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ABSTRACT
The Soviet-Afghan War serves as a significant case study to understand why states resort to violent acts against civilians during war. This study takes a multidimensional approach, examining strategic, operational, and individual factors and applying theories of violence and mass killing. By analyzing the conditions that led the Soviets to target civilians, this investigation identifies a nexus of interconnected factors. At the strategic level, Soviet leaders pursued a swift victory to establish a Communist client regime while minimizing casualties and controlling information flow. Operationally, the ill-preparedness of the Red Army for counterinsurgency warfare, coupled with an entrenched organizational culture, led to the adoption of counterproductive enemy-centric tactics against Afghan noncombatants. Additionally, inadequate training, prolonged deployments, and a lack of disciplinary measures at the individual level contributed to the perpetration of violent acts. Understanding the underlying causes of violence against civilians, particularly in the context of Russian forces, holds practical importance. This knowledge can assist policymakers in devising strategies that mitigate wartime violence and enhance the protection of citizens. Drawing parallels to contemporary conflicts involving Russia, the study concludes by recommending future research directions and emphasizing the relevance of comprehending the targeting of noncombatants in ongoing conflicts, notably the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
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This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1. Crowe, War Crimes, Genocide, and Justice, 330; and Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 5.
2. Crowe, War Crimes, Genocide, and Justice, 330; and Hilali, US – Pakistan relationship, 198.
3. Balcells and Stanton, ‘Violence Against Civilians’, 46–47. I borrow Balcells and Stanton and the levels of analysis within U.S. military doctrine’s levels of warfare at the strategic (national policy), operational (military campaigns within the theater of operations), and tactical (where I use the term ‘individual’ to delineate actions taken by soldiers not directed by military superiors).
4. It is difficult to precisely determine troop motives in this conflict, both due to the lack of primary source testimony and to the nature of sources during the 1980s, as most reporters received their information from Afghan refugees and not from first-hand inspection of the conditions in Afghanistan. However, the existing period sources and other scholarly works still provide key insights to troop motives.
5. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, ‘Draining the Sea’, 377–378.
6. Ibid., 378.
7. Masullo and O’Connor, ‘PKK Violence’, 80, and Downes, Targeting Civilians, 14.
8. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, ‘Draining the Sea’, 379.
9. Wood, ‘Rape as a practice’, 513.
10. Downes, Targeting Civilians, 15.
11. Valentino, ‘Final Solution’, 30. See also Mitchell, ‘Agents of Atrocity’ and Hultman, ‘Battle Losses’.
12. Downes, Targeting Civilians, 3–4.
13. Ibid., 4, 31–35.
14. Downes, Targeting Civilians, 36–37.
15. Ibid., 39.
16. Yager, ‘Personal Violence in Infantry Combat’, 257.
17. Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, 15.
18. Manekin, ‘Violence Against Civilians’, 1274.
19. Mackmin, ‘Acts of Personal Violence’, 71; Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict, 42; and Aron, War, 77.
20. Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict, 43; and Mackmin. ‘Acts of Personal Violence’, 71.
21. Zillman, Hostility and Aggression, 258–261; and Mackmin, ‘Acts of Personal Violence’, 72.
22. Manekin, ‘Limits of socialization’, 610.
23. Labuc, ‘Cultural and Societal Factors’, 487.
24. Bandura, ‘Moral disengagement’.
25. Bandura, ‘Selective moral disengagement’, 110.
26. Manekin, ‘Violence Against Civilians’, 1289 and Mackmin, ‘Acts of Personal Violence’, 76.
27. Bourke, An Intimate History, 182–183.
28. Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict, 3.
29. Bourke, An Intimate History, 13–15.
30. Mackmin, ‘Acts of Personal Violence’, 79.
31. Ibid., 73.
32. Sanin and Wood, ‘Ideology in Civil War’, 221, and Manekin, ‘Limits of Socialization’, 610.
33. Kalyvas, ‘The Paradox of Terrorism’, 101.
34. Downes, ‘Draining the Sea’, 421.
35. Souleimanov and Siroky, ‘Random or Retributive?’ 680.
36. Kalyvas, ‘The Paradox of Terrorism’, 101.
37. Downes, ‘Draining the Sea’, 421.
38. Souleimanov and Siroky, ‘Random or Retributive?’ 677–678.
39. Ibid., 682.
40. Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine’, 67.
41. Cameron and Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing, 14.
42. Schein, Organizational Culture, 12.
43. Ibid., 2.
44. Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine’, 68.
45. Long, The Soul of Armies, 51.
46. Kahl, ‘In the Crossfire’, 8.
47. Ibid., 28–41.
48. Hazleton, “Hearts and Minds, 82.
49. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 63.
50. U.S. Army, Field Manual 3–24, Chapters 1 and 9.
51. Paul et al., ‘Moving Beyond Population-Centric vs. Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency’, 1023.
52. Kilcullen, ‘Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency’.
53. Hughes, ‘The Soviet-Afghan War’, 339.
54. Finel, ‘A Substitute for Victory’.
55. Hazleton, ‘Hearts and Minds’, 88.
56. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency, 58.
57. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 142.
58. Blank, Operational and Strategic Lessons, 37–38.
59. Crowe, War Crimes, 331.
60. Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years, 145.
61. Pape, Bombing to Win, 15; Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence, 151–55.
62. Ibid., 52.
63. The Afghanistan Justice Project. Casting Shadows, 41.
64. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 142.
65. Ibid., 215.
66. Pilon, ‘Soviet Atrocities in Afghanistan’, 9.
67. Ermacora, human rights in Afghanistan, 18.
68. Kakar, Afghanistan, 216.
69. Grau, ‘Artillery’, 37.
70. Fremont-Barnes, The Soviet-Afghan War, 59.
71. US Department of State, Chemical Warfare, 16–17.
72. Ibid., 43.
73. Ermacora, human rights in Afghanistan, 18.
74. Ibid.
75. Pilon, ‘Soviet Atrocities in Afghanistan’, 9.
76. Tchantouridze, ‘Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan’, 334.
77. Ibid.
78. Boulouque, ‘Communism in Afghanistan’, 718–719.
79. The Afghanistan Justice Project, Casting Shadows, 43.
80. Kakar, Afghanistan, 217.
81. Polk, Violent Politics, 200.
82. Pilon, ‘Soviet Atrocities in Afghanistan’, 10.
83. Feifer, The Great Gamble, 165.
84. Kakar, Afghanistan, 217.
85. Pilon, ‘Soviet Atrocities in Afghanistan’, 10.
86. Ermacora, human rights in Afghanistan, 19.
87. Gibbs, ‘Reassessing Soviet motives’, 255–256.
88. Kakar, Afghanistan, 215.
89. Downes, Targeting Civilians, 4, 31–35.
90. Ibid.
91. O’Connor, ‘The Three Misunderstandings’
92. Hauner, The Soviet War in Afghanistan, 101.
93. Stanton, Violence and Restraint, 7.
94. Ibid., 7–10.
95. Legro, Cooperation under Fire; and Hull. Absolute Destruction.
96. Arnold. Afghanistan, 99.
97. Collins, ‘Soviet Military Performance’, 148–154; Zhukov, ‘Examining the Authoritarian Model’, 450.
98. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency, 50.
99. Olivier, Adelphi Papers, 13.
100. Kahl, ‘In the Crossfire’, 35–45.
101. Hauner, The Soviet War in Afghanistan, 93.
102. Galeotti, Afghanistan, 197.
103. Hauner, The Soviet War in Afghanistan, 97.
104. Dvorak, “‘It was lethal”.
105. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, ‘Draining the Sea’, 386.
106. Tchantouridze, ‘Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan’, 332.
107. Fremont-Barnes, The Soviet-Afghan War, 11.
108. Grau and Gress, The Soviet-Afghan War, 91–92.
109. Derleth, ‘The Soviets in Afghanistan’, 34.
110. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain, 208.
111. Manekin, ‘Limits of Socialization’, 610.
112. Drea, ‘In the Army’, 329–348.
113. Collins, The Soviet Invasion, 149, 153.
114. Amstutz, Afghanistan, 178.
115. Ibid., 171.
116. Ibid., 173.
117. Lyall, ‘Indiscriminate Violence’, 345.
118. Olusanya, ‘Armed Forces, Alcohol’, 105–122.
119. Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War, 46.
120. Braithwaite, Afghantsy, 231.
121. Mackmin, ‘Acts of Personal Violence’, 81.
122. Braithwaite, Afghantsy, 228.
123. Tepperman, ‘Echoes of the Past’, 39.
124. Collins, The Soviet Invasion, 134.
125. Feifer, The Great Gamble, 168.
126. Braithwaite, Afghantsy, 229.
127. Howard ‘A Look at the Laws of War’.
128. TASS, ‘Decision taken’.
129. Pietsch, ‘Putin honors’.
130. Hamourtziadou, ‘Ukraine War’ and Hodge, ‘In Russia’s military’.
131. Kahl, ‘In the Crossfire’, 15–16.
132. Garamore, ‘Russia Continues Attacks’.
133. Davydenko et al., ‘Lessons for the West’.
134. Grau and Bartles, ‘Russian Way of War’, 23.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Justin Magula
Justin Magula, U.S. Army, is a political science PhD student at the University of Virginia. He is a former assistant professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership and an Army strategist. He holds a master’s degree in international public policy from Johns Hopkins University and a B.S. in political science from West Point. His analysis has been published in venues such as Defence Studies, Military Review, War on the Rocks, Wavell Room, and Modern War Institute, among others. His areas of interest include security studies, military innovation, warfare, emerging tech, and combat operations.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.