Audit committee effectiveness and the audit fee

Abstract

The UK is the only major country within the European Union the majority of whose listed companies have formed audit committees composed of non-executive directors to monitor financial reporting, the external auditors, and internal control strength. The adoption of audit committees in contrast to the approach in Europe has arisen despite the lack of evidence on their effectiveness even in the USA and Canada, where they have been mandatory since the 1970s. This paper seeks to establish whether audit committees are effective in ensuring audit quality by protecting the auditors from fee cuts which might affect audit quality, and signal tighter internal controls which help to reduce audit time and hence audit fees. The problem is that the audit committee may be expected to exert a two-way pressure on audit fees. To the extent that audit committees should enhance audit quality, partly by ensuring that audit hours are not reduced, an audit committee may be expected to increase total audit fees. At the same time, an audit committee may reasonably be thought to be a proxy for internal control strength. Ceteris paribus, companies with strong internal controls may be expected to pay lower audit fees than those with weak internal controls. Our paper argues that the ‘quality’ aspect of the audit can be captured through a dummy firm size variable, whilst the internal control aspects can be captured through dummy risk and complexity variables. The hypotheses examined are that size related audit fees are higher in companies with an audit committee; and that risk- and complexity-related audit fees are lower in companies with audit committees. The hypotheses are tested by developing a regression model for audit fees of a sample of the companies which comprise the FT-SE 500, with variables being included for the presence or absence of an audit committee. The results show that the relationship between size-related audit fees and the presence of an audit committee is positive and statistically significant, but that although there is a negative relationship between risk- and complexity-related audit fees and the presence of an audit committee, the relationships are not conclusively significant. The findings provide support for the contention that audit committees are at least partially effective in preventing reductions in the audit fee to levels where the quality of the audit may be compromised.