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Abstract
Since the 1980s, the USA has fought cocaine in the Andes with carrots and sticks: interdiction and crop eradication wield the sticks, while Alternative Development (AD), which offers economic assistance to farmers who voluntarily abandon illicit cultivation, provides the carrots. Yet cocaine continues to permeate US streets, and rural Andean communities remain isolated from the legitimate economy. Many critics blame US belligerence for compounding the Andean drug war. The underlying problem with the existing strategy, however, might not be the aggressiveness of its military sticks, but the flimsiness of its development carrots. The inability of AD to persuade farmers to abandon coca cultivation may be causing US policy makers to over-apply military solutions – often inflaming rural communities and exacerbating regional instability in so doing. Few legal crops can match the earning power of coca. The article therefore suggests that the US carrot could be made more attractive by adopting a Venture Development model which helps rural farmers to process their legal produce into high-quality finished goods that command premium prices. Such a strategy could conceivably choke the cocaine engine by applying market-based forces to address market-based realities.
Un plan de développement économique rural pour aider les États-Unis à gagner la guerre contre la cocaïne
Depuis les années 1980, les États-Unis mènent une lutte contre la cocaïne dans les Andes au moyen de carottes et de bâtons : l’interdiction et l’éradication des cultures constituent les bâtons, tandis que le développement alternatif (Alternative Development – AD), qui offre une assistance économique aux cultivateurs qui abandonnent volontairement la culture illicite, fournit les carottes. De nombreux critiques accusent la belligérance des États-Unis d’avoir aggravé la lutte antinarcotique dans la région andine. Le problème sous-jacent avec la stratégie existante, cependant, n’est peut-être pas l’agressivité de ses bâtons militaires, mais la faiblesse de ses carottes de développement. L’inaptitude de l’AD à persuader les cultivateurs d’abandonner la culture de la coca pousse peut-être les décideurs américains à appliquer excessivement des solutions militaires – attisant ainsi la colère des communautés rurales et exacerbant l’instabilité régionale par la même occasion. Rares sont les cultures légales qui présentent le potentiel rémunérateur de la coca. Cet article suggère que la carotte des États-Unis pourrait être plus intéressante s’ils adoptaient un modèle de développement d’entreprise qui aide les cultivateurs ruraux à transformer leur production légale en marchandises finies de qualité qui se vendent aux meilleurs prix. Une telle stratégie pourrait en théorie étouffer le moteur de la cocaïne en appliquant des forces de marché pour aborder des réalités de marché.
Um plano de desenvolvimento econômico rural para ajudar os EUA a vencer sua guerra contra a cocaína
Desde a década de 1980, os EUA tem lutado contra a cocaína nos Andes com incentivos e punições: interdição e erradicação de plantações como punição, e o Desenvolvimento Alternativo (AD), que oferece assistência econômica aos produtores rurais que voluntariamente abandonam o cultivo ilícito, como incentivo. Muitos críticos culpam a beligerância dos EUA por aumentar a guerra das drogas andina. O problema que está por trás desta estratégia atual, porém, pode não ser a agressividade de suas punições militares, mas a fragilidade de seus incentivos de desenvolvimento. A inabilidade do AD para persuadir os produtores rurais a abandonar o cultivo da coca pode estar fazendo os formuladores de políticas dos EUA a aplicar soluções militares em excesso – frequentemente incitando comunidades rurais e exacerbando a instabilidade regional ao fazer isto. Poucas colheitas legais podem promover o mesmo poder aquisitivo que o da coca. O artigo, portanto, sugere que os incentivos dos EUA devem se tornar mais atrativos, adotando-se um modelo de Desenvolvimento de Iniciativa que ajude os produtores rurais a processar seus produtos legais em mercadorias finais de alta qualidade que proporcionem preços mais altos. Tal estratégia poderia de forma concebível sufocar a máquina da cocaína aplicando-se as forças de mercado para lidar com as realidades de mercado.
Un plan económico de desarrollo rural destinado a apoyar la guerra contra la cocaína en EEUU
Desde los años 80, los EEUU han librado una guerra contra la cocaína en la región andina usando zanahorias y garrotes: los garrotes son la prohibición y erradicación de los cultivos; la zanahoria es el Desarrollo Alternativo (DA) – asistencia económica para campesinos que voluntariamente dejan de cultivar enervantes. Para muchos críticos, la beligerancia de EEUU ha recrudecido la guerra antidrogas en la región andina. Sin embargo, el problema de fondo de la estrategia actual puede radicar no tanto en la violencia de los garrotes militares sino en la insuficiencia de las zanahorias. El poco entusiasmo entre los productores de coca por el DA puede haber provocado una excesiva respuesta militar de EEUU, aumentando el enojo entre los productores y la inestabilidad en el campo. Existen pocos cultivos tan redituables como la coca. El ensayo sugiere que la zanahoria podrá resultar más atractiva utilizando el modelo Venture Development (desarrollo empresarial) que facilita la transformación de los cultivos lícitos en productos acabados de más alta calidad y, por tanto, de precio final más elevado. Esta estrategia podría detener el tráfico de cocaína al aplicarse mecanismos basados en el mercado para transformar una realidad también fundada en el mercado.
Acknowledgement
The authors are indebted to the former Mayor of Cusco, Dr Carlos Valencia Miranda, for inspiring the conception of this article.
Notes
Please contact the authors for detailed calculations supporting all non-cited figures in this article.
USAID claimed that 27,700 out of 32,000 AD clients remained ‘coca-free’ through 2004 (USAID Citation2005b), suggesting a breach-of-contract rate of less than 14 per cent. But the actual percentage of participating families either replanting some coca or not entirely abandoning it in the first place was probably far higher. Most coca-farming communities are composed of scores of small, independent, and widely dispersed plantations whose ties to the central community leadership are tenuous. With few roads to interconnect communities, and with landowners often holding illegitimate and/or conflicting titles, community leaders can quite easily falsify the size of their ‘governing jurisdiction’ when negotiating an AD contract – which they might logically do in order to attract greater benefits. In effect, remote farming communities can rather easily rotate and/or conceal their plantations in such a way that they receive benefits without ever really abandoning coca.
When confronted with acute supply shortfalls, street dealers typically react by reducing purity, not by raising retail prices.
Some AD programmes in Afghanistan and the Andes have been helping rural farmers to grow high-priced specialty crops such as alfalfa, asparagus, saffron, and mint (Ward et al. Citation2008). Although these crops can offer family-based farms a greater earning power than coca (fresh asparagus, for example, can be twice as lucrative), viable markets and distribution channels are usually smaller and harder to access than are those of more mainstream produce. Furthermore, smallholder farmers are increasingly facing stiff competition from domestic agro-industry. Peru, for example, has already become the world’s leading exporter of asparagus – thanks to large-scale farms recently established on its arid Pacific coast. Smallholders hoping to export asparagus from the Andean sierra face major disadvantages, including non-ideal growing conditions, inability to attain economies of scale, and greater distance to shipping ports. Such specialty crops may offer family-based farms some relief from the effects of coca removal, but they will seldom become the cornerstone of a vibrant rural agricultural economy, unless the host community – by virtue of its growing location – enjoys a unique comparative advantage in their cultivation.
Bolivia and Peru maintain highly regulated legal markets for coca leaf, which probably discourages farm-based cocaine processing.
US cocaine consumption has been declining since the 1980s, mainly due to competition with heroin, ecstasy, and meth. Although cocaine abuse is rising in Europe and Latin America (and possibly in Africa and Australia, as well), these ‘up-and-coming’ markets are not yet substantial enough to overcome reductions in US demand, thus explaining why global consumption has fallen.
Interview with Dr Carlos Valencia Miranda, Mayor of Cusco, Peru, at the Cusco City Hall (August 2006).
Information provided by Dr Sergei Popov, Senior Environmental Specialist, Asian Development Bank (February 2008).
‘Past winners of the Socially Responsible Business Awards,’ available at http://www.sociallyresponsibleawards.org/pastwinners.html (retrieved 26 August 2009).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Jason Spellberg
Jason Spellberg is graduate students at The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs.
Morgan Kaplan
Morgan Kaplan is graduate students at The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs.
