Fertility, intergenerational transfers and economic development

Abstract

This paper develops a model of endogenous growth where agents are altruistic and value both the utilities of their parent and of their children. Individuals endogenously choose the number of their children, and arbitrate between financing education, leaving them some bequest and offering some gift to their parents. We establish the existence of three types of long run regime. Starting from a low level of human capital, an economy converges towards a stationary state associated with a constant output per worker, a high level of fertility and ascendant transfers. If the initial level of human capital is not too low, another stationary state jointly exists with a lower level of fertility and no transfer. Finally, starting from a high level of human capital, the economy experiences a steady growth of output per worker associated with a low fertility level and descendant transfers. We then assume that an economy is initially in the stationary underdevelopment regime with ascendant transfers, and we study the power of different policies to push the economy toward the growth regime. We successively consider a fertility control policy, an education subsidies policy, and the introduction of a pension system for the elderly.

Keywords:

• Endogenous Fertility
• Two-SIDED Altruism
• Growth