Introduction

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Notes

1. The notion of ‘constitutional inter-election period’ (CIEP) is widely used in the comparative study of cabinet stability to describe the maximum possible life-span of a cabinet between elections. See, for example, G. King, J.E. Alt, N.E. Burns, M.J. Laver, ‘A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science 34 (1990), pp.846–71.

2. For the United Kingdom see, for example, A. Smith, Election Timing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); comparative studies include K. Strøm and S.M. Swindle, ‘Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution’, American Political Science Review 96 (2002), pp.575–91.

3. On the notion of ‘agenda-setting power’ in legislative research see, amongst others, H. Döring, ‘Worauf gründet sich die Agenda-Setzer-Macht der Regierung? Theoretische und vergleichende Perspektiven auf den deutschen Fall’, in S. Ganghof and P. Manow (eds.): Mechanismen der Politik: Strategische Interaktion im deutschen Regierungssystem (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005), pp.109–48.

4. From a comparative perspective see, for example, D. Diermeier and T.J. Feddersen, ‘Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure’, American Political Science Review 92 (1998), pp.611–21 and J.D. Huber, ‘The Vote of Confidence Procedure in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review 90 (1996), pp.269–82. A case study on France can be found in J.D. Huber, Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.112–37.

5. The dissolution of the Bundestag in 2005 was only the third time in the Federal Republic's history that an election was held significantly earlier than the end of the ‘constitutional inter-election period’ of four years.

6. See P. Pulzer, ‘Germany Votes for Deadlock: The Federal Election of 2005’; West European Politics 29 (2006), pp.560–3.

7. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 2001).

8. For a brief analysis of the political process see T. Saalfeld, ‘Conflict and Consensus in Germany's Bicameral System: A Case Study of the Passage of the “Agenda 2010”’, Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 14 (2006), pp.247–69.

9. WASG candidates joined PDS lists in the election of September 2005. A special conference of the PDS was convened in July 2005, when the PDS delegates agreed to the WASG proposal to rename the party as ‘The Left Party’ (Die Linkspartei). PDS and WASG decided to merge after the election in 2006 or 2007. Gregor Gysi, the leader of the PDS and Oskar Lafontaine, the former SPD leader, were confirmed as the alliance's dual leadership. The PDS state organisations were allowed to retain their name (PDS).

10. Literature on the dissolution and its constitutional problematique includes E. Jesse, ‘Nach der gescheiterten Vertrauensfrage: Zur Lage der Parteien und des Parteiensystems in Deutschland,’ Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 36 (2005), pp.600–615; K. Niclauß, ‘Auflösung oder Selbstauflösung? Anmerkungen zur Verfassungsdiskussion nach der Vertrauensfrage des Bundeskanzlers 2005’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 37 (2006), pp.40–46; H. Pehle, ‘Verfassungspraxis im Zwielicht? Die Problematik “unechter Vertrauensfragen” und “vorgezogener” Bundestagswahlen,’ in E. Jesse and R. Sturm (eds.), Bilanz der Bundestagswahl 2005: Voraussetzungen, Ergebnisse, Folgen (München: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, 2006), pp.177–88; W. Reutter, ‘Yet Another Coup d'Etat in Germany? Schröder's Vote of Confidence and Parliamentary Government in Germany,’ German Politics 15 (2006), pp.302–17. A concise factual account of the dissolution, election and cabinet formation is provided by U. Thaysen, ‘Regierungsbildung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Daten zum Start der Regierung Merkel 2005/2006’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 37 (2006), 470–80.

11. See, for example, the survey data published by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Bundestagswahl: Eine Analyse der Wahl vom 18 September 2005 (Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V., 2005), pp.16–17 and 41.

12. See E. Jesse, ‘Parteiensystem im Wandel? Das deutsche Parteiensystem vor und nach der Bundestagswahl 2005’, in E. Jesse and R. Sturm (eds.), Bilanz der Bundestagswahl 2005: Voraussetzungen, Ergebnisse, Folgen (München: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, 2006), p.24.

13. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Bundestagswahl, pp.45–51 and 39.

14. For a recent description of the German electoral system see T. Saalfeld, ‘Germany: Stability and Strategy in a Mixed-Member Proportional System’, in M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell (eds.): The Politics of Electoral Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.209–28.

15. Jesse, ‘Parteiensystem,’ p.28.

16. For data for the entire period 1949–2005 see T. Saalfeld, Parteien und Wahlen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), p.193.

17. In German political discourse, different colours are attached to the different parties: The Christian Democrats' colour is black and the FDP's colour is yellow. The combination of green, yellow and black resembles the flag of Jamaica.

18. See Thaysen, ‘Regierungsbildung’.

19. For a brief portrait of Angela Merkel see Mark R. Thompson and Ludmilla Lennartz, ‘The Making of Chancellor Merkel’, German Politics 15 (2006), pp.99–110.

20. In the Federal Republic, federal-state ministries are sometimes considerably larger than national ministries as far as staffing and budgets are concerned.

21. For a recent survey see Saalfeld, ‘Germany: Stability and Strategy’.

22. See, for example, H.-D. Klingemann and B. Wessels, ‘The Political Consequences of Germany's Mixed-Member System: Personalization at the Grass Roots?’ in M.S. Shugart and M.P. Wattenberg (eds.), Mixed-Member Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.279–96; T. Stratmann and M. Baur, ‘Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ Across Electoral Systems’, American Journal of Political Science 46 (2002), pp.506–14; on the effect of the electoral system on voting behaviour see K. Bawn, ‘Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity: Ticket Splitting, Rational Voters and Representation in the Federal Republic of Germany’, British Journal of Political Science 29 (1999), pp.487–505.

23. The importance of the cohesion of collective actors is also emphasised by Saalfeld, ‘Conflict and Consensus’.

24. B. Crick, ‘Obituary: Kurt Sontheimer,’ The Guardian, 3 June 2005 (internet edition, http://www.politics.guardian.co.uk/germany/article/0,2763,1498096,00.html, accessed 5 October 2006).

25. Crick, ‘Obituary’. Far from glorifying Sontheimer, however, the obituary also brings out some of the complexities of Sontheimer's character.