Elements of Surprise: The 2005 Election and the Formation of the Grand Coalition

Abstract

The 2005 federal election departed from familiar patterns of German electoral and coalition politics. For the past six decades, federal coalition formation has been guided and shaped by increasingly well-entrenched informal rules. While remaining generally operative in 2005, there were significant deviations and departures from these customary rules. The outcome was the most prolonged, turbulent, and uncertain process of coalition formation in the Federal Republic's history, even once the logic of the Grand Coalition had become evident. The Grand Coalition that finally emerged bears a decided Social Democratic imprimatur, reflecting both post-election realities and the ability of the SPD to play a relatively weak hand to maximum advantage. Yet by revealing a new readiness to face Germany's structural problems and to arrive at pragmatic, if not necessarily dramatic, solutions, the 2005 Grand Coalition demonstrated once again the strength of Germany's consensus politics. At the same time, the electoral trends revealed in 2005 suggest not only new coalition options but also more difficult coalition negotiations in the future. But, as the Länder have demonstrated, less predictability in coalition formation need not lead to less political stability.

Notes

1. Karl-Rudolf Korte, ‘Was entschied die Bundestagswahl 2005’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 51–52 (2005), p.14.

2. William H. Riker, The Theory of Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962) and William S. Gamson, ‘A Theory of Coalition Formation’, American Sociological Review 26 (1961), pp.373–82.

3. Ian Budge and Michael Laver, ‘Coalition Theory Government Policy and Party Policy’ and ‘The Relationship between Party and Coalition Policy’, both in Michael Laver and Ian Budge (eds), Party Policy and Government Coalition (New York: St. Martins', 1992).

4. Torbjörn Bergmann, Constitutional Rules and Party Goals in Coalition Formation (Sweden: Umeä, 1995); Kaare Strøm, Ian Budge, and Michael Laver, ‘Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review 38 (1994), pp.565–98; Jean Blondel and Maurizio Cotta (eds), Party and Government (New York: St. Martins', 1996).

5. For the importance of informal coalition rules in Germany see especially Uwe Jun, Koalitionsbildung in den deutschen Bundesländern (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1994); Thomas Saalfeld, ‘Deutschland, Auswanderung der Politik aus der Verfassung? Regierungskoalitionen und Koalitionsmanagement in der Bundesrepublik, 1949–1997’ in Wolfgang Müller and Kaare Strøm, Koalitionsregierung in Westeuropa:Bildung,Arbeitsweise, und Beendigung (Wien, 1997), pp.47–92; Josef Anton Völk, Regierungskoalitionen auf Bundesebene (Regensburg: Röderer, 1989), and Sabine Kropp and Roland Sturm, Koalitionen und Koalitionsvereinbarungen (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1998).

6. Kropp and Sturm, Koalitionen und Koalitionsvereinbarungen, pp.39–41.

7. See e.g. Helmut Schulze Fielitz, Der informale Verfassungsstaat: Aktuelle Beobachtungen des Verfassungslebens der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Lichte der Verfassungstheorie (Berlin: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1984), p.105; also Christian Hanke, ‘Informale Regeln als Substrat des parlamentarischen Verhandlungssystem. Zur Begründung einer zentralen Kategorie in der Parlamentsforschung.’ Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 3 (1994), pp.410–40.

8. For a detailed analysis of informal coalition rules before, during, and after elections, as well as those governing coalition governments see Michaela W. Richter, ‘Continuity or Politikwechsel? The First Federal Red – Green Coalition’, German Politics and Society 20/1 (Spring 2002), pp.1–48.

9. Richter, ‘Continuity or Politikwechsel’, pp.11–14; Völk, Regierungskoalitionen, pp.81–2.

10. Völk, Regierungskoalitionen, pp.143–7

11. For these changes see especially Waldemar Schreckenberger, ‘Veränderungen im parlamentarischen Regierungssystem’, in Karl Dietrich Bracher et al. (eds), Staat und Parteien: Festschrift für Rudolf Morsey zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin, 1992), pp.134–57; and, by the same author, ‘Informelle Entscheidungsvorbereitungen zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Mehrheitsfraktionen: Koalitionsgespräche und Koalitionsrunden’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 3 (1994), pp.329–46.

12. Brandt in 1969 made it by only two votes; Schmidt in 1976 by only one vote, and Kohl in 1997 by only four votes. Wolfgang Rudzio, Das Politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 7th edn (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2006), p.216.

13. For these tactical consideration see especially Richard Hilmer and Rita Müller-Hilmer, ‘Die Bundestagswahl vom 18.September 2005: Votum für Wechsel in Kontinuität’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 1 (2006), p.189.

14. Two constitutional reform commissions (in 1976 and 1996) had recommended amending the constitution to allow the Bundestag to dissolve itself, but both times these recommendations were defeated for fear of returning to the instability of the Weimar Republic. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 July 2005.

15. For the issues involved in 1972 and 1982 see Gert-Joachim Glaessner, Demokratie in Deutschland (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1999), pp.285–6; 295–9.

16. Dieter Grimm, ‘Der Präsident darf nicht mitspielen’, Frankfurther Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 June 2005.

17. Ludger Helms, ‘Political Self-Reinvention: The 2005 Federal Election in Context’, German Studies Review 29/2 (2006), p.320.

18. Karlheinz Niclauss, ‘Auflösung oder Selbstauflösung? Anmerkungen zur Verfassungsdiskussion nach der Vertrauensfrage des Bundeskanlers’, Zeitschrift fur Parlamentsfragen,1 (2006), p.41.

19. Die Zeit, 9 June 2005.

20. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 June 2005.

21. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 June 2005.

22. Matthias Jung and Andrea Wolf, ‘Der Wählerwille Erzwingt die Grosse Koalition’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 51–52 (2005), p.6.

23. Die Zeit, 40, 2005.

24. These included the FDP's tax cut promises, its public opposition to the proposed VAT increases, and its rejection of their hardline internal security policies in favour of stronger protection for civil liberties. Der Spiegel, 24, 2005; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 June 2005.

25. Richard Hilmer and Rita Müller-Hilmer, ‘Die Bundestagswahl vom 18.September 2005: Votum für Wechsel in Kontinuität’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 1 (2006), pp.201–2.

26. Ibid., p.203.

27. There was also a net increase for all other small parties (notably the NPD), from 3 per cent in 2002 to 4 per cent in 2005. Jung and Wolf, ‘Der Wählerwille’, p.12.

28. Karl-Rudolf Korte, ‘Was Entschied die Bundestagswahl 2005?’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 51/52 (2005), p.2.

29. ‘For analyses of the impact of the 2005 elections on Germany's party system see especially Korte, ‘Bundestagswahl 2005’, pp.13–14; Jung and Wolf, ‘Wählerwille’, pp.12ff; Hilmer and Müller-Hilmer, ‘Bundestagswahl 2005’, pp.203 ff.

30. Hilmer and Müller-Hilmer, ‘Bundestagswahl 2005’, pp.199–200.

31. Ibid., p.213.

32. For more on the post-election coalition options, see Hilmer and Müller-Hilmer, ‘Bundestagswahl 2005’, pp.213–18.

33. To buttress Schröder's position, some SPD parliamentarians threatened to challenge the CDU/CSU's right (as the strongest parliamentary party) to nominate the president of the Bundestag and to introduce legislation calling for the formal separation of the two parties. The Greens, however, refused to support both proposals, [email protected], 30 September 2005.

34. ‘Erste inhaltliche Vereinbarungen vom 10.10.2005’. Appendix 1, Gemeinsam für Deutschland. Mit Mut und Menschlichkeit. Koalitionsvertrag von CDU, CSU, und SPD, 11 November 2005, http://koalitionsvertrag.spd.de/servlet?PB/menu/-1/index.html.

35. For details of the original 1998 code of conduct see Richter, ‘Continuity or Politikwechsel’, p.29; also Koalitionsvertrag von CDU, CSU, und SPD, pp.141–2.

36. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 October 2005; Die Welt, 11 October 2005; Die Zeit, 41, 2005.

37. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 October 2005.

38. For details see Die Welt, 17–19, 2005; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 October 2005.

39. Der Spiegel, 46, 2005; Die Welt, 1 November 2005.

40. See note 33.

41. Quoted in [email protected], 30 November 2005.

42. Der Spiegel 46, 2005.

43. ‘Deutsche Koalition der Staatsgläubigen’, Neue Züricher Zeitung, 14 November 2005.

44. ‘Die Koalition der Zumutung’, Die Zeit, 47, 2005.

45. Ibid.

46. The Financial Times, 14 November 2005; also ‘Deutsche Koalition der Staatsgläubigen’, Neue Züricher Zeitung, 14 November 2005.