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ABSTRACT
This paper reconstructs William of Ockham's (c. 1287–1347) account of the ontology of social groups. Across his writings, Ockham mentions kingdoms, religious orders, crowds, people, armies, and corporations. Using the political community as a case-study against the background of Ockham’s metaphysics of parts and wholes, it is argued that at least some social groups are identical to a plurality of many human beings who have decided to order themselves with respect to another in some particular way. In this regard, a social group is a structured aggregate that is nothing over and above its existing and ordered parts, and, at least in the case of the political community, is like an artefact inasmuch as it is partly dependent on the volitional acts of its members to exist at all.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Russell L. Friedman, Richard Cross, and the anonymous reviewers for their help in improving the paper.
Notes
1 The emphasis on the importance of the order is made by Miethke in Ockhams Weg, 511–6, but in a rather cursory way.
2 Unless stated otherwise, all citations are to works by Ockham and all translations are my own.
3 It is not clear to what extent Ockham is being fair. Surely, John XXII did not think that the Church was not real. The doctrine of persona ficta, which was originally developed by civil lawyers, was not taken to imply that a corporate entity is not real nor identical to a plurality of real persons. Rather, an additional legal identity or ‘personhood’ is conferred on that real plurality. See Canning “The Corporation” for an excellent discussion on corporate or legal personhood in the legal tradition.
4 On medieval mereology in general, see Arlig, “Medieval Mereology”. On Ockham in particular, see Cross, “Ockham on Part and Whole”; Normore, “Ockham's Metaphysics of Parts”; and Roques, L'essentialisme de Guillaume d'Ockham, ch. 4.
5 Not all artefacts are aggregates. In Summula I, ch. 20, 210–11, ll. 50–55 Ockham distinguishes between artefacts that are one per se, like mercury or a bronze statute, and composite artefacts, like a house. Ockham goes on to argue that the latter is composed of many real, natural things. While he does not use the language of aggregates here, this is surely what he means.
Whether Ockham can give an adequate account of the distinction between artificial and natural things is an important issue that falls outside the scope of this paper. For a recent discussion of various aspects of Ockham's ontology of artefacts, see Zupko, “‘Nothing in Nature is Naturally a Statue’”.
6 See Summula 1, ch. 19, 208, ll. 96–8, where Ockham notes that some wholes, i.e. aggregate wholes, are those whose parts unify “ … quandoque poterit aliquid esse medium sed requiritur rectus ordo, sicut plures homines faciunt unum populum”. I discuss the notion of order at length below.
7 The conditions under which the essential parts of natural substances unify into a whole composite substance having per se unity are far more complex than what is presented here. Ockham later revises his account in light of the theological case that God can separate a composite substance’s parts while they are co-located, which he addresses in Quaestiones variae 6, 2. Co-location ceases to be an absolutely necessary condition for composition. See Roques, L'essentialisme, ch. 4.
8 In light of the examples that Ockham consistently uses for aggregates, it seems unlikely that he would think any plurality of entities counts as an aggregate. Even the stones that make up a heap are ordered in some minimal way and in this sense qualify as a composite, albeit accidental, whole. It is not clear whether Ockham would agree that, for instance, all the marbles in the world are also an aggregate, structured or unstructured; I doubt he would. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to my attention.
9 One social group that Ockham discusses at length that I shall not address is the Church. He repeatedly describes the Church as the totality of all believers. Tabarroni, in “Il Tutto e la Parte” gives a thorough historical and philosophical analysis of Ockham's conception of the Church in light of his mereological commitments, especially as found in his earlier theological and logical writings. See also John Ryan, The Nature, Structure and Function of the Church.
10 Ockham’s discussion of sameness over time is addressed in Normore “Metaphysics of Parts”, 751–3 and Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 692–5, who both compare Ockham to John Buridan. While Ockham and Buridan are in much agreement, Buridan goes one step farther than Ockham in conceding that something can be the same successively, meaning that it gains and loses parts continuously over time. His famous example is the River Seine. This is the sort of weak numerical identity that one would have to appeal to in the case of social groups.
11 On the extension of a term’s signification, see SL 1, ch. 33, 95, ll. 2–15.
12 See Pelletier, William Ockham on Metaphysics, ch. 1 and Pelletier, “Mental Ontology” for Ockham’s aggregate conception of scientific knowledge.
13 In fact, God exercises remote agency in the establishment of any civil community so Ockham does not completely secularize the origin of civil communities. Elsewhere, I explore Ockham’s analysis of the institution of political and economic lordship, that is to say political jurisdiction or authority over peoples and the ownership of private property (see my “Ockham on Human Freedom”). Both forms of ‘dominium’ are powers that God gave the first human family in order to cope with the effects of the Fall, e.g. violence, greed, etc. However, Ockham insists that while these powers are God-given, we first act on them, thereby playing a direct and immediate role in their actual and historical institution. In this regard he argues for a ‘middle way’ between locating the origin of political and civic life in human nature and divine intervention. See Canning, Ideas of Power, ch. 4.
14 I discuss the ontology and semantics of lordship and ownership as relations of reason and powers in my “Social Powers and Mental Relations”.