The Causes and Consequences of Germany's New Citizenship Law

Abstract

Until recently, Germany was viewed as having an outdated and restrictive citizenship policy that was impervious to demographic realities and liberalising trends. Yet despite many predictions of continuity, Germany's policies have undergone considerable changes over the past decade. Indeed, the German Nationality Act of 2000 represented a liberalisation of Germany's notorious 1913 law, yet the new law did not go nearly as far as the Schröder government had hoped and planned – largely due to a massive anti-immigrant petition campaign. This article traces the historical context in which German citizenship policy has developed and evolved, and it speculates about the longer-term effects of the 2000 law in terms of creating a new definition and perception of what it means to be German. The detailed focus on the German case also helps to illustrate more general arguments about the politics of citizenship. In particular, it shows how an elite-driven process can lead to liberalising change, but also how the mobilisation of xenophobia can lead to a sudden and restrictive backlash.

Notes

1. A search of the EBSCO online database of academic journals for the terms ‘citizenship OR nationality’ and ‘law’ and the country name showed that Germany has been the subject of more than twice as many publications as the next closest country, France, and more than four times as many as the next closest EU country.

2. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p.185.

3. Marc Morjé Howard, ‘Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-National Research’, Perspectives on Politics 4/3 (2006), pp.443–55.

4. Simon Green, ‘Beyond Ethnoculturalism? German Citizenship in the New Millennium’, German Politics, 9/3 (2000), p.108. Also see Andreas Fahrmeier, ‘Nineteenth-Century German Citizenships: A Reconsideration’, Historical Journal 40/3 (1997), pp.721–52.

5. Kay Hailbronner, ‘Germany’, in Rainer Bauböck, Eva Ersb⊘ll, Kees Groenendijk and Harald Waldrauch (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), p.217.

6. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, p.115. There were, of course, exceptions to this principle, and certainly Germans living elsewhere could lose their German citizenship. The main point, however, is that it was made extremely difficult for a non-German to acquire German citizenship.

7. This is not to suggest that the 1913 citizenship law caused the Nazi citizenship policy. Rather, as Brubaker points out, the Nazi policy represented a ‘radical novelty’ that differed from the Wilhelmine tradition that had defined the 1913 law. Indeed, the Reichbürgergesetz within the Nuremberg laws of 1935 imposed extremist ethno-racial criteria that had not existed in the 1913 law – and which were promptly eliminated in the post-war period. Yet the point remains that it was easier for the Nazis to adapt the traditional German policy of exclusive jus sanguinis than it would have been to modify the French or American use of jus soli. See Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, especially pp.165–8. Also see Dieter Gosewinkel, ‘Citizenship and Naturalization Politics in Germany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in Daniel Levy and Yfaat Weiss (eds.), Challenging Ethnic Citizenship: German and Israeli Perspectives on Immigration (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), p.60.

8. Quoted by Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, p.167.

9. See, for example, Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, pp.82–4.

10. See, for example, Simon Green, The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in Contemporary Germany (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp.30–31.

11. This assortment of strategies seems to have worked. The number of Aussiedler admitted in 1990 was 397,000, but after the new quota was implemented, the numbers dropped gradually and consistently, from 222,000 in 1994 to 105,000 in 1999, and slightly under 100,000 in subsequent years. The admission of Aussiedler is set to stop altogether in 2010. See Philip L. Martin, ‘Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration’, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, German Issues Series 21 (1998), pp.24–5; Migration News 7/7 (July 2000).

12. See, for example, Simon Green, ‘Citizenship Policy in Germany’, in Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil (eds.), Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration, and Nationality Law in the EU (New York: Palgrave, 2001), especially, pp.44–6.

13. See Martin, ‘Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration’, p.3.

14. Note that when I refer to ‘Germany’ or ‘German society’, I mean specifically the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which was really ‘West Germany’ until unification in 1990, and has been ‘unified Germany’ since then. This discussion does not delve into immigration or citizenship policies in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or ‘East Germany’.

15. Interview with Gerold Lehnguth, Ministry of Interior, Berlin, October 2004.

16. Merih Anil, ‘No More Foreigners? The Remaking of German Naturalization and Citizenship Law, 1990–2000’, Dialectical Anthropology 29/3–4 (2005), p.460.

17. Ruud Koopmans, ‘Germany and Its Immigrants: An Ambivalent Relationship’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25/4 (1999), p.628.

18. Philip Martin, ‘There is Nothing more Permanent than Temporary Foreign Workers’ (Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2001), p.3.

19. See, for example, Green, The Politics of Exclusion, pp.84–8.

20. Randall Hansen and Jobst Koehler, ‘Issue Definition, Political Discourse and the Politics of Nationality Reform in France and Germany’, European Journal of Political Research 44/5 (2005), pp.636–37.

21. Hermann Kurthen and Michael Minkenberg, ‘Germany in Transition: Immigration, Racism and the Extreme Right’, Nations and Nationalism 1/2 (1995), pp.175–96.

22. Hansen and Koehler, ‘Issue Definition, Political Discourse and the Politics of Nationality Reform in France and Germany’, p.637.

23. More specifically, one element of the compromise (Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz) defined immigration as a consequence of the second world war, thereby restricting the upper limit of ‘ethnic German’ immigration to the previous year's total (220,000), and reducing the annual amount each year thereafter. See Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2001), especially, p.318.

24. Christian Joppke, ‘Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration’, World Politics 50/2 (1998), pp.266–93.

25. Hailbronner, ‘Germany’, p.220.

26. See Kurthen and Minkenberg, ‘Germany in Transition’.

27. See David Art, Debating the Lessons of History: The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

28. For a convincing discussion of why Germany liberalised its citizenship policy whereas Austria did not – despite the fact that both countries had similar traditions and policies until recently – see Alice Ludvig, ‘Why Should Austria be Different from Germany? The Two Recent Nationality Reforms in Contrast’, German Politics 13/3 (2004), pp.499–515.

29. Simon Green, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism: The Politics of Dual Nationality in Germany’, International Migration Review 39/4 (2005), p.927. According to research by Andreas Wüst, 73 per cent of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union vote for the CDU/CSU, whereas only 23 per cent support the SPD, and 1 per cent the Greens. See Andreas Wüst, ‘Naturalised Citizens as Voters: Behaviour and Impact’, German Politics 13/2 (2004), p.351.

30. Note that this expectation has also proven to be accurate, as Wüst shows that 84 per cent of naturalised Turkish-Germans vote for the SPD and Greens, with only 11 per cent supporting the CDU/CSU. Wüst, ‘Naturalised Citizens as Voters’, p.351. In the 2005 elections, the SPD and Greens received 86 per cent of the votes of Turkish-Germans. See Philipp Lichterbeck, ‘Deutschtürken: 86 Prozent für Rot–Grün’, Tagesspiegel, 16 October 2005.

31. Laura Murray, ‘Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland? Explaining the Evolving Positions of German Political Parties on Citizenship Policy. German Politics and Society, 33 (1994), pp.23–56.

32. Hansen and Koehler, ‘Issue Definition, Political Discourse and the Politics of Nationality Reform in France and Germany’, p.637.

33. See Christian Joppke, ‘Citizenship between De- and Re-Ethnicization’, European Journal of Sociology 44/3 (2003), pp.429–58.

34. Murray, ‘Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland?’, pp.32–9.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid, p.43.

37. Interview with Max Stadler, Member of Bundestag (FDP), Berlin, October 2004.

38. Murray, ‘Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland?’, p.31.

39. See the detailed discussion in Green, The Politics of Exclusion, pp.65–72.

40. Murray, ‘Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland?’, p.39.

41. Ibid, p.40

42. Ibid, p.30.

43. For people between the ages of 16 and 23, the new requirements included: ‘renunciation of previous citizenship; normal residence in the Federal Republic for at least eight years; completion of six years’ full time education, at least four of which at the secondary level; and an absence of criminal convictions'. For those older than 23, ‘those ordinarily resident in Germany for 15 years had an entitlement to naturalise if they renounced their previous citizenship, had not been convicted of a criminal offence and were able to support themselves without claiming unemployment benefit or income support’. Hansen and Koehler, ‘Issue Definition, Political Discourse and the Politics of Nationality Reform in France and Germany’, p.636. Also see Hailbronner, ‘Germany’, pp.223–5.

44. Murray, ‘Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland?’, p.32.

45. Jost Halfmann, ‘Immigration and Citizenship in Germany: Contemporary Dilemmas’, Political Studies 45/2 (1997), pp.260–74; Randall Hansen, ‘A European Citizenship or a Europe of Citizens? Third Country Nationals in the EU’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24/4 (1998), pp.751–68.

46. Hailbronner, ‘Germany’, p.221. Also see Rainer Münz and Ralf Ulrich, ‘Germany and Its Immigrants: A Socio-Demographic Analysis’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24/1 (1998), p.49.

47. See, for example, Richard von Weizsäcker, ‘Wer ist der Fremde?’, Die Zeit 11 (1995).

48. Interviews with Peter Altmaier and Norbert Röttgen, Members of Bundestag (CDU), Berlin, October 2004.

49. At one point they proposed a special citizenship status (Kinderstaatszugehörigkeit) for the children of immigrants who were themselves born in Germany and fulfilled certain residency conditions. But this proposal was shelved in 1994 when it was deemed unlikely that such a ‘quasi-nationality’ would be accepted by international law. See Hailbronner, ‘Germany’, pp.221–2. Also see Green, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism’, p.938, and Green, The Politics of Exclusion, pp.92–5.

50. Ibid. Also see Green, ‘Beyond Ethnoculturalism?’, p.112.

51. Hailbronner, ‘Germany’, p.223.

52. Anil, ‘No More Foreigners?’, p.462.

53. From the official translation, made available by the German Information Center, at http://www.germany.info/relaunch/politics/speeches/111098.htmml.

54. See Marc Morjé Howard, ‘Variation in Dual Citizenship Policies in the Countries of the EU’, International Migration Review 39/3 (2005), pp.697–720.

55. Interviews with Cornelie Sonntag-Wolgast and Eckhardt Barthel, Members of Bundestag (SPD), Berlin, October 2004. Also see Green, The Politics of Exclusion, pp.95–7.

56. Hansen and Koehler, ‘Issue Definition, Political Discourse and the Politics of Nationality Reform in France and Germany’, p.638.

57. Migration News 5/11 (November 1998).

58. Green, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism’, p.944.

59. Murray, ‘Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland?’, p.28.

60. Migration News 5/11 (November 1998).

61. Migration News 6/2 (February 1999).

62. Robert Birnbaum, ‘Schäuble: Doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft Ist Gift Für Die Integration’, Der Tagesspiegel, 4 January 1999.

63. This point was reinforced in an interview with Bernhard Mitko, a representative from the office of Michael Glos, Member of Bundestag (CSU), Berlin, October 2004.

64. Hansen and Koehler, ‘Issue Definition, Political Discourse and the Politics of Nationality Reform in France and Germany’, p.638.

65. Ibid, p.641.

66. See Green, The Politics of Exclusion, pp.97–103.

67. Migration News 6/2 (February 1999).

68. Also see Green, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism’, pp.939–41.

69. As the outgoing state governor Hans Eichel (SPD) put it, ‘the double citizenship law issue became so emotional that it mobilised the opposition’. Migration News 6/3 (March 1999).

70. Note that this refers to naturalisations based on a person's legal right (Anspruchseinbürgerungen), which is distinct from naturalisation by the discretion of German authorities (Ermessenseinbürgerungen).

71. Until the 2000 law, discretionary naturalisation had included a 10-year residency requirement.

72. Hailbronner, ‘Germany’, p.224.

73. Ibid, p.225. Note that in practice, this has led to widely different levels of difficulty on the language tests, with, for example, much more challenging tests in Bavaria than in Berlin. See Green, ‘Beyond Ethnoculturalism?’, pp.114–115.

74. Hailbronner, ‘Germany’, p.224.

75. In addition, the law provided for a one-time option for children under the age of 10 whose parents fulfilled the new conditions to acquire German citizenship automatically between 1 January and 31 December of 2000. To the surprise of many, only about 45,000 children took advantage of this opportunity, about 13 per cent of those who were eligible. See Hailbronner, ‘Germany’, p.224. The figures come from the Statistisches Bundesamt, the German national statistical office, and were reprinted in Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, ‘Integration’ (Nürnberg, 2005), p.89.

76. Green writes that ‘Although around two thirds of non-nationals fulfil the residential requirement, far fewer meet the residence status provision, which has meant that the new ius soli has applied only to about 40 percent of live births to non-national parents between 2000 and 2002’. Green, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism’, p.926. Also see Green, ‘Beyond Ethnoculturalism?’, p.114.

77. In practice the age limit is actually 23, since there is a five-year period in which to make one's declaration after turning 18.

78. Recall that they were resoundingly overruled by the CSU and the majority of the CDU.

79. Green, ‘Beyond Ethnoculturalism?’, p.116.

80. Indeed, Germany's dual citizenship scores on the Citizenship Policy Index shown in Chapter 1 reflect some liberalising change from the 1980s to today.

81. Green, ‘Beyond Ethnoculturalism?’, p.120.

82. Hailbronner, ‘Germany’, p.225. According to the new law, ‘exceptions apply as in the past where the nationality cannot be given up, or where it is only possible to do so with particular difficulty’. Specific provisions exist for older people, refugees, and people from countries (such as Iran and Afghanistan) that essentially do not allow someone to give up that citizenship, or that charge exorbitant fees in order to do so. The full citizenship law, including both the original 1913 law and subsequent amendments, is available from the Comparative Law Society's ‘German Law Archive’, at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StAG.htm.

83. ‘Daten Und Fakten Zur Ausländersituation’ (Berlin: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, 2002).

84. Interview with Tarik Tabbara, Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, October 2004.

85. Green, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism’, p.930.

86. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, ‘Plural Nationality: Facing the Future in a Migratory World’, in T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer (eds.), Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), p.76.

87. According to Green, ‘Between 1975 and 1997, almost 780,000 German children were born to bi-national (married) parents’. Green, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism’, p.925.

88. Ibid, pp.926–7.

89. Green, ‘Beyond Ethnoculturalism?’, p.119.

90. Green, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism’, p.927.

91. Ibid., p.945.

92. See, for example, Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration (New York: Guilford Press, 3rd edition 2003), p.246.

93. According to Philip Martin, the law in Turkey was modified in June 1996, and ‘Turks who lose their Turkish nationality by becoming a citizen of another country [now] retain their rights to property and inheritance in Turkey’. Martin, ‘Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration’, p.34. Few Turkish-Germans may realise this, however, following a propaganda campaign by some Turkish newspapers in Germany in December 1999, warning people not to give up their Turkish citizenship lest they lose these rights. Migration News 7/1 (January 2000).

94. This point was reinforced by an interview with Kenan Kolat, director of the Turkish Community of Germany (the largest immigrant organisation in Germany), Berlin, October 2004.

95. Horst Siebert, ‘Germany: An Immigration Country’ (Kiel: Kiel Institute for World Economics, 2003), pp.12–13.

96. Green, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism’, p.948.

97. Ibid, p.931.

98. Ibid, p.933.

99. Ibid, p.921.

100. See Marc Howard, ‘An East German Ethnicity? Understanding the New Division of Unified Germany’, German Politics and Society 13/4 (1995), pp.49–70.