The ontology of images in Plato’s Timaeus

ABSTRACT

In the Timaeus, Plato offers an account of the sensible world in terms of ‘images’ of forms. Often, images are taken to be particulars: either objects or particular property instances (tropes). Contrary to that trend, I argue that, roughly, images are general characteristics that are immanent in Plato’s receptacle. Moreover, I distinguish between simple images, which just are general characteristics, and complex images, which are bundles of general characteristics. Overall, then, the entire sensible world can be analysed in terms of immanent general characteristics, the receptacle, and forms, and fundamentally, there is no place for particulars in the sensible world. I end by arguing that my interpretation of the ontology of images is compatible with Timaeus’ construction of sensible entities from triangles.

KEYWORDS:

• Plato
• images
• particulars
• Timaeus

Acknowledgements

This paper was first presented at the 3rd Asia Regional Meeting of the International Plato Society (Seoul, 2020; held online). I would like to thank the organizers and audience for their helpful feedback, especially Christopher Buckels and Mary Louise Gill who gave me incisive written comments. Moreover, I am very grateful to two anonymous referees and the editor for BJHP whose comments have greatly improved the paper.

Notes

1 I discuss the receptacle in Section 4. As for forms, the main issue is whether the account of forms in the Timaeus is the same as that from the Phaedo and Republic (see Cherniss, “Relation of the Timaeus”; Owen, “Place of the Timaeus”; Sayre, “Role of the Timaeus”).

2 All translations are mine.

3 Unlike, e.g. Cherniss, “Misread”, I do not excise “καὶ τὴν τῷδϵ” (“and [the pronouncement] ‘by this’” at 49e3. Timaeus’ point may be that no grammatical form of ‘this’ or ‘that’ should be used to refer to images.

4 οὕτω δὴ τούτων οὐδέποτϵ τῶν αὐτῶν ἑκάστων φανταζομένων, ποῖον αὐτῶν ὡς ὂν ὁτιοῦν τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο παγίως διισχυριζόμϵνος οὐκ αἰσχυνϵῖταί τις ἑαυτόν; οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἀσφαλέστατα μακρῷ πϵρὶ τούτων τιθϵμένους ὧδϵ λέγϵιν· ἀϵὶ ὃ καθορῶμϵν ἄλλοτϵ ἄλλῃ γιγνόμϵνον, ὡς πῦρ, μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτϵ προσαγορϵύϵιν πῦρ, μηδὲ ὕδωρ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀϵί, μηδὲ ἄλλο ποτὲ μηδὲν ὥς τινα ἔχον βϵβαιότητα, ὅσα δϵικνύντϵς τῷ ῥήματι τῷ τόδϵ καὶ τοῦτο προσχρώμϵνοι δηλοῦν ἡγούμϵθά τι· φϵύγϵι γὰρ οὐχ ὑπομένον τὴν τοῦ τόδϵ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν τῷδϵ καὶ πᾶσαν ὅση μόνιμα ὡς ὄντα αὐτὰ ἐνδϵίκνυται φάσις. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἕκαστα μὴ λέγϵιν, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀϵὶ πϵριφϵρόμϵνον ὅμοιον ἑκάστου πέρι καὶ συμπάντων οὕτω καλϵῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ πῦρ τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοιοῦτον, καὶ ἅπαν ὅσονπϵρ ἂν ἔχῃ γένϵσιν· ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἐγγιγνόμϵνα ἀϵὶ ἕκαστα αὐτῶν φαντάζϵται καὶ πάλιν ἐκϵῖθϵν ἀπόλλυται, μόνον ἐκϵῖνο αὖ προσαγορϵύϵιν τῷ τϵ τοῦτο καὶ τῷ τόδϵ προσχρωμένους ὀνόματι, τὸ δὲ ὁποιονοῦν τι, θϵρμὸν ἢ λϵυκὸν ἢ καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα ἐκ τούτων, μηδὲν ἐκϵῖνο αὖ τούτων καλϵῖν.

5 Passages outside of the Timaeus where scholars have identified (immanent) general characteristics include Phd. 102b3–3a2 (see Gill, Philosophos, 25–6) and Rep. 478e7–79b10 (see Harte, “Particular”, 100–1).

6 Similarly, McCabe (Plato’s Individuals, 141–5) argues that, in the Theaetetus, sensible particulars are bundles. But she thinks that, in the Timaeus, they are “slices” of layered properties (Plato’s Individuals, 170).

7 For a contemporary statement of a similar bundle theory, see Van Cleve, “Bundle Theory”, 102–4. He calls the ontology which accompanies that theory ‘Platonic’ but does not think anyone ever embraced the theory. If I am right, the theory is at least canvassed in the Timaeus. Many thanks to an anonymous referee for this pointer.

8 ταῦτα δὴ πάντα καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδϵλφὰ καὶ πϵρὶ τὴν ἄυπνον καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσιν ὑπάρχουσαν ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὀνϵιρώξϵως οὐ δυνατοὶ γιγνόμϵθα ἐγϵρθέντϵς διοριζόμϵνοι τἀληθὲς λέγϵιν, ὡς ϵἰκόνι μέν, ἐπϵίπϵρ οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐφ’ ᾧ γέγονϵν ἑαυτῆς ἐστιν, ἑτέρου δέ τινος ἀϵὶ φέρϵται φάντασμα, διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ἑτέρῳ προσήκϵι τινὶ γίγνϵσθαι, οὐσίας ἁμωσγέπως ἀντϵχομένην, ἢ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν αὐτὴν ϵἶναι, τῷ δὲ ὄντως ὄντι βοηθὸς ὁ δι’ ἀκριβϵίας ἀληθὴς λόγος, ὡς ἕως ἄν τι τὸ μὲν ἄλλο ᾖ, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, οὐδέτϵρον ἐν οὐδϵτέρῳ ποτὲ γϵνόμϵνον ἓν ἅμα ταὐτὸν καὶ δύο γϵνήσϵσθον.

9 See Timaeus’ account of the liver, where he seems to assume that “appearances” (φαντάσματα) need to be in some entity, in this case, the physical organ (71a6; 71c3; 71e8).

10 Moreover, even if there are two notions of the receptacle, namely, receptacle-as-matter and receptacle-as space (Miller, Third Kind), the former will still generate the same difficulties.

11 Even if the receptacle has a basic mereological structure, it may not be, by itself, a full-blown (geometrical) space if it lacks, for instance, dimensionality (see Sattler, “Plato’s Receptacle”, 190).

12 The fifth solid, namely, the dodecahedron, is used for the universe as a whole (55c4–6).

13 Although, in the pre-cosmos, there can be chance combinations of traces (69b5–8).