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ABSTRACT
Special Operations Forces (SOF) played an important role in defeating the Islamic State (ISIS) physical caliphate in Syria. Acting as a force multiplier, SOF successfully mobilized, armed, supplied, and directed an indigenous guerrilla force across northern Syria against a numerically superior entrenched enemy. This effort was underpinned by a flexible operational approach that adapted operational art to the unique characteristics of unconventional warfare. This paper provides a case study on the conflict with ISIS in Syria, focusing on the first phase of the campaign from 2014 until 2016, examining the elements of operational art which had the most significant impact on the outcome of the conflict. The application of operational art throughout the campaign sought to preserve and strengthen the friendly center of gravity – the Syrian Defense Forces, or SDF – by improving access to critical capabilities, controlling tempo, recognizing culmination criteria, and properly phasing operations and resources. SOF’s practice of sustained engagement garnered influence with the SDF and provided situational awareness to key decision makers, connecting tactics to strategy, engendering mutual trust, and allowing the agility that led to battlefield success.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1. Troy James Sacquety, ‘The Organizational Evolution of OSS Detachment 101 In Burma, 1942–1945’, 15.
2. Antulio Echevarria II, ‘American Operational Art, 1917–2008’, in Martin Van Creveld and John Andreas Olsen, The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present, 137.
3. Special warfare consists of ‘activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment’. It includes ‘special operations forces conducting combinations of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and/or counterinsurgency through and with indigenous forces or personnel’. Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, Special Operations, Army Doctrine Publication 3–05, 9.
4. Dan Madden et. al., Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare.
5. Headquarters, Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept 2.0, May 17, 2010, 23.
6. Mona Yacoubian, ‘Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad’.
7. Congressional Research Service, ‘Syria Conflict Overview: 2011–2021’.
8. AQI had been largely defeated in Iraq by 2011; however, the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq provided time and space for the Al Qaeda offshoot to re-emerge.
9. Mason Watson, ‘The Conflict with ISIS: Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, June 2014–January 2020’, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Pub 78–2, Paper 34.
10. The Islamic State has several names: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIL). This paper will use ISIS for simplicity unless otherwise quoted using ISIL.
11. Watson, ‘The Conflict with ISIS: Operation INHERENT RESOLVE’, 17.
12. Charles Caris and Samuel Reynolds, ‘ISIS Governance In Syria’.
13. Watson, ‘The Conflict with ISIS: Operation INHERENT RESOLVE’, 18.
14. ISIS Sanctuary as of July 28, 2014, In Charles Caris and Samuel Reynolds, ‘ISIS Governance In Syria’, 10.
15. Barack Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
16. Barack Obama, ‘Statement by the President on ISIL’.
17. Mona Yacoubian, ‘Critical-Junctures-US-Policy-Syria’.
18. ‘United States Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State In Iraq And The Levant’, Hearing Before the Committee On Foreign Relations, United States Senate.
19. There is a long history of the insufficiency of air power alone in defeating ground forces. See, among many others, Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002) and T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: Macmillan, 1963).
20. Andreas Krieg, ‘Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and Us Foreign Policy in the Middle East’. International Affairs, 97–113, 104–105.
21. ‘Support for U.S. Campaign against ISIS’, Pew Research Center – U.S. Politics & Policy.
22. Obama, ‘Statement by the President on ISIL’.
23. Madden et. al., Toward Operational Art, xiv.
24. Samuel Charap, Elina Treyger, and Edward Geist, Understanding Russia’s Intervention in Syria.
25. Dr. Bob Hamilton attributed this quote to Dr. Olga Oliker in his presentation ‘The Russia Crisis in Ukraine, An Assessment’ (Noontime Lecture, Army War College, February 2022).
26. Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) translates to People’s Protection Units.
27. Dylan Maguire, ‘A Perfect Proxy? The United States-Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership’, The Proxy Wars Project, 6.
28. New Map: Kobane Situation September 27th 2014. ISIS 13 days-Offensive evolution, Reddit.com. Authors used base map and added YPG symbology.
29. Mason Watson, The Conflict with ISIS: Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, June 2014–January 2020.
30. Kobane breakout, To the Frontlines Against ISIS Part II. Authors used base map and added location and maneuver graphics.
31. Faysal Itani and Aaron Stein, Map 1.C Original Cantons and Areas of Kurdish Control as of April 1, 2016. In: ‘Turkey’s Syria Predicament’ (Atlantic Council, 2016), 4.
32. Dylan Maguire, ‘A Perfect Proxy? The United States-Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership’, The Proxy Wars Project, 6.
33. Amberin Zaman, ‘Fight against IS Helps PKK Gain Global Legitimacy’, Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East.
34. Amy Holmes, ‘Arabs Across Syria Join the Kurdish-Led Syrian Democratic Forces’, Middle East Research and Information Project.
35. Seizure of Tal Abyad and Hasakah], To the Frontlines Against ISIS Part II. Authors used base map and added locations and maneuver graphics.
36. Target Engagement Authority is the delegated authority given to a specific echelon in the military chain of command to authorize the use of lethal munitions against a specific target within the established rules of engagement.
37. Northern Aleppo offensive (2016), Wikimedia Commons. Authors used base map and added locations and Marea Line graphic.
38. Aaron Stein, Partner Operations in Syria: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward, 10.
39. ‘The PKK is an armed movement that demands autonomy for the Kurds in Turkey, and it operates against the Turkish forces inside Turkey and in the mountainous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan’. Azad Deewanee, ‘The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and People’s Protection Units (YPG) In Turkish Official Discourse’, World Affairs, 65. Deewanee further explains the Turkish official position is that the YPG is an organic component of the PKK. The PKK is officially listed as a terrorist organization by the United States. However, there are many conflicting opinions on the ties between the YPG and the PKK. The YPG is an organization focused on the protection of Syrian Kurds, while the PKK is primarily focused internal to Turkey.
40. ‘Declaration of Establishment by Democratic Syria Forces’, Kurdishquestion.com.
41. While the SDF was the main partner for the United States in Syria it still provided support to the Turkish Supported Opposition until after Operation EUPHRATES SHIELD in March 2017.
42. The SDC is the political leadership of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) See: ‘Syrian Democratic Council Fact Sheet’, Syrian Democratic Council U.S. Mission.
43. ”In 2014, Congress created a new authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) to train and equip select Syrians in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, Section 1209 of P.L. 113–291, as amended). This authority, as amended by subsequent legislation, enables DOD ‘to provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, stipends, construction of training and associated facilities, and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals’. Such assistance activities are authorized for select purposes, including supporting U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria and promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria’s civil war”. See: ‘Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response’, EveryCRSReport.com.
44. For background on Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, see Nicholas Danforth, ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Problem – Then and Now’. Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 5, 2016. For updated specifics on Kurdish actions against Turkey, see the Center for Preventative Action, ‘Conflict between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups’. Council on Foreign Relations, January 6, 2023.
45. Congressional Research Service, ‘Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response’.
46. Syria Physical Map, Western Asia Syria Map: GISGeography. Authors used base map and added locations and logistical routes.
47. Mecid Mohamed, ‘What Would Capturing Al-Shaddadi from ISIS Require?’ Atlantic Council.
48. Seizure of Al Hawl], To the Frontlines Against ISIS Part II. Authors used base map and added locations and maneuver graphics.
49. Watson, ‘The Conflict with ISIS: Operation INHERENT RESOLVE’, 44.
50. Tishrin Dam Offensive, Wikipedia. Authors used base map and added locations and maneuver graphics.
51. Amy Holmes, ‘Arabs Across Syria Join the Kurdish-Led Syrian Democratic Forces’.
52. Amy Holmes, ‘SDF’s Arab Majority Rank Turkey as the Biggest Threat to NE Syria: Survey Data on America’s Partner Forces’, 9.
53. ‘The Syrian Democratic Forces Takeover Shaddadi City in Al-Hasakah after Nearly 3 Days of Starting the Offensive’, Syrian Observatory For Human Rights.
54. ‘Statement of the General Command of the Syrian Democratic Forces on the Campaign of the Wrath of Al-Khabour and the Liberation of al-Shaddadi’.
55. Al Shaddadi Offensive, Wikipedia. Authors used base map and added locations and maneuver graphics.
56. Andrew Tilghman, ‘With U.S. Advisers and Firepower, Syrian Rebels Take Key City from ISIS’, Military Times.com.
57. Headquarters Department of the Army, Unconventional Warfare at the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Level.
58. Sam Heller, Manbij Pocket. In: ‘Are Cia-Backed Syrian Rebels Really Fighting Pentagon-Backed Syrian Rebels?’, War On the Rocks.
59. Maguire, ‘A Perfect Proxy?’ 6.
60. Watson, ‘The Conflict with ISIS: Operation INHERENT RESOLVE’, 47.
61. Congressional Research Service, ‘Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response’, EveryCRSReport.com.
62. Nathan Lane, Manbij Offensive June 2016. In ‘Mapping Developments Middle East’, Nathanlane.info. Authors added locations and maneuver graphics to base map.
63. Nathan Lane, Manbij Offensive June 2016. In ‘Mapping Developments Middle East’. Authors added locations and maneuver graphics to base map.
64. Nathan Lane, Manbij Offensive June 2016. In ‘Mapping Developments Middle East’, Authors added locations and maneuver graphics to base map.
65. Ibid.
66. Nathan Lane, Manbij Offensive June 2016. In ‘Mapping Developments Middle East’, Authors added locations and maneuver graphics to base map.
67. “Syria Rebels Give ISIL ’48 Hours’ to Leave Manbij”, Aljazeera.com.
68. Stein, ‘Partner Operations in Syria’,13.
69. Ibid., 14.
70. Stein, ‘Partner Operations in Syria’,15.
71. Headquarters Department of the Army, ATP 3–05.1 Unconventional Warfare, 2–1.
72. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, JP 5–0.
73. Madden et. al., Toward Operational Art, 59.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Bo Arnold
Bo Arnold is a US Army Special Forces Officer currently serving as the Deputy Commander of the Fifth Special Forces Group. A Distinguished Graduate of the US Army War College Class of 2022, he commanded a Special Forces battalion in combat in Operation Inherent Resolve in addition to numerous other combat tours.
John Nagl
John Nagl is an Associate Professor of Warfighting Studies at the US Army War College and a Fellow of the Irregular Warfare Institute. A retired Army officer, he served in combat in both Iraq Wars and is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (University of Chicago, 2005) and Knife Fights (Penguin, 2014). An earlier version of this paper was awarded the COL Francis J. Kelly Memorial Award as the best paper written on a Special Forces topic at the Army War College in Academic Year 2022. This paper represents their views and not those of the United States Army War College, the United States Army, or the Department of Defense.