Vote of confidence procedure and Gesetzgebungsnotstand: Two toothless tigers of governmental agenda control

Abstract

This article discusses two crucial devices for governmental control of the parliamentary agenda in Germany from the point of view of comparative politics. The vote of confidence procedure makes a contested policy an up-or-down proposal by linking it to the continuity of government, whereas the Gesetzgebungsnotstand gives government a last-offer privilege on a bill. The peculiarities of constitutional norms and political practice of the German procedures are singled out vis-à-vis the expectations assumed by internationally applicable standard rational choice models. It turns out the empirical German-style rules of the devices do not meet requirements being considered important for models to work. In contrast to most other parliamentary democracies, the German design makes the two instruments useful only under very special conditions, which explains why the Gesetzgebungsnotstand has never been used so far and the vote of confidence to control the agenda only on one occasion.

Notes

1. This paper was presented in an earlier version at the ECPR Joint Sessions in Granada, 14–19 April 2005. The authors would like to thank all participants of the workshop ‘The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda-setting’, the discussant Thomas Bräuninger and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.

2. A constructive vote of no-confidence stipulates that the Bundestag may censure a Bundeskanzler only by way of electing another chancellor with a qualified majority in secret voting. This device was first invented in Germany to safeguard a government against a notoriously disunited multi-party system and has now also been adopted by Spain, Poland, Belgium, Hungary and Israel.

3. John D. Huber, ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review 90/2 (1996), pp. 269–82.

4. Article 81(2) of the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law).

5. John D. Huber, ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’, pp.269–82, George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (New York: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp.33–37, 91–99.

6. Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen, ‘Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, American Political Science Review 92/3 (1998), pp.611–21 and John D. Huber, ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’, pp.269–82.

7. Ibid., pp.270, 277.

8. Thomas Saalfeld, ‘Determinanten der Fraktionsdisziplin: Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich’, in Steffen Ganghof and Philip Manow (eds.), Mechanismen der Politik – Strategische Interaktion im deutschen Regierungssystem (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2005).

9. Huber's model proceeds in four steps. First, a cabinet minister proposes a policy. Second, this policy can either be accepted by the majority, or rejected. In the latter case the majority proposes a refined policy which is either trying to avoid a vote of confidence or not. Third, this refined policy can either be accepted or rejected by the prime minister who can then decide whether to use a vote of confidence to push his policy through. If he uses the vote of confidence, his majority has to decide in the fourth step to accept this policy or vote the prime minister out of office to avoid this unwanted policy.

10. In Huber's formal model, the censure costs of the prime minister, the dimensions of the policy space and the original proposal of the cabinet minister do not play a role.

11. The authors do not discuss a situation where the majority of the assembly will be able to propose a point where the prime minister is willing to accept their proposal because his electoral costs are higher than his policy gains when using a vote of confidence. The difference is excellently shown by Huber, ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’, p.271.

12. We follow the standard conventions of spatial models here. They are that actors have ideal points, equidistant preference functions and assess the possibility for change with regard to the status quo.

13. G1 does not need to accept a lower utility here as the ideal point of pm makes it better of anyway.

14. Huber, ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’, p.271.

15. The chancellor's vote of confidence only carries with an absolute majority of the members of the Bundestag, but the policy is adopted with a simple majority. If the confidence vote is linked to a policy, the members are only allowed to vote simultaneously yes or no for the confidence vote and the policy. See Roman Herzog, ‘Artikel 68’, in Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig (eds.), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, (München: C.H. Beck, 2002), p.16 and Ute Mager, ‘Art. 68 Vertrauensfrage’, in Ingo Münch and Philip Künig (eds.) Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Band 2 (München, 4./5. Auflage 2001), p.1170. Thus, in Germany, three outcomes are possible: the chancellor both wins the confidence and the policy; both loses the vote and the policy; and loses the confidence, but wins the policy. The fourth theoretical outcome of losing the policy and winning the confidence as in France, is not possible because members can cast only one vote on both questions identically.

16. See Lieven De Winter, ‘The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation’, in Herbert Döring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (Frankfurt/New York: Campus/St Martins Press, 1995). A lost vote of confidence might indeed constitute an ideal situation for a German chancellor, whose options are: (1) ask the president for the dissolution of parliament; (2) get a new coalition partner; (3) do nothing and go on as a minority government if the coalition partner is lost; (4) ask for the Gesetzgebungsnotstand if going on as a minority government; (4) do nothing and ignore the lost vote if it is just one occasion; (5) ask for another vote of confidence.

17. Sylvain Brouard, The Role of French Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Granada, 14–19 April 2005.

18. See Article 63 of the German Basic Law.

19. See the decision of the German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 62, 1.

20. David Southern, ‘The Chancellor and the Constitution’, in Steven Padgett (ed.), Adenauer to Kohl. The Development of the German Chancellorship (London: Hurst & Company, 1994).

21. BVerfGE 62,1. Abweichende Meinungen Dr Zeidler, Rinck und Dr Rottmann.

22. Huber, ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’, p.119 and William Heller, ‘Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in Multiparty Parliaments’, in American Journal of Political Science 45/4 (2001), p.82.

23. William Heller, ‘Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in Multiparty Parliaments’, p.782.

24. Ibid., p.783.

25. For a formalisation, see William Heller, ‘Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in Multiparty Parliaments’, pp.780–98.

26. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, pp.33–37, 91–99.

27. Article 61 grants the chancellor power to ‘determine and be responsible for the general guidelines of policy’.

28. The opposition parties are not shown here. They are expected to be in the northeast of the status quo.

29. Under Gesetzgebungsnotstand the Bundesrat has veto power in all cases and not just for Zustimmungsgesetze.

30. Friedrich Karl Fromme, Von der Weimarer Verfassung zum Bonner Grundgesetz. Die verfassungspolitischen Folgerungen des Parlamentarischen Rates aus Weimarer Republik und nationalsozialistischer Diktatur (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1999, 3rd revised ed.), pp.92–102 and 139–42.

31. Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949–1982 (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1984), pp.411–16.

32. Manfred Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik (München: C.H. Beck 1999), p.498.

33. Wolfgang Jäger, ‘Die Innenpolitik der sozialliberalen Koalition 1969–1974’, in Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Jäger and Werner Link (eds.), Republik im Wandel 1969–1974. Die Ära Brandt (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt 1986), pp.68–9.

34. Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik, p.550.

35. Actually, not to everybody's surprise. Apparently, the infamous East German Secret Service, the Stasi provided the money to buy at least two CDU members votes to keep Brandt in power. See Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik, p.553 and Hubertus Knabe, Der diskrete Charme der DDR. Stasi und Westmedien, (Berlin/München: Propyläen Verlag 2001), p.275.

36. Until the unification of Germany the members elected by the citizens of West Berlin were not allowed to vote on policy matters. They were only allowed to give their vote on decisions about standing orders and the parliamentary agenda.

37. Wolfgang Jäger, ‘Die Innenpolitik der sozialliberalen Koalition 1969–1974’, p.74.

38. The result was 233 Yes, 248 No and 1 abstention. Only 482 members participated, See Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949–1982, p.405.

39. Wolfgang Jäger, ‘Innenpolitik der sozialliberalen Koalition 1974–1982’, in Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Jäger and Werner Link (eds.) Republik im Wandel 1974–1982 Die Ära Schmidt (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt 1987), p.261 and Hans-Karl Rupp, Politische Geschichte der Bundesrepublik (München: Oldenbourg 2000, 3. Auflage), p.230.

40. Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949–1982, p.415–17.

41. Data from Allensbach and Infratest dimap indicate the SPD had fallen to a low of 24 per cent in February and March 2004, only to recover to no more than 33 per cent in February 2005 and by the time of the North Rhine-Westphalia election nationwide was down again to 27 per cent of those intending to vote See http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/allensbach.htm and http://www.infratest-dimap.de/?id = 51.

42. Samuel E. Finer, The Changing British Party System 1945–1979 (Washington, 1980).

43. This view prevailed in media comments. See, for example, Tissy Bruns, Sein letzter Streich, in Tagesspiegel, 11 June 2005, p.3.

44. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 July 2005, p.3.

45. This issue has already been debated in earlier in the article.

46. Christoph Hönnige, ‘Die Entscheidungen von Verfassungsgerichten – ein Spiegel ihrer Zusammensetzung?’ Paper presented to the working group Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie of the German Political Science Assoication (DVPW) at Bamberg 2004.

47. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 9/84, 5 Feb. 1982.

48. Brockhaus Online: http://www.brockhaus.de/index2.html?service/aktuell/011115.html.

49. Jäger, ‘Innenpolitik der sozialliberalen Koalition 1974–1982’, p.231f.

50. WDR-Online: Zustimmung für Bundeswehr-Einsatz. Deutsche Soldaten in Mazedonien eingetroffen, 30.8.2001.

51. To deploy armed troops to countries outside the NATO area, the Bundestag has to be asked and take a formal vote with simple majority. Only in order to avert danger is the government allowed to deploy troops without the parliament's decision, but the Bundestag has to seek consent afterwards. The Bundestag is able to withdraw the Bundeswehr instantly if the consent is denied. See BVerfGE 90, 186.

52. Michael F. Feldkamp, ‘Chronik der Vertrauensfrage von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder im November 2001’, in Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 1/2002, p.6.

53. Der Spiegel 47/2001: Jenseits der roten Linie. Anatomie einer Schicksalswoche and Michael F. Feldkamp, ‘Chronik der Vertrauensfrage von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder im November 2001’, p.6.

54. Saalfeld, ‘Determinanten der Fraktionsdisziplin: Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich’, p.20.

55. Der Spiegel 47/2001: Jenseits der roten Linie. Anatomie einer Schicksalswoche.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Feldkamp, ‘Chronik der Vertrauensfrage von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder im November 2001’, p.7 and Spiegel-Online: Schröder stellt Vertrauensfrage, 13.11.2001, 14:49.

60. Interview Parlamentarischer Geschäftsführer/-in Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Junior Whip, Green party) and Spiegel-Online: Nächtliches Ringen um die Grünen, 15.11.2001, 15:56.

61. Interview Parlamentarischer Geschäftsführer/-in Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Junior Whip, Green party) and Der Spiegel 47/2001: Jenseits der roten Linie. Anatomie einer Schicksalswoche.

62. Huber, ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’, p.278.

63. Compare D Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen, ‘Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, p.617.

64. See Article 31, Geschäftsordnung des Bundestages, 30 April 2003.

65. Feldkamp, ‘Chronik der Vertrauensfrage von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder im November 2001’, p.9, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/202, 16 Nov. 2001 and Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/203, 27 Nov. 2001.

66. In the German electoral system when an incumbent resigns or dies, he or she is replaced by deputies from the party list. §48 Abs. 1 Satz 2 of the Federal Election Law (Bundeswahlgesetz) and the decision BVerfGE 97, 317 of the Bundesverfassungsgericht state that the only exemptions are in a Bundesland where a candidate who won a direct mandate resigns and if there are also surplus mandates (Überhangmandate), or there are no further members on the party list.

67. Feldkamp, ‘Chronik der Vertrauensfrage von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder im November 2001’, p.9.

68. Christian Ströbele in Spiegel-Online: Acht halbe Grüne, 16.11.2001, 15:07. All four dissenting members of the Green party were ranked badly on the party list for the elections in 2002. Two members had to leave the Bundestag (Christian Simmert and Anneliese Buntenbach), one moved only by chance on a safe place on the electoral list because a member being in front of him had to resign (Winfried Herrmann) and one won a direct mandate against all odds (Christian Ströbele).

69. For an international overview see: Klaus von Beyme, Die parlamentarische Demokratie. Entstehung und Funktionsweise 1789–1999 (Wiesbaden: Opladen 1999, völlig neubearbeitete Auflage), p.389f and Kaare Strøm and Stephen M. Swindle, ‘Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution’, in American Political Science Review 96(3) 2002, pp.575–91.