Between a rock and many Hard Places: The PDS and government participation in the eastern German Länder1

1. Work for this article was carried out as part of an ESRC-funded research project (RES-000-22-0803) on ‘Government Participation and the De-Radicalisation of Left-Wing Populist Parties’.

Abstract

It is now widely recognised that unification has led to an increased regionalisation of party politics in the Federal Republic. On the one hand a significant number of decision-making competencies within parties remain decentralised. On the other, regional party systems have become ever more differentiated both from each other and from that which exists at the national level. This article assesses to what extent there is any empirical evidence supporting such ideas by comparing four PDS Landesverbände. The article illustrates that ideological differences, personality clashes and different strategic agendas ensure that each the of the four Landesverbände has a different profile and can behave in strikingly different ways – highlighting that parties have much more room to manoeuvre at the Land level than is traditionally believed.

Notes

1. Work for this article was carried out as part of an ESRC-funded research project (RES-000-22-0803) on ‘Government Participation and the De-Radicalisation of Left-Wing Populist Parties’.

2. Arthur Benz, ‘Reformpromotoren oder Reformblockierer?’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B29-30 (2003), pp.35–37; Charlie Jeffery, ‘Party Politics and Territorial Representation in the Federal Republic of Germany’, West European Politics 22/1 (1999), pp.130–66; Charlie Jeffery and Dan Hough, ‘Germany: An Erosion of Federal-Länder Linkages?’ in Dan Hough and Charlie Jeffery (eds.), Devolution and Electoral Politics (Manchester: MUP, 2006).

3. Dan Hough and Charlie Jeffery, ‘Landtagswahlen: Bundestestwahlen oder Regionalwahlen?’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 34/1 (2003), pp.93–94.

4. Everhard Holtmann, ‘Funktionen regionaler Parteien und Parteiensysteme – Überlegungen für ein analytisches Konzept’ in Arthur Benz and Everhard Holtmann (eds.), Gestaltung regionaler Politik (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1998), p.65.

5. Although the PDS recently (17 July 2005) changed its name to the ‘Linkspartei’, the Party of the Left, we will continue to refer to the PDS throughout this piece. This is not just for reasons of clarity and consistency (although it does certainly facilitate this), but also as during the period when the research for this article was conducted, the party was still called the PDS.

6. For more on the PDS's development out of the SED, see Peter Barker, ‘From the SED to the PDS: Continuity or Renewal?’ in Peter Barker (ed.): German Monitor – The Party of Democratic Socialism. Modern Post-Communism or Nostalgic Populism? (Amsterdam: Rodopi BV, 42, 1998), pp.1–17.

7. See Jürgen P. Lang, Ist die PDS eine demokratische Partei? Eine extremismustheoretische Untersuchung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003); Viola Neu, Das Janusgesicht der PDS. Wähler und Partei zwischen Demokratie und Extremismus (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004).

8. Gudrun Heinrich, Kleine Koalitionspartner in Landesregierungen. Zwischen Konkurrenz und Kooperation (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2002), p.231.

9. See Jürgen P. Lang, ‘15 Jahre PDS – eine zwiespältige Bilanz’ Deutschland Archiv, 37/6 (2004), p.967.

10. See Kaare Strøm, ‘A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties’, American Journal of Political Science, 34/2, (1990), pp.566–68; Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller, ‘Political Parties and Hard Choices’, in Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm (eds.), Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions, (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), pp.5–9; Stephen B. Wolinetz, ‘Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies’, in Richard Gunther et. al. (eds.), Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges, (Oxford: OUP, 2002), pp.150–53.

11. A potential fourth aim – that of simply holding the party together as a coherent unit – is also sometimes mentioned alongside these three. See Gunnar Sjöblom, Party Strategies in a Multiparty System (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1968). See also Strøm and Müller, Political Parties and Hard Choices, p.31.

12. Wolinetz, Beyond the Catch-All Party, p.155.

13. Streitkultur remains inherently difficult to translate, but is probably best understood as ‘culture of debate’.

14. Wolinetz, Beyond the Catch-All Party, p.155.

15. Dan Hough, The Fall and Rise of the PDS in Eastern Germany (Birmingham: BUP, 2002), p.22.

16. See Hough, The Fall and Rise of the PDS, p.17. See also Michael Gerth, Die PDS und die ostdeutsche Gesellschaft im Transformationsprozess. Wahlerfolge und politisch-kulturelle Kontinuitäten (Hamburg: Dr. Kovac, 2003), p.139.

17. See Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, ‘An Integrated Theory on Party Goals and Party Change’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 6/3 (1994), pp.259–84. The nature of the aims that the party is pursuing will affect the nature of external shocks that they are most likely to be susceptible to: vote-maximisers are likely to see heavy electoral defeats as existential crises while the loss of a potential coalition partner will similarly threaten an office seeking-party. Policy-seekers suffer most when a key plank of their policy package somehow becomes redundant – something that would have strongly afflicted the PDS had the socio-economic living conditions in eastern and western Germany come into line through the 1990s.

18. See Frank L. Wilson, ‘The Sources of Party Change: The Social Democratic Parties of Britain, France, Germany, and Spain’, in Kay Lawson (ed.), How Political Parties Work: Perspectives form Within (Westport und London: Praeger, 1994), p.264; Robert Harmel and Alexander C. Tan, ‘Party Actors and Party Change: Does Factional Dominance Matter?’, European Journal of Political Research, 42/3 (2003), pp.409–24.

19. Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power (Cambridge: CUP, 1988), pp.247–50.

20. See Peter Lösche and Franz Walter, Die SPD. Klassenpartei – Volkspartei – Quotenpartei (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992).

21. See Michael Brie, ‘Das politische Projekt PDS – eine unmögliche Möglichkeit’, in Michael Brie, Martin Herzig and Thomas Koch (eds.), Die PDS – empirische Befunde und kontroverse Analysen (Cologne: Papyrossa, 1995), p.28.

22. Angela Marquardt left the PDS in 2003, claiming – amongst other things – that the compromises that the PDS made to enter government in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Berlin were not acceptable. See http://www.angela-marquardt.de/pds/austritt.php (17 Nov. 2005).

23. Gerth, Die PDS und die ostdeutsche Gesellschaft, p.188.

24. ‘Berliner PDS will Machtwechsel’, Berliner Zeitung, 2 Dec. 1996.

25. The most well-known document arguing for such a strategy came to be known as the ‘Letter from Saxony’ which was penned by Saxon politicians Christine Ostrowski and Ronald Weckesser in May 1996.

26. Stefan Richter, ‘…da halten sich Chancen und Risiken in der Waage’, interview with Stefan Liebich in Disput, 2 (2002). These comments illustrate that Liebich – who likes to be seen as the prototypical pragmatist – none the less possesses a clear vision of where the PDS should be heading and he should therefore be placed in the modern socialist camp (Andreas Spannbauer, ‘Eher dafür als dagegen’, Die Tageszeitung (taz), 1 Dec. 2001, p.36; Oliver Hoischen, ‘Hart am Leben orientierter Linker’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 Jan. 2002, Berliner Seiten, p.3). The Minister for Health, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, Heidi Knake-Werner, has also made similar observations. See Ulrich Kalinowski, ‘Vom Berg besteigen und den Mühen der Ebene’, Disput 2 (2002). See also the strategy paper published by Berlin MP Elke Breitenbach, who attempts not only to increase the PDS's profile in the West, but also to spawn a debate about the future of the whole welfare system – another consistent line in the modern socialists' ideological armoury. See Elke Breitenbach and Katina Schubert, ‘Opposition und Regierung – Partei und Bewegung – Widersprüche?’, Utopie kreativ, 165/166 (2004), p.722.

27. Robin Alexander, ‘Dabei sein ist alles’, taz, 29 June 2002, p.31. Of course, such comments seem less prescient now that the PDS is on the verge of amalgamating with the predominantly western German Electoral Alliance for Social Justice and Work (WASG).

28. Tobias Miller, ‘Wir wollen Magdeburger Verhältnisse’, Berliner Zeitung, 24 Nov. 1997.

29. Interestingly, the Berlin SPD believed that the Greens were too dependent on their rather awkward rank and file. This is something that the SPD does not need to fret about with the PDS. See Andreas Rabenstein, ‘Kinnhaken von der Berliner Basis’, Welt am Sonntag, 20 June 2004, p.76.

30. ‘Berliner PDS will einen rot-grünen Senat tolerieren’, Berliner Morgenpost (BM), 28 Feb. 1999.

31. Karsten Hintzmann, ‘Rot-rote Gedankenspiele der PDS’, BM, 23 Jan. 2001, p.26.

32. Manfred Gerth, Die PDS und die ostdeutsche Gesellschaft, p.125.

33. Rolf Reißig, Mitregieren in Berlin. Die PDS auf dem Prüfstand (Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Texte 22, 2005), p.10.

34. In reality, the PDS's savings plans actually went much further than did those of the Greens, the SPD or the CDU. Uwe Rada, ‘PDS spart am besten’, taz 25 June 2001, p.19.

35. Daniel Hough and Jonathan Olsen, ‘The PDS and Participation in Eastern German Land Governments’, gfl-journal, 3 (2004), pp.132–34.

36. Rolf Reißig, Mitregieren in Berlin, p.13.

37. ‘Der lachende Vierte ist die PDS’, Berliner Zeitung, 5 Dec. 2001.

38. For an initial attempt at assessing the policy outputs of the Berlin coalition, see Rolf Reißig, 2004, pp.17–49.

39. Barbara Junge, ‘Und der Zukunft wieder zugewandt’, Tagesspiegel, 27 Feb. 2003, p.11. This was not a one-off comment by a peripheral KPF member – a year previously, in 2002, the Berlin KPF also accused the party leadership of losing their sense of reality. ‘Um den Preis der Koalition nicht länger herumreden’, Junge Welt, 19 Oct. 2002, p.5.

40. Tobias Miller, ‘Die PDS badet in Harmonie’, Berliner Zeitung, 17 May 2004, p.19. Matthias Schlegel, ‘Hauptsache, wir regieren’, Tagesspiegel, 17 May 2004, p.8.

41. Wolfgang Rex, ‘Mehr einfallen lassen als SPD oder Grüne’, Neues Deutschland (ND), 15 Nov. 2004, p.15. Stefan Mentschel, ‘PDS-Glaubwürdigkeit bedroht’, ND, 16. Oct. 2003, p.18.

42. The PDS Basis in Berlin only appears to kick up a genuine fuss when issues of analysing the past arise. The most obvious example of this was the considerable disagreement about the wording of a section in the preamble to the 2001 coalition agreement where the GDR was defined as an ‘Unrechtsstaat’. See Dan Hough and Jonathan Olsen, ‘The PDS and Participation in Eastern German Land Governments’, p.136. Evidence that the PDS leadership in Berlin feels it has generated a considerable degree of independence can be seen in biting comments by some leading PDS politicians. Stefan Liebich, for example, provocatively remarked that it would be nice if the rank and file spent the same amount of time and energy analysing contemporary problems and challenges as it did analysing the past. See Stefan Richter, ‘… da halten sich Chancen und Risiken in der Waage’, 2002.

43. Anna Lehmann, ‘PDS-Spitze hat Konto überzogen’, taz, 5 April 2004, p.22.

44. Ulrich Zawatka-Gerlach, ‘Der Watschenmann wird noch gebraucht’, Tagesspiegel, 10 May 2004, p.10.

45. Stefan Liebich, ‘Drei Zahlen – milliardenschwer’, Disput 10 (2003).

46. See for example Sabine Beikler, ‘Die heimliche Opposition’, Tagesspiegel 16 June 2003, p.14; Christine Richter, ‘PDS: Das Studium darf nichts kosten’, Berliner Zeitung 8 Dec. 2003, p.20.

47. Rolf Reißig, Mitregieren in Berlin, pp.47–50.

48. Sabine Beikler, ‘Profil schärfen, Streit vermeiden’, Tagesspiegel, 28 Sept. 2004, p.10; Wolfgang Rex, ‘Mehr einfallen lassen als SPD oder Grüne’.

49. The parliamentary party is also quite prepared to follow Wolf along this course. The lone voice of scepticism was one of the PDS's two MPs in the Bundestag, Gesine Lötzsch. See Sabine Beikler, ‘Die heimliche Opposition’.

50. Arne Boecker, ‘Koalitionskrise in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 May 2005, p.6.

51. Karsten Hintzmann, ‘Rot-rote Gedankenspiele der PDS’.

52. Helmut Holter, ‘Mehrheiten gewinnen durch eine Politik für Mehrheiten. Rede auf dem Landesparteitag der PDS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern am 25.11.2000 in Greifswald’, Pressedienst, 48 (2000).

53. Georg Fehst, ‘Helmut Holter will Lösungen für die Leute im Land’, Disput 4 (2003).

54. Dieter Wenz, ‘Wir fühlten uns an DDR-Zeiten erinnert’, FAZ, 18 Aug. 1998.

55. Dieter Wenz, ‘Schwerin, die höchste Hochburg’, FAZ, 13 Dec. 1997.

56. Dan Hough and Jonathan Olsen, ‘The PDS and Participation in Eastern German Land Governments’, p.129.

57. Many of Helmut Holter's comments are positively un-PDS-like in nature. As early as 1996 Holter shocked many of his PDS colleagues with his explicit support of bio- and gene technology research. His claim that Germany should review its decision to gradually close down its nuclear power industry also caused a number of raised eyebrows. Holter also used language that very few of his PDS colleagues would invoke. He observed, for example, that the PDS should transform itself from a party looking to redistribute wealth to one that gives extra added value. See Thoralf Cleven, ‘PDS-Chef kam mit blauem Auge davon’, Ostsee Zeitung (OZ), 17 Feb. 1997 and Georg Fehst, ‘Helmut Holter will Lösungen für die Leute im Land’.

58. The SPD did present a series of demands to the PDS. The SPD stated that the PDS would have to fulfil all of them if the two parties were to enter into coalition together – and this as early as 1994. The SPD produced a similar catalogue of criteria during the governmental crisis of 1996. On both occasions this came to nothing, largely as the SPD central office black-balled all attempts to bring the PDS into the coalition equation. ‘SPD stellt der PDS Bedingungen’, Frankfurter Rundschau (FR), 27 Sept. 1997. See also Ingo Preusker, ‘Der dritte Mann’, Wochenpost, 25 April 1996.

59. Ingo Preusker, ‘Der dritte Mann’ and Gudrun Heinrich, Kleine Koalitionspartner in Landesregierungen, p.219.

60. Thoralf Cleven, ‘PDS möchte Konservative in Schwerin ablösen’, OZ, 12 Aug. 1996.

61. Thoralf Cleven, ‘PDS-Chef kam mit blauem Auge davon’.

62. Thoralf Cleven, ‘Im PDS-Kummerkasten steckt die SPD’, OZ, 20 June 1997.

63. Catherina Muth was forced to resign after having been caught shoplifting in Jan. 1999.

64. Andreas Frost, ‘Schweriner PDS lässt die Muskeln spielen’, Tagesspiegel, 11 March 1999.

65. Johannes Leithäuser, ‘Mit Besonnenheit, Konsequenz und Dialektik’, FAZ, 16 May 2001, p.3; Frank Kässner, ‘Das Schweriner Experiment mit der PDS gilt als Modellversuch für ganz Ostdeutschland’, BM, 16 Juni 2001, p.2.

66. Frank Pergande, ‘Schweriner Koalition streitet über EU-Verfassung’, FAZ, 27 May 2005, p.2.

67. Andreas Baum, ‘Der Fehlstart des Bettvorlegers’, FR, 12 Oct. 1998.

68. Brigitte Fehrle, ‘Vorwärts, und vergessen’, Berliner Zeitung, 2 Nov. 1998.

69. Klaus Walter and Jan Freitag, ‘Von Aufruhr keine Spur’, OZ, 4 Nov. 2002, p.3. Holter's position within the party was not assisted when the MVP Court of Auditors accused him of running his department in a “sloppy fashion”. Dieter Wenz, ‘Rot-rotes Auslaufmodell’, FAZ, 2 May 2003, p.10.

70. AG Bilanz, ‘Zur bisherigen Regierungsbeteiligung der PDS Mecklenburg Vorpommern’, Pressedienst 51 (2000).

71. Wolfgang Rex, ‘Im Kern eine positive Bilanz’, ND, 27 Oct. 2000, p.5.

72. See Klaus Walter and Jan Freitag, ‘Von Aufruhr keine Spur’.

73. Stefan Bockhahn, ‘Licht und Schatten und der Rat, Schwerpunkte zu setzen. Die APO-Gruppe in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’, Disput, 10 (2004).

74. Christine Richter, ‘Die Hauptstadt-PDS will auch mal die Faust ballen’, Berliner Zeitung, 19 Dec. 2003, p.20.

75. For further analysis of electoral behaviour in second order elections, see Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt, ‘Nine Second-Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results’ European Journal of Political Research 8, 1980, pp.3–44. For an updated analysis on second order elections in Europe, see Dan Hough, Charlie Jeffery and Michael Keating (eds.), ‘Multi-Level Electoral Competition: Regional Elections and Party Systems in Decentralised States’, Special Issue of Journal of European Urban and Regional Studies, 10 (3), July 2003.

76. Klaus Walter, ‘PDS-Landesspitze wehrt sich gegen Kritik der Basis’, OZ, 15 Sept. 2003, p.4.

77. This is even more surprising when one considers that the parliamentary party only consists of 13 members and nine of those supported the proposals in the mock vote that was held in the run-up to the parliamentary debate. Frank Pergande, ‘Massenverelendung’, FAZ, 28 June 2004, p.3; Arne Boecker, ‘Zeit der Pragmatiker’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 September 2004, p.5.

78. One possible explanation for this may lie in the membership profile in MVP. Many PDS members are former SED functionaries – particularly in the former county towns (Bezirkshauptstädte) of Rostock, Neubrandenburg and Schwerin – and it is these ‘normal’ members who are likely to be restorative ideologues or who possess, at the very least, traditionalist tendencies that lead them to be inherently sceptical of financial consolidation strategies. See Gudrun Heinrich, Kleine Koalitionspartner in Landesregierungen, p.222.

79. Michael Gerth, Die PDS und die ostdeutsche Gesellschaft, p.85.

80. Michael Mara, ‘Die PDS sucht ihr Oppositionsprofil’, Tagesspiegel, 21 March 2000.

81. Lothar Bisky and Kornelia Wehlan, ‘Brandenburger Weg ist endgültig zu Ende’, Pressedienst, 45 (1999).

82. ‘Die PDS in Koalitionslaune’, FAZ, 24 Feb. 1997.

83. Michael Mara, ‘Die PDS denkt sich ins Mitregieren hinein’, Tagesspiegel, 14 Jan. 1997.

84. Anita Tack's election to party leader caused considerable disquiet in some circles. Amongst other things, members of the central office in Brandenburg were accused of excessive alcohol consumption on the evening of her election and, somewhat amazingly, causing considerable trouble in the establishment where they had been drinking. When – following these bizarre events – a fax appeared in the Parteizentrale that had a falsified Tack signature on it, this prompted the usually relaxed and easy-going Bisky to talk of ‘left-wing bandits’ within the Brandenburg PDS. See Gudrun Mallwitz, ‘Politbüro Tack’, BM, 5 Dec. 1999.

85. Michael Mara, ‘Mit Schönbohm wird es für uns leichter’, Tagesspiegel, 16. Oct. 1998.

86. ‘PDS Brandenburg hat eine neue Vorsitzende’, FAZ, 22 Feb. 1999.

87. Michael Mara, ‘Die PDS sucht ihr Oppositionsprofil’.

88. See ‘Wir brauchen Optionen’, Interview with Ralf Christoffers, Der Spiegel, 13 Aug. 2001, p.58. ‘Muss es mit der CDU sein? Offener Brief von Ralf Christoffers’, Pressedienst 34 (2001).

89. See Gudrun Mallwitz, ‘PDS will aufs Regieren vorbereitet sein’, BM, 9 March 2002, p.27. Matthias Platzeck's rise to the top of the Brandenburg SPD to replace long-time leader Manfred Stolpe is also likely to have had a considerable impact on the course that the PDS chose to take. Stolpe always rejected cooperation with the PDS, largely as he feared accusations about his own links to the Stasi would be aired again, while Platzeck was seen as being much more open to such ideas. ‘Die PDS und die Koalitionsfrage’, Tagesspiegel, 10 August 1999; Stefan Berg, ‘Mann aus dem Kreml’, Der Spiegel, 23 Aug. 2004, p.30. Even Ralf Christoffers had previously rejected notions of cooperating with an SPD-led government by Manfred Stolpe. Ralf Christoffers, ‘Brandenburg: Politikfähigkeit der Großen Koalition in Frage zu stellen’, Pressedienst, 17 (2002).

90. Martin Klesmann, ‘Erfolg für PDS-Reformer: Christoffers als Landeschef wiedergewählt’, Berliner Zeitung, 10 Feb. 2003, p.26.

91. See Andrea Beyerlein, ‘Kampf um Bisky-Nachfolge beginnt’, Berliner Zeitung, 9 July 2003, p.24.

92. Christoffers frequently advocated a pragmatic course that had more akin with the working procedures of the PDS in MVP. According to Christoffers, for instance, 100 Million Euro could perhaps be moved into the education budget and 25,000 new jobs created by offering loan guarantees to companies. ‘Partner für große Koalition nicht erkennbar’, ND, 21 June 2004, p.18.

93. Gerinde Schneider, ‘Märkische PDS will “22 plus XXL”’, ND, 22 March 2004, p.16.

94. Christoph Seils, ‘Gebremste Kandidatin’, FR, 13 Sept. 2004, p.3.

95. Thomas Nord, ‘Brandenburg: Für weiteren Sozialabbau steht die PDS nicht zur Verfügung’, Pressedienst 41 (2004).

96. Oskar Niedermayer, ‘Die brandenburgische Landtagswahl vom 19. Sept. 2004. Reaktionen der Wähler auf Hartz IV’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 36/1 (2005), p.76.

97. Kerstin Kaiser only managed to win support from 69 per cent of the delegates when she was elected parliamentary party leader in Oct. 2005. See ‘Kerstin Kaiser neue Fraktionschefin der PDS im Landtag’, Tagesspiegel, 19 Oct. 2005.

98. Andrea Beyerlein, ‘PDS vor dem sechsten Führungswechsel’, Berliner Zeitung, 17 Dec. 2004, p.22; ‘IM-Debatte auf dem Parteitag’, Berliner Zeitung, 21 Feb. 2005, p.21.

99. ‘Bisky: PDS will zurzeit nicht regieren’, Berliner Zeitung, 4 Jan. 2003, p.22.

100. Nick Reimer, ‘Abschied von der Opposition’, taz, 9 Dec. 1999.

101. ‘Bundesvorstand rüffelt Sachsen-PDS’, Sächsische Zeitung, 9 Sept. 1999.

102. Christoph Seils, ‘In Sachsen toben Flügelkämpfe und legen den Landesverband lahm’, Berliner Zeitung, 24 Sept. 1997.

103. Sven Siebert, ‘PDS will Fünf-Prozent-Hürde für Bonn in Sachsen nehmen’, Leipziger Volkszeitung (LVZ), 24 November 1997.

104. This is one of the key reasons that Ernst was able to take over the leadership in the first place. Although Ernst is not seen as a particularly effective leader, this very weakness is seen as being an asset as it ensured that the balance Porsch created – and continues to maintain – between the Dresden and Leipzig groups of PDS MdL's remains intact. Sven Heitkamp, ‘Conny Ernst entzweit die Gemüter in Sachsen’, LVZ, 26 July 2001, p.4.

105. Michael Gerth, Die PDS und die ostdeutsche Gesellschaft, p.78.

106. Christoph Seils, ‘Interne Kritik an sächsischer PDS-Fraktion’, Berliner Zeitung, 21 Sept. 1999.

107. ‘Bundesvorstand rüffelt Sachsen-PDS’.

108. Bernd Honnigfort, ‘Die Entdeckung des Himmels’, FR, 7 June 2000.

109. Sven Heitkamp, ‘Conny Ernst entzweit die Gemüter in Sachsen’.

110. Michael Bartsch, ‘Regierungspläne vertagt’, ND, 2 July 2001, p.5.

111. Cornelia Ernst, ‘Wichtig ist, dass die PDS es aushält, weiter Regierung wie Opposition zu sein. Offener Brief des Landesvorstandes Sachsen an die PDS Berlin’, Pressedienst 3 (2002).

112. Cornelia Ernst and Peter Porsch, ‘Keine Alternative zur Überwindung der Stagnation der PDS von innen heraus’, Pressedienst 39 (2002).

113. ‘Neuer Streit um alte Linie im PDS-Programm’, LVZ, 12 March 2004, p.4.

114. Gunnar Saft, ‘Betonliste und Eigentor’, Sächsische Zeitung, 10 May 2004, p.7.

115. ‘PDS- Politiker fechten eigene Wahlliste an’, LVZ, 7 Oct. 2004, p.4.

116. Mechthild Küpper, ‘Hartz IV als Glaubwürdigkeitstest’, FAZ, 5 Aug. 2004, p.4.

117. Cornelia Ernst, ‘Die nächsten Aufgaben der PDS in Sachsen. Rede auf dem PDS-Landesparteitag am 28 November 2004 in Chemnitz’, Pressedienst 50 (2004). Interestingly, this observation comes from a speech that Ernst gave at a party conference rather than in an interview, indicating that it was directed more at the PDS's own supporters than at its electorate.

118. Even after his departure from office in 2001, Porsch never tired of stressing that the Saxon PDS was open to cooperation with the Social Democrats. Andreas Novak, ‘Auf Kuschelkurs zum rot-roten Sieg’, Sächsische Zeitung 16 July 2003, p.6; Gunnar Saft, ‘Rote Schattenkrieger: PDS benennt Wahlkampfspitze’, Sächsische Zeitung, 26 Jan. 2004, p.8; Hendrik Lasch, ‘Zwischen Profil und Partnersuche’, ND, 29 Nov. 2004, p.4.

119. Pragmatic in the sense that Porsch consistently behaved in a way that he believed was in the best interests for Saxony. Larger strategic aims and/or long-term theoretical goals that involved the bigger PDS and would have placed him in the modern socialist category were largely absent.

120. For more information on the PDS in western Germany, see Jonathan Olsen, ‘The PDS in Western Germany: An Empirical Study of Local PDS Politicians’, German Politics, 11 (1), April 2002: 147–72

121. This characterisation is not to be understood as anything approaching an exact science. The Berlin PDS is by no means a prototype office-seeking party – evidence of a lack of strong patronage links within the Berlin administration is indicative of this.