Path Dependence as an Explanation of the Institutional Stability of the German Parliament

Abstract

The theory of path dependence identifies sources of institutional stability and change. It emphasises the importance of early, contingent events and increasing returns over time to explain patterns of institutional persistence. Used to describe the evolution of the procedural practices of the German Bundestag, this theory points to the long-term importance of the consensus that developed early in the 1950s among the floor leaders of three dominant parties, which is in stark contrast to the absence of such inter-party consensus in the early years of the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic. Path dependence identifies factors endogenous to the institution to explain how the institution responds to external shocks, such as the entry of new parties. When the Greens and the PDS entered the Bundestag, the established parties responded by accepting their vigorous exercise of minority rights and they accepted the established practice of managing these rights by inter-party consensus.

Notes

The authors would like to thank Michael Feldkamp at the German Bundestag for his invaluable assistance in gathering and interpreting data for this research.

Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, American Political Science Review 94 (2000), p.264.

Kathleen Thelen, ‘How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative-Historical Analysis’, in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative-Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.211.

James Mahoney, ‘Path Dependence in Historical Sociology’, Theory and Society 29 (2000), pp.510–11.

Thelen, ‘How Institutions Evolve’, p.222.

Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp.17–19.

Thomas Mergel, Parlamentarische Kultur in der Weimarer Republik: Politische Kommunikation, symbolische Politik und Öffentlichkeit im Reichstag (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 2002), pp.47–52, 164–5).

Ibid., pp.187–9.

Parlamentarischer Rat, Stenographischer Bericht, 11te Sitzung (Bonn: Bonner Universitäts-Buchdruckerei, 1949), p.269.

Gerhard Loewenberg, ‘The Remaking of the German Party System: Political and Socio-Economic Factors’, Polity 1 (1968), pp.86–113.

Kathleen Bawn, ‘The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome’, American Journal of Political Science 37 (1993), p.987.

The definition of 'effective parties‘ and the formula for calculating the number is from R. Taagepera and M.S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), pp.78–9.

Although there were still five Fraktionen in the Bundestag after the election of 1953 – CDU/CSU. SPD, FDP, DP, and GB/BHE – the last two with 15 and 27 members respectively do not count as ‘effective parties’ in Taagepera and Shugart's sense (ibid.).

Mergel, Parlamentarische Kultur in der Weimarer Republik, p.203.

Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer, Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag 1949–1997 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), p.76.

Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz, ‘Parlamentsbrauch, Gewohnheitsrecht, Observanz’, in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh (eds.), Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989), pp.376–93.

Hans-Achim Roll, ‘Auslegung und Fortbildung der Geschäftsordung’, in Hans-Achim Roll (ed.), Plenarsitzungen des Deutschen Bundestages (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1982), pp.101–5.

Uwe Thaysen, Parlamentsreform in Theorie und Praxis (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1972), p.205.

Hans-Achim Roll and Annemarie Rüttger, ‘Zur Neufassung der Geschäftsordung des Deutschen Bundestages’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 11 (1980), p.493.

Margaret Levi, ‘A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis’, in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.409.

E. Gene Frankland and Richard Harmel, ‘The Greens and the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Implications of Organizational “Normalization”, 1980–2005’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois (2005), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p85881_index (accessed 15 June 2009).

Levi, ‘A Model, a Method, and a Map’, p.410 (emphasis added).

Roland Roth and Detlef Murphy, ‘From Competing Factions to the Rise of the Realos’, in Margit Mayer and John Ely (eds.), The German Greens: Paradox Between Movement and Party (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1998), p.58.

Unlike other party groups, the Greens elected three leaders of their Fraktion rather than one and subjected them to annual re-election and a two-year term limit. Likewise, they divided the tactical floor leadership among three floor leaders with annual terms and two-year term limits. A federal executive committee composed of party members not belonging to the Bundestag supervised the work of the party group. The elected Bundestag members were obliged to resign their seats halfway through their four-year term on behalf of their runners-up on the proportional representation ballot.

Data used in this section and in the figures come from Peter Schindler Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages, 1949 bis 1999 (Berlin: Nomos, 2000); and Michael Feldkamp, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages, 1994 bis 2003 (CD-ROM) (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 2003). The authors would also like to acknowledge the extraordinary assistance Michael Feldkamp provided (via personal communication) in interpreting some of the more recent data presented here.

Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages, in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 2. Juli 1980 (BGBl.I S.1237), zuletzt geändert laut Bekanntmachung vom 12. Februar 1998 (BGBl.I S. 428). This is the most recent version of the Rules of Procedure. One readily accessible source is the website of the Bundestag, http://www.bundestag.de (accessed 15 June 2009).

E. Gene Frankland and Donald Schoonmaker, Between Protest and Power: The Green Party in Germany (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp.158–64.

As quoted in Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German Political System (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), p.213.

Frankland and Schoonmaker, Between Protest and Power, p.160.

Schüttemeyer, Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag 1949–1997, pp.42–60.

Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages, 1949 bis 1999 (Berlin: Nomos, 2000), pp.1006–9; see also Schüttemeyer, Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag 1949–1997 and Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer, Parliamentary Parties in the German Bundestag (Washington, DC: American Institution for Contemporary German Studies, 2001).

Sarah Binder, Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.205.

Douglas Dion, Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997).

Binder, Minority Rights, Majority Rule, pp.51–66.