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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I address the controversy between Henry More and René Descartes on the indefinite extension of the world. I provide a new reading of Descartes’ famous final answer of 15 April 1649. I read the entire debate in the terms of a disagreement concerning the epistemological status of the necessity of our judgement about the extension of the universe. Accordingly, the disagreement on the infinity of the world constitutes a case of a more general disagreement on the nature of the necessity of the theorems of Cartesian Physics. In particular, as concerns Descartes’ last reply, I argue that his assertion that a finite world is contradictory should be interpreted as a reply to More’s claim that the thesis of the infinity of the world, in so far as it cannot be grounded on the identity between matter and extension, does not express a logical necessity. Descartes’ assertion of the logical impossibility of a finite world, far from being, as it has always been read, a concession he made under the pressure of More’s objections, expresses the more radical element of the entire debate about the extension of the universe.
Notes
1 More here alludes to Descartes’ theory of the continuous creation: see Principia philosophiæ, I, art. 21, CSM I: 200, AT VIII-1: 13.
2 See Koyré, From the Closed World, 110–24; Laporte, Le rationalisme de Descartes, 260–7.
3 Among the more recent contributions, see, however, Kendrick, ‘Uniqueness in Descartes “Infinite” and “Indefinite”’; Benitez Grobet, ‘Is Descartes a Materialist?’; Schwartz, ‘La question de l’infinité du monde et ses réponses cartésiennes’. On the contrary, the question is not addressed by the two recent, excellent, monographs on More's metaphysics: Reid, The Metaphysics of Henry More; Leech, The Hammer of the Cartesians.
4 As some scholars wrongly supposed: see, e.g. Koyré, From the Closed World, 114.
5 Democritus platonissans, To the Reader, CP 90. See, on this, Gabbey, ‘Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata’, 184.
6 For Descartes’ theory of the conservation of the world, see Principia philosophiæ, I, art. 21 (CSM I: 200, AT VIII-1: 13). See also Meditationes, III (CSM II: 33, AT VII: 48–9); Responsiones V (CSM II: 254–5, AT VII: 369–70).
7 On More's distinction, against Descartes, of logical necessity from physical necessity, see also Mamiani, Teorie dello spazio da Descartes a Newton.
8 Descartes, here, refuses to claim that the world is infinite not because it is limitless only in some respects, but because the particular respect (that is, its extension) in which it has no bounds allows one to say only that it is indefinite. In his letter to Chanut of 7 June 1647 (CSMK: 320, AT V: 52) and in the conversation with Burman (CB: 34, AT V: 103), he adds that such limits could be known by God: though we cannot conceive that the world is limitless, still it is possible that God could conceive it as limited. See also Kendrick, ‘Uniqueness in Descartes “Infinite” and “Indefinite”’, 30.
9 See Meditationes, Præfatio (CSM II: 7, AT VII: 8); Responsiones IV (CSM II: 159, AT VII: 226).
10 More will identify the presuppositions and the dangers of Descartes’ claim: the admission of both the identity between matter and extension and the infinity of the world would unavoidably lead to the elimination of God from the world. See, in particular, Scholium ad Epistola 2 (OO II.2: 254) and Enchiridion Metaphysicum, Ad Lectorem Præfatio, section 4 (OO II.1: 136). In the Enchiridium metaphysicum, the first demonstration of the existence of the immaterial substances starts from the distinction between extension and matter (OO II.1: 158–61). Here, moreover, More will reject the thesis of the infinity of the world. See the five arguments alleged in chapter 10, sections 6–14 (OO II.1: 179–82).
11 Actually, the interpretation of these texts is controversial. However, most of the interpreters, with the only relevant exceptions being Frankfurt (‘Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths’) and Beyssade (La philosophie première de Descartes), agree that in stating that we are not allowed to claim that God cannot do what conflicts with our conception of things, Descartes is only referring to what God could have done, and not to what God can currently do: this is also the position of Marion (Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes).