Obstructive all the way? British policy towards German unification 1989–90

Abstract

British policy towards German unification has been judged to be at best reluctant, at worst obstructive. This article seeks to revise that perception, using documents from the Federal Chancellor's Office and the author's interviews with British and German diplomats and politicians. It distinguishes between the rhetoric of the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The latter played a leading role in the Two Plus Four talks that resolved the external issues involved in German unification, and made a particular contribution to devising the formula for the termination of Four Power Rights over a unified Germany.

Notes

1. Wiedervereinigung (Unification), and Vereinigung, Einigung, (Unification, Unity) in German were both used to express the unification of Germany in 1990. But to be more exact, reunification implied that a unified Germany would return to the borders in 1937, which was practically impossible. See, Karl Kaiser, ‘Unity, not Reunification, for Germany’, New York Times, 6 Oct. 1989, A.31. I will use the two words interchangeably.

2. The General Treaty on Germany between the Three Powers and West Germany in 1954 stated that the US, France, and Britain would ‘retain the rights and responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement’ (Article 7.2). See, ‘Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany’, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954, Vol.7 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), pp.112–18.

3. See, inter alia, Lothar Kettenacker, ‘Britain and German Unification, 1989/90’, in Klaus Larres and others, (eds.), Uneasy Allies (Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp.99–123; Louis Richardson, ‘British State Strategies after the Cold War’, Robert Keohane and others (eds.), After the Cold War (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp.127–54; Frank Elbe and Richard Kiessler, A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), especially p.241; Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffrey and William E. Paterson, ‘Deutschlands europäische Diplomatie: die Entstehung des regionalen Milieus’, in Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), Deutsche Europapolitik: Optionen wirksamer Interessenvertretung (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1998), p.61. Simon Bulmer and others argue, ‘In bezug auf die deutsche Einheit bezog Thatcher, die zum damaligen Zeitpunkt eine dominierende Position in ihrer Regierung innehatte, eine erheblich ablehnende Position als das britische Aussenministerium, und sie setzte sich damit auch durch’ [author's itals]. (With regard to the German unification Thatcher, who at that time took a dominant position in her government, took a more rejectionist position than the FCO and she had her own way – author's translation.) Kettenacker also shares this analysis. Both Kettenacker and Bulmer agree that the FCO's position was not so different from that of Margaret Thatcher.

4. Julian Bullard, ‘Great Britain and German Unification’, in Jeremy Noakes, Peter Wende and Jonathan Wright (eds.), Britain and Germany in Europe 1949–1990 (Oxford: OUP, 2002); Yvonne Klein, ‘Obstructive or Promoting? British Views on German Unification 1989/90, German Politics 5/3 (Dec. 1996), pp.405–31. In a similar vein, she stresses the policy differences between Margaret Thatcher and the FCO, during the course of 1990.

5. Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann (eds.), Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit. Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90 (Munich: Oldenburg, 1998). Being a rare exception of the 30-year rule, the 430 documents disclosed give clear pictures of the German government's conception and implementation of the unification and integration policies during the crucial years. They document the telephone talks that Chancellor Kohl made, letters exchanged between Kohl and other leaders, such as US President George Bush, Mitterrand and the internal discussions in the Federal Republic to tackle the situation in East Germany. The documents are, however, not complete in that other archives such as those at the Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministries are still closed.

6. Among the primary materials used for this article are memoirs by major players from the Federal Republic and the Four Occupation Powers. Helmut Kohl, Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit, Kai Diekmann and Ralf Georg Reuth (eds.) (Munich: Ullstein Taschenbuch, 2000); Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen, 2nd edition (Berlin: Siedler, 1995); Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991); Margaret Thatcher, Downing Street Years, hereafter referred to as ‘DSY’ (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993); Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London: Little Brown, 2003); Mikhail Gorbachev, Wie Es War: Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung (Munich: Econ Taschenbuch, 2000); George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998); James A. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam's, 1995).

7. Neither Bullard nor Klein refer to the ‘British Problem’ at the last round of the Two Plus Four talks; only Bullard clarifies the timing around which the FCO took a pragmatic approach as end of January. Neither of them used the documents de-classified from the Federal Chancellor's Office.

8. Helmut Kohl, Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp.111–16.

9. Ibid., p.122.

10. Küsters, H.J. and others (eds.), Deutsche Einheit, doc. No.81, pp.505–7. Thatcher, DSY, p.793.

11. Küsters, H.J. and others, ibid., doc. No.82, pp.507–9.

12. Ibid., doc. No.85, pp.511–12.

13. ‘Mitterrand warning on border changes’, The Independent, 7 Dec. 1989; ‘Mitterrand warns of rapid change’, Guardian, 22 Dec. 1989, p.7; ‘Wir können Deutschland schliesslich nicht den Krieg erklären, um seine Wiedervereinigung zu verhindern’, FAZ, 12 Oct., 1995, p.3.

14. ‘Hurd flies over the Berlin Wall’, The Independent, 17 Nov. 1989, p.7. For his own accounts, Douglas Hurd, Memoirs, p.381. The following quotations are from the same source.

15. Küsters, ibid., doc. No.94B, pp.546–8.

16. ‘EC heads pledge help for Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 20 Nov. 1989, p.1.

17. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p.794; Helmut Kohl, Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp.149–50.

18. Thatcher, ibid., p.793.

19. Kohl delivered the speech on 28 November 1989. He gave prior notification only to the US, while the British and French ambassadors to Bonn were given accounts during his address. The Programme did not give a timetable to unity, but stressed German unity within the European context, conceiving of a process from confederation to federation. It also linked economic assistance to East Germany with the regime's political reforms. For background on the speech, see, Kohl, Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp.141–53; Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp.42–58. For the text of the Programme, see, ‘Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Überwindung der Teilung Deutschlands und Europa’, 28 Nov. 1989, Europa-Archiv, 24/1989, D 728–34.

20. Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp.675–6.

21. Author's interview with Baron von Richthofen (German Ambassador to London, 1988–93), 10 Feb. 2004; Thatcher, DSY, p.795.

22. ‘Clear view of the world from Bonn’, The Independent, 29 Nov. 1989, p.5.

23. ‘Outline of Remarks at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters in Brussels’, 4 Dec. 1989, Public Papers of the Presidents, George Bush, 1989, Book II (Washington, DC: United Government Printing Office, 1989), pp.1644–47.

24. Thatcher, DSY, pp.795–6.

25. The Communique states that ‘a necessary majority existed for convening such a conference under the Article 236 of the Treaty’, Bull. EC 12-1989, point 1.1.11.

26. Bull. EC 12-1989, point 1.1.20.

27. ‘Thatcher sees East European Progress as more urgent than German Unity’, Wall Street Journal (Europe), 26 Jan. 1990, A12. The following quotations are from the article.

28. Thatcher, DSY, pp.790–1.

29. In the above-cited document, No.148, Teltschik urged Kohl not to engage in open discussions with Thatcher on Deutschlandpolitik.

30. At a crucial meeting on 26 January 1990, The Soviet leadership concluded that they should deal with the German unity and give priority to the Federal Republic. See, M. Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Doubleday, 1996), p.528. P. Zelikow and C. Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MASS; London: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp.162–63. Gorbachev, Wie es war, pp.95–6. Thatcher also had private talks with Mitterrand on 20 January 1990. They were entirely focused on Germany. Even though the President remained very much irritated about the breakneck speed of events in Germany, nothing came out of the following meetings between the defence and foreign ministers of the two countries. See, Thatcher, DSY, pp.797–98.

31. P. Zelikow and C. Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p.97.

32. Julian Bullard also point the FCO's pragmatic approach to the end of January 1990, whereas Yvonne Klein does not specify the timing. See, Julian Bullard, ‘Great Britain and German Unification’, p.225; Yvonne Klein, ‘Obstructive or Promoting?’, p.409.

33. Author's interview with Christopher Mallaby (British Ambassador to Bonn, 1988–93), 24 May 2001.

34. Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp.120–1.

35. Author's interview with Douglas Hurd (British Foreign Secretary, 1989–95), 13 March 2001.

36. Ibid.

37. Percy Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on foreign policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London: J. Murray, 1997), pp.110–1.

38. Julian Bullard also describes the Chequers meeting as a point from which ‘the organs of British government marched to a different drum, a drum beaten by Mr. Douglas Hurd’. See, ‘Great Britain and German Unification’, p.225.

39. Mrs Thatcher convened a seminar on Germany at the end of March 1990 in Chequers in which a group of leading academic experts on Germany attended. Its minutes were leaked both to the Independent on Sunday and der Spiegel in mid-July. Even though the conclusions of the seminar were ‘we should be nice to Germans’, the fact that traits such as bossiness, an inferiority complex and insensitivity to others' feelings were defined as German national characteristics created a lot of public controversy. See, ‘What the Prime Minister learnt about the Germans’, The Independent on Sunday, 15 July, 1990, p.1; ‘Wer sind die Deutschen?’, Der Spiegel, 16 July 1990, pp.109–12. One academic participant contradicted such national character. See, Timothy Garton Ash, ‘The Chequers Affair’, New York Review of Books, 27 Sept. 1990, pp.20–3.

40. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported about this for the first time and it was repeated in Elbe and Genscher's books, ‘Mitten in der Nacht lässt Genscher Baker wecken’, FAZ, 13 Sept. 1990, p.2.

41. ‘Hurd endorses US formula on Unity’, Guardian, 14 Feb. 1990.

42. During his visit to Rome at the end of November 1989, Gorbachev made ‘Helsinki-2 proposal’ to deal with the developments in Eastern Europe. The Foreign Ministers of the EC in their informal gathering on 20 January the following year accepted the formula. See, ‘EC supports Gorbachev's call for early summit’, Financial Times, 22 Jan. 1990, p.11.

43. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp.166–70.

44. When the Four Allied Powers met on 12 December 1989 at the Soviet request in Berlin, it created a furore in West Germany. See, Elbe and Kiessler, A Round Table with Sharp Corners, pp.72–75.

45. D. Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: the US and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1998), p.393; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p.173.

46. Elbe and Kiessler, A Round Table with Sharp Corners, p.232.

47. Author's interviews with Lord Hurd, Sir Christopher Mallaby and Dame Pauline, Neville-Jones.

48. ‘Poles want place in German talks’, The Independent, 15 Feb. 1990, p.10; ‘Nervous Poles demand a seat at the table for unity talks’, The Times, 15 Feb. 1990, p.7.

49. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p.343.

50. ‘Alle gegen Deutschland-nein!’, Der Spiegel, 26 March, 1990, pp.1–5.

51. Author's interview with the then German Ambassador Baron von Richthofen.

52. Lothar Kettenacker, ‘Britain and German Unification, 1989/90’, p.102; Sir Julian Bullard, ‘Great Britain and German Unification’, pp.225–26.

53. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp.248 and 251, Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp.780–82.

54. Author's interview with Dame Pauline, Neville-Jones, 6 March 2001 and Sir Christopher Mallaby.

55. Elbe and Kiessler, A Round Table with Sharp Corners, p.202.

56. See, inter alia, Bush's remarks at the Nato summit in December 1989, note 21; ‘A New architecture for a new era’, Financial Times, 13 Dec. 1989, p.2.

57. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p.321.

58. ‘London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, July 6, 1990’, Public Papers of the Presidents, George Bush II, 1990, pp.964–67.

59. For the importance of the London Summit to Soviet leadership, see, Zelikow and Rice, ibid., p.293. Shevardnadze, E., The Future Belongs to Freedom (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991), p.141. For the rise of the Soviet military and conservative forces during 1990, see, D. Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, pp.404–10.

60. For the talks between Gorbachev and Kohl, see, Küsters, H. and others (eds.), Deutsche Einheit, doc. No.350, pp.1340–48/doc. No.353, pp.1355–67. Kohl, H., Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp.390–92. Gorbachev, M., Gipfelgespäche: Geheime Protokolle aus meiner Amtszeit (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991), pp.162–77.

61. Thatcher, DSY, pp.811–12. She wanted to keep intact NATO's nuclear doctrine of flexible response.

62. Elbe and Kiessler, A Round Table with Sharp Corners, p.241.

63. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p.359.

64. Genscher, Erinnerungen, p.870.

65. Elbe and Kiessler, A Round Table with Sharp Corners, p.198.

66. Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp.873–4.

67. L. Kettenacker, ‘Britain and German Unificaiton, 1989/90’, p.123.

68. Author's interview with Lord Hurd, 13 March 2001. See his own explanations, Hurd, Memoirs, p.389.

69. Louise Richardson, ‘British State Strategies after the Cold War’, p.151. In a similar vein, Kettenacker links ‘British problem’ to the delaying tactics, asserting that ‘Britain had given the impression of trying to hold on to her waning influence by means of procrastination’. Kettenacker, ibid., p.123.

70. Zelikow and Rice also argued that the Germans found it easy to blame the British, as they knew that the US agreed to the British requests – Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p.361.

71. Author's interview with Sir Christopher Mallaby.