Locke's theory of reflection

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Notes

¹Locke defines reflection in Locke 1689] 1975: Book II, Chapter 1, Section 4). Hereafter, I cite passages of this work as (Book, Chapter, Section). All italics and capitals in quotations are from Locke's text. I use ‘idea’ as a count noun and I take Locke to employ it in roughly the same way. The best way to individuate ideas is relative to minds, times, and topics. Further, ideas are distinct from mental operations; see (II, 1, 7). For the most part, I will ignore the other issues surrounding the best way to interpret Locke's use of ‘idea’ because very little of my discussion turns on them.

²Lee (1702, 40–1), Browne (1728, 64–72), Leibniz (1765, 51), Reid (1785, I, 5), Cousin (1873, 102), Grau (1916, 110), Ryle (1949, 159), Klemmt (1952, 49), O'Connor (1967, 95), Kraus (1969, 31), Aaron (1971, 129), Mabbott (1973, 51), Talmor (1978, 116), Rorty (1979, 50), and Jenkins (1983, 21). Cousin cited in Kulstad (1991, 84–5). Browne and Grau cited in Thiel (1994, 99, 102), respectively.

³Kulstad (1991, 88–9) and Ayers (1991b, 260, 266–7). Kulstad (1991, ch. 3) is a reprint of Kulstad (1984). All references are to the reprint.

⁴Specifically, Browne, Leibniz, Reid, Cousin and Klemmt.

⁵O'Connor (1967, 97).

⁶Sergeant (1697, 123), Ryle (1949, 165), O'Connor (1967, 103) and Rabb (1985, Ch. 1); Sergeant cited in Thiel (1994, 93).

⁷See McRae (1976, 34), Obstfeld (1983) and Rabb (1985, ch. 1). Kulstad (1991) discusses several of these interpretations too, but he does not endorse any of them.

⁸See Mabbott (1973, 55), Aaron (1971, 130–1), and O'Connor (1967, 112).

⁹(II, 1, 8) and (II, 9, 8), respectively.

¹⁰See (I, 1, 5), (II, 1, 25), (II 27, 9) and (IV, 21, 4).

¹¹O'Connor (1967, 99), Mabbott (1973, 54–5), Obstfeld (1983, 52) and Kulstad (1991, 91–4).

¹²Ayers (1991a, 205).

¹³Kulstad (1991, 109–15) and Mabbott (1973, 54–5).

¹⁴O'Connor (1967, 99).

¹⁵Gibson (1917, 57–8), O'Connor (1967, 97), McRae (1976, 34–5), Kulstad (1991, 92–109) and Thiel (1994, 103).

¹⁶Krüger (1973, 11–13) and Krüger (1981, 78–9).

¹⁷See Mackie (1976) and Mackie (1985) for more on the relation between representational interpretations and the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

¹⁸Yolton (1968, 49). See also (I, 7, 1) through (I, 7, 10).

¹⁹Lee (1702, 54), Leibniz (1765, 51–2), Yolton (1968, 49), Yolton (1985, 135–8), and Yolton (1993, 210–12).

²⁰See Yolton (1993, 210–12).

²¹Kulstad (1991, 111–12).

²²Webb (1857, 63–6), Gibson (1917, 57), Krüger (1973, 53–5), McRae (1976, 34), Thiel (1983, 89–104), Yolton (1993, 209) and Thiel (1994, 102–5).

²³Leibniz (1765, 51), Reid (1785, I, 5), Cousin (1873, 102) and Klemmt (1952, 49). Reid, Cousin and Klemmt cited in Kulstad (1991, 84–5).

²⁴Leibniz (1765, 117–18). See also Thiel (1994, 109–15).

²⁵Locke reiterates this fact in (II, 12, 1).

²⁶It seems to me that one could interpret Leibniz as expounding this problem as well. See n24.

²⁷See also (II, 11, 14).

²⁸See (II, 10, 2). Memory causes a tension in my assumption about how ideas are individuated. When a person comes to have an idea of a particular orangutan, loses the idea, and then uses his memory to recreate it, is the recreated idea identical to the original? It seems to me that one could say either that they are two tokens of the same type (by retaining the original criteria of individuation) or that they are identical tokens (by altering the original criteria of individuation). Again, I do not think that much turns on this choice. See n1.

²⁹(II, 6, 2).

³⁰See (II, I, 25), where Locke claims that the understanding is passive and cites the faculties of sensation and reflection to support his claim.

³¹For the apology, see (I, 1, 8). For examples of ‘perception’ used in place of ‘idea’, see (I, 1, 4), (I, 3, 21), and (II, 1, 3).

³²For a discussion of abduction and references to Peirce's work, see Hintikka (1998).

³³(II, 9, 4).

³⁴See (II, 3, 1), (II, 8, 4), (II, 8, 12), and (II, 33, 6) for Locke's take on the process of sensation.

³⁵See also (II, 19,3).

³⁶I claim that this use of ‘attention’ is consistent with Locke's use of that expression. ‘Mental impression’ is my term; I do not claim that Locke uses ‘impression’ in the way I use ‘mental impression’.

³⁷This claim does not require that Locke accept the representational theory of mind. The claim that the understanding perceives only mental entities does not preclude the claim that when the mind perceives an idea of an object, it perceives that object. See Rogers (2004) for suggestions of how to render these claims compatible.

³⁸(II, 9, 9).

³⁹(II, 1, 8).

⁴⁰See Kripke (1980) for the distinction between reference-fixing and meaning-fixing.

⁴¹See Kulstad (1991, 109–15) and Mabbott (1973, 54–5) for examples.

⁴²Having made this point, I can say that I think Locke does use ‘impression’ to refer to (what I call) mental impressions, but I cannot argue for this claim here.

⁴³Kulstad (1991, 89).

⁴⁴Kulstad (1991, 89, n23).

⁴⁵See also Mabbott (1973, 54), where he presents the same criticism but cites Locke's claim that thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks; see (II, 1, 19). Obstfeld argues that, for Locke, one must reflect on one's mental operations for them to exist at all. A premise of her argument is that consciousness of a mental operation is a necessary condition for it to exist; see Obstfeld (1983, 52). I have argued that one can know that one thinks without being directly conscious of one's mental operations and that we are not conscious of our mental operations.

⁴⁶The reading based on type/token ambiguity can be used on the other passages in which Locke seems to suggest that there are no unreflected operations. See (II, 27, 9) and (IV, 21, 4).

⁴⁷Note that Yolton (1985, 136–7) claims that space is an idea from reflection but Locke disagrees; see (II, 5). It is interesting that, for Locke, time is an idea from reflection but space is not.

⁴⁸Yolton (1985, 135–8) and Yolton (1993, 210–12). Kulstad also argues that if one distinguishes between reflection on mental operations and consciousness of mental operations, then one must admit that sensation and reflection are not the only sources of ideas; see Kulstad (1991, 109–12). However, this argument assumes that one is conscious of all one's mental operations. In my reply to Objection 4, I showed that this assumption is mistaken. Thus, Kulstad has given us no good reason to posit a third source of ideas.

⁴⁹I do not want to assume that one can immediately tell the difference between the idea of the contemplation of one idea and the idea of the contemplation of another idea. Perhaps ideas of contemplations are not individuated by the objects of contemplations. As far as I can tell, Locke says nothing on this issue.

⁵⁰Obstfeld (1983, 52–3).

⁵¹Mabbott (1973, 55) and O'Connor (1967, 97).

⁵²(II, 1, 7).

⁵³(II, 1, 2).

⁵⁴See Krüger (1973) and Krüger (1984).

⁵⁵(I, 2, 5).

⁵⁶Kulstad (1991, 98–9).

⁵⁷(IV, 7, 4) and (IV, 7, 10).

⁵⁸See Camp (2002, 14–23, 205–17) for discussion and references.

⁵⁹Camp (2002, 208–9).

⁶⁰(IV, 2, 1).

⁶¹I argue for these claims in Section 2.1.

⁶²See Williams (2001) for an introduction to these issues. See Woolhouse (1994) for a survey of Locke's epistemology.

⁶³See (II, 23, 23), (IV, 3, 6) and (IV, 3, 28).

⁶⁴A negative answer to this question might provide a reading of Locke's Essay that is analogous (in one sense) to both Strawson's reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1789) in Strawson (1966) and Diamond's reading of Wittegenstein's Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1922) in Diamond (1991, Ch. 6).

⁶⁵Again, this account is not supported by the text, but that is not its point. I am not saying, ‘This is how to interpret such and such passage of Locke's text’. I am saying, ‘Given what Locke writes, this is the best way of understanding the process by which one acquires an idea about reflection’. Because Locke does not write about this process, no account of it can possibly be supported by the text. The account I offer shows that it is possible to explain in Lockean terms how one acquires this idea.

⁶⁶I arrived at this figure by using the searchable version of Locke's Essay at http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Locke/echu/.

⁶⁷(III, 7, 1–5). See also Henze (1971).

⁶⁸See Flew (1968) for an example.

⁶⁹See Atherton (1983).

⁷⁰I would like to thank Joe Camp for stimulating conversations on these issues.