The European Union and the New Religious Movements

Abstract

The paper looks at how European institutions, namely the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe, deal with new religious movements (NRMs). Drawing upon the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, the paper addresses the question of the place of new religions in the ‘transparent dialogue’ with the European Commission. In order to answer this question, fieldwork has been conducted to find out which NRMs are present in Brussels and are dialogue partners of the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA). The article points out what is at stake for a new religious movement in participating in the EU debates over the role of religion and its contribution to the construction of Europe. The preliminary findings allow us to claim that some movements frequently considered as ‘cults’ or ‘sects’ in the parliamentary reports of several member states (as well as in reports of specialised state agencies of ‘cult’ control) have been recognised as possible partners in discussions with the EU Commission. Even though the dialogue is supposed to be open and transparent, this paper raises the question of the qualities needed in a religious movement to be represented at the EU level. The paper shows how European institutions have participated in the debate on NRMs and raises questions over the possible influence of EU institutions, direct or indirect, on the policy of member states on religious matters. It also shows how governance in the relations between EU, civil society and religions could constitute a possible model for member states in dealing with the growing pluralistic landscape of the EU.

Acknowledgment

This paper is the result of several interviews conducted in 2007. I am grateful to the representatives of Soka Gakkai France, Soka Gakkai Italy and the IESGI for sharing with us their experiences regarding the dialogue with BEPA and European issues; to the representatives of the EBU and the Vaishnava Communication Institute; and to the representatives of the BEPA office in Brussels. I am also grateful to James T. Richardson for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Notes

1 For an application of Dory's model, see Wydmusch (2001).

2 For example, the Directive (2000) for the fight against racism, discrimination and xenophobia.

3 The Cottrell Report was adopted by the European Parliament in 1984 and was withdrawn on 13 July 1998.

4 The Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs released an amended resolution, Resolution on Cults in the European Union, rejected by the European Parliament in January 1998.

5 Expressions used in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 resolutions and their reports. See: Resolution (2000); Report (2000); Resolution (2001); Report (2001); Resolution (2002); Report (2003).

6 Now Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as it results from the amendments introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon is still in the process of being ratified by the member states, in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Article 6 states that the Treaty will enter into force on 1 January 2009, provided that all the instruments of ratification have been deposited, or, failing that, on the first day of the month following the deposit of the last instrument of ratification (Consolidated, 2008).

7 The list of dialogue partners which was published on the BEPA website is no longer there. A written question to the European Parliament in October 2008 asked for clarifications about the classification of the organisations listed and as a consequence participating in dialogue meetings. See De Keyser (2007).

8 Michael Weninger was the European Commission political adviser responsible for dialogue with faith-based communities at the BEPA under the EC presidency of Manuel Barroso. The current adviser is Jorge César das Neves.

9 For example: MILS (Mission interministérielle de lutte contre les sectes (Interministerial Mission in the Fight Against Cults)); MIVILUDES (Mission interministérielle de vigilance et de lutte contre les dérives sectaires (Interministerial Mission for Monitoring and Combatting Cultic Deviances)), www.miviludes.gouv.fr

10 Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism follows the teaching of the Buddhist monk Nichiren Daishonin. Several movements refer to Daishonin's teachings; the best known is Nichiren Shoshu based in Japan, which looks after the original mandala prepared by Daishonin, the Dai-Gohonzon. Soka Gakkai was created as a lay organisation with the aim of spreading Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism and as a consequence it depends on the Nichiren Shoshu monastic organisation in Japan. In 1990, as a consequence of a long crisis, there was a split between the laypeople of Soka Gakkai and the monks of the Nichiren Shoshu organisation, who excommunicated Soka Gakkai.

11 Soka Gakkai is a member of the Buddhist national unions in United Kingdom and Austria: see http://www.e-b-u.org/members_list.html (last accessed 10 April 2007).

12 In 2002 the Council of Europe intervened once again in the NRMs issue. The resolution on Freedom of Religion and Religious Minorities in France referred to the French law ‘on the reinforcement of the prevention and suppression of sects which infringe on human rights and fundamental freedoms’. While considering ‘unnecessary to define what constitutes a sect or to decide whether it is a religion or not’ the Assembly invited the governments of member states ‘to use the normal procedures of criminal and civil law against illegal practices carried out in the name of groups of a religious, esoteric or spiritual nature’. It further argued that it was not competent to decide whether or not the French law was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.

13 The case concerned Greece. Following a complaint, two members of the Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted of proselytism. The case was referred to the ECHR which, following the Commission's report, considered that this conviction violated Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights because the prohibition on proselytism in this specific case was not a necessary measure in a democratic society, within the meaning of Article 9 para. 2 of the Convention. However, the Court accepted that improper proselytism should sometimes be prohibited or restricted (Kokkinakis v Greece). The terms ‘brainwashing’ and ‘mental manipulation’ are used several times in the report of this judgment, but, as various scholars have remarked, the report is not clear on how groups carrying on this kind of activity are to be identified. The above-mentioned report of the Council of Europe on ‘illegal activities of sects’ makes reference to the term ‘brainwashing’ concerning the protection of ‘those most vulnerable, and particularly the children of members of religious, esoteric or spiritual groups, in case of ill-treatment, rape, neglect, indoctrination by brainwashing’ (Report, 1999). On this issue see Richardson and Introvigne (2001, pp. 161–62).

14 Governance has become the prevailing mode of political regulation in Europe; it leads to less formal modes of decision-making. The concept is well known in political science, even if the notion is sometimes not very clear, as scholars often use diverging concepts and aspects to define it. According to A. Benz, the concept was introduced in political science in view of the fact that the traditional mode of the nation-state was no longer adequate to guide reform policies. The shift from government to governance involves a plurality of decision centres with non-formal hierarchies and consisting of networks. In governance, elected politicians play a secondary role compared to experts and public and collective actors, and the result is more intense interaction between the public and the private sectors (Benz and Papadopoulos, 2006). At the European level, the concept of governance was established by the EU Commission in the White Paper of 2001 (Commission, 2001). The main aim was to seek out new forms of governance in order to consolidate EU democracy and enhance the legitimacy of EU institutions. In this sense, governance should lead to EU institutions connecting more and more with civil society, including churches and religious communities, in the formulation of policies (Commission, 2001). For more on the notion of governance, see Benz and Papadopoulos (2006), Moreau Defarges (2003) and Commission (2001).