russian Fighter Regiment, Shooting Down A Quarter Of Its Crews”, Forbes, accessed September 29, 2022, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukrainian-air-defenses-mauled-a-russian-fighter-regiment-shooting-down-a-quarter-of-its-crews/ar-AA12omK2?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=b6c3a5701b5a4ef58dded806b1ba90cf.
51. Justin Bronk, “The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force”, accessed August 10, 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/mysterious-case-missing-russian-air-force.
52. Freedman, “Why War Fails: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Limits of Military Power”.
53. Andrew Meldrum, “Ukraine Cites Success in Downing Drones, Fixes Energy Sites”, accessed October 24, 2022, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/after-struggle-ukraine-claims-success-in-downing-drones/ar-AA13jsgs?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=4c72e758c79d4da5b37e4c6b034cdb76.
54. Warden’s argument, famous in Western schools of air campaigning, is that attacking the enemy’s concentric rings of leadership, infrastructure, etc. can lead to strategic ‘paralysis’. See Warden, John A. III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat. Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press. 1988. ISBN 978-1 -58,348-100-4.
55. Andrew E. Kramer, Michael Schwirtz and Marc Santora. ‘Ukraine Targets Bases Deep in Russia, Showing Expanded Reach’. The New York Times, December 6, 2022, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/05/world/europe/ukraine-russia-military-bases.html.
56. Bronk, Watling, and Reynolds, “The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence”.
57. Perez, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Offers Lessons on Land, at Sea and by Air”.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Sean M. Wiswesser
Sean Wiswesser is a national security professional with over 25 years of service, domestically and overseas, in a variety of assignments. He is a 2023 Masters candidate at the U.S. Air Force University, Air War College (Maxwell Air Force Base). Sean is a 1996 graduate with a Bachelor of Arts from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he was a Morehead Scholar with a double Major in History and Russian/Slavic Linguistics. He is a Cum Laude graduate of the Hill School, class of 1992.